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Regionalism and Ethnic Nationalism in France:
A Case Study of Corsica


by

John P. LOUGHLIN

Thesis approved and awarded the Degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the
European University Institute, Florence, Italy on 11 June 1987

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
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


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
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
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It might seem odd that an Irishman, studying in a European University situated in Italy, should study a small French island in the Mediterranean. The reason is that this study of Corsica began when I was completing a BA degree in French Studies and Politics at the University of Ulster. The year 1980-81 was to be spent in a French-speaking country with a view to perfecting the French language and preparing a final year project. I chose Corsica, not simply because of its position in the Mediterranean, but because I was vaguely aware that Corsican nationalist movements using armed struggle existed there. As, at the time, I was living in Belfast where an armed conflict was raging, I was interested in looking at other situations of violent conflict. Although my first period in Corsica was spent principally as an English Assistant in the lycée technique at Bastia and not doing full-time research, I was able to make many contacts among the local autonomists and nationalists as well as with people of other political tendencies. The fact that I was Irish, and not French, assisted my access to the nationalist groups and for several months I attended meetings of the Bastia section of the Consulta dei Cumitati Naziunalisti (CCN) which was my first period of participant observation. This was especially important as this was the period approaching the Presidential elections of May 1981. These elections provoked a serious debate within the Corsican regionalist movements, a debate

which I could observe at first hand. In 1982, I enrolled as a doctoral candidate at the European University Institute, Florence, with Corsican regionalism as my research topic. This entailed a second long period on the island in 1983-4 when I returned to carry out my field research.

There are several difficulties which confront a researcher studying Corsican regionalism. First, there is the problem of gaining access to primary sources. Reports on the movements by groups such as the police judiciaire are covered by the thirty year rule. Furthermore, the archives of the militants were often destroyed because the large number of arrests and searches of domiciles by the police meant there was a risk of discovery. This might lead to imprisonment for possession of seditious literature or, at the very least, would give the police information concerning the movements. As a result there remain three principal methods for collecting the data: (i) archival research; (ii) participant observation; (iii) interviews with key informants. All three methods have been used in this thesis, although stress was laid on (i) and (ii).

The author spent several weeks in 1982 in three archival resources in Paris: the Bibliothèque Nationale, the Versailles Annexe of the B.N. and the library of the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, rue St-Guillaume, Paris. This period was used principally to prepare Chapters One and Two. The archival

research for the Corsican case-study was carried out in Paris and on Corsica itself. The Archives Départementales in both Ajaccio (Corse-du-Sud) and Bastia (Haute-Corse), the Salle de Documentation of the Préfecture in Ajaccio and of the Assemblée Régionale, also in Ajaccio; the Bibliothèque Municipale of Ajaccio, as well as some private collections were used. The principal types of source examined were several newspaper collections (Ajaccio and Versailles) and dossiers de presse (Rue St-Guillaume; private collections); Government reports (B.N. and Ajaccio). A full list of these sources may be found in the Bibliography.

The most important period of participant observation was, as mentioned above, in 1981-82 when the author was privileged to be accepted into a group of Corsican nationalists in Bastia: the CCN. This allowed him to observe the functioning of a Corsican nationalist group from the inside: to become aware of the different tendencies and tensions, the type of membership, and the degree of popular support. From October 1983 until June 1984, the author spent a further period of residence on the island. Although he kept in touch with members of the movements, he did not attempt to join the movement but instead observed at close hand but from the outside. In this way, a more detached observation could take place. During these two periods, the author conducted informal interviews with academics, journalists and militants.

Much of this research has been already published. My undergraduate dissertation which looked at the problem from the standpoint of the theory of internal colonialism was published (with Paul Hainsworth) as "Le Problème corse", in the American review Contemporary French Civilization (for details, see Bibliography). However, as my doctoral research progressed and I tried to place Corsica within a wider comparative context, I abandoned this model. This change may be found in my chapter "Regionalist and ethnic nationalist movements in contemporary France" which appeared in Yves Mény and Vincent Wright, Centre-periphery Relations in Western Europe in 1985. Material from this chapter may be found in a reworked form in Chapters One and Two of the thesis. Some material of a historical nature appeared in an Italian law review Rivista italiana di giurisprudenza co-authored with Yves Mény. The section of the thesis dealing with the Statut Particulier was first published as a European University Institute Working Paper. Some of the first section of this working paper has been incorporated in Chapter Six of the thesis.

Finally, I would like to thank all those who assisted me in the writing of this thesis. My supervisor, Dr Vincent Wright of Nuffield College, Oxford, and my first reader, Professor Yves Mény of the University of Paris, guided me through the complicated world of French regional politics and provided me with an excellent background of the wider problem

of the regions in Europe. Both commented on my written work at various stages in a most constructive and helpful manner. Susan Baker, formerly of the European University Institute and now at the University of Ulster, was a most stimulating critic of different parts of the manuscript. Dr Paul Hainsworth, of the University of Ulster, encouraged and supervised my original undergraduate project on Corsica, and gave useful advice on the final version of the doctoral manuscript. Many other academics helped me along the way in friendly discussions and I can do no more than list some of them: Ian Budge, Michel Crozier, Luigi Graziano, Francis Pomponi, Dorothy Carrington, Pierre Dottelonde, Henri Mendras, Bruno de Witte, Charles Tilly, L.J. Sharpe, Daniel Seiler, Philippe Schmitter, and many others. I would also like to thank the many Corsican militants and politicians who kindly gave their time and patience to an inquisitive Irishman despite their own pressing preoccupations.

INTRODUCTION

Corsica, in the 1950's, was regarded by most Frenchmen as simply a quaint society whose strange customs had somehow survived into the modern age. Corsicans were seen as strange, violent creatures with a horror of physical labour and a proclivity for non-manual occupations such as the Civil Service, the Customs, and the Police. Such views were shaped to a large extent by nineteenth century Romantic authors such as Mérimée and by the fact that many Corsicans did indeed occupy such positions. There existed a mythe corse which often influenced not only public perceptions but also government thinking.

One element of this mythe was that few Frenchmen, including those in Government, thought that Corsicans, by themselves, were capable of taking control of their own development. Indeed, this too seemed to have a great deal of truth in it at least with regard to the Corsicans who remained behind on the island. The island society seemed to be characterized by a fatalistic torpor. When the Governments of the Fourth Republic did adopt a programme of economic development for the island its administration was largely in the hands of non-Corsicans. Despite this, most Corsicans approved of the Government's measures with enthusiasm.

In the 1960's, however, a problème corse marked by a great deal of agitation and violence had emerged and, by the 1970's, the problem was high on the governmental agenda. It was also firmly implanted in the public consciousness. A good indication of this growing awareness may be found among the press files (1945 -) at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris. In the file on minorités nationales, the section on Corsica thickens as the years progress. By the 1980's, it is by far the thickest of all. In 1981, the problem was taken so seriously by the newly elected Socialist Government that the island was given a Statut Particulier as part of a wider programme of decentralization.

Why did the Corsican problem come to be placed so high on the agenda of the Governments of the Fifth Republic and particularly on that of the Socialist Government of 1981? This is the principal question which this thesis tries to answer. Although the thesis is not an histoire événementielle, it will be nevertheless useful at this point briefly to summarize the recent history of the Corsican problem.

The emergence of the Corsican problem

Corsica was annexed by France in 1768, having been a colony of Genoa for several centuries. This annexation had been preceded by a revolt against Genoa which had lasted forty years. The most dramatic phase of this revolt was the attempt

by Pascal Paoli to set up a rudimentary Republic along liberal democratic lines. Paoli had been influenced by writers of the Enlightenment such as Montesquieu and perhaps Jean-Jacques Rousseau who wrote a Constitution for the embryonic state. The Genoese, in decline as a great Mediterranean power, were unable to contain the revolt, asked the French for assistance and finally ceded de facto sovereignty to them in 1768. Although this was followed by some revolts, most Corsicans seem to have preferred French rule to Genoese, as the latter had left behind memories of cruel repression and injustice against the native Corsicans. In fact, when the French Revolution occurred in 1789, the first of the Corsicans' doléances was that their island become integrally French and not be returned to Genoa which still claimed de jure sovereignty. Total integration at the political level did, in fact, take place at this time. Another powerful source of identification was the fact that Corsica's most famous son was Napoleon Bonaparte. Although the Emperor did not allow any sentimental attachments to deflect him from cruelly repressing any revolts on the island if he considered this necessary, later generations looked with pride on his achievements. This became a strong element of identification with France and the mythe napoléonien was at its strongest in Corsica.

This attachment to France on the part of the Corsicans seems to have been a dominant feeling among the islanders throughout the nineteenth century and the first half of the

twentieth. Many Corsicans realized the advantages of being attached to a powerful state even if that state often seemed indifferent to their lot. At least they were marginally better off than their Italian neighbours who were often forced to come to Corsica to find work. There were, nevertheless, those who questioned this attachment. At the end of the nineteenth century there appeared regionalist movements which accused the French Government of criminally neglecting the island. Such discontent usually occurred in periods of economic hardship for the island. Nevertheless, attachment to France was reinforced by the blood sacrifice made by many Corsicans for the Mère-Patrie during the First World War. But there were also discontents during the inter-war period when autonomist and even separatist movements appeared. However, in both these periods these movements seem to have been confined to a tiny minority of intellectuals and failed to make a significant impact on the Corsican masses. Furthermore, some of their number flirted with extreme Right-wing ideas and espoused the irredentist cause of Mussolini. When the Italians invaded the island in 1942, some of these regionalists collaborated with them. This led to a discrediting of Corsican regionalism in the immediate post-war period. As in other French regions, such as Brittany and Alsace, where a similar collaboration and discrediting had occurred, regionalists confined their attention to cultural or economic issues and did not publicly advocate political reforms along regionalist lines.

Immediately after the War there followed a period of very strong pro-French nationalism. This was related to the fact that Corsica was the first and only French département to liberate itself by force of arms from the Occupant. This insurrection was led principally by the Corsican Federation of the French Communist Party, known for its extreme Jacobinism. This period of strong identification with France led the local economic and political élites to become aware of the moribund state of the island, especially as the French mainland was experiencing rapid economic growth. Fortunately, for the local elites, this coincided with a period when the Governments of the Fourth Republic were also becoming aware of the problem of the geographical dimension of economic disparities in France and were developing regionalization programmes to combat these. An important influence here was Jean-François Gravier whose book Paris et le désert français, calling attention to the excessively centralized nature of the French state and the adverse consequences this had for the provinces, appeared in 1947 (1). Another important influence was the lobbying tactics of the Breton Comité de liaison des intérêts bretons (CELIB). The regionalization programme of the Fourth Republic, met some of the demands of the local Corsican elites for a Government-assisted economic development programme for the island. For the first time since the Second Empire, when the Government had adopted some measures in favour of the island, the French Government took the island's problems sufficiently seriously to adopt an important economic development programme: the

Programme d'Action Régionale (PAR) adopted officially in 1957. Most of the islanders welcomed this.

Unfortunately, the expectations of economic development which this raised were not to be realized - at least not in the manner in which many of the islanders wished. The principal reason for this was the collapse of the Fourth Republic, the arrival of De Gaulle to power, and the establishment of the Fifth Republic. The regional policies of the new équipe differed considerably from those of the Fourth Republic in that they emphasized national rather than regional development. This affected the implementation of the PAR whose funds dried up. This, with other policies of the Gaullist Government, was the catalyst which sparked off organized regionalist protest on a scale never before seen in Corsica. The first phase of this protest is what may be called moderate regionalism: that is, the dominant regionalist movement was basically Jacobin in orientation. Moderate regionalism had some successes in reversing Government policies but eventually withered away. This was because it ultimately failed to realize its principal demands because of the intransigence of the Gaullist Government and several other reasons which are dealt with more fully in Chapter Seven below. This failure led to a radicalization of regionalism and the formation of new organisations. The latter were not, however, homogeneous but composed of several tendencies. These tendencies and the

political significance of the movements are analysed more fully in Chapter Eight below.

The 1960's and 1970's saw a continual deterioration of the situation. The moderate regionalists were frightened at the growth of extra-parliamentary activities and the anti-Jacobin critiques of the French state and returned to the traditional channels of political behaviour. This left the field free for the radicals who developed extra-parliamentary tactics of both a legal and illegal nature.

The radical regionalists became involved in most of the social conflicts of the period, even if these were not directly connected with their own aims, and attempted, often with some success, to transform them into conflicts that questioned the relationship between Corsica and France. Occasionally, they too used violence, as at Aleria in August 1975 when they occupied the vineyard of a pied noir (see below) who had been involved in a scandal of doctoring wines with excessive amounts of sugar. They also organized many marches and road blocks as peasants in Brittany were doing in the same period.

Clandestine separatists began a bombing campaign in the early 1960's which, except for that of the Spanish Basques, is probably the longest lasting in Western Europe. The targets have been principally property rather than people, the

property being either Government buildings or installations connected with the economic development agencies. Occasionally, targets on mainland France have been chosen. The slogan I francesi fori (IFF - French Out!) appeared increasingly all over the island.

Government responses to these events were a mixture of the carrot and stick. The central state continued to subsidize the island but not along the lines desired by some of its inhabitants. The agricultural programme of the PAR was revived in the early 1960's but principally in order to facilitate the return of about 20,000 repatriate pieds noirs (2) returning from newly independent Algeria. The preference given to these new settlers over native Corsicans was a powerful source of resentment especially among young Corsican farmers. The early Governments of the Fifth Republic often seemed to behave with extraordinary insensitivity. One of their first decisions with regard to the island was to threaten to close down its only railway. This was soon followed by an attempt to use the island as a test site for nuclear weapons! Grievances built up on a number of issues such as the closure of the remaining mining and manufacturing industries, and the failure to bring to task an Italian company which was dumping chemicals into the sea which polluted the island's shores. The attempts at reform, particularly during the Giscardian period, usually were too little too late, and disappointment at them further fuelled the grievances of the radical regionalists.

Increasingly under President Giscard d'Estaing the Government resorted to outright police repression in the form of dozens of arrests and perquisitions. Even those who were unsympathetic toward Corsican nationalism and autonomy criticized the Government's heavy-handed manner with which it responded to the events of Aleria in August 1975. This consisted in sending a large contingent of security forces to surround a vineyard occupied by the autonomists. The circumstances still remain unclear but a fracas broke out during which a gendarme lost his life and an autonomist was seriously wounded. That evening serious rioting occurred in nearby Bastia when the Préfecture came under armed attack and another policeman was killed.

There was also the growth of counter-violence by terrorist barbouzes whom many Corsicans, including some who were not autonomists, claimed were supported by the Government. It later emerged that they had contacts with the notorious Service d'Action Civique (SAC), a violent quasi-criminal group which had been set up by the Gaullists during the Algerian crisis. The most serious incident involving this group occurred in January 1980 when three barbouzes set out to kidnap and murder a leading autonomist living in a mountain village near Ajaccio called Bastelica. The group had, however, been infiltrated by an autonomist sympathizer who informed the autonomists of Bastelica of the intended kidnapping and

murder. The latter, in their turn, kidnapped the would-be kidnappers and captured a large arsenal of weapons in their vehicle. They then wished to hold a press conference to publicize the existence of the barbouzes. The Government reacted in a way similar to their reaction in Aleria - by sending a large contingent of security forces to surround the village. Somehow the autonomists escaped with their captives to Ajaccio where they occupied the Hôtel Fesch. The security forces followed and again surrounded them. This time a crowd of autonomist sympathizers gathered outside the hotel and confronted the security forces. A shot rang out from the crowd and a police-man was shot dead. Later that night, at two separate road-blocks, nervous gendarmes killed a young man and young woman.

Events such as these raised the political temperature on the island and the heavy police tactics were an important cause for growth in sympathy for the radical regionalists. Many young Corsicans were becoming increasingly alienated from the French state as is clear from the successful organizing of autonomist and nationalist groups in the island's lycées. By the time of the presidential elections in May 1981 the island was a tinder-box, with the threat of widespread violence if President Giscard d'Estaing were re-elected. As it turned out, François Mitterrand won the election and the comprehensive decentralization reforms which he introduced bring us to the present phase of the Corsican story.

It might seem strange that a country such as France, which has often been regarded as the model of the unitary state, "the one and indivisible Republic", should experience such problems of peripheral minorities. Furthermore, this eruption seems to be part of a wider phenomenon of a revival of submerged ethnic or national minorities both in France - Bretons, Basques, Occitanians, Flemish - and in other European countries - the South Tyroleans in Italy, the Flemish in Belgium, the Basques and Catalonians in Spain, the Northern Irish Catholics, Scots and Welsh in the United Kingdom.

This phenomenon of the revival of what has been variously termed "ethnic nationalism", "micro-nationalism", "ethno-regionalism" and what is simply called in this thesis "regionalism" gives rise to questions important to the social sciences. In the French case, the most important question is: why is it that a unitary state such as France has suddenly experienced what seems to be an explosion of centrifugal forces. In answering this question the researcher may help to elucidate the nature of the French state itself and the relations between state and society in France. Furthermore, he may contribute to a wider body of literature which is questioning the validity of, or at least seriously modifying, concepts such as unitary and federal systems: this literature includes theories such as Intergovernmental Relations. The nature of nationalism, too, might become clearer in studying

what seems to be the clash of two nationalisms: the official nationalism of the nation-state and the nationalisme contestataire of at least some of the regionalist movements. A second question is: why did it occur at this particular time in these particular regions? The answer to this question may give us a greater understanding of the territorial dimension in politics and of the geographical diversity of French society. A third question is: how strong were these movements and what effect did they have on Government regional policy? This is important, as many authors, including academics, simply accept, in a rather uncritical manner, the self-explanations of the movements themselves. Part of this self-explanation often takes the form of inflated claims about the movements' representativeness of the local population. In other words, the movements promote a mobilizing myth of their own leadership of an ethnic or national group which challenges the dominant myth of the nation-state. To answer the question as to the impact they have on Government policy, it is necessary to deal with another related one: how have Governments dealt with the phenomenon in practice - what are the range of options open to a Government which seeks to reduce regional or ethnic conflict? In answering this question important aspects of governmental policy-making and policy-implementation will be studied and, in particular, the success or failure of governmental regional policies.

This thesis attempts to answer these questions in the case of Corsica, although, for reasons outlined below, it does so by putting the Corsican case in the wider context of France as a whole. There are several reasons why Corsica is of particular interest. First, as is evident from the brief historical resumé given above, it is a region which has experienced a wide range of regionalist movements and types of protest from elitist bargaining between local notables and central politicians and administrators to the attempt to set up an independent Republic by extreme nationalist movements using armed struggle. This is useful because it allows an analysis of a wide range of movements in a small setting. Secondly, being an island, Corsica has preserved many features of traditional society which help to explain the revival of regionalism as an important force. This makes it a kind of "laboratory" in which many of the factors which have caused the ethnic revival may be more easily observed than in other regions where they may have disappeared or exist only in a diluted form. Thirdly, there has been a paucity of research on the Corsican case by political scientists particularly in English. Valuable research by English-speaking researchers such as Jack Hayward, Suzanne Berger and Malcolm Anderson has been conducted on regions such as Brittany and Alsace (see bibliography for these and the following authors). Practically nothing has been done on Corsica. Some studies of a partial nature, such as the work of Savigear, Koffman and Hainsworth and Loughlin, have appeared. More substantial historical

studies have been published by Dorothy Carrington. In French, most studies of Corsica have fallen into one of three categories: historical, as in the work of Pomponi and Dottelonde; sociological, and in particular the work of Dressler-Holohan on autonomist movements; or polemical, as in the works of regionalist sympathizers such as Pascal Marchetti and journalists such as Jean-Paul Delors and Stéphane Muracciole. There has, however, been no comprehensive attempt by a political scientist to provide an explanation of the emergence and political significance of Corsican regionalism or to apply to it any of the models developed in the social sciences in recent years to explain the phenomenon of regionalism and ethnic nationalism.

This thesis attempts to make a contribution toward filling this lacuna. One of its primary concerns is to develop a framework within which the wider phenomenon of regionalism may be described and explained. The thesis then attempts to use this framework to analyse the roots of this phenomenon in the Corsican case. It is also used to describe and explain the factors which led to its recent emergence and ensured that it was put on the political agenda and remained there. The framework is developed through a critique of some of the principal existing models. It tries to provide a set of concepts which help to answer the questions why regional diversity has survived in a unitary state like France, why regional conflict occurred when it did, who the principal

protagonists are, and the significance it has for an understanding of the French state. However, it is hoped that the model will be flexible enough both to describe and to explain what Corsica has in common with other similar cases and where it differs from them. It is hoped that the model will be useful for comparative work on the wider phenomenon including countries outside France.

But it is also important to point out what the thesis does not try to do. It is not an attempt to write either a political or an economic history of Corsica. For such treatments the author is referred to excellent works by journalists such as Paul Silvani, La Corse des années ardentes or Jean-Paul Delors and Stéphane Muracciole, Corse: La Poudrière and the works of historians such as Francis Pomponi and Dorothy Carrington. Particularly valuable is the doctoral thesis of Pierre Dottelonde which gives a "blow by blow" account of the movements from 1959 to 1973/4. Dottelonde's painstaking reconstruction of the biographies of many of the principal protagonists of the Corsican problem as well as his detailed analysis of the internal structures of the movements themselves are especially valuable. Nor is this thesis an anthropological treatise on Corsican society. For this the reader is referred to the works of authors such George Ravis-Giordani and José Gil. Finally, it is not a sociological analysis of the movements themselves. The first steps toward such an analysis have taken by Wanda Dressler-Holohan. In

summary, it is essentially a political analysis which lays stress on the system of public administration at the local level.

Plan of the thesis

The thesis is organized in the following manner. Section One, which includes Chapters One and Two, attempts to define the correct theoretical and empirical frameworks. Chapter One is a search for the correct empirical framework. It rejects frameworks more appropriate to other disciplines such as geography, sociology and anthropology and, since the thesis is a thesis in political science, it chooses to examine Corsica within the context of the French political system. By a comparative analysis of similar movements within the French system, it searches out the relevant questions to be answered in the French case. As the bulk of the rest of the thesis is a case-study of Corsica, this is dealt with only briefly in this Chapter. Chapter Two then attempts to find a suitable theoretical framework which will help us to answer the questions raised in Chapter One. Several models, drawn from both academic research - Centre-periphery theories (Rokkan and Urwin), theories of Nationalism and micro-Nationalism (A.D. Smith), the uneven development thesis (Ernest Gellner), theories of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) (Jean-Claude Thoenig), which is an application of organisation theory to political institutions, and theories of decentralization (L.J.

Sharpe)- and the theorizing efforts of political militants - the theory of internal colonialism (Robert Lafont), theories of ethnicity and ethnic nationalism (Guy Héraud), theories of federalism and corporatism (Alain Greilsammer) - are examined in a critical manner and those parts of them useful for the French case are retained. Finally, these concepts are combined to produce a model that may be useful not simply for the examination of particular cases such as Corsica but also for comparative work.

The bulk of the case-study of Corsica may be found in Section Two, comprising Chapters Three, Four and Five, and Section Three, comprising Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. These two sections are complementary and examine the Corsican problem from two different directions. Section Two, "Les ambiguïtés de la Corse française" is an attempt to answer the question: why is it that a unitary state such as France, with allegedly Jacobin tendencies toward a complete assimilation of all differentiated territorial units, yet contains units such as Corsica, each marked by a strong differentiation. The section thus explores the phenomena of assimilation and differentiation. Chapter Three, using the vertical dimension of the model, looks at the way in which institutions such as the prefectoral system, designed to promote assimilation and integration, become means by which the local society, in this case Corsica, may preserve its identity. Chapter Four examines how economic developments, or the lack of them, emanating from

the centre can also produce a sense of assimilation or differentiation in the periphery. Chapter Five takes different forms of political "statements" which the centre has made about Corsica during the period the latter has belonged to France. Once again, it is demonstrated that Corsicans, like their French masters, finished with a sense of ambivalence about Corsica's place in the French nation. Curiously, the very intensity with which Corsicans, supported by some French leaders such as De Gaulle, proclaimed their "Frenchness" was itself a cause of differentiation. Not only were Corsicans French, they were super-français.

Section Three, "Le problème corse", looks at the problem from the point of view of the islanders themselves. It explores the consequences for the island's politics of the existence of a dual identity as the island experienced the phenomenon of rapid social, economic and cultural changes. Chapter Three is a short historical treatment of economic, social and political developments on the island. This corresponds to the "horizontal" dimension of our model: the socio-economic backdrop against which the regionalist movements emerged. Particular attention is paid to the existence of a distinct Corsican culture and to the socio-economic roots of the clan system: the Corsican system of mediation between the local society and the state. This provides us with an indispensable framework within which the different forms of regionalist movement may be placed. The

following two chapters deal with two distinct kinds of regionalism, each of which corresponds to a different dimension of the dual Corsican identity. Chapter Seven on moderate regionalism analyses the way in which the strong identification with the French state of certain socio-economic groups gave rise to certain demands based on a Jacobin understanding of French-Corsican relations. This was the position of the leaders of the movement who did not radically question these traditional relations. The movement itself, however, was a coalition of forces, and it enabled other groups more alienated from the traditional system and anti-Jacobin in ideology to reintegrate into the mainstream of political life. Chapter Eight is an analysis of this tendency which may be called radical regionalism: its different tendencies and its successes and failures. It is called radical because it radically questions the traditional Jacobin relationships between Corsica and France. Both types of regionalism are analysed in relation both to the socio-economic background of the island and to the system of mediation between the local society and the state.

Section Four is a detailed analysis of the Socialist reforms of 1982 and, in particular, of the Corsican Statut Particulier. This should be regarded a kind of epilogue. The previous sections analysed the roots of the Corsican problem and described and attempted to explain the emergence of regionalist movements. This section looks at the governmental

response which, to date at least, seems to be going some way toward providing a solution to the problem: the creation of local administrative institutions controlled, through democratic elections, by the local populations. These new institutions have had the effect of drawing into one democratically elected assembly all the political groups of the island including those, such as the extreme nationalists, who had been most alienated from the traditional system.

Finally, the Conclusion will try to draw together the main findings of the thesis and point out the contribution they make to the wider field of studies in "ethno-nationalism" and state responses to regional conflict.

The general argument of the thesis is as follows. Corsica became French in 1768. Thereafter most Corsicans have been happy to remain French: there has been an identification with France. However, the island has remained highly differentiated socially, economically, politically and culturally. The most distinctive political phenomenon peculiar to the island was the clan system of mediation. This situation led to the creation of an ambivalence or dual identity on the part of Corsicans. In the period following the Second World War rapid political, social and economic changes took place on the island and disrupted the traditional relationships within the island and between the island and France. These stresses led to the emergence of regionalist movements which exploited, in

their different ways, the ambivalence of the Corsican identity: the moderates based their demands on the pro-French or Jacobin dimension; the radicals based their demands on the Corsican or anti-Jacobin element. To describe and explain the emergence of these movements a model with two dimensions has been constructed: the vertical dimension allows us to position the movements in relation to the system of mediation (the system of public administration); the horizontal dimension allows us to analyse them in relation to the socio-economic context. This model allows us take account of the complexity of the movements, and to assess both the degree of support for them and their effects on Government policy toward the region. The following hypotheses have emerged from the research:

- the movements grew up in response to rapid changes in traditional society;
- the strength of the movements is directly proportional to the degree of traditionality and to the rapidity of the changes;
- the changes led to a crisis in the system of mediation: the movements' ideologies and tactics must be seen in relation to this system of mediation: the more moderate the ideology and tactics the closer the movement to the system of mediation; the more radical the ideology and tactics the more alienated the movement from this.

The implications of these findings for the wider field of studies in regionalism and ethnic nationalism will be drawn out more fully in the Conclusion.

The period examined by the thesis is 1943 to 1984, although reference is made to earlier periods when this is necessary. It might be objected that the regionalist movements did not first appear until 1959: this, for example, is the starting point chosen by Pierre Dottelonde. The problem is that it ignores what may be called the phenomenon of proto-regionalism which was developed by the Corsican Communists just after the Second World War in Corsica. It also ignores the fact that, while 1959 was indeed the date when the movements made their first organized appearance with DIECO and the Mouvement du 29 Novembre the disparate elements of these movements already existed throughout the the period of the Fourth Republic. It is necessary to analyse this early period in order fully to appreciate the roots and political significance of later splits in regionalism. The cut-off point chosen is 1984 although some reference will be made to later events. Once again this differs from the thesis of Dottelonde which finishes its treatment of the regionalist movements in 1973/4.

The reason for this difference is that while Dottelonde is concerned principally with a micro-analysis of the

movements themselves, one of the principal focuses of this thesis is to analyse the movements in the context of state responses to the phenomenon with a view to increasing our understanding of the French state itself and especially how it integrates or fails to integrate differentiated territorial units. Throughout the period of the Fifth Republic may be seen different governmental responses, ranging from massive financial subsidization of the clientelistic system of mediation to outright police repression. The period following the Socialist victories of 1981 and the decentralization reforms which began in 1982 represent a quite distinct governmental response from previous responses by the state. These have had important consequences for Corsica and, indeed, Corsica was being used as a kind of "guinea pig", testing the decentralization reforms for the benefit of the rest of the country. It was felt important, therefore, that these developments be analysed in some detail in this thesis. By 1984 two elections to the Corsican Assembly had been held. In the period between the elections the new institutions began to function and in the light of this experience the Government modified the system of proportional representation. This enables us to make some tentative judgements on the experiment to date. Elections also took place in 1986. However, it was felt that to analyse these in any detailed way would produce an unwieldy thesis.

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SECTION ONE: EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Section One attempts to find the correct empirical and theoretical and frameworks within which to analyse the Corsican problem. Chapter One deals with the empirical framework which is the French nation-state and presents a comparative analysis of regionalist movements which have arisen within the "Hexagon". Chapter Two attempts to provide the appropriate theoretical framework which will help to answer the questions which arise from the analysis presented in Chapter One.



CHAPTER ONE: REGIONALIST AND ETHNIC NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN FRANCE

The subject of this thesis is the emergence and political significance of the regionalist movements in contemporary Corsica. In order to examine this phenomenon, it is necessary to find the correct empirical and theoretical frameworks and this Chapter will be concerned with the problems of defining that framework. The next will concern itself with the appropriate theoretical framework.

Several empirical frameworks are possible for the examination of the Corsican problem which, for instance, could be examined within the contexts of "the problem of islands", "the Mediterranean basin", "Italianate civilization and culture", or "the French political system". It is clear that Corsica could fit into any of these empirical frameworks but that each would present different kinds of questions and demand, therefore, different theoretical frameworks to answer these. For instance, the problem of islands could be seen primarily as a problem of geography even if this is prefixed by the terms "social" or "political". Corsica as a subsystem of the Mediterranean might entail an anthropological approach. Since our concern here is with the political significance of social phenomena, the appropriate framework for examining the Corsican problem is the political system of which Corsica is a

part and other frameworks should be used only in so far as they help to elucidate this.

The political system of which Corsica is part is French state and society. This is its primary political definition even if it occupies a peculiar position within the system. The secondary frameworks, such as island, Mediterranean, Italianate civilization, are useful as ways of elucidating distortions within this system. The question then arises: if Corsica is part of the French political system, are Corsican political phenomena, such as regionalist movements, sui generis or are they one instance of a more widespread phenomenon. A preliminary step in answering this question is to conduct an empirical search of similar phenomena in France and, having found them, to analyse them comparatively. In this way the ground will be cleared for formulating the significant questions and finding the appropriate theoretical framework for answering them.

Before doing so, it would be useful at this point to clarify the terminology used in this thesis. The first distinction is between regionalism and regionalization. Regionalism is the ideology of groups on the periphery, or of their sympathizers at the centre, which postulates that the periphery should have some control over its own affairs. Regionalization may be defined as the regional policies adopted by central Government toward the periphery. It may

take the form of an economic decentralization which entails an administrative deconcentration, but may not necessarily include political decentralization. Regionalism may or may not coincide with Governmental regionalization. It, in turn, may be broken down further. Moderate regionalism does not seek to put into question the attachment of the region to the French state but wishes to maintain in existence the existing administrative structures even if these may be improved. Radical regionalism does put into question the attachment of the region to the state at least implicitly. It may take the form of autonomism, federalism, or nationalism. Usually, these are positions along a continuum. However, these distinctions are not water-tight. They represent merely general tendencies.

THE PLURALITY OF FRANCE

France has usually been considered the archetypal example of the unitary state: from the time of the monarchy through the Revolution and Empire until the present day the state has played a centralizing role to create a unified nation. Yet regionalists, and others such as federalists, have pointed to the existence of a diversity or plurality in France which the official ideology of unity and indivisibility at times ignores. One of the manifestations of this diversity is the existence of distinct cultural or linguistic minorities within the "Hexagon". This thesis is primarily concerned with such groups.

A useful criterion for distinguishing the existence of an ethnic minority is the presence of a distinct language (1). Today, after centuries of assimilation and/or repression, several different languages are still spoken within the boundaries of the French state: one Celtic language, Breton; Basque, which is a language sui generis; two Germanic languages, Flemish and Alsatian; and four Romance languages, French, Occitan, Catalan and Corsican (2). The territories of two of these linguistic groups, Brittany and Occitania, are found entirely within the confines of the "Hexagon". The French Basque Country, French Catalonia and French Flanders are minority parts of larger linguistic groups which straddle its borders. Alsace and Corsica, each possessing a distinct dialect or language, nevertheless share a common linguistic and cultural heritage with the German and Italian-speaking peoples respectively. It is in these areas that different forms of regionalism have arisen, although not to the same extent in all of them.

Catalonia (3)

French Catalonia, which formed part of a larger unit which was divided between France and Spain, was attached to France in 1659 by the Treaty of the Pyrenees. The area became partially integrated economically into the wine-growing economy of the French Midi, and the Catalonian peasants shared

much in common with their counterparts in Languedoc (4). Because of this economic integration, Catalonians have tended to look northward toward Paris as their cultural, political and economic reference point, rather than southward toward Barcelona, even when the latter was the capital of the largely autonomous Spanish Catalonia. Regionalism in Catalonia has been at a low level and has been mainly concerned with preserving the area's language and culture, although there have been some attempts to give the movement a political expression. The Grup Rossellones d'Estudis Catalans (GREC) was founded in the 1960's. In 1969, the group held a "Université catalane d'été", in which several subjects were taught in the Catalan language. In 1975, the town council of Perpignan (the principal town of French Catalonia) created the Centre de Documentation et d'Animation culturelles catalanes (CDACC). An attempt to translate these cultural activities into the political arena was made by setting up the Comitatz Rossellones d'Estudis e d'Animacio (CREA), created in 1970 mainly by extreme-leftists in the wake of the events of May 1968. But such political initiatives found little response among the local population and the region has been quite calm compared with other regions.

Flanders (5)

French Flanders is the southernmost tip of a Flemish-speaking area which is today divided among three states -

France, Belgium and Holland. Unlike Catalonia or the Basque Country, however, this area was never united into a homogeneous society. The French portion, especially, consisted of a series of separate regions which were mingled with French-speaking areas. Nevertheless, a moderate regionalist movement existed in the nineteenth century, and between the wars of this century there existed a radical regionalist movement which sought the unification of all Flanders. This movement was distinguished by its extreme right-wing views: during the war some of its members collaborated with the Nazis. It was this collaboration which resulted in the movement being discredited after the war, and it is one of the principal reasons why regionalism and autonomism have been slow to develop in the area.

It is only in recent years that there has been some development of regionalism and, as in Catalonia, the concern is mainly with the preservation of the culture and language. Today, there are two main tendencies within the regionalist movement. The Cercle Michel de Swaan has its roots in the Right-wing groups of earlier periods. It refuses both the "American way of life" and Marxism. The other tendency emerged under the influence of the theories of "internal colonialism" which had been developed in other regions (see below). At first it did not have its own organisation, but, in 1977, the Vlaamsch Zomervolkeshoogeschoole (Flemish Summer University), directly influenced by its Catalanian counterpart, was held.

After the university sessions, an association called "Menschen Lyk Wyder" was created to develop the idea of a statute of autonomy for French Flanders. So far it has had marginal impact.

Alsace (6)

Alsace is unique among the ethnic regions of France in that, for quite long periods of its modern history, it has lived under two different states, France and Germany. Incorporated into France under the ancien régime in 1648, it was annexed to Germany by Bismarck in 1870 and remained German until 1918 when it was returned to France by the victorious Allies. In 1940, Hitler again annexed it, and thousands of Alsatians were drafted into the German Army. It was these fluctuations, as well as the fact that both German and the Alsatian dialect were spoken by many Alsatians that gave to the region a strong particularity. This was so even at the level of administration. In the inter-war period the Concordat which had been signed by the German Reich and the Vatican was retained even after re-incorporation into France. A Commissariat général (21 March 1919), aided by a Conseil consultatif (9th September 1920), was created to facilitate the region's re-integration into the French Republic but in fact served to maintain the unity and sense of specificity of the region. In the interwar period the hardening attitude of French Governments, hostile to any form of particularism

within the Republic (particularly in Alsace), combined with the worsening economic situation to provoke strong regionalist and autonomist movements. The French Communist Party supported the latter and then split, with the setting up of an Alsatian Communist Party. However, as in Flanders, an important number of the Alsatian autonomists showed more sympathy for Nazi ideology than for Marxism and eventually collaborated with Hitler during the Occupation.

The experience of Alsace under Hitler differed considerably from the period between 1870 and 1918. In the earlier period, Germany had given to the region a large degree of autonomy. Hitler made no concessions. The result was that the nostalgia which had been one of the main causes of the development of autonomism in the 1920's and 1930's was absent in the post-war period. Furthermore, most Alsatians were weary of the insecurity involved in the shifts from one state to another. Moreover, Alsace participated fully in the economic upsurge of post-war France. For all these reasons, as well as the discredit thrown on the idea of autonomism because of the collaboration of some autonomists with the Nazis, regionalist demands have been confined mainly to defense of the language and to promoting the right to learn German in school (this had been suppressed under the Fourth Republic but was later restored).

Several groups have been created for this purpose. These include the Cercle René Schickele, the Front culturel alsacien (1974), the Comité pour le droit au dialecte à la maternelle (1978), the Groupe des militants de la culture alsacienne (1980), and Unsar Gerichtigkeit - mouvement pour l'autogestion culturelle en Alsace, which supported Mitterrand in the Presidential elections of May 1981.

Small groups, dedicated to a more political expression of regionalism, have come into existence. The Mouvement régionaliste d'Alsace-Lorraine, founded in 1970 by Dr Iffrig, is frankly neo-Nazi in inspiration (7). It has advocated "l'indépendance de l'Alsace-Lorraine" within an "empire européen des peuples germaniques". The group split in 1975 when those who rejected Iffrig's Nazism set up the Mouvement EL-Front autonomiste de Libération, seeking autonomy within the French state. These groups, however, have failed to gain significant support from among the local population.

Occitania (8)

This is the term used to describe the area of France south of the Loire, where the "Oc" dialects are spoken. The langue d'Oc is so called because of the way in which the word for "yes" was pronounced. French is the langue d'Oïl (pronounced "oui"). Occitania was gradually absorbed into the French Kingdom from the time of the Albigensian Crusades in

the thirteenth century which were used by the Capetian Kings as a pretext to expand their territorial control.

A form of regionalism existed here in the nineteenth century as a Romantic literary movement called the *Félibrige*, led by the Provençal poet Mistral. Today there are two main cultural movements. The first is the Institut d'Etudes occitanes (IEO) which was founded in 1945. It has concerned itself with consolidating the linguistic forms of the Occitan language. Robert Lafont has tried to give this movement a political expression and has advocated the ideas of autonomy and autogestion. It is he who has popularized the "internal colonialism" thesis (9). There does exist a nationalist tendency whose leader is Yves Rouquette, but the majority tendency seems to be that of Lafont. The other movement is the latter-day *Félibréens* who see themselves as successors of the nineteenth century movement of Mistral. Their main activity is the study of the latter's works and the preservation of local customs. They are not directly involved in political activity perhaps because of the diversity of their members' political positions, ranging from the extreme-right to the centre-left.

The Occitanian movement resembles those of the first three regions in as much as it has largely been a movement for the preservation of the culture and language of the region. Where it differs is in its size and the extent to which it has given rise to theorizing. It has also had more success in making links with social protest movements such as the fight

of the Larzac peasants against the establishment of a military base on their lands and the agitation of the wine-growers in the Midi. Nevertheless, political mobilization on purely regionalist grounds has remained minimal and the movement has been confined mainly to intellectuals.

The French Basque Country (10).

The French Basque Country, situated at the western extremity of the Pyrenees, comprises three of the seven historic provinces of Euskadi. When Henri of Navarre became Henri IV of France in 1589, the three northern provinces were attached to the French Kingdom. The French provinces, unlike their Spanish counterparts, have seen little industrial development but have remained essentially rural. The Basque society has been marked by social and political conservatism and its leaders have been the Church and the local notables. These élites have exercised a mediating function between the local society and the state.

The first manifestation of regionalism in the modern period was the founding of the group Enbata (Association des Etudiants basques) in 1953 by Basque students at the University of Bordeaux (11). The group at first concerned itself with preserving Basque culture and local customs, nostalgically seeking to recreate a society which they had left behind - the peasant society of the Basque country. in

1956, it transferred its headquarters to the Musée Basque in Bayonne (the principal town of the French Basque Country). This act may be seen as an anticipation of the stirrings of radical regionalist sentiment.

There existed several tendencies within the group at this period, ranging from moderate regionalism to a radical regionalism which included nationalism. The more conservative adherents, mainly notables and local businessmen, wished to use it as a vehicle for promoting moderate regionalist ideas. This was a response to the break-up of the traditional Basque society through economic decline and emigration. Furthermore, the traditional mores of Basque society, based on the family and the Catholic faith, were under threat from the penetration of modern ideas through the mass media. The other main tendency was made up of young intellectuals who were influenced by the struggle for national liberation being waged by ETA in the Spanish Basque Country. This tendency wished to show support for their fellow Basques suffering under the repression of the Franco régime. Furthermore, they gave a sympathetic hearing to ETA refugees living on the French side of the border.

Enbata's public face changed at different periods, as these two tendencies struggled for control of the group. In 1960, the radicals managed to force the group to adopt some more nationalist positions. In 1963, Enbata became a political

party, but its leadership remained in the hands of the moderate regionalists who tried to discourage contact with ETA members. In 1967, this element was overthrown and the radical regionalist or nationalist element took over. From this period, the group also began to develop theses sympathetic to socialism. Then contacts with ETA increased and there was a spilling over of violence from the southern provinces, although ETA did not always look kindly on this violence. Between April 1975 and January 1979, there were 53 violent incidents, including bomb attacks against police stations, tourist offices and secondary residences. Much of this violence came from Ipparetarre ("those of ETA from the north"), a tiny group dedicated to "liberating" the northern provinces from French rule and uniting them with the south. There was also, however, violence from right-wing Spanish extremists, such as the GAL (Groupe Anti-terroriste de Libération), which resulted in the deaths of several ETA refugees and innocent bystanders (12).

The French Basque Country is interesting because here may be found a more developed form, as it were, of regionalist activity than in the regions just examined. The Basque movement has included moderate and radical regionalism making political and economic demands as well as cultural demands for the preservation of the language and culture, while its tactics have ranged from attempts at mobilizing the masses, electoral activity and separatist violence. It would be wrong,

however, to exaggerate the strength of this movement. In electoral terms, it failed to make any significant impact. In 1967, when Enbata was at the height of its influence, it obtained very little support in the elections of that year. In the rural areas the results were the following: in Mauléon, 1,879 votes out of 40,126 cast, or 4.6 per cent; in Basse Navarre, 1,058 out of 31,109 cast or 3.4 per cent; in Soule, 821 out of 9,107 cast, or 9.01 per cent. In Bayonne, the result was only 3,156 out of 70,007 cast, or 4.58 per cent (13). Today, Enbata has declined to such an extent that only a journal of the same name exists. Separatist violence, too, has been on a much lower scale than in Corsica and Brittany. It may be concluded, therefore, that the Basque regionalist movement failed to obtain a significant foothold in the masses of the population. The latter has remained unmoved by appeals to its "national" identity and has continued to give its support to conservative politicians, either Christian Democrat or Gaullist, although in 1981 a Socialist candidate, Jean-Pierre Destrade was elected.

Brittany (14)

This region, situated on a peninsula in the North West, was an ancient Celtic society incorporated into the French Kingdom in 1532 by a Treaty between its rulers and the French monarchy. Hitherto, it had been a semi-autonomous state, although it already had close relations with the French.

Before the French Revolution it had been allowed to retain much of this semi-autonomous character, and the Church and nobility were the main agents in maintaining the cohesiveness of its society. After the Revolution these élites used the society's cultural distinctiveness as a defense against the encroachments of the central power. This was one of the main factors in the preservation of the Breton language.

Suzanne Berger has described traditional Breton society as being rural and conservative in which Christian social doctrine served as the basis of a corporatist ideology which was the cement holding the society together (15). This society related to the French state through the mediation of its élites - nobility, Church, and notables each fulfilling this function at different periods of its history. Regionalist movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were promoted by these groups as a means of defense against changes from outside which threatened to break up the society and as a means of conserving their own power base (16). In the 1930's and 1940's, some of these regionalists, influenced by the partially successful struggle for Irish independence and the strong Alsatian autonomist movement, adopted autonomist and separatist positions. During the Second World War most of the regionalists cooperated with the decentralization programme of the Vichy régime, and some of the separatists even actively aided the Nazi occupants against the Resistance (17).

This collaboration and the heightened French nationalism in the post-war period resulted in the repression of the Breton movement and, as in Flanders and Alsace, the discrediting of the idea of autonomism. Brittany, however, did not share in the economic upsurge of post-war France as did the latter two regions. The result was that regionalism appeared much sooner in the former than in the latter. At first, the movement confined itself to promoting cultural activities without putting forward any economic or political programme. Groups such as the Bodadeg ar Somerian (1946) and the Kendal'ch (1951) were formed with such purely cultural aims.

The most famous expression of Breton regionalism was the Comité d'Etudes et de Liaison des Intérêts Bretons (CELIB), created officially in 1949 (18). The CELIB was founded by Breton notables whose economic and societal interests were threatened as traditional Breton society began to disintegrate under the impact of modern capitalism. It set itself two tasks: to act as a study group which would analyse Brittany's economic problems and to become a pressure group attempting to influence Parliament in order to resolve these problems in its own interests. Its programme of action had a twofold strategy: to gain the support of prominent individuals and organisations and to persuade the central Government to draw up a plan which would provide an economic framework for regional development. What was at stake, in fact, was an attempt by the notables to

control what they saw as the inevitable break-up of Breton society so that they would suffer least from its consequences. In the early period of their existence they were successful in their attempt both to mobilize the Breton population and to exert pressure on the central Government. The early Governments of the Fourth Republic agreed to develop a regional "Plan", and the idea was subsequently applied to other French regions.

The group reached the peak of its influence at the beginning of the 1960's, after which it went into decline. Hervé Guillorel lists the reasons for this (19): after the accession to power of General De Gaulle, the Government ceased to take into account the CELIB's proposals and especially the fact that, after the success of the Gaullists in the 1962 elections, most of the CELIB leadership became unconditional Gaullists (a conversion which was regarded by the radical regionalists as the trahison des notables). They thus deprived themselves of their position as an intermediary between local society and the state or, rather, Parliament. Furthermore, this provoked a split with the departure of important left-wing members such as Michel Philipponneau. The CELIB became a model for other moderate regionalists in that it sought to preserve the position of the notables in the local society without calling into question the attachment of the region to the French Republic: its discourse was based on the fact that Bretons were French and therefore entitled to the same

treatment as other Frenchmen. It confined its demands therefore to purely economic matters.

A more radical regionalist group had been in existence since 1957. This was the Mouvement pour l'Organisation de la Bretagne (MOB), founded mainly by young intellectuals and cultural activists, which advocated a solution to Brittany's problems which would take a more political form. The MOB sought to create different political structures between Brittany and the rest of France. Its long-term aim was independence, and autonomy was seen as a step in the realisation of that goal. Its concept of independence was in the context of a federalist Europe, and is summed up in the phrase: "aménager l'appartement Bretagne, dans l'immeuble France, du quartier Europe" (20). In other words, the MOB saw itself as part of that section of the European movement which proposed a form of integration based on a federal system (21). With regard to the internal organisation of the economic and political structures of Brittany, it declared itself to be "ni rouge, ni blanc", that is, in favour of neither capitalism nor socialism.

It was this ambivalence about which political solution to adopt (capitalist or socialist) which led the left-wing members of the MOB to break away. In 1963, they founded the Union démocratique Bretonne (UDB). Its programme was socialist and internationalist and its political philosophy is summed up

in the words of Yann Sohier (an early Breton nationalist who was also a Marxist): "Le travailleur breton est doublement exploité: il est exploité en tant que Breton est en tant que travailleur" (22). The UDB adopted the internal colonialist thesis, describing the relationship between Brittany and France as a colony occupied by an imperialist power (23). But its aims were more moderate than those of earlier Breton nationalists and it rejected the idea of separatism (although it has supported Breton political prisoners including those imprisoned for separatist violence). Its strategy was to cooperate with the parties of the French left and its members have stood for elections as part of Union de la Gauche lists.

After the break-up, the right-wing members of the MOB formed the Strollard ar Vro (SAV) or "parti national breton et fédéraliste européen". This group, however, has almost disappeared from the Breton political arena. Other smaller groups include the Parti Communiste Breton and the extreme right-wing Stourm Breizh. But the principal representative of the Breton nationalist movement remains the UDB.

Separatism in Brittany has also taken a violent form with the setting up of the Front de Libération de la Bretagne (FLB). The FLB was founded in 1966 and set up an armed wing, the Armée Républicaine Bretonne (ARB). The FLB-ARB has attacked what it regarded as the symbols of "French occupation" - army barracks, police stations, Government

buildings - but avoided injuring persons. Dismantled once in 1969, the FLB-ARB resumed its activities until 1972 when there was a new series of arrests. Today there are only sporadic outbursts of armed activity in Brittany.

Brittany is important because, not only is it an area in which regionalist activities have been at a relatively high level, but also because it provided a model for other regions. This is particularly true of the CELIB whose organisation and strategy were imitated although not always with the same success. But just how much support did the Breton regionalists garner? As already noted, the CELIB was largely successful in the early phase of its mobilization of individuals and groups. These included business associations, peasants' groups, and trade unions such as the CGT and CFDT. But the unity of such diverse groups was an ephemeral one and did not survive the crisis of the organisation when some of its leadership rallied to Gaullism.

The most successful radical regionalist group has been the UDB. This success is, however, relative to the other nationalist groups such as the MOB, SAV and FLB. In relation to the Breton population as a whole, it has been quite unsuccessful in mobilizing mass support, which is surely the criterion of "success" for a party which describes itself as socialist and which seeks, in some sense, to mobilize the Breton "nation" or "people". Electoral achievement is one way

of judging the success or failure of this mobilization (24). The UDB has been least successful in general elections: in 1973, five candidates stood and received an average of 2.20 per cent of the total number of votes cast. In 1978, there were seventeen candidates who received an average of 1.87 per cent of the total votes cast. In 1981, sixteen candidates received an average of 2.19 per cent of the votes cast. However, the party fared slightly better in local elections. In the municipal elections of 1971, it stood on Union de la Gauche lists in four towns - Vannes, Auray, Lorient and Quimper - and presented 37 candidates on a UDB list at Brest. Its overall score was 4.8 per cent of the votes cast. This pattern has repeated itself. In the cantonal elections of 1973, eight candidates received an average of 4.45 per cent of the votes cast; in those of 1976, nine candidates received an average of 5.63 per cent of the votes cast; in those of 1979, 34 candidates received an average of 5.63 per cent of the votes cast. The most interesting result was that of the municipal elections of 1977 when the UDB had 35 councillors elected, twenty-one of whom were elected on the first round and eleven in seven towns of more than 30,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess whether these candidates were elected on the basis of their "Breton" programme or because they were part of left-wing lists. In conclusion, it may be said that while moderate regionalism in Brittany did experience a temporary success, there has been wide indifference to the theses of radical regionalism or

nationalism. Rather, the majority of Bretons have continued to vote mainly for candidates whose attachment to the Republic is manifest - traditionally Christian Democrat or Gaullist, but recently also Socialists who made important gains in the 1981 general elections. This tendency to vote for traditional French parties was confirmed at the recent 1986 parliamentary and regional council elections, although these fall outside the time-scale of this thesis.

Corsica

Since the bulk of this thesis is devoted to Corsica this section will be brief. It suffices to say that Corsica, too, has produced moderate and radical regionalist movements which, like Brittany and the Basque Country, have adopted the entire range of tactics from peaceful mass mobilization to violent separatism. Corsica, in fact, has been the region where the regionalist phenomenon has been strongest, as this thesis hopes to demonstrate. However, at this point we shall not anticipate. Instead, we shall see what problems arise from our survey of the regionalist movements in contemporary France.

We are now in a position to ask certain questions concerning the nature of this phenomenon. The most relevant question is: why did it arise in the first place at this particular time and with this amount of support?. We have seen that the amount of support the movements received was small.

It was, nevertheless, greater than had been the case in previous periods of French history since the Revolution. In the period following the Second World War, ethnicity became politically salient and, in certain regions, highly so. The second interesting question that may be asked is: why did it arise in some regions but not in others where it might have been expected? More exactly, why did it have a "strong" expression in some regions such as Corsica, Brittany and the French Basque Country (although the strength varied in each of these regions), while it had a "weak" expression in others such as Alsace, French Flanders, French Catalonia and Occitania? The third question is: why the movements took the forms and ideologies that they did? We have seen that these ranged from moderate to radical regionalism and that tactics varied from élitist consociational bargaining, through attempted mass mobilization to the use of political violence. Connected with this question is the question: which socio-economic groups, if any, adopted which sets of ideologies and tactics? We have given a tentative response to this question in the preceding survey. However, it is necessary to make the analysis more precise and to put forward some hypotheses in answer to these questions. Finally, the question arises as to the nature and role of the state in these phenomena. One of our principal concerns in answering these questions is throw light on the nature of the modern state and its relation with society, in this case local society. In other words, the answer to such questions may help us to understand the nature

and functioning of the French system of public administration at the local level.

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to ask them in the context of a theoretical framework. The next Chapter attempts to elaborate such a framework.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL ISSUES

The comparative analysis presented in Chapter One ended with a series of questions concerning the regionalist phenomenon in France. In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to find an appropriate theoretical framework. This Chapter will attempt to construct this. It will do so by critically analysing different theoretical models that have been used in the social sciences to study the problem of regionalism and ethnic nationalism. It will then assess what elements of these models are useful to study the French case. Other elements from other theoretical approaches will then be combined with these to produce an appropriate model.

INTRODUCTION

Ernest Gellner has noted that the emergence of ethnic nationalist movements in western societies , took by surprise both "liberalism" and Marxism, the two principal traditions in the social sciences (1). One of the basic assumptions of these traditions, according to Gellner, was that society, moving from pre-industrial to industrial forms, would follow a pattern of political, social and cultural homogenization. The consequence should have been that phenomena such as the local society, regionalism and local nationalism would disappear. A similar assumption was made by at least three of the major theories of "integration": functionalism (Mitrany),

neo-functionalism (Haas and Schmitter) and transactionalism (Deutsch) (2). Federalism, on the other hand, has included a recognition of the regional question as an essential component of integration.

The assessment by Gellner seems exaggerated, at least with regard to Marxism, but does have a large core of truth. This may be because social scientists have great difficulty in seeing beyond the parameters and tendencies established by their own societies, cultures and civilizations. Thus the softening of cleavages within societies at certain periods - the general rise in the standard of living since the turn of the century and the arrival of mass welfarism since the Second World War - created the assumption in the minds of many that such cleavages had disappeared for ever. For this reason, in the 1960's, the end of ideology was proclaimed which, in essence, meant that the reality of class struggle had disappeared (3). It is no accident that this ideology of the end of ideology should have occurred at a period of consensus politics made possible by the post-war economic boom which attenuated class divisions. In other words, this interpretation of reality was made according to the political exigencies of the classes in power at the time and there was a sufficient phenomenological correspondence with what was actually happening in Western societies to make it seem plausible. The mistake was to elevate the interpretation of what were essentially transitory phenomena to the status of

"science" by giving them a predictive value which today can be seen as being quite unjustified, as events such as the rise of the highly ideological Margaret Thatcher at the head of a transformed Conservative Party in Britain, and the highly ideological miners' strike, testify.

A similar process seems to have occurred with regard to the possibility of the continuing survival of cultural and linguistic minorities and the salience of political and social movements claiming to represent the interests of these groups. Despite the efforts of both integrationists and radical regionalists, the nation-state remains the basic framework in which political life, both domestic and international, is acted out (4). From the nineteenth century onwards, those in positions of political, social, economic and cultural power have exercised this power either within the nation-state (in domestic affairs) or from it (in international affairs). The official interpretation of political and social reality (the Liberal version) and the principal opposition to this (Marxism, at least in the twentieth century) were also elaborated within this context. It was, therefore, assumed that societal units which hindered the process of building nation-states, which even Marxists saw as "progressive" in the sense of the progress of history, should disappear (5).

Within this latter category were "survivals" such as those societies marked by ethnic differentiation which seemed

to deny the unity and indivisibility of the "nation" identified with the modern state. The next step, the glissement of normative into explanatory analysis, proclaimed that such entities had, indeed, disappeared or would do so very shortly. As in the question of class mentioned above, there seemed to be sufficient phenomenological evidence to support such an assertion at certain periods. The apparent contradiction of these expectations by the survival of moribund societal units is the basis of the surprise spoken of by Gellner.

In any case, questions such as regionalism, ethnicity, ethnic nationalism, emerged once again onto the political agenda and, as a consequence, onto that of the social sciences. The implicit challenge to the afore-mentioned traditions led some social scientists to look again at the premises of their disciplines and this has led in turn to an enrichment of these disciplines. Concepts such as "nation", "nation-state", "federalism and federation", "the region", which were taken for granted or were given a nebulous treatment in political theory, were looked at in a fresh way.

These attempts at theorizing may be placed into two broad categories which may be called: (i) the "militant" variety and (ii) the "academic" variety. These two categories are not mutually exclusive and, indeed, often overlap. The distinction is useful, nevertheless, because it permits us to distinguish

two basic approaches to political analysis: a normative one and an attempt toward objectivity. On the hand, there is analysis which forms part of a political project, and is the ideological underpinning, justification and mobilizing tool of that project. On the other, there is analysis which pretends to a certain detachment, standing back from the situation in order to grasp more clearly the elements of that situation. This distinction, however, does not correspond completely with that found in Marxism between ideology and science , which in turn corresponds to a difference between error and truth, or between false consciousness and true consciousness. On the contrary, in both the militant and scientific varieties there is both ideology and science in the Marxist senses of these terms. In other words, both may reveal something new about the nature of political and social reality. But both also have ideological shortcomings which serve to mask these social realities. This is why it useful for both approaches to be confronted in a dialectical manner and this is the approach chosen in this Chapter.

MODELS OF INTERPRETATION

Academic models have often tended tended to be applications of general theories of either conflict or harmonization (6). One theory of conflict, mentioned above, is Marxism. This, at least in its orthodox form, could analyse the problem of regionalist and ethnic nationalist movements

only with difficulty, given its emphasis on the class struggle as the primary determinant of conflict. This meant that ethnic or regional conflict had to be interpreted in these terms, whereas, in fact, ethnicity might be more salient than class (7).

However, certain approaches, developed within the Marxist tradition, such as the theory of uneven development, have been used and found to be valuable analytical tools. An example of this is Ernest Gellner himself who uses the uneven development thesis to explain the rise of nationalism (8). According to this thesis, industrialisation has not spread or been diffused evenly, so that some regions have not benefited from its consequences - a higher standard of living and greater participation in the benefits of culture and political control.

A variation of the thesis of uneven development is the theory of internal colonialism. Internal colonialism may be seen as encompassing both the academic and militant approaches to theory. As was noted above in Chapter One, internal colonialism was first developed in France by ethnic activists themselves, and in particular by Robert Lafont (9). It was conceived there under the direct influence of the decolonization process engaged in by France since the Second World War and especially the disengagement from Algeria. If Algeria had been considered as part of the "one and

indivisible Republic" by those opposed to its secession, then its subsequent separation put this notion in question. This process was seen as one of decolonization. Ethnic activists concluded, therefore, that their regions, equally considered to be part of the "one and indivisible Republic", might also be considered as "colonies". This led to a re-interpretation of relations between the local society and the state which emphasizes certain structural features such as unequal economic exchanges, dependency, and cultural, social and political inferiority.

However, the most ambitious attempt to combine the internal colonialism thesis with that of uneven development has been made by Hechter, who tested it in the context of the British Isles. Hechter's thesis is summed up in the following paragraph :

The spatially uneven wave of modernisation over state territory creates relatively advanced and less advanced groups. As a consequence of this initial fortuitous advantage, there is a crystallization of the unequal distribution of resources and power between the two groups... This stratification system, which may be termed a cultural division of labour, contributes to the development of a distinctive ethnic identification of the two groups (10).

Beer (11) has attempted to explain the rise of ethnic nationalism in France by combining this thesis with the theory of relative deprivation as defined by Gurr : "Marginal increases in value capabilities among deprived groups tend to

increase the salience of the group's expectations" (12). After attempting to test these two theses by correlating independent and dependent variables, Beer concludes : "While internal colonialism explains the preservation of ethnic regions, rapid economic development and its attendant rising expectations explains the extra-electoral ethnic protests of the present time" (13).

Sharpe criticizes Hechter's thesis on the grounds that it does not explain why ethnic nationalism did not reach significant proportions in Scotland and Wales before the 1960s and does not explain why Ulster has consistently refused to leave the United Kingdom (14). The internal colonialism thesis seems to have even less applicability to France and it could be seen as a political slogan rather than as a theory which explains social and political phenomena. Internal colonialism as developed in France is a good example of the "militant" approach to theorizing about the problem. The basic assumption of French exponents of the theory is that there exist distinct "nations" or "peoples" which have been colonized by an imperialist power - the centralizing French state. This assumption, however, simply begs the question that has to be answered.

Another approach which shares this assumption has been developed by ethnic activists who have attempted to develop a theory of "ethnicity". A leading exponent of this approach is

Guy Héraud, a conservative federalist, who argues that France is a collection of "ethnies", each distinguished by its own language, culture and history (15). The full development of these "peoples" has been arrested by the constraints of the centralized French state ; for Héraud, this situation can be reversed only by the creation of a federalist Europe in which the nation-state no longer exists.

A key assumption of theories of "ethnicity" is that there exist distinct societal units, possessing their own territories and with distinct features such as language, customs and religion. This assumption is shared by another approach which sees "ethno-nationalism" as part of the larger phenomenon of nationalism (16). The ethnic groups within existing nation-states are seen as submerged "nations" sometimes called "micro-nations" or "nations without states". It is the last description which provides the key to understanding this approach: the "micro-nations" are understood as basically smaller versions of the larger units referred to by the "nation" in "nation-state". But, since the nineteenth century, the doctrine of nationalism associated with liberalism stated that nations ought to have states. The leap is made, therefore, to claim that submerged nations ought also to have states. The problem with this mode of analysis is that it assumes that like entities are being dealt with. But, the very literature on nationalism makes clear that the term "nation" may be used in quite distinct senses (17). The

nineteenth century concept referred to above uses nation in the sense of a voluntary association of citizens in a democratic state. This derives from the liberal doctrines of the French Revolution. The ethnic groups, however, may not constitute nations in this sense but in a more ancient sense of the word: meaning simply the place where a group is born (Latin = natus). On the level of voluntary association, such groups often identify with the so-called oppressor nation. On the other hand, as in Ireland, these identifications may change over time and in certain circumstances, so that such groups may in time constitute nations in the modern sense of the word. But, as with theories of ethnicity, ethnic nationalism tends to beg the question which should be answered.

A more academic approach to the problem is developed by Sharpe. He has recognised the importance of the uneven development thesis but considers that, by itself, it does not explain the rise of ethnic nationalism in Western Europe. For Sharpe, this is part of a general trend towards decentralization, other manifestations of which are the rise of neighbourhood councils and the reform of local government. Factors other than that of uneven development may explain this trend. With regard to the rise of ethnic nationalism, Sharpe lists these as: the presence of ethnicity; the tendency towards the disintegration of states because of the rise of international organisations and the lessening of the need for

internal cohesion because of East-West détente; the presence of states (for example, Libya) and groups (for example, Irish Northern Aid) which materially support the terrorist wings of ethnic nationalist groups; the reaction against the socio-economic forces of standardization and centralization; the fact that promotion of one's own culture may be a form of "psychic income"; small states may have economic advantages over large ones; and finally, and most importantly, the rise of representative democracy and the concept of equality: "There has to be a prior and necessary condition of regional-cum-ethnic differentiation and a degree of democratization before unevenness, of either a positive or negative kind, takes effect" (18).

The above-mentioned theories are examples of wider theories being applied to a particular problem. Theories of ethnicity and ethnic nationalism draw on anthropological models and political science models such as nationalism. The uneven development and internal colonialist theses may be seen as applications of wider theories such as Marxism to the problem of regionalism and ethnic nationalism. They may also be related to such macro-theories as the centre-periphery theories developed by André Gunder Frank, who sees centre-periphery relations on a world scale as a phenomenon of imperialism (19) and Immanuel Wallerstein, who analyses differences between elites at the centre and elites at the periphery (20).

Another "macro" approach is that of Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin who also saw the rise of regionalist movements as part of a more general problem of "centre- periphery" relations (21). Rokkan and Urwin have made a valuable contribution to the field of regional studies by clarifying the existence of different kinds of centre and different kinds of peripheries. These occur in the political, economic and cultural fields:

The key characteristics of peripheries ... are distance, difference and dependence. A periphery is located at some distance from the dominant centre or centres, and its transactions with the latter are fraught with costs. A periphery is also different from the central areas on one or more scores: while the degree of distinctiveness will vary, being to some extent a function of distances and dependence, there will invariably be some minimum level and sense of separate identity. Finally, a periphery is dependent upon one or more centres in at least one of ... three domains of behaviour: in political decision-making, in cultural standardization, and in economic life.

Corresponding to these different kinds of periphery are different kinds of centre:

Centres can be minimally defined as privileged locations within a territory. ... The location of military-administrative, economic and cultural institutions gives the first and most obvious clue to the identification of territorial centres.

Using these definitions, the authors then distinguish between countries described as monocephalic structures (all three centres are grouped near each other, as in France) and polycephalic centres (the three kinds of centre are dispersed,

as in Germany and Italy). This leads to the construction of a simple model of centre-periphery relations with different kinds of interaction - integration/resistance- between the centre and the periphery.

The model of Rokkan and Urwin is useful in so far as it helps us to distinguish different kinds of interactions between the centre and the periphery. Its drawback is that it tends to view the problem too much from the point of view of the periphery - a reaction against excessive centrist orientation of previous studies. This means that at times they underestimate the close identification with the centre by the periphery. Another problem is that, although they see different kinds of centres and peripheries, these tend to be viewed as discreet, homogeneous units. As this thesis hopes to demonstrate, the "periphery" is less homogeneous than this seems to imply.

Another valuable part of these authors' work is their "conceptual map of Europe". This attempts to place each nation or part of a nation on two axes: a north-south axis and an east-west axis: the north-south axis is the "state-culture" dimension, the east-west the "state-economy" dimension (22). The status of each unit could be determined by its position on the "conceptual map". Another way in which the centre-periphery model of Rokkan and Urwin is useful is that it

elucidates the long-term historical trends of state and nation-building.

All of these theories are useful in so far as they provide a useful historical or economic developmental background to particular conflicts. They also may help to elucidate the processes of nation- and state-building and the relations between nations and states in these processes. However, a general criticism that may be made of them is that they are "grand theories" which may be of limited value in interpreting events in particular countries. Tagil is correct in pointing to the necessity of a "middle range theory" that will combine historical perspectives with concrete empirical analysis (23). This is the approach which this thesis tries to follow, although rather differently from Tagil.

The approach developed by Sharpe is already an attempt to develop a middle range level of analysis. However, while he is correct in seeing the rise of ethnic nationalism as part of a general trend, it is necessary to examine each case individually in order to assess fully its causes and significance. It would be truer to say that the causes in each country are unique and that only after ethnic nationalism has arisen in a particular country does it become part of a general trend by tuning into or using wider tendencies such as the process of decentralization. Or rather it is necessary to distinguish two sets of causes : indigenous and external, each

reacting on the other. One of the main aims of this Chapter is to analyse some of these indigenous causes in the case of ethnic nationalism in France. These are of three kinds : historical, socio-economic and political. An examination of these may provide the beginnings of a conceptual framework which will make it possible to answer the questions posed in the first Chapter: why did regionalism arise in such a centralized state as France?; why did it emerge in some places and not in others?; why was it stronger and take different forms in some places than in others?. An attempt will then be made to construct such a conceptual framework.

Tagil suggests that, as the prerequisite for a middle range analysis of regionalism and ethnic nationalism, it is necessary to isolate the long-term historical factors in a particular country. The following section will attempt to do this.

HISTORICAL FACTORS: NATION-AND STATE-BUILDING IN FRANCE

The centralizing character of the French state is well known and was commented upon by Tocqueville and Marx in the nineteenth century as well as by contemporary writers (24). The main outlines of the modern French state may be seen emerging from the time of Richelieu, and then Louis XIV in the subjugation of the French nobility and of all Frondiste tendencies. The absolute monarch was taken to personify the

"nation" and the Revolutionaries of 1793 transferred this concept of the king's person and applied it to the "people" - the "nation" then became identified with the "one and indivisible Republic" (25). The dynamism of centralization was retained by the Jacobins as a response to internal dissension and external attack against the Revolution itself. Finally, Napoleon carried centralization to its logical conclusion by setting up the administrative system of prefects which lasted, with minor alterations, until the recent changes made by the Mitterrand regime.

If the centralized French state was thus a reality, at least in its administrative structures, it also became the basis of an ideology that was in part mythical. This is the ideology of French nationalism. But in France le mythe has the power of becoming a "fact" in the sense of becoming a factor which influences political and social behaviour. Nevertheless, it remains mythical, and when placed under the gaze of critical observation, can be shown to be an incomplete interpretation of reality. This is so in the case of French nationalism which conceived of the "nation" as an organic whole - the "one and indivisible Republic" of the Jacobins. Michelet expressed the same idea in his Histoire de la France: "L'Angleterre est un empire; l'Allemagne un pays, une race; la France est une personne." This idea of France as "person", borrowed from Rousseau (who had, however, applied it to small societies), was developed by Renan in his Qu'est-ce une

nation? In more recent times it was developed by De Gaulle who, as is well known, had a love affair with "la France", that is, with an organic abstraction, but was alleged to have despised "les Français", who might not live up to its "grandeur".

The myth of French nationalism was developed in response to a reality, and it was designed in some way to overcome that reality. In France, the myth of the "one and indivisible Republic" was an ideological tool meant to overcome the fact that France, at the time of the Revolution, was many and divided, composed of several societies distinguished by language, culture and ethnic origins. The centralizing nature of the French state and the ideology which justified it were attempts by those who controlled the state to arrest the potentially centrifugal forces that might develop in such a situation. At the time of the French Revolution there was no French "nation" but a state whose function was to create one. Thus the revolutionaries developed the concept of the "nation-state" as a weapon to be used in a political struggle. Those who used this weapon were the enlightened bourgeoisie in control at the centre of power and those local bourgeoisies seeking to overthrow the remnants of feudalism in their regions.

This historical precedence of the state over the "nation" has, in fact, been recognised by recent French leaders.

General De Gaulle, for example, in a speech delivered in Lyons on 24 March 1968, that is, before the "events" of May, declared :

L'effort multiséculaire de centralization qui fut longtemps nécessaire pour réaliser et maintenir son unité, malgré les divergences des provinces qui lui étaient successivement rattachées, ne s'impose plus désormais (26)."

President Pompidou took up the same theme :

Depuis plus de mille ans, il n'y a eu de France que parce qu'il y a eu l'Etat pour la rassembler, l'organiser, la défendre ...L'histoire nous montre que notre peuple, voué par nature aux divisions et à l'individualisme le plus extrême, n'a pu, au cours des siècles, constituer la nation française que par l'action de l'Etat (27).

Finally, President Giscard d'Estaing, in a televised speech on 4 December 1975, expressed it thus :

La France est un très ancien pays, dans lequel l'administration centrale a toujours exercé une influence importante ... Grâce à cette action nous avons été le premier pays à réaliser notre unité (28).

The first three presidents of the Fifth Republic approved of this process and felt that the "nation" had indeed been created, and that some form of decentralization was possible. This idea was also shared by the mainstream of the French left, including the Communist and Socialist parties, which were traditionally faithful in their majority to the Jacobin tradition of centralization (29).

It must be noted that the building of the French "nation", that is, of an entity whose members distinguish themselves by a common language, culture and history, and who live together in voluntary association, has been largely completed. The vast majority of those who live within the boundaries of the French state think of themselves as "French", as opposed to being German, British, or Italian. This includes those who live in the so-called ethnic regions.

Two points, however, should be made. First, the notion of "national identity" is, by definition, a subjective one in part imposed from above by a nationalistic cultural system. Secondly, the nation-building process in France has not been entirely successful. There has remained, to some extent, the ancient substratum of a patchwork of peoples, described in the previous Chapter, in which the French national identity has been superimposed on a more ancient identity, which, too, was once distinguished by a different language, culture and history. In other words, large numbers of French people have a double identity (30). It is the combination of these two factors, the incompleteness of the imposition of the French identity and the persistence in some areas of a more ancient identity, which has left an "ideological space" which various forms of regionalism have tried to fill in competition with the dominant culture. Struggles for this "space" took place in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by regionalist movements led mainly by clericals and conservatives as a means

of attacking the central government, especially when this was Republican and anti-clerical. And it is the persistence of this "space" which has left open the possibility of a resurgence of these movements in the period following the Second World War. Although there is, therefore, a continuity between earlier movements and the present ones, there are also differences. The more specific reasons why these movements have arisen in the contemporary period may now be examined.

SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS: THE DISINTEGRATION OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES

Renaud Dulong has explained the rise of Breton regionalism as being the result of the disintegration of traditional society, characterised by a pre-capitalist mode of economic production, because of the penetration of monopoly capitalism (31). The essential point is that in France there co-existed two kinds of society, each characterised by a different mode of production. In the ethnic regions of Brittany, Corsica and the Basque Country there existed a kind which Dulong describes as a "mode de production marchande", by which he seems to mean an autarkic economic system with a localised market and the remnants of a system of barter exchange. Relations within these societies were marked by conservatism, and the society was held together by a kind of corporatist ideology. In Brittany and the Basque Country it was based on the social doctrines of the Catholic Church (for instance the encyclical Rerum novarum of Leo XIII), while in

Corsica it was the solidarity of a clan system. In each of these societies local elites - the notables - played an intermediary role between what was basically an apolitical society and the central power. Grémion defines a notable as: "A man who has the power to act on the state apparatus at certain privileged levels and who, in return, sees his own power reinforced by the privileges which these contacts, so far as they are sanctioned by results, confer" (32). During the nineteenth century and for most of the Third Republic (1870-1940) these societies were tolerated by the central power, since they represented a force for conservatism in the country. It was only when the central power threatened the prerogatives of the local elites that regionalist movements developed. This happened, for example, during the anti-clerical campaign of the Third Republic.

Modern regionalism has its origins in the response of these elites faced with the disintegration of their societies whether by economic decline or by the radical restructuring which has resulted from the penetration of modern capitalism. It is the attempt by the notables either to resist this (as in the Basque Country) or to ensure it is to their advantage (as in Brittany and Corsica). In other regions - Flanders, Catalonia, Alsace and Occitania - the local elites have not been directly threatened or have more quickly come to terms with the problem. This was so in Flanders and Alsace, which shared in the post-war economic development of France, along

with other parts such as the north, the Paris region and the Rhone Valley. In Catalonia the integration of its economy with that of the wine growers of the Midi, has eroded over a longer period the existence of a pre-capitalist economy, and this is probably a principal reason why there has been little regionalist agitation in this area. Finally, "Occitania" is more of an idea than a coherent society, and so it has been difficult for regionalists to organize a cohesive movement.

The development of regionalism by the local notables produced a process of radicalization. Firstly, it allowed more radical forms of regionalism discredited after the Second World War, to re-emerge. Secondly, it was ambivalent: while it did not wish to call into question the attachment of the region to the Republic, it nevertheless implied a critique of this. This critique was then carried further by a new generation of intellectuals (who developed it first in their student days) up-rooted from the traditional society.

The latter found themselves pulled in two directions. On the one hand, living in an urban milieu (Paris, Bordeaux, Marseilles), they experienced a nostalgia for a lost world (their "nation") and tried to recapture it through the preservation of their culture and language. On the other hand, the mere fact of attending university exposed them to a new universalistic way of looking at things. Thus, in the late 1950's and early 1960's they were influenced by two wider

factors : Marxism and the process of decolonization, especially the successful struggle for independence in Algeria. They were led to criticise the moderate regionalism of their elders and developed a radical regionalism which was a potential nationalism different from the nationalism of earlier periods. Marxism allowed them to analyse the economic and political relations between their local societies and what they conceived to be the imperialism of the centralized Jacobin state. The process of decolonization gave them a model of action: the "national liberation struggle". However, such a nationalist approach found its greatest success only in those areas - Brittany, Corsica and the Basque Country - where the traditional society had survived longest and where the process of disintegration had been most rapid. In the other regions it was less evident for the reasons given above to explain the weakness of moderate regionalism. Where it did exist, for example, in Occitania, in a very weak form, this may be explained by a "contagion" effect. The result was the ideology of internal colonialism which should be regarded as being more a political weapon than a theory.

In those areas where violence has been used to promote regionalist ends there have been traditions of violence which the radical regionalists could refer to. In Brittany, separatists had used violence in the 1930s and the example of Ireland (a Celtic cousin) was not far away. In Corsica violence is part of the island's mores. In the Basque Country,

the activities of the Spanish ETA were a strong influence but it would be wrong to exaggerate the extent of this violence or the amount of support for it even among other regionalists.

Ethnic nationalism and theories of ethnicity may be criticised on the ground that there are, in fact, no "national minorities" in France, in the sense that the term itself begs the question. There do exist the remnants of societies, some more intact than others, that may once have had the possibility of becoming "nations" as France did. But all these minorities have been largely assimilated into the French polity. It is the "ideological space" which allowed regionalists and nationalists to gain a certain audience in these regions, and certain social classes used the notion of "region" or "nation" to defend or promote their own interests. By seeing ethnic nationalism as an ideological tool used in a particular socio-economic context it is possible to see more clearly the status of the different groups involved. That French nationalism has been almost completely victorious is borne out by the fact that the nationalists, as was noted in the previous Chapter, have failed to mobilize significant support around the concept of the Corsican, Breton, or Basque "nations". This is true a fortiori of the other regions.

POLITICAL REASONS

It has been argued that regionalism arose most strongly in those regions where a traditional society was undergoing a drastic restructuring of its internal and external structures. But what brought about such changes (33)? In the period of the Fourth Republic, France experienced an economic upsurge, as the Marshall Plan began to take effect and as the process of European integration facilitated the expansion of capitalism. The political leaders of the Fourth Republic encouraged these tendencies, which necessitated a break-up of the traditional system of the coexistence of two modes of production of which we have already spoken. It is this process which brought about the disintegration of the traditional societies. Dulong has described it as the "deterritorialization" of France (34). It is this which provided the external impulse for regionalism. It has been argued that the advent of the Fifth Republic was, in some ways, the "rationalisation" of this process by providing the economic infrastructure with political structures more suited to it (35). In other words, the purpose of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic was to end the political system in which the local notables could hinder the forces of economic change which were taking place. General De Gaulle encouraged this process because it was ideally suited to his programme of promoting the grandeur of France.

It was in this context of a rationalisation of the spatial dimension of economic growth that the various attempts at decentralization took place in France. Hayward has

described this as a "functional regionalism" whose purpose was to "incorporate the periphery" (36), while Wright has spoken of the "triumph of the functional approach" (37). In other words, regionalization in France was a means of reinforcing the control over the periphery by the centre, an administrative deconcentration rather than a decentralization which would have involved the devolution of real power to the regions. While the notables quickly came to terms with these developments, they provoked the process of radicalization described above. Once in existence, these movements could then feed into the other movements of revolt which developed in France especially in the period following May 1968 - autogestion, ecology, feminism, anti-authoritarianism, and so on. However, it is important to point out that the radical regionalist movements are not simply other expressions of the May 1968 movement (38). Finally, it should be noted that repression has played an important role in keeping these movements alive. This, in fact, is more important than the outside supporters of "terrorism" mentioned by Sharpe, such as Libya, whose interference in French affairs has never been proved. Repression reached its highest level under Giscard d'Estaing and his Ministers of the Interior, Poniatowski and Bonnet. This is especially true in Corsica where the heavy-handed tactics of the government confronted the island's traditional solidarity and ensured a continual flow of recruits into the FLNC (see Chapter Eight).

The factors outlined above provide a useful historical framework for understanding the rise of regionalist movements in France. It remains, however, too general and crude. It is necessary to refine it further by providing a conceptual framework which elucidates the articulation between the local society and the state.

THE STATE AND LOCAL SOCIETY IN FRANCE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

France was traditionally regarded as the model of the unitary state, occupying one end of a spectrum at the other end of which is found the federalist state. In this schema, attention was paid to the degree of administrative centralization and to the locus of political sovereignty. In both these areas France is indeed at the opposite end of the scale from a federal system. Its administrative structures were characterised by the system of prefectoral tutelle set up by Napoleon. Political sovereignty remained (and remains) firmly at the centre. Strictly speaking, France has no local governments but rather administrative entities - communes, départements and, more recently, regions. These entities are juridically incapable of passing laws binding on the central power. Their powers were and remain subject to strict control either by the Prefect, the courts or the Parisian ministries. Nevertheless, this interpretation of the French state, while valid as a description of France's administrative structures,

masked another possible interpretation of the state and its relationship with society, particularly local society.

The local society and the state

A useful method of going beyond the constitutional-legal relationships within and between administrative institutions and those who operate them is the approach known as Intergovernmental Relations (IGR). This was developed in the United States of America by authors such as Deil Wright and then applied to the United Kingdom by authors such as Rod Rhodes (39). Basically, the IGR approach postulates that relationships within and between institutions may not correspond to their constitutional and legal frameworks. On the contrary, power networks and policy communities may diverge considerably from what one might expect from such frameworks. This is what has been termed the "hidden dimension" of government. In order to analyse this "hidden dimension", scholars have used a game theory approach. The emphasis here is on the relationships between persons rather than structures and the recurring patterns of relationships and power games that take place between them.

Motivated by a desire to reform a société bloquée Michel Crozier and his associates Thoenig and Worms founded a school of organisation theory in France (40). Crozier began by applying these models of organisation theory which had been

developed in the United States to a study of the French bureaucracy. His concern was to go beyond the French tradition of basing political analysis on the idealist approach of interpreting social and political reality according to the ossified categories of past political debates. His method would be careful empirical analysis. The central notion that emerged from his study of the French bureaucracy is that of complicity: the idea that the actors involved in the bureaucratic framework are caught up in a network of mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing relationships.

These relationships are, however, indirect since the bureaucratic system is a complex of self-enclosed entities which are isolated from each other. Communication occurs via third parties. This leads to the convenient situation for everyone involved (except perhaps the public) that there is little need for anyone to take responsibility for his actions. The buck can be passed up or down as need be. Crozier points to the conservative and immobilist character of such a system and suggests ways of changing it, although he rejects any revolutionary method of doing so.

This model was then applied by Thoenig and Worms to the relations between the institutions and actors of the state - the prefects and civil servants - and the local politicians. In his seminal study, Worms emphasised the complicity that exists between the Prefect and his notables. Thoenig then

developed this analysis by constructing what is known as a "honey-comb" model, which describes the relations between the centre and periphery as consisting of a series of ascending pyramids. In each of these a more powerful actor regulates the affairs of less powerful actors. This series rises toward the centre in a zigzag fashion between the political and administrative domains.

There are exceptions to the system such as politicians holding many offices (known as the cumul de mandats) or mayors of large towns. But these exceptions, according to Thoenig, merely confirm and maintain the system since their privileges are defined in relation to it. Thus the Prefect, far from being a kind of imperialist governor (41), as federalists and regionalists claimed, is caught up in a system of mutual dependence with the local politicians. It is in the interests of both to maintain this system. For the Prefect there is the advantage that order is maintained among the local population (his principal function), while for the local politicians there is a channel by which they may tap the resources of the state for their clientèles - the main basis of their legitimacy as politicians.

Sidney Tarrow tried to develop these insights in a study comparing local politicians in France and Italy (42). Tarrow explained the differing relations between local politicians and the state in both countries by referring to their

different patterns of state development. In France, the process of centralization dates from a much longer period than in Italy. The consequence is that in the former country the administration is more coherent and efficient while in the latter it is more diffuse and inefficient. This means that in France local politicians are more integrated into the system and cooperate with it at the local level by what he calls policy brokerage. This means simply that the local politicians behave as brokers for their constituents. According to Tarrow, however, this should not be defined as clientelism since they are not involved in individualistic bargaining for clients. Instead they are involved in policy-making (in the sense of being consulted about policies) with the state actors. Their concern is to direct these policies in such a way that their commune or region benefits from them. In Italy, on the other hand, local politicians must bypass the local levels of the administration and go straight to Rome or to a higher level to plead their clients' demands. This Tarrow defines as clientelism in the stricter sense, since it involves bargaining on an individualistic basis or for individual favours. It might be remarked with regard to Tarrow's distinction that policy brokerage seems to be nothing more than clientelism adapted to a French context, since a French mayor who seeks favours for his commune is not exactly concerned with the common will but with a particularistic set of demands. Furthermore, in what Tarrow calls policy brokerage one finds the same asymmetrical power relationship that is

characteristic of clientelism in its essence. Policy brokerage, therefore, may be simply another form of patron-client relations, but collective rather than particularistic and individualistic (43).

Nevertheless, the value of this analysis is that it brings out clearly the existence of local interests not identical with that of the state and of a system of mediation between these local interests and the state. It is probably not important whether we call this system policy brokerage or clientelism. It is the concept of Intergovernmental Relations, with games such as policy brokerage and mediation being played, that allows us to go beyond the simple notion of the unitary state. It also gives us a more sophisticated analysis than the excessively normative approach of the federalists and regionalists. The concepts of complicity and mediation are valuable in that they reveal some of the sources of immobilism within the French administrative system - the resistances of the prefectoral corps, civil servants and local politicians to changes within this system such as decentralization programmes (44). Although it is important not to exaggerate the notion of immobilism, nevertheless, it does remain a tendency within any bureaucratic system. This immobilism, in turn, is one factor which helped the diversity of France to survive despite the official Jacobin ideology which proclaimed the unity and indivisibility of the Republic.

There are two major criticisms which may be levelled at this model of state/ local society relations. First, it is concerned mainly with the relations between the state and the representatives of local society, less with the relationships between the latter and other groups within the local society itself (45). Second, it conceives of the state as a self-enclosed system (46). While it very usefully describes the internal functioning of this system, it does not account for changes that occur within it because of external forces. This is because it ignores the existence and influence of other variables such as economic structures, modes of production, and processes of change in these structures and modes. In other words, while there is an underlying normative concern for reform of immobilist structures in this approach, the model is trapped in its own immobilism.

It is here that another approach to understanding state/local society relations may be useful. This is the neo-marxist approach of Renaud Dulong, already referred to above, who has proposed an explanation in terms of what he calls the territorialization of French society (the existence of a dual economy) and the relations between this and state development (47). What this means, basically, is that the economic development of France has occurred in such a way that there existed alongside each other two modes of production. On the one hand, the industrial capitalism of regions such as the Paris area, the North and the East. On the other, a

traditional rural form, which Dulong describes as a "mode de production marchande", characterised by autarkic societies based on small holdings. The conservative classes who controlled the French state, until the period following the Second World War, needed this coexistence. One of the main reasons for this was because the conservative societies of rural France provided a useful bulwark against the influence of the urban working classes impregnated with different kinds of revolutionary ideas and, worse still, projects. The result was the preservation of the traditional societies alongside the urban formations.

This approach allows us to modify the Crozerian/Tarrowian model in two ways. First, it gives us a basis from which to analyse the internal relationships within the local societies. This is because it enables us to distinguish the existence of different classes and groups (rich or small peasants, large landowners, notables, intellectuals) and relate them to a particular form of society at a particular phase of development. Secondly, it introduces a dynamic element into a static model which allows us to interpret changes within the system in the context of wider processes of change. These processes are the economic development of France since the Second World War, with its accompanying programmes of industrial decentralization and administrative deconcentration but not political decentralization. These changes brought about a disruption of the traditional societies and a

consequent crisis in the regions as the subsequent breakup of the traditional relationships led to a loss of societal control by the elites.

The growth of different forms of regionalist movements with different support bases within the regions and different ideologies may be interpreted as the responses of these particular groups to this crisis. What is of interest here is the significance of this for our analysis of state/local society relations. The model allows us to interpret the changes within the local societies as resulting from the economic deterritorialization of France which has led to the disruption of these societies (48). Consequently it will be possible to identify the political and ideological responses of the specific classes and groups within the local society to the crisis. These responses vary according to the societal positions and relationships of these groups. This, in turn, allows us a better understanding of the nature of the system of mediation as being based on sets of economic relationships in a particular form of society.

There is thus a model which combines two dimensions, a vertical one, which has a tendency toward immobilism and a horizontal, dynamic one, which introduces changes into the system. The first describes the system of mediation between the local society and the state. The second explains the changes in this system, and introduces the element of group

relationships within the local society and how these in turn relate to the state. Nevertheless, we still need a concept to explain the mechanism by which such societies, which, as we have seen, are heterogeneous, are cemented together in seeming harmony.

A further refinement of the model along these lines may be made by introducing the notion of corporatism. In French, le corporatisme may be used in two senses. First, it is a pejorative term to describe groups - such as trade-unions, administrative corps - who promote their own interests against the national interest (the Rousseauesque concept of general will). When French lorry-drivers, for example, blocked roads they were described in the French press as being part of "la montée des corporatismes". The second way in which the term may be used is related to an understanding of society which derives from Christian social doctrine. In France, the main exponents of this theory were, in the nineteenth century, reactionaries such as Le Maistre. In the modern period, it may be found among federalists, regionalists and ethnic nationalists even though these groups may not call it corporatism but communalism, regionalism, ethnicity. There have been both left- and right-wing versions of the theory (49).

The theory of corporatism is both normative and descriptive. It is normative because its exponents (this

includes those who do not use the term but approve the idea) wish to preserve and promote their "organic" societies against what they see as the levelling and dehumanizing influences of the modern nation-state and the industrial, formally democratic society associated with it. These influences are described by some federalists thinkers as bringing about the "proletarianization" or "massification" of society. The political expression of this process is the system of representative and parliamentary democracy which many of the federalists despise. This also explains the abhorrence for both Marxism and Liberalism felt by traditionalist federalists and regionalists. The former social theory postulates not only the existence of social classes but explains all social reality in terms of class struggle. The latter, in their opinion, sees society as being composed of individual units (citizens) who relate to the state directly without passing through intermediary bodies such as the family, the commune, the region or the ethnie. The theory is descriptive because it does describe certain features of the rural societies which the corporatists wish to preserve. This refers to the fact that relations within these societies seem to be based on a natural harmony where each individual and group has his or its "natural" place. It is true that rural societies in France have traditionally been characterised by the existence of a large number of small peasants, mostly illiterate or ill-educated, economically separated from one other (the "sack of potatoes" of Marx's 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte). These

peasants did not, therefore, constitute a class conscious of itself, but remained only dimly aware of the existence of the state and its institutions (50). It seemed natural, then, that the "interests" of these groups would be "represented" by the articulate and politicized classes - the priests, lawyers and teachers who form the social grouping known as the notables. In other words, the kinds of relationships in such societies may be described as "corporatist" since they seem to portray a natural harmony between classes and groups. Often this corporatist system is made explicit by a direct reference to the teachings of the Church who control peasant syndicates such as the Breton Office de Landernau, as Suzanne Berger has illustrated in her work on Breton peasants and their relationship to the French state (51).

There is now a middle range theoretical framework for understanding state/local society relationships. This model has two dimensions. The horizontal dimension is provided by the concepts of plurality and economic territorialization. These two concepts go beyond the traditional understanding of France as simply a unitary state and are a reminder that this is also characterised by diversity. They provide an explanation as to why this diversity exists and has survived. The horizontal dimension also allows us to understand the socio-economic changes which this system has undergone and to interpret the actions of the different actors within the context of these changes. The concept of corporatism explains

the ideological nature of the cement by which such societies maintain an internal coherence. The vertical dimension of the model provides us with a set of concepts which help explain the articulation between the local society and the state. It is concerned with the system of public administration at the local level. The key concepts are complicity and mediation and these include the notions of policy brokerage and clientelism.

The next two sections of the thesis are an examination of the Corsican regionalist movements within this conceptual framework. Section Two examines the vertical dimension: the links between the local society and the state. It explores the phenomenon of integration-cum-differentiation and analyses the mechanisms by which the local society has preserved certain peculiarities. It is based on the three types of centre and periphery interactions referred to by Rokkan and Urwin: the administrative-political, the economic and the politico-symbolic. However, it is developed in a way that brings out the complexity of the interactions more than is the case in their model. The perspective taken in this Section is that of the centre to the periphery. Section Three begins with an application of the horizontal dimension of the model. It examines the socio-economic foundations of the local society and relates these to the vertical dimension. It then relates the emergence of moderate and radical movements to these and to the vertical dimension. In other words, Section Two takes the perspective of the local society to the state.



SECTION TWO: "LES AMBIGUITES DE LA CORSE FRANÇAISE"

Section Two looks at the Corsican problem from the point of view of the attempt by the centre to integrate a geographical territory differentiated in culture, language and history from the dominant French culture, into the French nation. It is based on the three-fold typology of centre-periphery relations advanced by Rokkan and Urwin: administrative (but not the military), economic and politico-symbolic. Chapter Three examines this phenomenon from the point of view of institutional development. Chapter Four examines it from the angle of economic developments in France and Corsica. Chapter Five looks at the political "statements" about Corsica made by elites at the centre.

CHAPTER THREE: FRENCH INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN CORSICA

This Chapter explores the phenomenon of integration-cum-differentiation on Corsica from the point of view of institutional developments on the island. It first of all examines the function of institutional development in general terms. Then it examines the role of institutions in relations between the centre and periphery in France. In particular, it notes that institutions designed to assimilate differentiated territorial units into a common polity or nation may, in fact, help to maintain differentiation. Finally, it analyses the phenomenon of institution-building in the Corsican case.

Eisenstadt has suggested that "institutions or patterns of institutionalization can be defined ... as regulative principles which organize most of the activities of individuals in a society into definite organizational patterns from the point of view of some perennial, basic problems of any society or ordered life" (1). Political and administrative institutions, therefore, may be seen as concrete ways in which societies have attempted to meet some of the "perennial, basic problems" of that society in a political manner, that is by an organization of the state. Politicians create new institutions or elaborate policies within existing ones, while administrators or civil servants operate within these institutions in implementing these policies.

In the case of France, one of these fundamental problems has been the contradiction between the centrifugal and centripetal forces within French society (2). The former include the Frondiste, regionalist and micro-nationalist tendencies with which this thesis is primarily concerned. The latter include monarchist, Jacobin Republican and imperialist tendencies. The nature of French institutional development at the local level has been to a large extent determined by this tug-of-war, and different régimes, with their various political and administrative institutions, present different ways of attempting to solve the problem.

Nevertheless, there seems to be one constant element in the history of French institutional development: those groups - monarchists, Republicans, or Bonapartists, whether of the left or the right - which actually held the reins of power have either created institutions or maintained preexisting ones which have reinforced the control of the centre over the periphery. This is true even if such groups have professed anti-centralist or regionalist positions prior to taking power. The differences between groups and régimes lie in the way they have actually exercised control from the centre. A student of the French administrative system, Georges Dawson, has expressed it thus:

"L'étude de l'histoire des institutions administratives locales montre que, suivant les régimes politiques, il y a prédominance des institutions déconcentrées ou des institutions décentralisées. Dans un régime d'inspiration théocratique, dont la conception métaphysique considère que le pouvoir politique est transcendant à la société, on aura évidemment une prédominance des institutions déconcentrées. Dans un régime démocratique, dont la conception métaphysique considère que le pouvoir politique est immanent à la société, on assistera au contraire à une prédominance des institutions décentralisées" (3).

The same author provides the following distinction between décentralisation and déconcentration:

"...les pouvoirs de décision abandonnés par l'administration peuvent être remis, soit à des agents dépendant directement du pouvoir central et nommés par lui - on dit alors qu'il y a déconcentration - soit remis à des organes relativement indépendants du pouvoir central et le plus souvent élus par les habitants de la circonscription - on dit alors qu'il y a décentralisation" (4).

The point is that these are two ways by which the centre has attempted to solve the basic contradiction between centrifugal and centripetal forces within French society. In the first case, deconcentration, it does so authoritatively from above without necessarily consulting or involving the population of the periphery. In the second case, it attempts to do so with the explicit collaboration of the periphery. Some, for example M. Flory, would argue that in the long term it does not really matter which method is chosen: the result is still the same - excessive centralisation (5). The position taken in this thesis, however, is that "content follows context", that is, the nature of local politics and policy-

making derives from the type of institutions themselves. The outcome depends on the type of institutions adopted and indeed integration into, or differentiation from, the centre depends on this.

One of the primary functions of the institutions of local administration in France has been to integrate local societies into the French polity or nation. In more historical terms, it could be said that these institutions have been the tools by which the French state, or at least those élites who controlled the key power positions within the state, attempted to create the French nation. As has been argued above, it was the former which created the latter (6). However, the regular resurfacing of the centrifugal forces at frequent intervals in French history is an indication that this process of integration has not been totally successful. There still remain décalages between the state and the nation, administrative or political "spaces" which these forces may attempt to fill. The "strength" or "weakness" of such movements, in terms of popular support or disruptive capacity, may taken as indications of the degree of integration or décalage.

Paradoxically, however, this disintegrative potentiality may exist because of the very institutions which were created to overcome them. A striking example of this, mentioned above in Chapter One, is Alsace-Lorraine in the period following the

First World War, when the region was returned to France after being German since 1870. In order to reintegrate the region into the French Republic two special committees were set up (7). In practice, these committees helped to maintain a sense of Alsatian difference from the rest of France and thereby contributed to the upsurge of autonomism which experienced an important growth in the interwar period (8). This phenomenon is true even in regions without the strong sense of ethnic identity such as Alsace-Lorraine possesses. The work of Worms, Thoenig and Grémion, mentioned in the previous chapter, has shown how local élites such as prefects, civil servants and notables are caught up in a set of institutions which tends toward an immobiliste situation (although it is true that important changes did occur after the Second World). It is true that this tendency toward immobilism is an integrating factor, since it discourages change in any direction. However, it also ensures that local societies are protected from the centre, even when the latter is dominated by a Jacobin ideology which proclaims the necessity of abolishing all local differences which interfere with the complete integration of the periphery into the centre.(9).

THE PREFECTORAL SYSTEM

This integrating-cum-differentiating character of the French administrative system may become clear by a brief glance at the prefectoral system. This is the centre-piece of

the system and was set up by Napoleon by the Law of 28 pluviöse An 8 (17 February 1800) (10). This law established the geographical units of local administration - the département and the commune, both created during the Revolution- and the kind of administration - an official appointed by the central Government who would act as a kind of governor directing all the administration in his département. All other officials - Sub-prefects and mayors - were theoretically subordinate to the prefect. Chaptal described this system in the following terms:

"The prefect ... transmits orders to the Sub-prefect; this latter, to the Mayors of towns, boroughs and villages... in such a way that the chain of command descends without interruption from the Minister to the subject and transmits the law and orders of the Government ... with the rapidity of electric fluid" (11)

Machin's work, The Prefect in French Public Administration, has shown that this system has generated a certain number of myths which do not always correspond with the realities of the everyday administration of the départements by the prefect. This was particularly true of the functions of the prefect as outlined above by Chaptal. The seemingly all-powerful position of the prefect in his département was modified in several important ways. First, by control from the Government itself - legislation increasingly determined the scope and nature of the prefect's powers, thereby imposing limits on them. Secondly, they were limited by social groups within the département itself: local politicians, national politicians with a popular base, pressure groups. The prefect could not afford to be on bad

terms with Deputies or Government ministers who might also be maires or members of the Conseil Général. It was often the latter who controlled the prefect and not vice versa.

This analysis is confirmed in the study by Worms which stressed the almost affective relationship between the prefect and his notables (12). Thoenig's model, known as the "honeycomb model", describes the transmission belt from the summit (the Government) to the base (the local authorities and the notables) as consisting of a series of interlocking relationships, which ascend and descend in a "zig- zag" fashion, between local politicians, civil servants and the prefect (13). The value of such studies is that they provide a conceptual framework which describes with great finesse the actual working of the system. They also lay bare one of the principal causes of immobilism in the French administrative system: those within the system benefit in different ways from it and are concerned to maintain the status quo since this would endanger their prerogatives. The concept, formulated by Michel Crozier to explain relationships within the system of bureaucracy, that encapsulates these relationships is that of complicity (14).

There have, nevertheless, been changes in the system brought about mainly by the imperatives of changes of régime. These are the approaches which emphasize either decentralization or deconcentration, in the sense these terms



have been described above. Machin also noted the secular tendency of a reduction in the powers of the prefect and a corresponding increase in the powers of local politicians. These power relationships have been expressed principally within the institutions of local Government.

The institutions of local administration have, then, a double aspect: they are the means by which local societies are integrated into the French polity; at the same time they are the means by which certain élites within the local society maintain the status quo, that is, they defend the local society from the centre. It is this ambiguity (15) which makes it possible for centrifugal forces to emerge and put into question the very institutions themselves. This is why, to appreciate the full significance of these movements, it is necessary to situate them historically and sociologically within the context of institutional development and functioning. On the other hand, a study of the movements themselves reveals how the system itself functions. The remainder of this Chapter is an exploration of this ambiguity as it has been expressed in the development of French institutions in Corsica. Firstly, it will examine those institutions common to the rest of France. Secondly, it will examine what is peculiar to Corsica. Finally, it will attempt to assess the extent to which institutions have contributed to Corsica being integrated into or differentiated from the rest of the French nation.

But before looking at French institutions in Corsica, it will be useful to examine the situation before the French took possession of the island.

PRE-FRENCH CORSICA

It is impossible to appreciate the nature of French institutions in Corsica without seeing the continuity with, and differences from, what went before. Before the Corsican revolt of 1729-1769 and the annexation by France in 1768-9, both *de jure* and de facto sovereignty over the island was exercised by Genoa. The status of the island in the Genoese system was that of a colony which the Republic wished to exploit agriculturally because its own hinterland was unsuitable for producing foodstuffs. Native Corsicans were largely excluded from the administration of the island (16). It was this, as well as attempts by the Genoese to mettre en valeur the island but to exclude Corsicans from this development process which led to the rebellion which lasted from 1729 until 1769 (17).

This thesis cannot give a full account of this rebellion: its concern is rather with its effects on subsequent institutional development under France. The main point is that during the pre-French period the principal concern of the rebels and even of those loyal to Genoa was to find places

within the system of administration of their island. The Paolian period (1755 -69) during which "Republican" institutions were set up may be interpreted as an attempt to create a set of autonomous institutions by which the island could then be integrated into any great power which would accept it. At first, they sought such an arrangement with Genoa. When this failed they approached other powers and finally France (18).

The French did not accept this "offer" on the terms in which Paoli presented it. When annexation did occur, however, the French were more astute than their Genoese predecessors, and took into account this desire on the part of Corsicans to participate in their own administration. This took the form of coopting the principal clan leaders and also some of those who had fought with Paoli against both the Genoese and the French. The sons of such leaders were sent to the French continent to complete their studies and become loyal Frenchmen. A good example of this is Charles Buonaparte, father of Napoleon, who had been an ardent paolista but quickly became a good friend of the French military governor, Marboeuf. Napoleon's career began in a French military academy on the mainland.

FRENCH INSTITUTIONS IN CORSICA

When the French occupied Corsica in 1769, the juridical status of the island was highly ambiguous. The Genoese ceded *de facto* sovereignty by the Treaty of Versailles signed between the two powers in 1768. It retained, however, de jure sovereignty. The French agreed to pay a sum of two million livres over a number of years for the occupation of the island. Strictly speaking, therefore, the island was not "bought" as Voltaire claimed at the time and as anti-French Corsicans have repeated ever since (19). It was rather leased by the French from Genoa. Nevertheless, the French knew that the island would never be returned to the latter and proceeded to set up institutions as if it were also the de jure occupant. The problem was that the Corsicans themselves were unsure of their status and it seems that many wished to remain French and feared a return to Genoa.

The French regarded their new possession in the same way that it did other colonies and saw it as a champ d'expérience of institutional reform and of economic development (20). These experiments are revealing as they illustrate some of the continuities of institutional development in Corsica. The aim of the movement was "l'application de mesures éclairées visant à plus d'efficacité et d'ordre dans les institutions" (21). Corsica may have been chosen because of the challenge its peculiar traditions presented to the reformers. Eventually,

the good intentions of the reformers were modified by taking into consideration "certaines structures préexistantes" which contributed to "conférer des traits originaux à cet ensemble [d'institutions] par rapport aux autres provinces du royaume" (22). Thus, we find the two basic elements of institutional development in Corsica: the imposition of the same structures as are found in the rest of France (or, at this period, in the provinces) and a continuity with what went before.

Responsibility for the island was confided to the Secrétariat d'Etat à la Guerre, then to the Contrôle général des Finances and then, just before the Revolution, back to the Secrétariat à la Guerre. Authority was shared in an ill-defined way between an Intendant and a military Commandant en chef (23). The island was given the status of pays d'Etat with a representative assembly elected at various levels and in hierarchical order (nobility, clergy and Third Estate). This was the situation until the Revolution.

The erection into a pays d'Etat is an example of the island's integration into the Kingdom, since this was the status of many of the ancient provinces. At first, however, a part of the Corsican population reacted to this situation with violence which explains why the island was attached to the War Ministry and had a military governor as well as an intendant. This represented the element of differentiation. The violence was both traditional banditry and vendettas, but also

"l'expression d'une volonté de rejet à l'égard d'une domination étrangère oppressive et brutale" (24). This, however, was only temporary and, as time passed, a "nombre de notables s'accommodaient de la nouvelle situation où ils cherchaient à se faire une place" (25).

REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE IN CORSICA

It was during the Revolution and the Empire periods that the ambiguity of Corsica's constitutional status and its relationship with the rest of France was resolved, at least on the juridical and institutional levels, that is, at the level of the island's administrative structures. Formally at least, the island became French à part entière. This "integration", however, was not achieved without serious obstacles from both within and without the island. Furthermore, the formal or legal integration was not immediately translated onto the sociological and political levels.

The most serious obstacle to integration came from within the island itself. Corsican society was riven by clan rivalry and the great events of the Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars taking place in Europe were recast on the island in the terms of clan politics (the origins and nature of the clan system will be analyzed more fully below in Chapter Six). Thus, some clans supported the ancien régime, others the Revolution; among the latter some supported the Girondins, others the

Jacobins. At the beginning, however, almost all sections within Corsican society were united in one desire: to shake off Genoa forever and be attached definitively to France (26).

This desire to be treated as Frenchmen, equal to all other Frenchmen, is evident in the satisfaction with which Corsicans responded to the invitation to send Deputies to the Etats généraux in 1789. This was a concrete manifestation on the part of the French monarchy that Corsicans were recognized as fully French. As Pomponi comments:

Les quatre députés de la Corse, porteurs des doléances de leur compatriotes, rejoignirent l'Assemblée de Versailles en se faisant les interprètes d'un large consensus pour exprimer la satisfaction d'avoir été admis à délibérer au même titre que les représentants des autres provinces sur les affaires générales du royaume" (27).

Furthermore, the first of the list of doléances carried by the Corsican Deputies asked that the island become "partie intégrante de cette monarchie". It is true that behind this demand was the desire of the Corsican middle classes to occupy those positions in the administration of the island now occupied by French fonctionnaires. As Pascal Marchetti expresses it: "On relève aussi la revendication de l'égalité entre les Français et les Corses" (28). However, this was simply another way of asking to be fully integrated into the kingdom since the desire for integration was based on an appreciation of the advantages that it would bring. When the

Constituent Assembly was set up one of the Corsican Deputies, Cristofanu Saliceti, tabled a motion that:

"L' île de Corse est déclarée partie intégrante de l'Empire français; ses habitants seront régis par la même constitution que les autres Français. Dès ce moment, le Roi sera supplié d'y faire parvenir et publier tous les décrets de l'Assemblée nationale" (29).

This resolution was adopted by the Assembly and, as Pomponi remarks, the decree putting it into effect "fut salué en Corse dans une atmosphère de fête jusque dans les villages" (30). Despite a protest from Genoa, still theoretically sovereign over Corsica, the island now became wholly integrated constitutionally into France. Another way of saying this is that the island became fully part of the French nation by a voluntary act on its part and was accepted by the nation.

Corsica received the same administrative institutions as the rest of France. In January 1790, it became a département with Bastia as the chef-lieu on the grounds that Bastia had been the administrative centre during the Genoese period. There was no concession made to the Paolian attempt to make Corte, the geographical centre in the interior, the capital. The département was divided into nine districts each of which was divided into cantons, based on the old pievi, or parish boundaries which had been the administrative units in the Genoese, Paolian and ancien régime periods. In 1793, two départements, the Golo and the Liamone, corresponding to the geographical division caused by the range of mountains running

down the centre of the island, were created. It might be remarked that these administrative divisions tend to confirm the argument of "departmentalists" such as Bourjol who claim that the départments created at the time of the Revolution correspond largely to natural human and geographical boundaries as opposed to certain regionalists who see this as an attempt to divide such natural communities (31). In effect, the pieve may be traced back to administrative divisions existing in Roman times and subsequently taken over by the Church, while the two départements correspond to the natural division of the island as well as to the existence of two different kinds of communities known as the Terra dei Comuni (the north-east) and the Terra dei Signori (the south-west) (see below Chapter Six). Thus, the setting up in Corsica of the institutions of modern France was marked by both continuity and change. The continuity lay in the actual geographical units chosen. The change lay in the kinds of institutions themselves.

Integration, however, in a social and political sense, that is the conformity of the local population to the social mores of the ruling élites and in the willing acceptance of their right to rule, would not take place by the simple passing of a decree and the setting up of new institutions. Before this could happen, the acceptance by important sections of the Corsican population had to be won or forced. As has been already remarked, the most serious obstacle to this was

the persistence of clan rivalry which tended to try to play off nations (France, England, Spain) or factions (Royalists vs. Republicans; Girondins vs. Jacobins) against one another. The most serious incident was the attempt by Pascal Paoli to lead a rebellion against the Jacobin Revolutionaries and eventually to ask for English help to set up an Anglo-Corsican Kingdom (32). Paoli had returned from twenty years exile in London, and was acclaimed by the French Revolutionaries as a hero of liberty (a mythe paolien had grown up). He had, however, mellowed in his old age and identified with the moderate Girondins rather than with the more radical Jacobins. He protested, for example, at the execution of Louis XVI. When the Jacobins came to power in 1793, he was already under a cloud of suspicion and moves were being made by radical Corsicans close to the Jacobins to replace him. In reaction, in 1794, he invited the English, who had important strategic interests in the Mediterranean, to set up the Anglo-Corsican kingdom which attempted to combine the traditional Corsican administrative structures (the pieve) with the tradition of English parliamentarism. In reality, this became simply another set of institutions which served as the setting for clan rivalry. Paoli was eventually ousted by the English administrators, who feared his influence, and by rival clan forces. In 1796, the island was finally recaptured by the French with troops under the command of Napoleon who stated that "Il faut que la Corse soit une bonne fois française" (33).

This, however, did not occur easily. While it is true that Corsicans had wished to be French, they objected to the repression that followed their re-entry into the Republic. Charles Santoni has pointed out that during the Napoleonic period there were several important revolts by Corsicans against the French (34). Napoleon feared that the island would degenerate into a second Vendée and become a support base for the English in the Mediterranean, fears which were justified by the affair of the Anglo-corsican kingdom. When he became First Consul, he placed the island under a régime d'exception to prevent this happening. But this was the principal cause of the revolts. The Constitution of An VIII was not at first applied to the island and its administration exhibited several peculiarities (35). A decree of 1801 appointed Miot as administrateur général with wide powers, of the two départements. In January 1803, Morand became military governor and instituted what the historian Renucci, a contemporary, described as "un véritable despotisme militaire et policier" (36). At the beginning of the nineteenth century the two départements were reunited into one with Ajaccio, the home of the Emperor, as the chef-lieu. It was felt that Bastia was too oriented, economically and culturally, towards the Italian peninsula and that, by choosing Ajaccio, the island would be more easily integrated into France.

The period just outlined is important because it was at this time that Corsica received the institutions which formed its basic administrative system for most of the modern period. During the Revolution it became a département, then was divided into two départements, and finally, became one again. It is true that the island was under a régime d'exception during much of the Napoleonic period but, eventually, it received a prefect like the other départements of France.

During this period, too, may be observed the basic sociological and political realities which have characterized modern Corsica. First of all, there is the element of continuity. Despite the different sets of institutions set up during different periods - ancien régime, Revolution, Anglo-Corsican Kingdom, Empire - the administrative units always remained basically the same and were based on the old pieve system. This often corresponded to the geographical boundaries of natural human communities. Secondly, the basic sociological realities of the island did not change. The system of clans remained and was not destroyed by a new system whatever form this took. Thirdly, this translated itself politically by the institutions becoming the settings for clan struggles. Fourthly, some groups of Corsicans (or clans) revolted when they felt excluded from the benefits of attachment to the mainland. But this, at root, was based on a fundamental acceptance of, and attachment to, the French state. Fifthly, the state responded by trying to coopt some clans at the

expense of others but with the long-term aim of integrating all of Corsican society. Finally, while the institutions succeeded in "integrating" Corsicans at the formal or voluntaristic level, the peculiar interpretation they received on the island served to reinforce the sense of "differentiation".

ASSIMILATION AND DIFFERENTIATION IN MODERN CORSICA

This is not the place to give a complete history of Corsica from the Revolution until the present day. Our concern in this Chapter is rather to see how the basic features of institutional development in Corsica have either hastened integration into the French nation or strengthened the sense of differentiation of the local society. From what has been said above, it should now be clear that the situation was, to say the least, ambivalent. However, this ambivalence was present mainly on the sociological and political levels. On the level of a voluntary identification with France, most Corsicans seem to have been quite decided in their choice of France. For instance, despite attempts by modern Corsican nationalists (e.g. Marchetti) to give a nationalist interpretation to the above mentioned revolts or to the phenomenon of banditry, these would seem to have little explicit political content and should be seen more as jacqueries or inter-clan warfare. In Corsica, there was no massive rejection of the state such as occurred in Southern Italy and

the Italian islands in the period 1860-70: in Sardinia, for example, there was, during this period, a flourishing of local literature which sought to affirm the local identity against the Italian state. In Corsica, on the contrary, the local population largely identified with the French state and produced little literary output seeking to affirm a local identity (37).

Did the institutions, therefore, transform Corsicans into Frenchmen, to paraphrase Eugen Weber (38)? This is clearly not the case if to be French means to belong to a culturally and sociologically homogeneous community. This kind of assimilation was a much longer process than the voluntary association mentioned above. On this level, the institutions of the French state actually served to hinder rather than accelerate the process of assimilation.

It has already been seen that the local clan leaders quickly came to terms with the new institutions of whatever régime was in power, and their principal concern was to occupy the most important positions within them. This was the case throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The institutions of modern France were invested in Corsica with what one nineteenth observer, Paul Bourde, in his invaluable work on the Corsican clan system, called the esprit de clan (39). The esprit de clan meant simply that the interests of one's clan came uppermost. The notion of "intérêt général" was

absent. Or rather, it was invoked by the rival clan when it was in opposition and complaining about the particularistic practices of the clan in power, When it, in its turn, came to power, the situation was reversed.

The primary unit of local administration was the commune and it was here that the esprit de clan was most evident (40). The struggles of the clan were fought out in the municipal elections as if the two clans were going to war with the mairie as the prize for the victor (41). This influenced the actual functioning of the communal institutions. First of all, all means were fair in the winning of the prize. When elections were the means to do so, as in the Third Republic (1870-1940), these were marked by massive corruption. Secondly, the maire was not regarded and did not regard himself as the père de la commune, that is as someone whose position was not regarded in a partisan manner (42). On the contrary, his first duty was to protect and promote the interests of his own clan. The interests of the rival clan were to be systematically blocked, and this was to be done in a public manner.

This manner of running the local institutions was repeated at every level right up to the Conseil Général. As Delors and Murraciale describe it:

"Ils [les clans] accaparent les présidences et dévorent les sièges électifs. Les mairies, les conseils généraux, la direction des administrations locales, la présidence des sociétés d'économie mixte, rien ne semble leur échapper" (43).

This approach to running local affairs was largely tolerated by the French state. The prefect in Corsica eventually became a figure much less important than the local politicians who often were Government ministers, thus confirming Machin's analysis outlined above. This was especially so from the Second Empire on when Napoleon III, who, for sentimental reasons, showed a great interest in the island's welfare, encouraged Corsicans to enter the administration and established the tradition of having a Corsican minister in his cabinet. During the Third Republic, the Corsican minister was Emmanuel Arène, known as "U Re Manuele", who was responsible for the modern system of political clanism (44). In effect, real power on the island was in the mairies and in the Conseil Général. With the tradition of cumul des mandats the latter institution usually contained the local Deputies and Senators and was known as Le petit parlement. In Corsica, it was the prefect who often followed the instructions of these powerful figures and not vice versa. Another reason for the lack of prestige of the Corsican prefect was that the island was regarded within the prefectural corps as a posting of low status. The aim of most Corsican prefects on arriving on the island was to leave as soon as possible. They were soon astounded by the political

mores of the island and, if they objected, could be abused, even physically, by the islanders. The result was an indifference to political corruption and an apathy with regard to reforming it. This ensured the survival of corrupt practices.

CONCLUSION:

This Chapter has shown that institutional development in Corsica was characterised by the phenomenon of integration/differentiation. The former occurred by the mere fact that the island's population recognized that their material interests lay with France and that material resources were channelled by means of the institutions of local administration. They wished, therefore, to occupy the most important positions within them. On the other hand, they imbued the institutions themselves with the esprit de clan, a clientelistic mentality similar to that of Southern Italy and the other islands of the Western Mediterranean (45). The phenomenon of complicity was also present: the central state tolerated this situation of irregularity; the local notables in turn ensured the loyalty to the French state on the part of the local population. This gave to the institutions a character which, in French terms, was specifically Corsican. In turn, this helped to preserve the local Corsican culture and identity. Thus, the institutions helped to maintain a sense of differentiation.

This institutional level is important as it was the context within which other developments of a political, economic or cultural nature occurred. The following two Chapters will continue this exploration of the phenomenon of integration/differentiation. Chapter Four will examine the effect of initiatives of an economic nature. Chapter Five will look at political initiatives.

CHAPTER FOUR: CORSICA IN THE FRENCH ECONOMY

In the previous Chapter, it was suggested that the structures of local administration served both to integrate Corsican society into the French nation and, paradoxically, to preserve its specific character. Such structures are the framework within which other aspects of Corsican society, such as the economic and political, found their expression. But the island received from the centre influences of an economic and political nature which also served either to reinforce the integration or accentuate the differentiation, or both at the same time. This Chapter will deal with this phenomenon on the economic level. However, it should be pointed out that the analysis presented here is a sociological and political one rather than one based on economic theory. This means that the question of "successes" or "failures", in the sense of whether a particular economic policy produced the results it was designed to produce, is secondary to the question of its social and political effects on the local society.

The development of Corsica's economic structures was determined by two principal factors. The first was the internal geographical, topographical and societal conditions of the island itself: these will be described at greater length in Chapter Six. The second was the economic conditions and development on mainland France. The latter affected Corsica sometimes in a negative way, either by leaving the

island as it was through indifference, or by disrupting the local economy by, for example, a massive influx of cheap goods from the continent as was the case at the end of the nineteenth century. The influence was occasionally positive as when the regional economic policy of the centre brought benefits to the island. In this Chapter, therefore, we shall examine economic development in France itself to see how it affected Corsica.

The main characteristic of economic development in France and what distinguishes it from, say, Britain and Germany, is the slowness with which change occurred (1). It is even debatable whether there occurred an economic "take-off" in the Rostovian sense of the word (2). It is out of place here to discuss this problem. What is important is to recognise that the slowness with which economic change occurred meant that many parts of France retained traditional peasant societies based on a subsistence economy and polyculture, many of which lived in autarkic isolation from one another. Even those regions marked by the development of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century such as upper Normandy and Lorraine, tended to live in a kind of protectionist autarky. The conservative nature of some elements of French capitalism is well known. It could be described as the peasant mentality adapted to industrial conditions. This meant that societies such as Brittany, the French Basque Country and, a fortiori, Corsica, all marked by geographical isolation, retained their

traditional economies for long periods of time without being threatened by outside economic forces.

This system began to break down during the Second Empire with the development of the railways (3) and accelerated toward the end of the nineteenth century with the expansion of capitalism on a world-wide scale including France (4). The Third Republic, nonetheless, continued to be marked by economic conservatism and by Malthusian demographic trends (5). This had the effect of limiting les dégâts in the traditional societies which continued to be shielded from excessively brutal change. It is significant that even the crash of 1929 reached France later than other countries, and then it was in an attenuated form. Economic change was occurring and was affecting the local societies, but these were cushioned from its potentially disruptive effects by a compromise worked out between the local élites and those in control at the centre. A good example is the working relationship between the Front populaire of 1936 and the right-wing Office de Landernau, a peasant syndicate in Brittany, which has been described by Suzanne Berger (6). Furthermore, those who were affected by the changes and who were forced to emigrate from their region could be absorbed into the administrative system or into the French colonialist system.

THE FRENCH ECONOMY AND CORSICAN INTEGRATION

These trends were also true of Corsica. Throughout the nineteenth century, the island remained dominated by its traditional economic structures (see below), which were not simply traditional but archaic, in the sense that the techniques in use sometimes dated from neolithic times (7). Nevertheless, some economic development of a more modern nature did occur in the nineteenth century. As Edouard Perrier puts it: "La Corse connaît des années 1815 aux années 1870 un développement économique complexe, contradictoire, mais incontestable" (8). This development was, however, of a limited and uneven nature and the more archaic agro-pastoral economy tended to predominate. Its political and social effects were to reinforce the islanders' identification with the centre, since the development often occurred with the help of subsidies from the mainland. This was especially true during the July Monarchy and the Second Empire periods (9).

When these progressive sectors of the economy collapsed in the 1880's, there was a regression to the more subsistence form of economy. However, during the nineteenth century, the population of the island had increased from 255,000 in 1861 to 273,000 in 1881 (10). The reversion to a subsistence economy meant that the island could no longer support this excess population. The result was that emigration, which had hitherto been a trickle, turned into a flood. Janine Renucci

used another metaphor, taken from medical terminology, and called it the virus migrateur, (11), that is, a kind of disease which ravaged the island affecting every family.

This had important political and social effects. First, the French state had to step in to assist the local population. It did so by direct subsidies which were proportionately greater than for any other French region. It also facilitated access for Corsicans into the police, army, customs and civil service, and to the Colonies, especially in North Africa (12). Secondly, it allowed the local clan leaders to administer this system. Thus, while many parts of France lived in economic torpor during the Third Republic, Corsica lived in the isolation of its système assistenciel. The most important political effect was that almost all Corsicans identified completely with the French state. The exceptions were a few intellectuals who tried to stir the population into a consciousness of their situation by adopting regionalist slogans. However, they seem to have had little success in this enterprise (13). These tendencies were accentuated by the catastrophe of the First World War when Corsica, like other rural regions of France, suffered a heavy loss of man-power. This loss, however, simply reinforced the identification with France, in the sense that Corsicans were proud of the fact that they had fought for their country. Finally, although Corsicans were deprived economically, they were still better off than their Italian neighbours. In fact, each year about

twenty thousand of these, pejoratively referred to by Corsicans as Lucchesi (as many of them originated from Lucca in Tuscany), arrived to perform the seasonal work which many Corsicans despised. The latter preferred the more attractive positions within the state bureaucracy. It may be concluded, therefore, that integration, in the sense of identification with the French state, which is in itself a French identity, was reinforced by these economic trends, whether they were of a negative or positive nature.

THE FRENCH ECONOMY AND CORSICAN DIFFERENTIATION

On the other hand, Corsica occupied a peculiar place within the French system. First of all, it was the metropolitan département which received the most assistance (14). Secondly, it seemed to many Frenchmen that Corsicans were characterised by an unwillingness to work. This was based on their predilection for non-manual positions within the administrative system. In fact, this opinion was exaggerated. It is true that Corsicans preferred non-manual over manual work. But such a predilection seems to be shared by most of the human race including those who criticised Corsicans. Furthermore, by failing to develop the Corsican economy and by operating the système assistenciel, the French state encouraged this phenomenon. Finally, the Corsican economy which did survive - the agro-pastoral economy of the mountainous interior - was, as we have seen, of the most

retrograde type and marked by primitive techniques and low yields. This marked Corsicans off from other rural regions which had more advanced systems. All of this heightened the sense of specificity which Corsicans felt towards themselves and which other Frenchmen felt toward them. Such attitudes mutually reinforced each other. Thus, their economic situation made Corsicans identify strongly with the French state, nation and empire, while at the same time it reinforced their sense of specificity. The latter, however, led to a feeling of inferiority which made Corsicans try to reinforce the former. That is, they wished to show they were super-français as we shall see in Chapter Seven on moderate regionalism.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1945

It is generally recognised that France, for thirty years after 1945 (les Trente Glorieuses), experienced rapid and important economic changes. As Fohlen expresses it:

The recovery (from the devastation of World War II) was undeniably spectacular, particularly after 1948... Changes as radical and fundamental as these had been unknown since Napoleon III. Indeed, so radical and fundamental are they that we may wonder whether we are not witnessing a veritable industrial revolution (15).

The same analysis is shared by Maurice Niveau:

L'histoire économique de la France depuis la fin de la dernière guerre est celle de sa croissance et de son développement. Malgré les échecs rencontrés ici ou là, malgré les méfaits de l'inflation, le redressement économique français amorcé depuis vingt ans a été considérable ... Jamais dans notre histoire nous n'avions connu une telle prospérité continue, une telle hausse du niveau de vie et, peut-être, une telle "révolution économique" (16).

The rapid economic growth following the Second World War brought about important changes in French society and politics. Our concern here is principally with its effects on Corsican society and its relationship with the French state and how it affected the problem of centre-periphery relationships, that is, the processes of integration and differentiation.

This problem may become clearer by placing it within the context of the different phases in which the French economic miracle took place (17). Firstly, there was the phase 1945-55/6 in which national recovery was emphasised. This was to be achieved by reconstructing the most important economic sectors (steel, coal, transport, related external economies) by means of indicative planning. The great architect of this was Jean Monnet who was responsible for drawing up the First Plan. This phase of economic planning paid little attention to the regional aspects of economic planning.

There was, nevertheless, a growing awareness of the regional dimension of planning and in particular of the

disparities between the regions and the Parisian metropolis. The best known work which drew attention to this was Paris et le désert français by Jean-François Gravier (18). There was also at this period a flourishing of interest groups within the regions which began to compile dossiers on the economic and social plight of their societies (e.g. the CELIB - see Chapter One above). Such groups, or rather those in control of them at this time, emphasised the economic dimension of the regional problem and played down political demands, that is, demands for constitutional change. One of the results of this movement was that around the mid-1950's, a series of Plans d'Action régionale (PAR's) were drawn up by the central Government to form the basis of regional economic policy. Although these plans were related to the overall national plan, they were not yet fully integrated into it (19). Furthermore, their principal concern was to reduce unemployment in, and slow down emigration from, the regions. There was a fear of the potentially dangerous political and social effects of the rural exodus which began to accelerate all over Western Europe. This was especially important in still heavily rural France. The Government, in response to this situation, promoted a policy of industrial decentralization (20). Nevertheless, there was still little awareness of the importance of regional policy as a dimension of national policy .

This awareness came about in the period following 1958, that is with the advent of the Fifth Republic, and may be found in the Third and Fourth Plans. From then on there would be a continuing attempt to integrate regional policy and national economic planning. However, the result of this approach was a diminution of the control of the periphery over its own economic development, and certain regions which had been favoured under the previous approach were quietly forgotten. This was because in the policy approach developed by the Gaullists priority was given once again to national economic development, and those regions (including Paris) which were already strong or showed potential to be, were favoured over the weaker ones. This is expressed in a comment on regional development by Michel Debré, De Gaulle's first Prime Minister: "L'aménagement du territoire a pour premier objectif de maintenir et de développer la prospérité des régions florissantes. La seconde ligne d'action capitale ... c'est l'aménagement de la région parisienne" (21).

This economic Darwinism was tempered only by the growing recognition that Paris was in danger of becoming an economic liability, as the number of its inhabitants and the social costs of further industrial development had passed a certain threshold. Accordingly, the policy of industrial decentralization was continued, but in the regions themselves the approach of "growth centres" was adopted. This was based on the idea that large cities in the provinces should be

developed so that they might act as a counter-weight to Paris and at the same time stimulate growth in the areas surrounding them. The twenty-two economic regions of the PAR's were reduced to seven "growth areas".

The early regional policy of the Fourth Republic had an underlying technocratic philosophy which interpreted economic development in terms of capitalist growth. Nevertheless, this was constrained by the influence of the regional notables who remained aware of the societal and human aspects of economic development. Under the Fifth Republic many such constraints were swept aside with the decline of influence of the notables and the priority given to overall national development. It is at this time, as we shall see below in the Chapter on radical regionalism, that the radicalization of the regionalist movements took place.

CORSICA AND FRENCH REGIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

How did this affect Corsica? First of all, Corsica, in the period following the Second World War, was left behind by the economic reconstruction which, as we have seen, paid little attention to the regional dimension. The island's already moribund economy had received a severe blow as a result of the heavy fighting which accompanied the Liberation in 1943 and which had caused serious damage to the island's infra-structure (22). Roads were damaged, bridges destroyed,

and an entire section of the small railway put out of service. Furthermore, American bombers dropped their load on the port of Bastia - destroying the harbour and killing many of the town's inhabitants who gathered after the Germans had left! Since Corsica was the first département of French soil to be liberated from the Occupant and since this liberation had taken place mainly on the initiative of the Corsicans themselves, the latter felt that the central Government should take swift action to repair the damage caused.

Governmental action was taken, but only very slowly. The first serious assessment of the island's economic situation did not take place until 1949 (23). And it was not until 1957, that the island, although it was officially attached to the economic region of Provence-Côte d'Azur. received its own Plan d'Action Régionale, as part of the regional policy initiatives outlined above. This became law in 1957 and began to be implemented in 1958 (24).

This period from 1943 until 1957 is important from the point of view of this thesis since it was then that the seeds which would sprout as the regionalist movements were being sown. Indeed, the latter existed in embryonic form but needed something to catalyze them into action and unity. First of all, the islanders developed a sense of disappointment based precisely on their strong identification with the French nation and state. They had proved their "Frenchness" by

helping to liberate themselves in 1943 and yet the nation seemed unconcerned with their economic plight. This corresponded to the first phase of economic policy outlined above and may be called the period of relative deprivation. However, the very strength of the Corsicans' identification with France also reinforced their feeling of differentiation, since the old feeling of being abandoned by the state was dominant. At this period, however, few wished to question the attachment of the island to the French Republic. The granting of the PAR in 1957 raised hopes, and reinforced the identification but, in a subtle way, maintained the sense of differentiation, as we shall see below. Finally, the Gaullist period led to a sense of frustration which led some Corsicans to call into question the attachment of the island to France or at least the nature of the link. Central to these developments was the Plan d'Action régionale and it is therefore necessary to examine this in some detail.

THE CORSICAN PLAN D'ACTION REGIONALE OF 1957

The Corsican PAR of 1957 deserves special attention for several reasons. First, it represents the most important effort by any French Government to develop economically the island since annexation in 1769. Second, this mise en valeur has borne fruits, even if these fruits have had a bitter taste for some of the islanders. Third, the form of economic development, and especially the change after 1958, have had

important effects on the island's traditional societal structures. Fourth, the development brought into the open more than ever before the ambiguities of French/Corsican relations. It is, thus, one of the basic factors which has led to the rise of contemporary regionalism. The effects of these points will be seen in greater detail in the Chapters on the regionalist movements. This Chapter is principally concerned with the integration/differentiation factor.

The PAR for Corsica was an instance of a general programme and at the same time recognised the island's specificity. It was one of the series of PAR's made possible by a decree of 30th June 1955 (25). The purpose of the PAR's was to promote "l'expansion économique et sociale des différentes régions et en particulier de celles qui souffrent de sous-emploi ou d'un développement économique insuffisant" (Art 1). They would coordinate the activities of the different départements of the administration with projects "dus aux initiatives locales publiques et aux initiatives privées bénéficiant du concours financier de l'Etat ou d'une collectivité publique" (Art 2). The PAR's, then, were to reduce unemployment and economic backwardness in the regions by an economic development based on collaboration between the state, the local authorities and private enterprise.

It was recognised, however, that Corsica had specific problems not to be found in other regions. This was why the

island was detached from the economic region of Provence-Côte d'Azur. As the Corsican PAR puts it:

La Corse est, du fait de son insularité, l'unique département de la France métropolitaine qui constitue à lui seul une région naturelle incontestable, à la différence de ceux du continent dont il y aurait eu très souvent autant de raisons valables de rattacher les franges au département voisin" (26)

Nevertheless, this mise en valeur should take place in the context of France as a whole, as part of "une expansion harmonieuse en toutes ses composantes de l'ensemble de l'économie française" (27). Thus the aim was to integrate more fully the island into France as a whole while at the same time recognizing its specificity.

THE AIMS OF THE CORSICAN PAR

The authors of the PAR saw the continuing depopulation of the island as being the most serious symptom of its dire economic situation. The seriousness of this problem became clear by a comparison with other islands in the Western Mediterranean, such as Sardinia and the Balearic Islands. In 1955, Corsica's population density was 20 inhabitants/sq.km, if the two main towns of Ajaccio and Bastia were included and, if they were excluded, the density of its rural population was 15 inh/sq km. The population density of Sardinia was 53 inh/sq.km, while that of the Balearic Islands was 90 inh/sq.km. In absolute terms, Corsica's population fell from a

maximum of about 260,000 reached during the Second Empire to 180,000 at the beginning of the Fourth Republic, that is, its population had diminished by about one third. In Sardinia, on the other hand, the population rose from 853,000 at the turn of the century to 1,274,000 in 1951 - an increase of 50 per cent. That of the Balearic Islands progressed from 313,000 to around 450,000 in the same period (28) This decrease in the case of Corsica was not due to Malthusian factors. On the contrary, there was an excess of live births over deaths by about five or six thousand. The reality was that between 1000 and 1200 Corsicans were obliged to leave the island each year.

The PAR gives the reason for this exodus with brutal honesty: "L'émigration s'explique en grande partie par la faiblesse du niveau de vie insulaire, qui est probablement aussi le plus bas de la métropole" (29). The emigration reinforced, in turn, the economic degradation: "Ainsi la raréfaction du peuplement, loin de se traduire par une amélioration du pouvoir d'achat individuel de ceux qui restaient, n'a fait qu'aggraver l'enlissement de l'île dans des structures archaïques et y a entraîné à son tour une dégradation de plus en plus profonde des conditions d'existence" (30).

It then outlines the reasons for this economic degradation. The primary reason is the archaic agricultural system and the abandonment of large areas of land that could

be productive. Once again, the comparison is made with Sardinia: in the latter island, only 16.7 per cent of the surface area was unproductive, while in Corsica it was 64 per cent. The authors attack, as many previous observers had done, the survival of pastoralism which, in Corsica, was characterised by archaic techniques and poor yields in the breeds of livestock (31). Nevertheless, it stressed that Corsica has great agricultural potential: " ... il n'existe aucune discussion sur le fait que la Corse pourrait facilement nourrir sa population sédentaire et une importante clientèle touristique si elle était mise en valeur avec un minimum de soin" (32).

It is this conviction that was the basis of the proposed remedy. The above quoted phrase puts in a nut-shell the solution chosen. Agriculture would be developed but in the context of the development of tourism. In fact, it was the latter which was chosen to be the motor of the island's economic recovery: "tout fait de la Corse par prédestination un "gisement touristique" de classe internationale" (33). Rather patronisingly, the PAR felt that this option was more suited to the Corsican character: "Si les Corses manquent peut-être d'aptitudes agricoles et industrielles, ils se sont ainsi montrés parfaitement capables de gérer des hôtels et des industries touristiques" (34).

It was hoped that other sectors of the economy would be stimulated as a consequence of this development of tourism: "Ce rôle de multiplicateur économique, c'est évidemment au tourisme qu'il peut le mieux être demandé de le remplir. Il n'y a pas en effet de plus sur moyen d'attirer les hommes et les capitaux, de créer en peu de temps des débouchés, des emplois, des revenus et d'élever ainsi le niveau de vie de tous" (35). It was claimed that this had already worked in the Alpes-Maritimes , Savoy and the Balearic Islands.

However, those responsible for the PAR were concerned that it should not remain at the level of voeux pieux as had happened so often with previous governmental development projects for Corsica. For this reason, care was taken to provide the means by which the orientations of the Plan could be put into effect. It was decided that the best means were those provided by legislation already passed several years before. These were the sociétés d'économie mixte, made possible by the law of the 24 May 1951 which allowed the creation of institutions whose function was to promote major projects of regional development (organismes responsables de grands aménagements régionaux) and the decree-law of 10 November 1954 authorizing the setting up of semi-state bodies (sociétés d'économie mixte). The Corsican PAR defines the rôle of these bodies as follows.

For agriculture:

En Corse, ces deux textes devront être utilisés dans le domaine agricole pour mener à bien, grâce à l'intervention d'un maître d'oeuvre associant l'Etat et les intérêts locaux, des opérations n'ayant aucune chance de se réaliser autrement, comme les aménagements hydrauliques et le défrichement des surfaces cultivables actuellement improductives(36).

For tourism:

Le décret-loi du 10 novembre 1954 permet la mise sur pied d'une autre société d'économie mixte ayant, celle-ci, pour objet l'aménagement de l'infrastructure touristique: constructions destinées à l'hébergement, plages, établissements thermaux, etc., l'exploitation étant ensuite confiée à l'initiative privée (37).

The names given to these two bodies were the Société de la mise en valeur agricole de la Corse (S.O.M.I.V.A.C.), set up in 1957, and the Société de l'équipement touristique de la Corse (S.E.T.C.O.), set up in 1958.

THE RESULTS OF THE CORSICAN PAR

It would take us too far outside the scope of this thesis to analyse the success or failure of this programme in purely economic terms (38). Our concern is principally with its effects on the traditional society and the rise of regionalist movements. Nevertheless, it is relevant to point out that within its own terms of reference, which may be described as development according to a neo-functionalist diffusionist model, the PAR did produce some spectacular results. Since

these results have constituted an important element in the ideological battle between governmental Jacobins and radical regionalists, it is necessary here to present their main features.

It is undeniable that the previous secular trend toward depopulation of the island was stopped and, indeed, reversed:

Year	Population	<u>General rate of growth</u>	
		Corsica (%)	France (%)
1954	170,000	- - -	- - -
1962	175,000	0.4	1.0
1968	209,000	3.0	1.1

(Source: INSEE) (39).

Furthermore, several other indicators reveal an important economic growth. Between 1961 and 1971, deliveries of cement increased at an annual rate of 11.9 per cent (6.9 per cent for France as a whole). This represented an average of 79 tonnes per head of population (France = 55t). The number of Telex lines increased by 56 per cent between 1961 and 1971 (France = 22.5 per cent). Of the forty-two bank branches in existence at the end of 1971, twenty had been opened since 1969. Between 1966 and 1971, bank deposits increased by 237 per cent (Provincial France = 127 per cent) while credits

per cent (Provincial France = 127 per cent) while credits increased by 234 per cent (Provincial France = 113 per cent). (40).

More specifically, each of the areas targeted for development by the planners showed a spectacular growth. In agriculture, the value of gross agricultural product (produit brut agricole) increased by 12.4 per cent from 1957 to 1971; 10 per cent from 1957 to 1967, and 19 per cent from 1967 to 1971 (41). Tourism also showed an amazing growth in purely quantitative terms. As the PAR points out, the number of travellers arriving in Corsica went from 144,000 to 201,000 per annum between 1953 and 1956 - an increase of 40 per cent. In 1955 alone, 18 new hotels were opened (42). The PAR, therefore, sought to continue and rationalise existing trends. The success of their policy may be seen in the figure given by the Rapport Neuwirth (43), although the figures for 1956 are slightly different from those given above:

YEAR	SEA ARRIVALS	AIR ARRIVALS	TOTAL
1949	-----	-----	75,000
1953	-----	-----	144,000
1954	112,516	40,744	153,000
1955	118,409	55,255	173,664
1956	123,235	70,261	193,496
1957	143,839	65,709	209,548
1958	143,776	74,093	217,869
1959	170,787	90,450	261,237
1960	183,577	92,406	275,983

(44)

These figures may be completed up to the early seventies

(45):

YEAR	NUMBER OF TOURISTS (<u>thousands</u>)	INCOME (<u>mlns of frs</u>)
1967	341	118
1968	369	137
1969	404	171
1970	445	200
1971	512	254
1972	557	301

It is clear, then, that the Corsican economy "took off" in a very dramatic way, much to the satisfaction of the

planners. Looking behind the figures, nevertheless, it becomes clear that this form of "development" despite its "miraculous" character in purely quantitative terms, contained serious contradictions. While the fact that the programme itself was defined and then actually implemented tended to be an integrating factor in Corsican - French relations, it also emphasised Corsican specificity and, more seriously, excluded certain sections of the local population.

The integrative force of the PAR lay in the fact that Corsica was at last taken seriously by the central Government, just as it had been in 1789 when Corsicans were invited to participate in the Etats Généraux. Firstly, Corsica was regarded as part of the national territory and, indeed, it was recognised that it had special problems which called for specific solutions to enable it to "catch up" with the rest of France. Secondly, some of the local politicians (e.g. the Deputy and Minister Jean Filippi) and some business leaders (e.g. Michel Martini who founded DIECO in 1960 - see Chapter on moderate regionalism) were involved in drawing up the PAR. The advice of these leaders seemed to be taken seriously (e.g. their warnings about the continuing loss of population) and some of their recommendations (the improvement of the transport system, the development of agriculture and tourism) were incorporated into the Plan. Finally, and most importantly, the Plan actually began to be implemented, and the semi-state bodies, the SOMIVAC and SETCO actually set up.

The local clan leaders, François Giacobbi and Jean-Paul de Rocca-Serra, both sat in the board which was common to both bodies, although they did not occupy the key positions which were reserved for non-Corsicans.

On the other hand, the PAR itself reinforced the sense that Corsica was different. It has already been seen how the first article recognised the island's specificity based on the fact of insularity. A specific response was required for a specific set of problems:

"... les caractères qu'elle présente et surtout les problèmes qu'elle pose sont si particuliers qu'il s'imposait, pour l'application du décret no 55-873 du 30 juin 1955, d'en faire l'objet d'un programme spécial d'action régionale, exceptionnellement limité en l'occurrence au cadre départemental" (46).

There is thus the affirmation that, while Corsica is French, it is not like the rest of France when considered as a geographic entity.

There is also reference to a specific Corsican character or set of attitudes: " ... l'individualisme insulaire et l'absence d'initiative économique..." (47); "Si les Corses manquent peut-être d'aptitudes agricoles et industrielles, ils se sont ... montrés parfaitement capables de gérer des hôtels et des industries touristiques" (48); "...l'erreur fut ... de postuler une révolution dans les mœurs des populations intéressées sans rien faire pour les amener à modifier

d'elles-mêmes leur comportement" (49). The condescending tone of these remarks is in line with a long tradition of superciliousness of the continentaux towards the islanders. The underlying assumption is that the Corsicans, by themselves, are incapable of taking charge of their own development. This, however, was in itself a reinforcement of the notion that Corsicans are a group distinct from other Frenchmen, and are even somewhat inferior to the latter.

If the PAR itself seems in this way to stress the difference between Corsicans and other Frenchmen, the way in which it was implemented and the results of this implementation strengthened this emphasis. The choice of the sociétés d'économie mixte rather than the traditional administrative institutions (the Conseil Général and communes) implied that the latter were unsuited to the task of carrying out economic development. The PAR describes the sociétés as "organismes moteurs suppléant à l'absence trop fréquente d'initiatives locales" (50). This analysis was repeated in the Rapport Neuwirth which states: "Au surplus, des tâches comme la mise en valeur des plaines littorales et l'aménagement rationnel des zones montagnardes excèdent manifestement les possibilités techniques et financières des collectivités corses" (51). Despite the assurance of M. Marcel Savreux, prefect of Corsica in 1957 and responsible for implementing the PAR, that "la rénovation agricole de la Corse a été voulue et entreprise par les Corses eux-mêmes" and that

"on ne saurait considérer que la Société d'Economie Mixte intervient comme un reproche et qu'elle rappelle les conseils judiciaires dont le Code Civil dote les citoyens incapables de gérer leurs biens" (52), this is, in fact, how it was interpreted by many Corsicans. This feeling of being regarded as inferior and incapable was reinforced by the exclusion of Corsicans from the key administrative posts which were confided to reclassified civil servants from North Africa (53).

THE PAR AND THE FIFTH REPUBLIC

Despite these objections which pertain to the very early period of the PAR's existence, most Corsicans were basically favourable to the programme which they saw as an important opportunity for the island. This became clear with the change of regime in 1958. The new Government backtracked on its support for the PAR and failed to provide the promised funding, as the Rapport Neuwirth later admitted (54). The SOMIVAC did little more than carry out the preliminary studies which represented only the first stage of the development process. This enraged those who basically supported the programme. As shall be seen in the Chapter on moderate regionalism, one of the first demands of the early regionalist movement was the implementation of the PAR. What concerns us at this point in our analysis is the effect of this decision on the Corsicans' sense of integration or differentiation. It

is clear that the latter regarded this as a betrayal, especially as they had, in their majority, been firm Gaullists (see next Chapter). Thus, the arrival to power of a man whose main purpose was to restore the unity and greatness of France resulted, because of an economic policy which, as we have seen above, ignored the weaker regions, in a greater sense of alienation and differentiation in the region which had most supported him.

The continuing war in Algeria, however, with its growing exodus of piéd noir settlers back to France, gave the Government an opportunity to make a gesture which they hoped would conciliate the Corsicans and at the same time solve the problem of the resettlement of the returning piéd noirs. The Government decided to reactivate the SOMIVAC by providing it with the necessary funding. However, the aim now was, not so much the mise en valeur of Corsica, as the resettlement of the piéd noirs. These repatriates, between 15 and 17,000, were destined to become the driving force behind the agricultural renewal. The climate of Corsica and the conditions of the Oriental Plain were similar to those of North Africa, and it was thought that the piéd noirs could use their experience of working in these conditions to develop agriculture in Corsica.

While the authorities denied that the repatriates were shown special favour, the Rapport Neuwirth provides figures which suggest that this was, indeed, the case: out of 100

applications made for the first allotments, SOMIVAC granted 16 to repatriates, one to an ex-colon from Guinea, and only one to a Corsican (55). This pattern repeated itself (56). There were, in fact, good reasons for this, as the Rapport Neuwirth points out: the Corsican origins of the repatriates, their superior technical skills, and the fact that candidates were required to possess the 60,000NF necessary to buy the basic equipment and which Corsican farmers were unlikely to possess.

Nevertheless, these "good reasons" did not alter the actual impact on Corsican feelings. Corsican peasants were infuriated at not being given priority over outsiders, even if the latter were of Corsican origin. Most of all, many Corsicans felt excluded from their own development despite the promises of Marcel Savreux mentioned above. Moreover, it did not help that this approach actually worked. As Janine Renucci, the analyst of the transition from the old to the new Corsica, has commented: "Ainsi le changement n'est pas d'origine insulaire. Il provient d'une initiative étatique, puis de l'installation des rapatriés. Il a été stimulé spontanément aussi par le gonflement progressif du courant touristique après 1960-65" (57).

After the arrival of the repatriates there was a spectacular growth in the agricultural sector similar to that in the tourist sector. As the following figures show:

Evolution of gross agricultural product (thousands of francs 1971)

	1963	1965	1967	1969	1971
Vineyards	38,100	51,274	68,705	156,097	200,000
Fruit	-	12,547	19,713	26,529	-
Other products	45,346	28,530	25,875	30,284	-

Total vegetable products	83,446	92,351	114,293	212,910	-

Animal Products	33,920	39,500	45,845	43,007	-

Overall Total	117,366	131,851	160,138	255,917	317,000

Proportion of vineyard (%)	32.5	38.9	42.9	61.0	63.1

(58)

The Corsican boom benefited some, who were not always Corsicans, while it excluded whole sections of the Corsican population. It was from these excluded sections as well as from parties such as the French Communist Party that a more radical critique of the development programme itself was made. Previously, moderate regionalism had accepted the basic approach of the PAR and simply demanded that it be implemented. Now, the critique was aimed precisely at the basic philosophy of the PAR itself. This will be dealt with more fully in the Chapter on radical regionalism. Here, it will suffice to draw on some elements of this critique as an

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First, it became clear that economic development was to be limited and in two ways: in the economic sectors to be stimulated and in their geographical location. This approach, based on the philosophy of encouraging "areas of growth" noted above as part of the regional policy of the Fifth Republic, found expression in the Schéma d'Aménagement de la Corse published in 1972 which simply made explicit what had been the implicit policy for the previous decade (59). Thus, tourism was given priority, agriculture came second, while industry was barely considered. Development was to take place only in a few locations on the island, mainly on the coast-line. This was interpreted as an acceptance of the abandonment of the interior, the home of the traditional society and culture.

More seriously, the benefits of development were limited to certain groups. The favour shown to the pieds noirs in the agricultural sector has already been noted. In the tourist sector too, native Corsicans did not always benefit. Those to

benefit most were large banks and multi-national corporations. As Perrier puts it: "Le marche pied construit pour faciliter l'entrée en action du grand capital a bien fonctionné, notamment pour la Banque Rothschild, la Banque de Suez, la Compagnie Paquet, la chaîne américaine Sheraton (ITT)" (60). Furthermore, the same author points out that "les plus grands hôtels et les villages de vacances fonctionnent en vase clos, sans aucune relation avec le commerce local". (61). Thus, entire sections of the peasantry and petite bourgeoisie were excluded from the economic boom.

CONCLUSION

This Chapter has shown the Corsica's sense of integration into or differentiation from the French polity on the economic level was influenced by economic initiatives or the lack of them on the part of the centre. The lack of initiatives left Corsica economically dependent on the mainland. This reinforced the identification with France. But, it also was a source of differentiation in so far as the Corsican economy was characterised by archaic methods and low productivity. This marked it off even from the poorest regions of mainland France. When economic initiatives were taken by the Government, as in the PAR of the middle 1950's, they may be said to have had a double effect. On the one hand, they served as an integrating force by virtue of being part of an overall plan of reconstruction for all of France. Most Corsicans were

in favour of the measures taken and interpreted them as a genuine attempt, at last, by the French state to take account of their very real economic problems.

But this integrating aspect contained within itself an element of differentiation. This is because the basis of the Plan was a recognition of Corsica's special problems deriving from its insularity. There were also disparaging references to the peculiar character of Corsicans. These differences implied that Corsicans were not, indeed, like other Frenchmen. There was also the implication that the traditional mediation system operated by the clans had served its day and should be supplanted by other means of channelling resources from the centre to the periphery. This threatened the basis for the legitimacy of the old system. These feelings were reinforced by the arrival on the island and the success of the North African pied noir repatriates. Finally, the actual manner of development and the limited sectors of those who benefited from it increased the alienation.

It might be said that while the institutional development described in the previous Chapter reinforced integration while maintaining differentiation, the economic initiatives described in this Chapter tended to increase differentiation more than integration. Or rather, institutional structures integrated almost the totality of the Corsican population, while economic development helped integrate some sections or

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classes while it encouraged the alienation of others: which sections or classes will be treated more fully in our analysis of the regionalist movements themselves. Finally, from this analysis it clearly emerges that there is an element of periodization as there is a move from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic. This will become clearer in the following Chapter which deals with political initiatives from the centre to the periphery.

CHAPTER FIVE: FRENCH POLITICO-SYMBOLIC "INITIATIVES" TO CORSICA

This Chapter will look at the more explicit political statements made about Corsica by political actors at the centre. Its aim is to explore the phenomenon of what I have called the "super-French" character of the Corsican identity. In effect, this is an expression of a profound insecurity on the part of Corsicans with regard to their identity: what I have called "the Corsican phobia". It traces these statements through several different régimes from annexation by France until the Governments of the Fifth Republic.

From the time of annexation by France in the eighteenth century, Corsicans suffered from what might be described as "the Corsican phobia": the fear that the island might one day leave France and be returned to Italy. The ambiguity of Corsicans' status as Frenchmen was heightened by the contradictory messages they received from the centre. On the one hand, there was the reassurance that Corsica and Corsicans were really French, nay, super-français. On the other, there was the message that Corsicans were somehow different from other Frenchmen. We have already seen in the previous two chapters how both institutional and economic development created and reinforced this ambiguity. Other kinds of symbolic messages also played their part. In literature, for example, the nineteenth century Romantics

went to Corsica to look for a contemporary version of the bon sauvage. Novelists such as Mérimée in his Columba created what became the stereotype of Corsican society: a society riven by the irrational violence of banditry and the vendetta (1). In fact, this novel is a very intelligent and sympathetic treatment of the problem of the co-existence of two distinct cultures, French and Corsican. However, most Frenchmen retained only the more "folkloric" aspects, while contemporary Corsican nationalists resent it for what they consider its unfair portrayal of their island. What counts here are the actual effects: the creation in the minds of both Frenchmen and Corsicans of an ambivalence toward Corsica and Corsicans.

This Chapter, however, will examine this phenomenon on the level of how more directly politico-symbolic messages have affected our problematic - how they have reinforced either integration or differentiation. By political messages is meant statements by those holding political power at the centre. These "statements" may take the form of discourses during visits to the island of Presidents or government Ministers or official documents concerning the island drawn up by the latter. They also include policy initiatives or the lack of them on the part of the central Government. As shall be seen, such statements or messages vary according to the regime and according to the political complexion of the Government in power.

MESSAGES FROM THE CENTRE PRIOR TO 1945

The most important statement concerning Corsica to come from the centre of political power in France was that of the Constituent Assembly of 1789 which declared Corsica to be an integral part of the French nation which has already been quoted above (see Chapter Three). This reassurance, however, was tempered by others such as that of the Jacobin Deputy Barrère which cast doubts on the revolutionary integrity, that is, on the true Frenchness, of those who did not speak the French language: for the Jacobins, being a revolutionary and belonging to the French nation were identical: "le fédéralisme et la superstition parlent bas-breton, l'émigration et la haine de la République parlent allemand, la contre-révolution parle italien [i.e. Corsican], et le fanatisme parle basque" (2).

But those who spoke the French language in France at this time were probably a minority of the inhabitants of the French territory. As Eugen Weber has shown, it was only slowly that the inhabitants of the "Hexagon" assimilated the dominant French culture (3). This was true, a fortiori, of Corsicans whose insularity and inaccessible mountainous interior helped to preserve their traditional language and culture well into the twentieth century. However, although there was a certain amount of unofficial tolerance of these

patois, at least until the Third Republic, the official disapproval led to feelings of guilt and uneasiness among some of those who spoke them (4).

Nevertheless, Corsicans were accepted as Frenchmen if they adapted to the dominant culture. This was especially true at the time of Napoleon III who showed favour to the island for sentimental reasons and encouraged Corsicans to enter the civil service. However, it led to problems when Louis-Bonaparte and his Empire fell in 1870. Some left-wing Republicans, irritated by the island's identification with Bonapartism suggested that the island be handed back to Italy. On 4 September 1870, for instance, Henri Rochefort, a left-wing journalist and member of the Government of National Defense, writing in the weekly newspaper La Lanterne, demanded "la restitution de la Corse à l'Italie pour un franc" (5). On the 15 February 1871, Dr Peyrussueau presented to the National Assembly a petition which urgently demanded "la séparation de la Corse d'avec la France et l'exclusion immédiate des députées corses de ses séances" (6). On the 6th March of the same year, Georges Clemenceau, acting on behalf of the Club positiviste of Paris, tabled a motion in the National Assembly "que la Corse cesse immédiatement et irrévocablement de faire partie de la République française" (7). These statements and petitions, which represented a widespread feeling among the Republican left at this time, were rejected by the National Assembly.

They nevertheless illustrate the ambivalence, over one hundred years after annexation by France, with which Corsica and Corsicans were regarded by at least some influential Frenchmen (although Clemenceau later changed his mind when he became Prime Minister). On the other hand, the statements could hardly be said to reassure the Corsicans themselves.

Despite this ambiguity, Corsicans later became closely involved in the colonial expansion of France (8). They also proved their identification with France during the First World War when they lost between 15 and 20,000 men on the battlefield (9). The dominant message which came from the centre after this event was that they were true Frenchmen and that Corsica was really French and would stay so. This became a live issue after Mussolini came to power in Italy, and Corsica was included as part of the Fascist regime's irredentist claims. In order to reassure the islanders, Paul Daladier arrived in Ajaccio on 2 January 1939. Paul Silvani describes the visit in the following terms:

Daladier débarque à Ajaccio sous les ovations et les cris de "A bas Mussolini, Mussolini au poteau!" La marée humaine déferle sur son passage. A ses côtés César Campinchi et les anciens ministres corses, chefs des clans qui régneront sur l'île, Adolphe Landry et François Pietri. "Comment ne retrouveriez-vous pas votre propre génie à travers le Génie de la France, vous Corses, alors que de cette île partit un jour un jeune homme qui s'appelait Bonaparte et qui devait devenir Napoléon I^{er}". (10)

It was during this visit to the island that the people of Bastia swore the famous oath of loyalty to France: "Face au monde, de toute notre âme, sur nos gloires, sur nos tombes, nous jurons de vivre et de mourir Français" (11). But, despite these reassurances, Corsica was occupied by Italian forces on 11 November 1942 (12).

THE LIBERATION AND THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

During the Occupation, Corsica distinguished itself by the strength of its resistance movement, known as the maquis, a term which came to be applied to the entire French Resistance. Many Corsicans rallied either to De Gaulle in London, or to the Communists, the two leading components of the Resistance movement. However, even those who were loyal to the Communists showed an admiration for De Gaulle and saw in him the incarnation of the French nation. Corsica liberated itself from Fascist Occupation in 1943 (13), and soon after, De Gaulle himself landed on the island. It is from this date that an alliance was cemented between the General and the islanders, a relationship which expressed the strong desire of the latter to remain French. The General reciprocated this loyalty and responded to the Corsicans with a great deal of flattery. The statements made by him at this time, either from Algiers or during visits to the island, express well how he thought of the island's relationship to France.

On the 24 September 1943, a few weeks after the island's liberation, De Gaulle made the following statement in a radio broadcast from Algiers:

Après trois ans et demi d'odieuse oppression et d'épreuves indicibles, la Corse, la Corse française, la Corse aimée et si admirée, paraît à son tour au soleil de la libération. La France entière a tressailli, d'abord parce qu'en Corse l'ennemi recule en abandonnant, sur le terrain conquis par nous, des cadavres, des prisonniers, des armes; ensuite qu'au mesure que fuit l'envahisseur, reparaît de ville en ville et de village en village, le peuple français tel qu'il est, c'est-à-dire courageux, rassemblée, résolu à la liberté. (14)

In this broadcast, De Gaulle made clear that Corsicans were the French people and that their virtues were the virtues he desired for the rest of France: in other words, the French patriotism of the Corsicans was a model for other Frenchmen. The General justified this identification between the Corsicans and the French nation by referring to the notion of "volonté nationale", which is clearly derived from Rousseau's concept of the "general will" and which the Corsicans, by their actions, had proved they possess: in the same broadcast he noted that France rejoices "de voir en Corse la volonté nationale". On 19 January 1944, he returned to the same idea: "cette volonté profonde du peuple français ... dans l'opération hardie de la libération de la Corse". (15).

Two of De Gaulle's emissaries to the island repeated this message. André Philip, Commissaire à l'intérieur du Comité d'Alger, stated at Ajaccio on 30 September 1943:

par l'action hardie des patriotes de Corse, la France a reconquis le droit de parler avec les alliées sur un pied d'égalité absolu. (16)

And, in a speech to Corsicans on 4 October 1943, General Martin stated: "Vous avez été ici les bons ambassadeurs et les bons ouvriers de la République. (17)

Finally, when De Gaulle himself eventually landed on 4 October 1943, he said the following:

La Corse a la fortune et l'honneur d'être le premier morceau libéré de la France. Ce qu'elle a fait éclater de des sentiments et de sa volonté à la lumière de sa libération démontre ce que sont les sentiments et la volonté de la Nation tout entière. (18)

Thus, the message from De Gaulle was clear: not only was Corsica French, but it incarnated the virtues of the French nation. It was this identification of Corsica with France made by De Gaulle that helps explain the attachment of the islanders to the General until the period of his accession to power.

Nevertheless, if Corsicans were super-French, this marked them off from other Frenchmen, at least in their own eyes. At this point of its historical development, one of

the principal manifestations of the island's difference was in the fervour of its attachment to France. This was recognized by De Gaulle in several speeches. During a visit to Ajaccio in 1948, he stated:

Non, la Corse n'est pas un département comme les autres. C'est un endroit où l'on discerne mieux ce qu'est la grandeur française ... c'est parce qu'elle se sent vraiment française que la Corse m'est fidèle (19).

For Corsicans, the syllogism was satisfying: De Gaulle embodied France; Corsica identified with De Gaulle; therefore Corsica was French. This is one reason why many Corsicans remained loyal to De Gaulle when he quit public office and during his traversée du désert. This identification with De Gaulle and France also expressed itself during the Algerian crisis when many Corsicans identified with Algérie française and thought that De Gaulle did also. It was local Gaullists who carried out the attempted coup in Ajaccio in 1958 in sympathy with the pié noir rebels in Algeria itself (20). Subsequently, when De Gaulle came to power, Corsicans voted massively in favour of the referendums which brought into being the Fifth Republic and which were tests of his own popularity. This was true even when the voters supported anti-Gaullist candidates at the local level (21).

But, during the Fourth Republic, it was not only De Gaulle who encouraged Corsican identification with France.

The centre-left Governments who replaced him also did so by their regional economic policy which has been dealt with in the previous Chapter.

CORSICA AND THE FIFTH REPUBLIC

Paradoxically, it was the arrival of De Gaulle to power which led to the most serious souring of relations between the islanders and the French state in recent times. This may be interpreted mainly as the result of the different approach to regional policy from that of the Fifth Republic which has been outlined in the previous Chapter. This resulted in a different kind of message which the periphery was receiving from the centre. The new équipe running the Fifth Republic was primarily concerned with creating a strong state in order to promote the grandeur of France. This meant reducing the power of the rural notables, represented mainly in the Senate and National Assembly and in the party system, and encouraging a more technocratic approach to politics and policy-making. In fact, the latter had already existed during the Fourth Republic. The concern of the Gaullists was to better adapt the state to its logic. This led in some areas to a kind of social darwinism in which the strong were encouraged to become stronger while the weak were left to fend for themselves. We have already seen this expressed in the statement of Michel Debré quoted in the previous Chapter.

In Corsica, the immediate effect was the drying up of funding for the PAR, especially for the SOMIVAC. What is important here is the political message which the periphery was receiving from the centre. Corsicans now thought that, while they had shown their loyalty to France and had supported De Gaulle as the embodiment of France, Gaullist France was now refusing to carry out its promises to Corsica. Indeed, Corsica seemed to be regarded by this France as deserving little consideration and was regarded only as a very minor part of an overall plan to develop French grandeur.

This change of attitude on the part of the élites at the centre may be perceived in a series of decisions or events which occurred after De Gaulle came to power. On 14 April 1960, Pierre Guillaumat, ministre-délégué for Atomic Energy, and Francis Perrin, High Commissioner, arrived in Ajaccio "en vue d'examiner sur place les possibilités de création d'un centre d'expérimentations nucléaires souterraines" (22). The two Government representatives envisaged carrying out underground atomic tests in the disused mines of Argentella, 15 kms south of Calvi. The response of the local politicians was immediately hostile, despite assurances that the tests would cause no danger to the local population. A local journalist, Aimé Pietri

expressed the feelings of the latter in the title of an article: "La solution au problème corse: la bombe atomique".

In the end, the Government backed down. But what is interesting are the underlying assumptions on the part of the Government which are revealed by this incident. First of all, the overriding concern of the technocrats was to improve France's force de frappe, which De Gaulle saw as being essential to the grandeur of France. Secondly, the fact that Corsica was chosen as the test-site illustrates that, for those responsible for the project, the island was regarded as being similar to any other island, such as those in the Pacific where tests were normally carried out. In other words, they did not really conceive of Corsica being part of France in the same way as, for example, Picardie or the Drôme. This, in any case, was the message received by many Corsicans.

This attitude was evident in other incidents which it will suffice to mention only briefly here. In December 1958, the Government threatened to suppress the local railway which ran between Ajaccio-Bastia-Calvi. The funding for the railway which was normally included in the national budget simply did not appear in the Finance Bill for 1959. The argument of the Government was that the transport system of the island would be more efficiently served by lorries rather than by the inefficient and slow railway. For

Corsicans, however, the railway was a symbol of their département's attachment to France, since to suppress it would have meant that Corsica would be the only département without a railway. Once again, the technocratic criteria of economic efficiency and rationalization at the national level clashed with the local vision which was based on other criteria such as identification with France. Furthermore, to suppress the railway meant dealing a severe blow to the island's interior. For radical regionalists this was another "indication" that the French state wished to destroy the Corsican ethnie.

Another bone of contention was the island's fiscal statute which had followed a special regime since the time of Napoleon (23). On 18 December 1965, the Cour de Cassation decided that "le décret impérial du 24 avril 1811 demeure applicable en Corse aussi longtemps qu'un texte législatif contraire n'apporte pas de modifications au régime exceptionnel établi par le dit décret" (24). The Finance Minister, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, did not agree. For him, the decree guaranteed tax exemptions only in those cases established by the decree when it was promulgated. This refusal to respect a statute which tried to compensate for the fact of insularity sparked off a campaign of agitation and became one of the central concerns of moderate regionalism.

What is interesting here is that while on the question of the railway, the Corsicans were demanding that they be treated on a par with the rest of France, on the question of the fiscal statute, they demanded to be treated differently. Giscard d'Estaing, on behalf of the Government, insisted that Corsica be treated on a par with the rest of France in all matters. Paradoxically, this led to a heightening of the islanders' consciousness of their own specificity.

In summary, then, the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republics and the accession of De Gaulle to power served to bring into the open latent tensions which existed in the Corsican identity. These tensions had been only faintly discernible during the Fourth Republic when Corsicans, after a slow start, were confirmed in their identity as Frenchmen. The PAR, despite its limitations and the fact that it emphasized Corsican specificity, strengthened Corsicans in the conviction that they were Frenchmen like others, since they were being invited to participate in the development of France as a whole. This was changed by De Gaulle's accession to power and a more technocratic approach to regional problems. Now, the very high expectations of Corsicans were disappointed and this led to a corresponding sense of alienation or feeling of differentiation from the whole. This pattern was accentuated in the following years of the Fifth Republic at least until the arrival to power of François Mitterrand and the

Socialist Party. However, Corsicans remained largely faithful to De Gaulle as a man and tended to blame the Government rather than the President for these problems. This is illustrated by the results of various referendums, including that of the 27th April 1969 to reform the Senate and on the regional question which led to the General's departure, when Corsicans tended to vote massively in favour of De Gaulle (25).

CORSICA UNDER POMPIDOU

President Pompidou wished to continue the Gaullist project of promoting French grandeur. What marks the Pompidolian period in particular is the emphasis on great industrial projects, many of which were carried out at the expense of aesthetic values. Pompidou shared De Gaulle's concern with creating a great industrial power, but dispensed with much of the General's rhetoric and more fanciful interpretations of the meaning of the French nation, adopting instead a more pragmatic approach.

This pragmatism and lack of concern for ideology, or the political implications of ideological terminology, became evident during the President's first visit to Corsica, on 15 August 1969, for the occasion of the bicentenary of Napoleon's birth. At the Hôtel de Ville in Ajaccio, he made the following declaration:

J'ai essayé, Monsieur le Maire d'Ajaccio, de répondre à votre attente en essayant de résoudre quelques problèmes qui vous tiennent à coeur. Il faut à la Corse une certaine autonomie. Elle se trouvait liée au référendum dont le rejet a apporté tant de bouleversements et de tristesse. Mais ce rejet n'entraîne pas celui des légitimes revendications de la Corse [my emphasis] (26)

Pompidou was clearly unaware of the political effects of the word "autonomy" in the Corsican context. Later that afternoon, it was necessary for him to clarify his statement in a written note to the Corsican parliamentarians:

S'agissant du problème de la régionalisation, le président de la République a confirmé qu'il avait toujours été favorable à l'octroi d'un statut administratif particulier à l'île et à son détachement de la région Provence-côte d'Azur. (27).

A gesture was made toward this by naming the Corsican CODER (see below) a CODEC, with slightly different powers and Corsica became a circonscription d'action régionale (28). However, this fell far short of the statute of autonomy which the radical autonomists were now demanding. In fact, it was simply a return to the status quo ante since this was the administrative situation prior to the advent of the Fifth Republic. The result was that an initiative designed to placate some of the Corsican grievances did not go far enough and merely exacerbated the conflict. Other "initiatives" emanating from the centre fuelled further this conflict. Here we will simply outline the principal ones.

In 1972, the Government published a schéma d'aménagement de la Corse, in line with similar schémas for other regions (29). The schéma, drawn up by a Mission interministérielle and the Mission régionale, betrayed an essentially technocratic view of development. It advocated an intensification of the previous form of development based on tourism and the kind of agriculture which the pieds noirs were promoting and an increase of population to 320,000. It was accepted by the local politicians only after they suggested serious modifications (30). These, however, were largely ignored by the Government. In other words, the latter had drawn up a programme to develop Corsica, without taking into consideration the advice of the local politicians. This, in turn, led to a further weakening of the political legitimacy of the latter. The reaction of the radical regionalists was even stronger: they asked, in particular, who the 320,000 inhabitants of Corsica were to be: Corsicans or non-Corsicans. This reaction betrayed the fear that the island community or ethnie was itself threatened.

This fear had been provoked by another "initiative" emanating from the centre. In 1970, the DATAR had commissioned the Hudson Institute to draw up a report on the Corsican situation (31). The results of the report were not officially published but copies were leaked to the

autonomists. The Report suggested two solutions to the Corsican problem:

either:

accélérer la disparition de l'identité culturelle corse en encourageant, par exemple, une nouvelle immigration massive en provenance de la métropole. La période de transition serait ainsi plus brève et la Corse atteindrait un niveau élevé de peuplement, environ 500,000, en majorité non corse.

or:

conserver et restaurer l'identité culturelle et les traditions corses en développant le potentiel de l'île dans son contexte.

It added that:

ne choisir aucune de ces deux options accroîtrait les difficultés. La première est douloureuse, difficile et aléatoire; la seconde semble raisonnable, sans grands risques, et pourrait se révéler intéressante et passionnante ... sans changement décisif de la politique gouvernementale, on ne peut envisager d'actions locales ou privées susceptibles de ralentir ou de modifier la détérioration de la situation. Une politique de continuité, même si on y apporte des changements majeurs, développera selon toute vraisemblance un accroissement du malaise.

In fact, it was precisely this "politique de continuité" that the Government decided to pursue. Many Corsicans, however, concluded that the it had chosen the first option: the disappearance of the Corsican people and its replacement by another population. It is less important whether the Government actually made this choice than that

some Corsicans really believed they did. This is because any further Government initiatives would be interpreted in this way by a sizeable minority. Thus, attempts to integrate further the island had as a consequence the alienation of a section of the population and the heightening of a sense of differentiation among many of the remainder.

In summary, then, the technocratic approach to French regional policy during the Fourth Republic and intensified under De Gaulle, was reinforced, or perceived as such, during the Pompidolian period. The approach continued to be applied to Corsica despite the promises of Pompidou mentioned above and despite the growing chorus of complaints from local politicians and the burgeoning radical regionalist movement. The former found their legitimacy questioned by the latter because resources were now channelled to the island by outside economic forces which escaped their control. The regionalists used this fact to attack the local politicians and the central Government whom they now accused of trying to wipe out the island community. At least, this is how they interpreted the Hudson Report. It was against this background of growing disquiet that, in 1974, President Pompidou died and was succeeded by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

CORSICA UNDER GISCARD D'ESTAING

During the early period of Giscard d'Estaing's septennat, the President wished to temper the authoritarianism of the Gaullist period and the technocratism of the Pompidolian with his own brand of "démocratie libérale avancée" (32). In fact, he did introduce several important changes of a liberal nature into French society (33). During the latter part of his septennat, however, the President became ever more distant from the French people retreating into a kind of monarchist isolation, and his Governments abandoned any liberalism except economic and introduced increasingly repressive measures (34).

These two phases of the Giscardian period were evident in his Governments' approaches to Corsica. During the election campaign of 1974, Giscard d'Estaing as candidate stated during a visit to the island:

Il y a les réalités corses; il y a les besoins - réels - de la Corse, et puis il y a le coeur de la Corse: souvenez- vous de moi et je me souviendrai de vous.(35)

This, of course, was nothing more than the traditional combination of promises and flattery which was necessary for politicians to receive votes in Corsica, and remained vague enough. However, the future President's thoughts on Corsica

were clarified further in an interview given to the Corsican magazine Kyrn:

Q. Pensez-vous que l'on doit traiter comme des séparatistes ceux qui réclament pour la Corse, dans le cadre de la Nation française, un statut d'autonomie interne lui permettant de protéger son identité culturelle et les particularismes de son économie?

VGE Bien évidemment, la réponse est négative. Je suis favorable d'une façon générale à la décentralisation des décisions, inséparable de la liberté et seule capable de susciter des initiatives individuelles. Il me semble important dans cet esprit que la Corse se fasse avec les Corses. Quant aux séparatistes réels, ils doivent avoir assez de courage pour dire qu'ils le sont. Et le courage n'est pas une vertu rare en Corse.

Q. Les mouvements autonomistes ont avancé la notion de peuple corse et demandent à l'Etat de la reconnaître juridiquement. Cette reconnaissance vous paraît-elle compatible avec l'unité nationale? A défaut de reconnaissance juridique, la notion de peuple vous paraît-elle concevable aux plans culturels et ethniques?

VGE La notion de peuple ne correspond à aucune qualification juridique autre que celle d'habitants d'une patrie. A l'intérieur de la patrie existe le droit à la diversité, qu'elle soit géographique ou ethnique. Il y a en Corse des hommes ayant des qualités particulières et des traits de tempérament propres. Toute action tendant à valoriser ces éléments caractéristiques dans un souci de développement culturel mérite le respect. Elle contribue en effet à enrichir cette diversité des cultures et des hommes qui est un des atouts de la France.(36).

Giscard d'Estaing's statement was in line with his plan for a "liberal advanced democracy" and seemed to go some way at least toward recognizing the existence of a Corsican specificity. However, the future President was clear that there would be no juridical recognition of a Corsican

peuple. The only peuple was the French one of which the Corsicans were a part. Once again, the ambiguity of Corsican-French relations is present in official thinking. This time, some hopes were raised but the limitations were also laid down.

In line with the liberal element of this approach, the Government, in 1975, sent Libert Bou, a civil servant with experience in solving regional problems, to examine the Corsican problem. Bou was appointed Chairman of the Mission interministérielle and of the Fonds d'expansion économique. The Government also appointed him Délégué au développement économique and Commissaire à la rénovation rurale - a formidable array of posts which underlined the importance of his mission.

One of Bou's first steps on arriving in Corsica was to consult the radical regionalists and to lend a sympathetic ear to their problems. He stated that he agreed with their analysis of the island's problems, but categorically refused their solution: "s'ils veulent poser comme préalable à toute discussion le problème de la réforme constitutionnelle de la République française dont la Corse fait partie intégrante ... il [ne] sera [pas] possible de faire un travail en commun, car la constitution française n'est pas négociable" (37). and "...même 200,000 Corses autonomistes ne pourraient rien changer [de la Constitution française]" (38).

The outcome of Bou's mission was the drawing up of a Charte de développement de la Corse, which contained the important phrase peuple corse in its preamble and recognised that "la crise de croissance se traduit par des déséquilibres graves, générateurs de tensions sociales, économiques et politiques contradictoires". The Charte recommended a new approach to development: "orienter le développement économique dans un sens plus conforme aux besoins de l' île, de sa population et surtout de sa jeunesse" It stated that it was necessary to "répondre aux aspirations profondes d'un peuple trop souvent incompris" (39).

The Comité économique et social, on 23 June 1975, further recommended:

1. Mettre en place des institutions nouvelles et originales par l'élection du Conseil régional au suffrage universel et à la proportionnelle - ce qui est demandé par la plupart des formations politiques de l' île, des autonomistes aux Républicains indépendants en passant par les parties de gauche et du centre - et par l'élargissement du Comité économique et social;
2. Mettre un terme à la pratique institutionnalisée de la fraude électorale par l'adoption de dispositions appropriées. (40).

The Conseil général, however, while accepting the necessity of electing regional bodies by universal suffrage, rejected that this should be by proportional representation.

The Government diluted the ideas of the document even further. The name was changed from the more solemn Charte to the simple programme. More importantly, from the point of view of the autonomists, was the dropping of any reference to the peuple corse.

The Libert Bou episode marks a further radicalization of the Corsican problem. At first, it seemed as if the Government would adopt a more liberal approach, in line with Giscard d'Estaing's promises. Bou raised such hopes and recognised the existence of a peuple corse. This reinforced Corsicans in the sentiment of differentiation. Having raised these hopes, however, the Giscardian Government did little to satisfy them. Indeed, they seemed to take away what little recognition had been given by Bou. This was done in the name of Corsica's status of being integrally a part of France. But it further alienated those elements of the population which were already alienated from it.

This, in fact, was the pattern for the remainder of Giscard d'Estaing's septennat: a liberalism which appeared willing to make some concessions combined with a heavy-handedness which eventually became police repression.

Other examples of the the liberal approach were the holding of an enquiry into the wine-growing problem, which had been directly responsible for the events of Aleria in

August 1975, and the attempt to meet the problem of insularity by the granting of a statute of continuité territoriale on 1 April 1976. Heavy-handedness, on the other hand is evident in the Government's handling of the incidents of Aleria and Bastelica-Ajaccio which resulted in the loss of lives (41). There was also an insensitivity on the part of Government ministers such as Christian Beullac, who spoke disparagingly about the Corsican language, and Michel Poniatowski who did likewise about a mythical body known as the "Union Corse", allegedly involved in Mafia-type activities (42).

It was during the Giscardian period that the sense of alienation and differentiation on the part of many Corsicans was at its height. Corsican nationalism, as opposed to the more moderate autonomism, became an important political force during this period and entered more explicitly into competition with the official Jacobin nationalism. The rise of this pur et dur nationalism may be seen as a continually hard-line response to the growing repressiveness of the Giscardian regime. However, it also had the effect of forcing other Corsicans, including the moderate regionalists, to rethink their own attachment to France. In the end, most Corsicans were concerned to emphasize their Frenchness while, at the same time, many had a secret admiration for the autonomists. Thus, it might be said that the ambiguity remained with the different elements

struggling for domination. It was not until Mitterrand was elected to power in 1981 that a more balanced attempt to reconcile these elements would be made (see Chapter Nine on Statut Particulier).

CONCLUSION

Since the time of its annexation by France, Corsica strongly identified with France. This identification was largely an expression of a deep-seated insecurity on the part of Corsicans with regard to their own identity. On the one hand, they wished to remain French and to differentiate themselves from their Italian neighbours. At certain periods, such as the period after the Second World War, they were encouraged in this identification by French leaders such as De Gaulle. However, this very strong identification with France served, paradoxically, to differentiate themselves from other Frenchmen. Furthermore, the fact that they did possess a distinct cultural identity closer to Italy than to France created an ambivalence in the minds of many Frenchmen including French leaders. This led to certain types of statement which emphasised Corsican differences. This, in turn, influenced the way in which Corsicans thought about themselves, in that it reinforced the ambivalence in their minds.

Relations between Corsica and France have been marked by ambiguity and ambivalence. The ambiguity lies in the fact that initiatives of an institutional, economic and political nature, designed to integrate the island into the French polity, often served to protect its differentiation. This led to an ambivalence both on the part of Corsicans and on the part of other Frenchmen: Corsicans were formally French, but they were also different. Another way of saying this is that while Corsica was integrated into France on the formal and legal levels this did not translate itself culturally, economically and sociologically. This led to the creation of a dual identity: Corsicans are both French and Corsican. The vertical dimension of our model - the system of mediation between the local society and state - made it possible to describe and explain this phenomenon. The following section explores the islanders' reactions to these developments. It begins by developing the horizontal dimension of the model: the socio-economic context. Then it examines the regionalist movements in relation to the vertical and horizontal dimensions.



SECTION THREE: "LE PROBLEME CORSE"

Section Three will examine the Corsican problem from the perspective of the islanders', that is, from the bottom up. It begins, in Chapter Six, with a treatment of the horizontal dimension of the theoretical model: the socio-economic context of the region. In effect, it analyses the roots of the system of mediation known as the clan system. The different kinds of regionalist movements are then analysed in relation both to this socio-economic context and to the system of mediation. Chapter Seven analyses moderate regionalism, while Chapter Eight analyses radical regionalism. The hypotheses that emerge from this treatment are that moderate regionalism comprises those socio-economic groups closest to the system of mediation: the Corsican middle-classes and their clienteles; while radical regionalism consists of those most alienated from it: old-style regionalists, the young Corsican intelligentsia, the petite bourgeoisie and peasants left out of the economic developments of post-war Corsica.

SECTION THREE: THE REGIONAL CONCEPT

Section Three will examine the regional problem from the perspective of the inhabitants, that is, from the bottom up. It begins, in Chapter Six, with a treatment of the horizontal dimension of the theoretical model: the socio-economic context of the region. In effect, it analyzes the roots of the system of mediation known as the class system. The different kinds of regionalist movements are then analyzed in relation both to this socio-economic context and to the system of mediation. Chapter Seven analyzes moderate regionalism, while Chapter Eight analyzes radical regionalism. The hypotheses that emerge from this treatment are that moderate regionalism comprises those socio-economic groups closest to the system of mediation: the dominant middle-classes and their clientelists; while radical regionalism consists of those most alienated from the old-style regionalists, the young urban intelligentsia, the petite bourgeoisie and peasants left out of the economic development of post-war Colombia.

CHAPTER SIX: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

This Chapter will apply the horizontal dimension of our model to the Corsican case: it will present and analyse the socio-economic context of the island. It begins by briefly summarizing the principal elements of Corsican history and geography. Then it looks at economic and demographic developments. This is the socio-economic background essential for understanding the emergence of distinct forms of society and culture. Finally, the Corsican political system - its internal features and its relation to the French state - is analysed in the light of these features of Corsican history and society. Particular attention is paid to the phenomenon of the clan system.

CORSICAN GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

Corsican history has been dominated by two principal factors: geography and topography. The more important of these is the former: Corsica is an island, the third largest in the Mediterranean, situated in the Gulf of Genoa (1). It is closer to Italy than to France, lying about 80 kms from Livorno (Leghorn) and 180 kms from Nice. Less than twenty kilometres to its south lies the island of Sardinia. But the second factor is also important. The German geographer Ratzel, in a celebrated phrase, described the island as a "mountain in the sea" (2). In fact, the island was formed when two separate

mountain formations collided. This has led to a natural division between the eastern and western parts of the island. These are divided by a high mountain ridge which, until recent times, was impassable for part of the year. Ratzel's description is not an exaggeration: on the entire island there exists only one extensive plain, the Oriental Plain which is about 50 kms in length and about 20 kms in breadth at its widest point. The remainder of the island consists of mountains which often plunge directly and dramatically into the sea. Another important feature of these mountains is their height. The highest peak, Monte Cinto, reaches 2,710 m while about ten others are over 2,000 m in height.

Important prehistoric sites such as Filitosa testify to early human settlements (3). However, monuments similar to those in Corsica have been found in other parts of Western Europe such as Spain and Brittany, suggesting that the island was used as a stepping stone by peoples travelling from East to West (4). In any case, what is clear is that the island was settled from early times and that an indigenous Corsican population came into being, although little is known about it. Another group which settled on the island was a colony of Phocian Greeks driven from their home in Asia Minor by pressure from the Persians (5). The Greeks founded the city of Alalia (later Aleria) on the Oriental Plain around 600 BC at roughly the same time that Marseilles was founded by people of the same origin.

The geographical position of Corsica as an island in the Western Mediterranean gave it great strategic importance for the different civilizations which grew up around the basin. As these civilizations grew in sophistication and complexity and especially when they developed great navies and extensive maritime commerce, the island became especially Prized as a landing stage between the Iberian and Italian peninsulas. It was for this reason that the town of Aleria was fought over by the Romans and Carthaginians in the 4th century BC. It was the Romans who finally captured it and, after devastating the old Greek city, rebuilt it along Roman lines (6). Using Aleria as a base, the Romans proceeded to conquer the remainder of the island and imposed a Pax Romanica which lasted for several centuries. Although Corsican slaves were not popular with the Romans because of their "untameable" disposition (7), the Corsicans seem to finally accept the Romans as their masters and adopted a version of Latin as their language (8), although some traces of the original language can still be noted in the Corsican dialect. Thus, Corsica became a part of Roman civilization and for most of this period was attached to Sardinia to form one province. Another integrating influence was the arrival of Christianity which was introduced to the island and accepted by its inhabitants at an early stage, although elements of older religious beliefs continued to be practised (9).

This pattern repeated itself throughout Corsica's history. With the breakup of the Empire, under what is known as the Barbarian Invasions, the island was occupied by barbarian tribes who had occupied North Africa and moved back up through Europe to Italy (10). Then, for a long period, Corsica was under the protection of the Papacy. During the period of the Moslem conquests of the Mediterranean and part of Europe, Corsica remained Christian and was subjected to only a superficial Moorish or, later, Saracen presence. Pisa was given control in the eleventh century but, after a struggle in the fourteenth century between Pisa and Genoa, the island became the possession of the latter which treated it as a colony. The Genoese interest in the island lay in the fact that they themselves lacked a hinterland where they could grow foodstuffs to support the city republic. Corsica was to provide such a "bread basket" (11). Finally, after an ephemeral Republic was set up by Pascal Paoli in the eighteenth century, the Genoese ceded control to the French in 1768 (12). Only twice since then has the island ceased to be controlled by France: once during the period of the Royaume Anglo-corse in 1794 and then during the Italian occupation of 1942-43 (13).

Topography has also influenced the island's history. This indeed is one of the principal explanations for an important element of continuity of this history: the existence of a societal dualism between a more primitive society of the

interior, based on village life and an agro-pastoral economy, and a more advanced urban society on the coast, in touch with continental civilization. The reason for this is the structure of the Corsican mountains. This is not fully captured by Ratzel's description which gives the impression that there is just one mountain. In fact, as noted above, there are two distinct mountain formations which meet in the centre of the island. This has created a high central ridge constituting a kind of spine, which runs from the north-west to the south-east. Until recent times, this ridge closed off one part of the island from the other for much of the winter. Branching off from this spine were ribs which descended, often abruptly, to the sea. In this way, deep valleys were formed. These valleys were often completely separated from one another. The inaccessibility of these valleys gave to the Corsicans safe retreats from the many invaders who arrived on the shores of the island. The latter, in their turn, tended to remain on the coast, especially on the Oriental Plain. The height of the mountains created three distinct sub-climates: an alpine climate; a temperate band; and a sub-tropical mediterranean climate (14). The original Corsicans tended to settle in the middle belt, and it is here that most of the villages are to be found (15). Besides being safer from outside attackers, another reason for settling in this region was that it was healthier than the malaria-infested coast which could only be inhabited only during the winter.

ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS

Fernand Braudel, speaking of the incredible diversity of France, has pointed out that each region, even each micro-region, itself contains a great diversity of climate, language, social and economic habits (16). From what has been said above, it will be clear that there is no one set of economic features or unified society on Corsica, but rather several distinct social groups each with its particular economic activities and social habits. The different climates which led to different types of economic activities have already pointed out: in the high mountains, pastoral activities predominated, mainly sheep rearing; in the middle belt there was a more settled pattern of cultivation (mainly fruit and nut trees, especially sweet chestnuts - chataignes - and olives); on the coast, vineyards were cultivated and a good quality Corsican wine was produced.

There was often conflict between the shepherds and the farmers. This arose because of the Corsican shepherd's practice of transhumance: the semi-nomadic herding of large flocks of sheep from one region to another, mainly between the high alpine meadows in the summer and the coast (what Corsicans refer to as the "plain") in the winter (17). At one time, transhumance took place between southern Corsica and northern Sardinia where several Corsican-speaking villages, peopled by the descendants of shepherds who remained behind,

may still be found. The farmers, naturally, reacted against the ravages done to their crops by passing flocks of sheep and goats (18).

Despite these differences, the great majority of the economic activities of the interior had one feature in common: their primitive and often archaic nature. Some practices, such as the burning of the maquis by the shepherds, dated from neolithic times. and the agricultural techniques used by the farmers were often of the most primitive kind. For example, most of the mills in which olives were crushed used a horizontal water-driven wheel rather than a vertical one which demanded a more sophisticated degree of technology (19). As a result of this backward agriculture the quality of live-stock was poor and the yields from them were derisory except in a few regions of the island.

In fairness to the Corsicans it must be said that the environment in which they lived was a harsh one despite the impression of luxuriousness which an occasional visitor might have (20). Although the existence of high mountains meant an abundant supply of rain water, this fell in torrential downpours during very short intervals. This meant it was hard to capture and, furthermore, was a source of erosion of the soil. Only in modern times has the technology for dam-building been available.

Added to these natural difficulties was the continual insecurity and endemic violence (see below) which persisted throughout Corsican history. This made it difficult for farmers and shepherds to develop more sophisticated techniques. Finally, the very isolation of the island communities meant they remained unaware of, and unaffected by, technical progress. Thus, the dominant economic activity of the interior may be described as a primitive form of subsistence economy, based on agro-pastoral activities.

It might be thought that fishing would be a favoured activity of Corsicans, given their closeness to the sea. In fact, most Corsicans feared the sea and preferred to remain in the safety of their mountain villages. A Corsican dicton says: "U Corsu patisce tuttu da mare in là" (All of the Corsican's misfortunes come from across the sea). The major exception was in the Cap Corse, the finger pointing toward Genoa, where a maritime tradition grew up as well as a tradition of commerce between the Cap and the Italian peninsula.

The non-native inhabitants of Corsica (Genoese and French), who settled on the coastal regions, were often impressed by the seeming luxuriousness of the island, and tried to improve the traditional activities by introducing more modern techniques. The Genoese, whose interest, as we have seen, was in turning the island into their "bread-basket", made several attempts to mettre en valeur the island,

none of which was very successful (21). Similar attempts were made by the French during the ancien régime (22).

However, it was only in the nineteenth century that progress began to be made (23). A rising rural bourgeoisie, in regions such as the Cap Corse and the Balagne, began to introduce new agricultural techniques which produced better yields. There was even some industrial development, including the beginning of heavy industry, e.g. the production of steel in foundries near Bastia using iron-ore extracted from mines on the island of Elba between Corsica and Italy.

Unfortunately, these developments came to a halt toward the end of the nineteenth century. During this period there occurred, in the Western world, a dramatic improvement in transport and manufacturing techniques which led to a world-wide expansion of capitalism with the creation of new markets. This expansion affected both the industrial and agricultural sectors on Corsica. Cheaply produced goods from outside found their way into the remotest Corsican villages to be sold at cheaper prices than the local produce. Furthermore, Corsican goods exported to the continent were penalized by a special tariff rate which favoured French produced goods (24). The result was that Corsican goods were unable to compete, and one productive sector after another, both industrial and agricultural, collapsed (25). The first to go were the industrial units followed by the more progressive agricultural

regions. These reverted to the traditional methods of subsistence farming.

By the early twentieth century, the island was in a wretched condition. An official report, known as the Rapport Clemenceau, and published on 26 September 1908, describes the island in the following terms: "Il n'y a aucun pays d'Europe qui puisse donner une idée de la misère et du dénuement actuel de la Corse" (26).

These economic trends had serious effects on the number of inhabitants of the island. Throughout the nineteenth century, the population had steadily risen reaching a peak by the 1880's (see figures presented above in Chapter Four).

As in all Mediterranean regions there was a constant emigration flow but at this time this was, relative to what was to come, a mere trickle. When the economic collapse occurred, at the end of the century, this trickle turned into a flood. Janine Renucci has described it as a virus migrateur - a kind of disease which affected every family. These trends, which were already depleting the island of its most active and valuable elements, received a disastrous impetus with the First World War. It is well known that this conflict affected principally the rural regions of France, but even compared with these Corsica was affected particularly cruelly. It is impossible to give an accurate figure of the number of losses

suffered by the island but it is safe to say that at least 20,000 men were killed or wounded (27). This represents nearly 10 per cent of a population of 270,218 thousand. The effect on the island's society was catastrophic. An already disadvantaged and moribund economy was pushed even further along an accelerating road of decline. Many Corsicans feared for the very survival of their society.

SOCIETY AND CULTURE

The forms taken by Corsican society and culture were determined, to a large extent, by these material constraints of geography and topography, and the modes of economic production that that were possible within them. These determinations were modified by extraneous factors such as the relations between the island and neighbouring states (28). Here, it is possible only to sketch the main features of Corsican society and culture and to examine them in so far as they shed light on our problematic: the duality and ambiguity of Corsican-French relations.

As mentioned above, there existed since Roman times two forms of settlement on the island which corresponded to the two types of society: an urban pattern on the coast; and a village pattern in the mountainous interior. The sizes of villages ranged from tiny hamlets, such as those which dot the Castagniccia region, to small towns such as Corte in the

central mountains and Sartène in the south. The pattern of village settlement, however, was not evenly distributed. More villages were founded on the eastern side of the mountain ridge than on the western. This was based partly on the fact that the latter region was less amenable to cultivation and partly on the fact of different societal traditions on each side of the ridge. The eastern side, known as the En dècà des Monts (i.e. with reference to the Italian peninsula) was more influenced by the Italian communalist movements and was also known as the Terra dei Comuni. The feudal system broke down more quickly in this region than in the west and this gave rise to a system of elites known as the caporali who were drawn from the ordinary people (29). The Terra dei Comuni was also more prone to insurrection against outside rulers, and many of the rebellions of Corsican history began and ended here. The Au-delà des Monts, on the other hand, was characterised by the longer survival of the feudal system and was dominated by great land-owning lords (in Corsican Sgio). It was known as the Terra dei Signori.

These different patterns of authority had their roots in an institution which was even more important than the village: the Corsican family. This was the Mediterranean family with, at its head, the paterfamilias. It extended to several branches of cousins. The family in turn was at the root of the system of clans: a group of families with one dominant family at its head, which has survived to the present day and has

been a primary determinant in Corsican political life (see below). In fact, the primary loyalty of Corsicans has been to his family and clan rather than to another unit, even his village, but especially not his region, or island.

The material basis for this loyalty to the family was the necessity of eking out a precarious existence using subsistence methods in a harsh environment (30). This led to competition for scarce resources, and the unit best suited to this struggle was the united extended family. Such a struggle also took precedence over other more abstract loyalties such as loyalty to the state or to a system of law defined by outsiders. This competition between rival clans for resources is at the root of an important characteristic of Corsican society: its conflictual nature. Within each unit of habitation - the hamlet, the village, the region, the island as a whole - there were always two parties (in Corsican partitu = clan), the bianchi and the neri, bitterly opposed to each other.

The cement which bound together the family, what might be called the cultural expression of family unity, was the notion of honour. This was a kind of corporatism, similar to the Catholic corporatism found in regions like Brittany and the Basque Country, in the sense that the individual mattered less than a larger unit - the extended family. Again this is a phenomenon to be found in all Mediterranean societies, the

best known being Sicily. "Honour" refers both to the individual's perception of himself and to his consciousness of belonging to a family unit. The two are so intertwined as to become almost indistinguishable: an affront to the honour of the individual is also an affront to the family and vice versa. An affront had to be avenged by the spilling of blood.

Here, we have the origin of another important feature of Corsican society: its propensity to violence. To kill a man who had, even trivially, affronted the honour of the family was regarded by Corsicans, not as a crime but as a duty which fell on the male members of the family. And to avenge such a killing by another death was a further obligation for the males of the family of the dead man. Such family feuds could last for generations, and the historical record shows fantastic numbers of people killed on the island at different periods, especially the Genoese period (31). What was at stake here was the ability of a family to survive against external attacks.

"Macho" behaviour did not always lead to deaths. As in southern Italy, this was often a ritualized form of behaviour where the protagonists knew the limits which they could not transgress. However, the younger, more impulsive members sometimes went beyond these limits and this sparked off the vendetta. What is remarkable is that Corsicans reserved this treatment almost uniquely for fellow-Corsicans. Visitors to

the island were usually treated with the greatest kindness and courtesy, and hospitality was considered to be both a duty and a privilege (32).

Related to this propensity to use violence was the phenomenon of banditry (33). Corsican males who had murdered a member of a rival family "took to the maquis". There they were supported by their own family. Sometimes bandits set up counter societies, controlling agricultural activities and collecting taxes from the local inhabitants. However, it would be wrong to see such phenomena as being an explicitly political reaction against legitimate authority as some later commentators have tended to do. Rather bandits often preyed on the local population in what was simply a criminal manner.

These social relations and habits may be described as part of Corsican culture, if the term culture is used in its anthropological sense (34). This may be seen as one expression of a more widespread Mediterranean culture - les grands faits méditerranéens - shared by the other peoples of the basin. More specifically, Corsicans developed a particular set of traditions - of language, music and song, which are mainly part of what may be described as Italianate civilization. During the Roman period a form of vulgar Latin , with some traces of a more ancient language, was spoken. During the long period of Genoese rule, the official language became Tuscan Italian. An unwritten dialect or, rather, set of dialects

(35), now called Corsican was also spoken. Without entering into the debate as to whether this is a dialect of Italian or a language in its own right (36), descended directly from Latin, it can be said that Italian and Corsican were so close that they existed in harmonious relationship with each other (37). Today, a Corsican speaking his own dialect has little difficulty understanding Italian or some dialects of Italian such as that found near Genoa. By contrast, there is as much difference between Corsican and standard French as there is between French and Sicilian. When French became the official language it had a conflictual relationship with Corsican (38). Among other features of Corsican culture were a distinctive musical tradition which seems to have been influenced by Italian and Arabic traditions. Finally, traditional Corsicans, despite their strong loyalty to Christianity, retained more ancient superstitions such as the mazzeri (these were individuals who could foretell the death of another by looking into the face of an animal such as a goat or sheep) (39).

The Church itself seems to have been less powerful in Corsica than in other French regions such as Brittany, French Flanders and the French Basque Country. During the Paolian period, the Corsican clergy met at a Franciscan convent in Orezza, in the Castagniccia region, to justify the revolt in their Justificazione della Rivoluzione. But, although Corsicans remained loyal to the Church during the nineteenth century, the clergy does not seem to have played an important

mediating role between the local society and the state. This, in fact, was played by the clan leaders. The sense of community solidarity which came from the social teachings of the Catholic Church in regions such as Brittany was provided in Corsica by the solidarity of the clan system and through the ancient notion of "honour".

The final relevant characteristic of Corsican society and culture of interest is its successful survival into modern times. This is a consequence first of Corsica's geographical isolation, the island being badly served in transports from mainland France, and because of the inaccessibility of its mountainous interior (40). It is also the consequence of the peculiar protection given by institutions meant to integrate the island - a phenomenon which has been analysed in Chapter Three. The result was the survival of a society with its own distinct cultural characteristics which were closer to the types of society found in southern Italy and the Italian islands. This survival was noted by nineteenth travellers such as Mérimée and Flaubert. In the second half of the nineteenth century many Corsican notables knew no French and spoke only Italian and Corsican. The literary intelligentsia around Bastia still retained many links with Italy and often expressed themselves in Italian (41). In the early years of the twentieth century the French courts in Corsica often had to employ interpreters as the local population often had no French. The last bandits were suppressed only in the 1930's

(42). Finally, and most importantly from the point of view of this thesis, these traditional mores deeply affected the island's political life and habits and the relationship between the island and mainland France. To this we now turn.

CORSICAN POLITICS - THE DOMINATION OF THE CLANS

Corsican politics have been dominated by the system of clans or, in Corsican, partiti, alluded to above (43). A clan may be defined as a set of families grouped in a pyramidal structure with a dominant family at its head. The head of the dominant family is also the head of the clan. Some clan leaders in the twentieth century could trace their ancestry back to the period before the Revolution of 1789 (44). In line with the general mentality outlined above, a clan was primarily loyal to itself and to its own members. It was this which determined the actual functioning of a clan. The task of the clan leaders, the great family chiefs, was to procure scarce resources, mainly use of land or resources from the state such as subsidies and pensions, which they would then distribute to their clientèle. In turn, the clan followers pledged absolute loyalty to the chief. They would engage in any act, violent or not, to repay the favour shown by him to them. In other words, relations within the clan were clientelistic (45). In the nineteenth century, this clientelism was of an individualistic nature, but during the

twentieth century it became increasingly collective and party based.

The institutions of public administration - the state, judiciary and the local collectivities - were regarded by the clans as instruments which they could control in order to obtain resources for their clients. This was true of all the successive régimes to which the island belonged from Genoese times until the present. In fact, the clans rarely, if ever, called into question the régime of any particular period: ancien régime, Revolution, Empire, Republic. What determined the "political" position of a clan was the position chosen by its rival - this often changed as the fortunes of a régime changed. In other words, the clan system was essentially apolitical. What mattered were the clans' clients and the necessity of controlling institutions which were the source of precious resources.

The institution most prized by the clan was the mairie (46). Controlling this meant controlling important resources such as the communal pastures which were rented out to shepherds. Local elections in Corsica, for this reason, became passionate and often violent affairs, not because of the Corsican's interest in politics or political ideas, but because the livelihood of a client depended on the outcome in a very direct way. The important thing was to win the election, and any means could be used to do so: these included

electoral corruption and violence or the threat of it. It is this which is behind the many "folkloric" incidents of Corsican political history. This approach to politics was repeated at every level: the Conseil Général, posts in the judiciary, and posts in the civil service were all prizes to be captured by the clans. In the actual distribution of these resources, it was important that the victorious clan be actually seen to be victorious, and that the defeated clan be seen to be defeated. The humiliation of the rival gave to the winners a satisfaction that was almost as great as that derived from simply winning. This often led to physical violence in the desire to avenge this humiliation.

It is clear that this type of politics (see Appendix One for a survey of electoral behaviour) is far removed from any modern notion of politics based on a conflict of ideological or class positions. In fact, the Corsican clans adopted the political labels of continental parties but the behaviour of one clan was basically little different from that of its rival and could not be said to be based on ideological convictions (a fact which makes the study of Corsican politics extremely difficult as clans continually changed labels and allegiances). Nevertheless, the central Government made little effort to remedy the widespread political abuses that were found on the island at every level. Eventually, the clan leaders, dominating the Conseil Général (also known as the Petit Parlement) became more powerful than the prefect himself

who generally acquiesced in their activities (see above Chapter Three).

This unspoken tolerance of the clan system was strengthened by the emergence of Emmanuel Arène, a lawyer turned politician who became associated with Gambetta's campaign of republicanization at the beginning of the Third Republic (47). Arène, known on Corsica as U Re Manuele, became the most powerful Corsican of his time and instituted a system of political clientelism whose connections went to the very heart of the state. The central Government, in turn, turned a blind eye so long as Corsicans remained loyal to the state itself. This, in effect, is what occurred, and throughout the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries there were no serious challenges to the attachment of the island to France. On the contrary, Corsicans strongly identified with the French state.

Another factor which ensured the continuing survival of the clan system was the role it played following the period of economic decline and near collapse at the end of the nineteenth century, and especially its function as a kind of conduit by which Corsican emigrants found positions in the institutions of the state and administration (48). It was now that the "colonization" of the administration by the clan leaders began to pay off. Those forced to leave the island were given positions in the civil service, army, police and

customs. Corsicans, like most other predominantly peasant groups, had always valued such positions, clean jobs with the security of pensions, to the hard grind and insecurity of farm life. Now, their procurement became a matter of the survival of the Corsican community as such. An extensive diaspora was created in cities such as Marseilles, Toulon, Nice, Lyons and Paris (49). This period also corresponded with an expansion of the French overseas Empire. Corsicans went as colonists to both North and black Africa. It is said that the clans divided the Maghreb into zones of influence and placed their own followers in their respective zones (50). Other Corsicans left for other parts of the world such as North and South America. Venezuela and Puerto Rico especially saw the establishment of important colonies of Corsicans (51). Recently, the election of a President of Venezuela of Corsican origin was fêted in his village of origin in the Cap Corse. Thus the clans helped to mitigate the worst consequences of the economic collapse of the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This has been described by one writer as a crise compensée (52).

Those who remained behind were not forgotten. The island became a real système assistenciel with the clans distributing favours to their followers as never before. The handouts took the form of state subsidies and pensions. Corsica became the département which received the greatest percentage of assistance in all of France (53). Again the central Government

did little to try to remedy the abuses that came to be one of the principal characteristics of the Corsican system.

Thus, at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries the basic features of the Corsican system and the relations between the island and the mainland were in place. These changed little in the period prior to World War II except in the sense that the economic and demographic trends deteriorated even further. During this period the masses of Corsicans seemed to have accepted their lot and only a small minority raised protests. Real changes in Corsican society and economy were introduced only from the outside and occurred after the Second World War (See Chapter Four).

CORSICA IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Immediately after the Liberation of Corsica the economic and social situation on the island was appalling (53). Although the official census figures of 1954 put the population at 240,000 inhabitants, the real figure was probably closer to 180,000. That meant that the population had decreased by at least fifty per cent in fifty years. This included a high proportion of active members of the population. Official figures put the exodus at around 1,000 - 1,200 emigrants per year. The problem was that the crise was no longer compensated. The drain on the island's human

resources had reached a point where the very existence of the island community itself was endangered.

One of the principal reasons for this exodus, admitted later in the Neuwirth Report, was the low standard of living on the island compared with the rest of France. This is clear from several indicators available for 1954. There was only one car per 90 inhabitants. 80Kwh of electricity was consumed on Corsica per head of the population, compared with 179Kwh in France as a whole. If a base line is set at 100, the average income per head on Corsica was 38, in Paris it was 166, in the East of France it was 118, and in the North it was 137. The decline in agriculture had also taken its toll: at the end of the eighteenth century, 144,000 hectares of cereals were cultivated, in 1833, 38,000h, in the 1950's, only 3,800h. Arable land, too, was under-utilized: of 23,000h around the Oriental Plain, only 4,000 were under cultivation. Furthermore, Corsica imported more than it exported: in 1959, it imported 18,000 tonnes of flour and 4,5000 tonnes of meat; at the same time, it exported 15 tonnes of almonds and 379 tonnes of artichokes. Primary materials such as minerals and cork were exported in their raw state since there were no enterprises to transform them into secondary products. Finally, the region which had the lowest standard of living had the highest cost of living: 30 per cent higher than on mainland France. Janine Renucci summed up this situation as: "Agriculture moribonde, élevage amenuisé à l'extrême,

industrie insignifiante, balance commerciale déficitaire ..."
(54). In contrast to this moribund island, was a Diaspora that
was successful and vibrant, as Pierre Dottelonde has pointed
out (55). This would have important consequences in the
revival of regionalism.

CONCLUSION

This Chapter has analysed the socio-economic context of
the Corsican problem: the horizontal dimension of the model.
The brief survey of the main historical, geographical,
economic and cultural features of Corsica shows that the
island possesses distinct forms of culture, society and
political behaviour. These are, in some senses, closer to
those of their Italian neighbours than to France. These
distinctive features have also affected the nature of the
island's political life: they have produced the peculiar
system of mediation between the island and the state known as
the clan system. This clan system - a form of clientelism -
also dominates social and political relationships internally
on the island.

The clans came to occupy a crucial position as mediators
between the island and the French state. This they did by
monopolizing the institutions of state and administration,
controlling scarce resources, and distributing the goods in a
clientelistic manner to their followers. This suited most

Corsicans who needed the clans' protection and favours in a situation of extreme distress. It suited successive French Governments in so far as it ensured that Corsicans remained loyal to the state whichever type of régime this adopted: Corsicans became "super-French" in their identification with the French state. It suited the clans because it gave them the political and social power which was their raison d'être. This was even more important than money to the clan chiefs. Thus a tissue of complicity was woven, based on mutual self-interest. But this tissue was fragile.

At the heart of the clan system, however, was a contradiction. Their power was based on the existence of economic backwardness and even decline. It is true that, in one sense, they were a necessary protection against the worst consequences of these features of the Corsican problem. It might even be said that the clan system as it developed at the turn of the century saved the traditional Corsican society from extinction. However, the clans were also an obstacle to progress because of the very backwardness and decline on which their power was based. Any initiatives from the state were transformed into the inflationary and clientelistic mould of clan politics. The clan system in this way survived right up to the period following the Second World War and was the main brake on any progress developing from within Corsica itself. But in the period immediately following the Second World War, the island was in such a wretched condition that even the

clans were forced to take steps to remedy it. This meant calling on the state for help. Unfortunately for the clans, the way in which the state did respond, with the PAR of 1957 and the Gaullist approach after 1958, tended to undermine the legitimacy of the clans themselves. Furthermore, the kind of development that was adopted tended to break up the traditional forms of Corsican society.

These developments led to challenges to the hegemony of the clans from various kinds of regionalist, movements. Before the First World War and in the inter-war period such movements had failed to gather significant following among the local population. It was only after the Second World War that they gained an important support base in the local population. The challenge came from those who were in some way excluded from this system of mediation. These forces, like the Corsican identity itself, were highly ambiguous and the next two chapters will analyse their significance.

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF MODERATE REGIONALISM

The previous Chapter outlined the basic socio-economic structures of Corsican society and how these have produced the peculiar form of mediation between the island and the state known as the clan system. The changes in this system (1), because of endogenous (economic decline and rural exodus)) and exogenous (rapid economic development) factors put the system itself under strain. The regionalist movements which appeared in the period following the Second World War may seen as symptoms of this strain. For the purpose of this thesis, the analysis will serve to illustrate the nature of the system itself and the way in which the elites who operate it have responded to crises which put it in danger.

Several hypotheses may be formulated with regard to the emergence of these movements. First, they originated in social groups which were excluded from the system of mediation. Second, the kind of movement - moderate or radical (2) - may be related to the degree of exclusion from the system. Finally, these characteristics may be further related to two contextual factors: the socio-economic structures of the society and the periodization of a shift from the Fourth to the Fifth Republics.

This Chapter will analyse the rise and decline of moderate regionalism by relating it these hypotheses while the following Chapter will examine radical regionalism.

THE BACKGROUND

Regionalist movements of both a moderate and radical kind existed in Corsica prior to 1945. Such movements appeared during periods of economic or social crisis, such as at the end of the nineteenth century (3) or during the interwar period (4). The most important of these was A Muvra, a group based around a newspaper of that name and founded in 1920. In 1922, the Partitu Corsu d'Azzione (P.C.A.) was founded. In 1927, this became the Partitu Corsu Autonomista (P.C.A.). What is relevant to this Chapter is that some members of these groups, sympathetic to Italian culture and attracted by irredentism and/or Fascism, collaborated with the Italians when the latter invaded and occupied Corsica in November 1942. A similar phenomenon occurred in Brittany, Flanders and Alsace, in France (5), and with the IRA in Ireland (6). It may be related to two factors: the explicitly conservative or reactionary nature of this kind of nationalism which leaned toward extreme right-wing political positions and the idea that "my enemy's enemy is my friend and my enemy's difficulty is my opportunity" (7).

Although the number of such collaborators was probably a minority of the regionalists and autonomists (8), the phenomenon of collaboration was used by some of those who took power after Liberation - mainly the Communists and Gaullists - to discredit the very idea of regionalism. This was not totally successful, as there were federalists and regionalists among the other dominant group, the Christian Democrats (9). But the Vichy regime had also attempted to implement a form of decentralization (10) and there was a reluctance to show approval of this even though some of its features were adopted by the early Fourth Republic. In other words, the period immediately following the Second World War was marked by an increase of traditional Jacobinism while traditional regionalism and autonomism were forced to adopt a low profile. In Corsica, some of the collaborators went to prison, and the field seemed to be clear for the traditional Jacobins. Nevertheless, it was precisely this heightened sense of identification with France and the fact that Corsica had become a kind of model for other Frenchmen, as De Gaulle implied in the statements quoted above in Chapter Five, that created an awareness of specificity on the part of the islanders even among the Jacobins. This, in turn, gave rise to a kind of regionalist response which we propose to call "proto-regionalism" that is, it implicitly adopted many regionalist positions which would appear later in a more explicit manner. This was true mainly of the Corsican

Federation of the Communist Party, but it can also be found among the Gaullists. It is to this that we now turn.

THE PERIOD OF "PROTO-REGIONALISM"

The Occupation of Corsica by the Italians destroyed the traditional system of clan/clientelistic relations between the island and the French state. One of the two clans supported the Vichy regime while some of the autonomists supported the Occupants. This "rupture" was the occasion for a return of the Corsican phobia - the fear of being cut off from the French state and returned to Italy. It was this, combined with traditional feelings of Italophobia which ensured a strong Resistance movement (11). Since the Communists were the most uncompromising Jacobins and also the leading component of the Resistance movement (12), many young Corsicans gave them support. Furthermore, the clientèle of the Pietri clan found themselves orphaned by the public discredit in which François Pietri found himself: he had supported the Vichy régime and was its ambassador in Franco's Madrid. It seems that many of these aderenti transferred their allegiance to the Communist Party rather than give it to the rival clan (13). It was this support which led to the most serious challenge to the clan system in the modern period.

The growth of the Communist Party was spectacular (see Appendix Three for details of the party's electoral fortunes).

From three to four hundred members before 1939, it progressed from 1200 in September 1943, to 2000 at the end of that year, 4,500 in December 1944, 6,150 in 1945, 8,800 in April 1946, and 9,830 in December 1946 (14). This support was translated into control of the local political institutions. After the Liberation, the Front National (FN), led by the Communists, seized control of around two-thirds of the island's roughly three hundred and fifty mairies. Although this occurred at the point of a gun, support was subsequently confirmed in elections (see Appendix Three). In the municipal elections of 13 May 1945, the Front National won 189 municipalities, the "giacobbistes" (Gaullists) 112, Socialists 12, "pietrists", 42 (15). By 1947, the Party had 10,000 members, 50 maires, one Deputy, one Senator and several conseillers généraux.

CORSICANS = "SUPER-FRANÇAIS"

The most important effect of the Occupation/Liberation experience is that it heightened the Corsicans' sense of identity with France. This was true both for Communist and non-Communist Corsicans. Some quotations from the local press at this period will illustrate this ultra-French identity. The newspaper of the Corsican Federation of the PC was Terre Corse, founded clandestinely in 1943. In it may be found what may be called the party's self-identity expressed publicly. The paper called for May Day 1944 to be celebrated, not by an appeal to proletarian internationalism, but by asserting that:

"En ce 1er Mai nous affirmerons, les armes à la main, par des actes, contre nos ennemis et Vichy, notre volonté de chasser l'envahisseur, d'exterminer les traîtres, de rester Français [my emph]" (16).

The Communists' loyalty, however, was to a special kind of France: "France d'hier, France d'aujourd'hui, France de demain. La France a toujours été le peuple de progrès" (17). And in this vision of a new progressive France, Corsica had a special place: "Vive la Corse française. Vive la Corse nouvelle, fille aimée de la France nouvelle" (18). Not only was Corsica French, it was an example for the rest of France since Corsica was the first and only French département to liberate itself (19).

The right, too, affirmed its attachment to France as can be seen from the columns of Le Petit Bastiais. Prior to 9 September 1943, the sub-title of this paper had been: "Journal d'Information et de Reconstruction régionales et nationales". That is, it had been a mouthpiece of Vichy France. It disappeared on 9 September 1943 to reappear on 16 December of the same year with a new editor, Martin Bianconi, and a new sub-title: "Quotidien Republicain d'Information et de Libération nationale". In this period, it supported the party which the Republican clan, the "landryists", had adopted - the Parti Republicain et Socialiste. The intense loyalty to France of the new équipe may be seen in Bianconi's first editorial in which he paid homage to "Tous ces anonymes qui, non investis

d'une mission officielle, ont payé de leur sang et de leur vie leur noble titre de Français [my emph] (20). A few days later, he wrote: "Il n'est pas nécessaire, je crois, d'ajouter "française" dans un journal insulaire; l'équivoque n'est plus possible: nul au monde, sans excepter les chefs de l'Etat, les chefs du gouvernement qui ne sont pas toujours les mieux informés, ne sauraient douter de l' AUTHENTICITE FRANÇAISE du coeur et du sol corses..." [emph in text] (21). On 26 December, the paper announced that, on the following day, Bastia would celebrate "le décret d'incorporation du 30 Novembre de la Corse à la France" (22). A year later, the paper reported a similar event: on the "30 Novembre 1944 Bastia a commémoré dans le recueillement l'anniversaire du 30 Novembre 1789" (23).

On both left and right, then, we find a strong sense of identity with France. But it was mainly the Communists who began to spell out the implications of this. First, there was total support for the nation still at war with the Germans: "Pour la France en bataille la Corse a répondu" (24).; "Faire la guerre! Rien Que la Guerre!" (25). But other implications could be drawn. One of these was that, if Corsicans are so French, then they have a right to demand special treatment from the Government. Thus, in 1946, we find in the Communist paper the following statement: "Il y a plus de deux ans que nous sommes libérés. Sur le continent, un effort considérable est fait dans tous les domaines, reconstruction,

ravitaillement, etc. Ici la situation s'aggrave tous les jours" (26). In other words, there was a sense of relative deprivation.

The Communists did not simply limit their critique to empty complaining. They also proposed a programme of economic and social revival which is interesting as it anticipates many of the critiques and programmes of later regionalist movements. Perhaps the most interesting element of the Communist analysis was that the island's ills were blamed not principally on the central Government but on the local clan system. Both right and left clans are put into the same category, and both are seen as anti-Corsican: "Les clans contre la Corse" (27). It was the clans which prevented the establishment of a modern Republic on the island: "Votez pour la République! Le peuple de Corse ordonne: Arrière, les chefs de Clans!" (28). Secondly, the Corsican problem was an economic one linked to the clan system. The clans operated on behalf of the capitalist "trusts" to strangle the island's vital substance (29). The Communists proposed, therefore, an alternative economic development programme the details of which may be seen in the pages of Terre Corse.

The Communist upsurge and attack on the clan system was so serious that Paul Giacobbi, the Gaullist leader and head of the "left" clan, entered into a pact with the rival "pietrist" clan to head off the threat. The tactic was to win back from

the Communists the pietrist aderenti which had gone over to them during the period of Resistance. To this end, Giacobbi invited Jacques Gavini, a cousin of François Pietri, to take over the leadership of the clan. A deal was made by which Giacobbi relinquished to a gaviniste the Presidency of the Conseil Général while Giacobbi himself would become a Senator (30). From the cantonal elections of 1945, this tactic began to succeed. By the early 1950's, the PC had lost most of its important electoral posts although it retained some of its bastions and remained an important force on the island (for details of electoral performance, see Appendix Three). What is important is that it was now excluded, by a pact made between the two clans, from the mainstream of political life. The traditional system of mediation had reasserted itself.

Nevertheless, this period and these events are important for several reasons. First, it was a period of intense pro-French nationalism in which the expectations of the islanders were at a peak. The old-style regionalists and autonomists were driven underground. Second, there was a serious threat to the traditional system of mediation from the Communists. This was beaten off by the system which reasserted itself but the effect was to exclude the Communists. Furthermore, the latter presented a coherent well-thought out critique of the island's problems which saw the traditional system of mediation - the clans - as being its root cause. This encouraged the

traditional politicians to take seriously these problems and it is to this that we now turn.

THE LOCAL POLITICIANS AND THE FRENCH STATE

The local politicians realised that the traditional system was under threat. Furthermore, even they realised that the island's decline, had gone too far (see Chapter Six). Their hold on the island society was partly based on this decline but they now realised that the decline itself threatened to undermine their own legitimacy. In other words, the success of the clan system was based on the ability of the clan leaders to "deliver the goods". Now, the goods to be delivered were nothing less than the halting of the decline and a programme of economic reconstruction. The Communists had exposed the inefficacy of the clans. Now the clan leaders had to act to prove otherwise.

They did so, like the Breton CELIB, by trying to pressure the central Government into adopting economic measures in favour of the island. The first phase was to conduct a series of studies of the island's problems. In 1949, the Conseil Général requested that an Inventaire départemental be drawn up. In 1957 a Plan d'aménagement was produced (31). Commenting on the results of these enquiries, Janine Renucci remarks: "La dégradation de l'agriculture a fortement marqué les paysages insulaires. Il est vrai qu'elle était réduite, vers 1950-55, à

une survie dérisoire [my emph] après avoir joué un rôle essentiel dans l'économie traditionnelle" (32). By the mid-1950's, then, the traditional politicians had a fuller appreciation of the island's problems.

The next phase was to put pressure on the Government to do something about this appalling situation. At this juncture, two factors worked in their favour. First, this was the period when the Governments of the Fourth Republic were developing their own regionalization programme (see above Chapter Four). The Corsican demands, limited at this point to economic aid, could easily be fitted into this programme. Second, the Corsican prefect at this time was Marcel Savreux, who proved to be a dynamic advocate of the islanders' cause (33). The result was the adoption of the PAR which was examined in detail in Chapter Four.

To have such a programme adopted was a considerable coup for the traditional local politicians, and they tried to use it to reestablish their legitimacy as the islanders's representatives. This was an important "good" which they were bringing to the island. Their influence with the central state could be seen to have paid off. As in other clientelistic type societies, being seen to have influence was more important than the influence itself. This process of claiming credit for something that was only partly a result of their efforts began as early as 1953. Jean-Paul de Rocca-Serra, then President of

the Conseil Général and new leader of the Pietri clan, made a speech to the Council in which he referred to the creation of a Commission de Modernisation, d'Equipment et d'Aménagement de la Corse (a forerunner of the PAR). He stated: "Ce sera l'honneur de cette Assemblée d'avoir pris l'initiative de solliciter et d'avoir obtenu, grâce à l'action conjuguée des conseillers généraux et des parlementaires avec l'aide des autorités administratives, la création de cette commission [my emph]" (34). Furthermore, it was a Corsican Senator, Jean Filippi, who, as Rapporteur-Général de la Commission du Plan, was responsible for drawing up the details of the Corsican PAR.

But not only did the local politicians need to be seen to be behind the adoption of the PAR, they also needed to be seen as controlling the new institutions which were set up to implement it - the SOMIVAC and the SETCO. In fact, these were two sections of a single société d'économie mixte which had one board and different sections to deal with tourism and agriculture. In the section responsible for tourism we find the two Corsican Deputies Jacques Gavini and François Giacobbi (son of Paul who had since died) and in the section responsible for agriculture we find the Senators Jean Filippi and Dr Jean-Paul de Rocca-Serra. It is worth noting that these four politicians were the leaders of the two main clans: Gavini/de Rocca-Serra represented the gavinisti; Filippi/Giacobbi the landrysti. It is possible, though

impossible to prove, that the two clans perceived the new institutions as another piece of "territory" to be divided between them.

It seemed, then, as though the traditional system of inter-Corsican and Corsican-French relations had reasserted themselves. The traditional clan leaders were back in the driving seat and seemed to be carrying out their traditional role of channelling resources from the centre to the periphery. Furthermore, they had beaten back any threat to their hegemony either from the left or from the old-style regionalists. But this tranquillity existed only on the surface. Underneath, social forces hostile to the clans were preparing to attack again.

THE EMERGENCE OF MODERATE REGIONALISM

Several factors contributed to continue the undermining of the clan leaders' legitimacy. First, the political hegemony of the clans over the island society was no longer complete. Although groups such as the Communists seemed to be driven underground, they still retained an important support base and, as noted above, held several important bastions such as Bastia and Sartène. Other groups were also outside the traditional network of politics. There were still the old-style regionalists who, like their counterparts in Brittany and Alsace, were still under a cloud of discredit because of

the collaborationist activities of some of their number. At first, they limited their activities to cultural matters. These grouped around a journal published in Corsican called U Muntese. An important figure was Jean Makis (the nom de plume of M. De Susini), an old-style regionalist who had been imprisoned for collaboration. Makis founded a newspaper (written in French) called L'Insulaire which provided a forum for those sympathetic to right-wing and regionalist ideas. When Makis died, the newspaper was taken over by his son Achille De Susini. Another excluded group, this time by geography rather than political decisions, were the many young Corsicans who had left Corsica to study in the universities of the mainland such as Paris, Marseilles, Nice and Lyons. Finally, some of the powerful Corsican Federations which grouped together the Corsicans living in France were not sympathetic to the clan system. The most important of these was the Fédération Corse De Marseille et des Bouches-du-Rhône, led by Bastien Leccia who was a close associate of the Socialist Mayor of Marseilles, Gaston Defferre.

Second, as has already been discussed above (Chapter Four) the necessity of a société d'économie mixte to implement the development programme seemed to cast doubt on the efficacy of the traditional institutions. This was reinforced by the fact that, despite the visible presence of the clan leaders on the board, real control lay with non-Corsicans, mainly reclassified civil servants from Morocco and Tunisia (35). At

least one interpretation of this could be: the central Government did not have the confidence in the local politicians that the latter had in themselves.

Thirdly, the PAR itself proved to be less ambitious and extensive than the Corsicans had at first believed. It was limited in the number of geographical areas ear-marked for development. It was also limited in the funding made available for it. This has been treated in greater detail in Chapter Four.

Finally, at this time, there appeared, perhaps for the first time, a Corsican public opinion. Before the early 1950's, there had been no single newspaper covering the entire island (36). Newspapers in Corsica were traditionally limited to single towns or regions and tied to a particular clan. This changed in the early 1950's when the Nice newspaper Nice-Matin began to publish a Corsican page and was sold all over the island. Then the Marseilles daily Le Provençal began to publish a special Corsican edition - La Corse-Le Provençal - which was also sold all over the island. With the improvement of communications between the island and the mainland, especially the advent of a daily air service, by the end of the 1950's Corsicans, even in the remotest villages, could have a daily newspaper on their breakfast tables. Furthermore, the Nice paper was politically sympathetic to the right, the Marseilles paper to the left. Corsicans therefore had access

to a wider range of political ideas and information than ever before. The existence of these means of communication also made it easier to mobilize the population. It meant, too, the creation of a new class of journalists most of whom were outside the clan system.

All of these factors combined at the end of the 1950's to produce the Mouvement du 29 Novembre to which we now turn.

LE MOUVEMENT DU 29 NOVEMBRE

The Mouvement du 29 Novembre (Mdu29N) is a movement the importance of which has frequently been underestimated, especially by radical regionalists who wished to illustrate the inefficacy of moderate regionalism (37). This has been repeated by certain subsequent authors who do not seem to have researched sufficiently this period (38). In fact, the rise and decline of the Mdu29N has an important place in the development of subsequent movements which cannot be understood except in reference to it. What is presented here, therefore, is a new interpretation of the significance of this movement.

The Mdu29N was a coalition of those groups, listed above, which had been excluded from the traditional system of politics on the island. But even before the coalition was formed some of the groups were already organised and sniping at the local politicians. The Communist Party has already been

treated above. In L'Insulaire, De Susini was attacking the recent developments. The PAR was criticised for its lack of funding (39) and because it was "...une sinécure pour caser quelques fonctionnaires à reclasser.." (40). The tone of De Susini's articles mounted after the arrival of De Gaulle to power in 1958 and the realisation that even the limited funding promised during the Fourth Republic would not materialize. The PAR was then described as an instrument of colonialism: "...une méthode [qui n'a pas] très bien réussi, tant en Indochine qu'en Afrique du Nord et en Afrique noire" (41). According to De Susini, "...l'on perçoit que la Corse devient la dernière terre coloniale française... Nous subissons déjà l'emprise De la SOMIVAC dont le but réel est d'EXPLOITER LA CORSE SANS LES CORSES - la mise en valeur De l'île n'en était que le fallacieux prétexte [emph in text]" (42)

In 1959, the Gaullist Government threatened to close down the island's only railway. This was the spark that led to the formation of the first mass movement in modern Corsican history. Although it is still unclear, it seems to have been the Communists who took the initiative to establish a more structured opposition to the Government. The Party, however, was aware of the intensity of partisan competition on the island and did not wish to appear publicly as the leaders of the opposition. (43). They therefore contacted several of the island's journalists known to be sympathetic to the need

for reform. These included M. Mariaux (A.F.P.), Achille De Susini (L'Insulaire), Francis Maure (Provençal-Bastia), Paul Silvani and Pascal Bontempi (Le Provençal), Louis Rioni (L'Informateur), and Joseph Santi (Courrier De la Corse). These journalists formed a Comité De Presse which agreed to organise the public meeting from which emerged the Mouvement du 29 Novembre.

The Congrès du 29 Novembre met, in fact, on 27 November 1959 at Ajaccio. The title of the congress was chosen because it was on the 30 November 1789 that the Constituent Assembly formally declared Corsica to be fully integrated into the French Empire (i.e. nation). The title chosen implied that Corsica was, in reality, still only on the eve of integration and that it wished to be fully integrated. In other words, the movement remained within the framework of a Jacobin understanding of relations between Corsica and France. For this reason it may be called moderate regionalism. The influence of the PCF can be clearly discerned here. This loyalty to France was clear when, after the inaugural meeting, the delegates proceeded to the Monument des Morts, laid a wreath to those who had given their lives for France and ended by singing the Marseillaise (44). Other elements of the coalition, such as the tendency represented by De Susini, were less Jacobin but at this phase it was the Jacobins who were in control. For the moment, the unity of the movement was most important.

The sinking of ideological differences may be seen in those chosen to be the movement's first officers. Achille De Susini was elected President; one of the Vice-presidents was Philippe Semedei (who was, however, close to François Giacobbi) of the Comité De Presse; and the General Secretary was Albert Feracci, a leading member of the Communist Party. The desire for unity was stressed by De Susini in his presidential address: "Nous sommes venus sans parti, ni parti-pris pour engager toutes nos forces pour qu'enfin vive la Corse" (45). It should be noted that the French word "parti" translated the Corsican partitu meaning clan.

One of the first acts of the movement was to draw up a list of demands to be made of the central Government. The Jacobin orientation of the group is clear from these demands:

L'application intégrale des Arrêtés Miot;

Le maintien du Réseau Ferré;

L'alignement de la Corse sur les autres départements en regard des frais d'approche (46).

It is significant that these demands related both to the problem of the railway closure and to that of insularity. The second referred to attempts to reduce the effects of insularity by a system of "territorial continuity" (although the term was not yet used). It is clear that such a demand was

based on the idea that Corsica is fully French and should be more fully integrated into the nation. Furthermore, there is also the implicit idea that France has a duty to assist this integration.

In order to achieve this fuller integration the movement felt it was necessary to mobilize the local population around these purely economic demands. The adoption of these tactics was clearly influenced by the activities of the Breton CELIB (see Chapter One above). At first, mobilization seemed to be successful. The inaugural meeting itself was attended by 1200 delegates from all parts of the island; there were 1000 telegrammes of support and 30,000 signatures to a petition supporting the movement's aims (47). Several important interest groups were present. L'Association des Maires De Corse and the Fédération des Commerçants were both represented. The Fédération des Groupements Corses de Marseille, presided by Bastien Leccia was present. However, the traditional clan leaders were absent. Indeed, with the possible exception of François Giacobbi, they viewed the new movement with caution and, at times, with hostility.

The wider population, too, seemed to respond to the call to mobilize. A series of strikes, lasting from a few hours to a full day (isula morta), were well observed as can be seen from the columns of the local press at the time. Violence was strictly excluded, although some members of the movement,

including De Susini, threatened to use it. Nevertheless, apart from the occasional scuffle between demonstrators and police, there was no violence at this stage.

Although the demands were being made by the movement directly to the state, their real targets were, in fact, the traditional politicians. In reality, the movement did not seriously question the existing system of mediation and the existing institutions in which this took place. Rather their intention was to influence this system and, in a sense to cleanse it of its traditional corruption. This is why the traditional clan leaders regarded the movement with such suspicion: it directly attacked their own legitimacy by calling into question their ability to deliver the goods. Furthermore, the leaders of the Mdu29N pointed to the representativeness of their own inaugural meeting and contrasted this with the unrepresentativeness of the traditional politicians who were, they claimed, elected by fraud (48).

The Mdu29N did ensure that the railway was saved, but failed to obtain other demands. It was, however, successful in forcing the local politicians to react. As the Mémorial des Corses expresses it: "Face à l'explosion du phénomène, ils [ont été] tout d'abord surpris, voire agacés, par le débordement d'une action que jusque-là ils canalisaient" (49). The attitude of the local politicians is summed up in an

editorial which appeared in the Journal De la Corse, a Gaullist newspaper which had not supported the Comité De Presse. Following the success of an isula morta at the end of 1959, it appealed to the local population:

Revenons ... au calme, après la tempête, mettons un peu d'eau dans notre vin. Si cela n'ira pas beaucoup mieux, cela ira moins mal, car nos pleurs, loin d'attendrir les maîtres de nos destins, les incitaient à ne rien donner à ceux qui demandaient tout, risquant à tout perdre en voulant tout gagner (50).

In other words, don't bite the hand that feeds you!

But it was precisely this supine attitude on the part of the local politicians that the new regionalists refused to accept and which they wished to change. Their actions became serious enough to force the prefect, M. Bernard, to receive a delegation (51). Then François Giacobbi, President of the Conseil Général and leader of the "left" clan, assured the movement of the support of the conseillers généraux (52). Corsican politicians at the national level showed more reserve as was evident in their answers to a letter which the Mdu29N had addressed to them (53). All the politicians, in their answers, were concerned to show how much they had done, as individuals, about Corsican economic problems. But they pointed out that their influence had been severely limited by the arrival of the Gaullist régime and the diminution of the powers of Parliament.

The same letter had been addressed to all the national political party leaders in the National Assembly, but only M. Waldeck-Rochet, the PCF leader, answered it. His comments are interesting, as they give another impression of the attitude of the Corsican Deputies and modify the image they present of themselves. He pointed out that the PCF Deputies had fought against the suppression of the Corsican railway and added:

[Les députés PCF] ...n'ont pas eu gain de cause en raison De l'opposition conjointe du Gouvernement et de la majorité de l'Assemblée Nationale (y compris les députés de la Corse) (54).

By the end of 1960, the failure of the PAR to make a dent in the island's economic problems, the insensitivity and intransigence of the Gaullist Government, and the impotence of the local politicians all combined to ensure the success of the mobilization by the Mdu29N. When the movement held its second Congress in November 1960 all the island's politicians, including those at national level were present. Nevertheless, the movement largely failed to have its most important demands met. In the Corsican context a movement will succeed only if it manages to deliver the goods. The clans had failed but so did their principal opponents. This, combined with the entry into the movement of the traditional politicians or their representatives, ensured that the movement would inevitably decline.

THE DECLINE AND DEMISE OF THE MODERATE REGIONALISTS

On 27 October 1963, the Mdu29N changed its name to the Comité d'Action et Promotion De la Corse (CAPCO). The President of the new group was Bastien Leccia from Marseilles; there were two Vice-Presidents, Achille De Susini (Ajaccio) and Philippe Semedei (Bastia); and two General Secretaries, the Communist Albert Feracci (Ajaccio) and Jean Pieraggi (Bastia). Almost all of the political, social and economic forces of the island were represented in the Comité Directeur (55). The local politicians did not participate directly for, according to them, tactical reasons. At its inaugural meeting the CAPCO adopted the following programme:

- 1) The realisation of a genuine continuité territoriale;
- 2) the establishment of a new fiscal statute which would respect the spirit of the Arrêtés Miot;
- 3) the granting of an indemnité provisoire d'insularité compensatrice de la vie chère for civil servants who lived on the island;
- 4) the passing of a law establishing the amount of funding and a timetable for the implementation of the PAR. (56)

Despite the seeming continuity in personnel and with the programme of the Mdu29N, the founding of the CAPCO was the beginning of the end of moderate regionalism. The movement was already running out of steam and the serious ideological differences within the coalition were now breaking out into

the open. In December 1963, De Susini resigned as Vice-President (57). The former President of the Mdu29N gave two reasons for his resignation. First, he claimed the CAPCO was the creation of the local politicians with the purpose of channelling the "mouvement revendicatif". He claimed that Jean Filippi and François Giacobbi had both tried to exclude him from the leadership position because of his outspoken criticism of the clan leaders. Second, he claimed that his demotion was the result of the political ambitions of Bastien Leccia who wished to use the Corsican movement to further his ambition of becoming Deputy for Marseilles in the event of Gaston Defferre winning the Presidential election of 1965 (58).

It is, of course, possible that De Susini was piqued at having lost the leadership of the movement and his attacks against the CAPCO were the result of sour grapes. Nevertheless, his claim that the movement had been "recuperated" by the local politicians seems to be accurate. The Mémorial des Corses, commenting on the setting up of the CAPCO, states that "... il est clair qu'un effort a été fait pour mettre dans le coup le plus d'élus possibles, maires ou conseillers généraux" (59). Although the leading clan politicians stayed away, their colleagues from a lower level managed to infiltrate the organisation.

De Susini took with him the old-style regionalists who now resented the new organisation and the presence of the clans. It might be remarked that the split was also one between left and right within the movement. The movement was now taken over completely by the traditional Jacobin left - the Communists and Socialists. It seems that this left were now willing to accept the "left" clan of Giacobbi as part of the left. Henceforth, the attacks against the "clans" were to be directed principally against the "right" or Gaullist clan of De Rocca-Serra.

But the change and the departure of important sections left the movement weakened, while the presence of the local politicians meant a dilution of the demands and forms of action. The CAPCO limped on until May 1967, when it changed its name to the Mouvement Revendicatif Insulaire (MRI). But this was only a pale shadow of the Mouvement du 29 Novembre. As the Mémorial expressed it: "[Le MRI] fait figure de vain replâtrage et la promulgation d'une charte revendicative qui reprend les thèmes sur lesquels la bataille a été menée en vain depuis plusieurs années ne suffit pas à donner un élan nouveau" (60).

CONCLUSION

The phases of proto- and moderate regionalism are revealing in several respects. First of all, they show very clearly the nature of the system of mediation on the island. Twice in just over a decade the system was under serious threat from forces which lay outside it. However, the clans joined forces to neutralize the threat either by taking up the demands themselves or by taking over the movements which articulated the demands. The period also reveals the ambiguity of Corsican-French relations. If Corsicans are French then they expect the benefits of being French.

Moderate regionalism was distinguished by two principal features: its attachment to a Jacobin understanding of Corsican-French relations; and the presence in its ranks of local notables (with the exception of the Gaullists). With regard to the first point, the vast majority of the leaders of the movement, especially the traditional left, such as the Communist Party, identified strongly with France, even if they opposed particular Governments such as those of De Gaulle. Secondly, the movement was dominated by socio-economic groups - journalists, local politicians, business-men - close to the system of mediation. Such groups, while they wished to reform the way in which the traditional system based on the prefect and the commune operated, did not wish to radically change it.

Because of their strong Jacobinism the moderate regionalists did not question the attachment of Corsica to France, but the mobilization which occurred under their leadership allowed anti-Jacobin groups to become reintegrated into the legitimacy of political life. Moderate regionalism therefore laid the ground for the emergence of radical regionalism. To this we turn in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE RADICAL REGIONALISTS OCCUPY THE CENTRE OF THE STAGE

Moderate regionalism broke up when it failed to "deliver the goods". Its component parts split into different directions. The Jacobin element - the parties of the French left - eventually joined forces with the "left" clan which was also in opposition to the Gaullist regime. The anti-Jacobin elements, the old-style regionalists and the young intellectuals in the French universities - now began to occupy the centre of the stage of the protest movement. We thus find a radicalization of the regionalist movement. This radicalization occurred both at the level of ideology and of tactics, although this latter took place at a later date than the former. This Chapter will analyse the regionalist movements both as distinct entities and in their relationship to one another. It will also attempt to place them in relation to the system of mediation.

There were three distinct phases in the growth of radical regionalism. The first is the period around the late 1950's and early 1960's when young Corsicans began to rethink the situation of their island. The second, from about 1960 to 1967, is the attempt to give organizational form to the different tendencies. The third, which occurred around 1973 is a further radicalization, when the movements move from regionalism to an explicit autonomism and nationalism (1).

However, the last phase may be seen more as the making explicit what had been implicit or hidden in the earlier phases.

THE FIRST STIRRINGS OF RADICAL REGIONALISM

The most important first step toward creating an organisation which represented the specific interests of young Corsicans of the diaspora was taken on 25 November 1960 when Charles Santoni founded the group Union Corse. This was composed of young Corsicans, either students or recent graduates, living in Paris (2). Pomponi describes it as a "groupement de compatriotes qui se présente comme un nouvel organe de liaison pour les Corses de la région parisienne" (3). The association produced a newspaper Union Corse which appeared until 1968. Its first President was Dominique Leandri.

The new group seemed at first to be little different from the other Corsican Amicales which existed on the French mainland. Like them, it sought to promote mutual aid among the islanders and to preserve and develop Corsican culture. This is clear from a presentation of the objectives of the association made by Leandri in Union Corse in July 1961. He states that "L'Union Corse n'a pas la prétention d'oeuvrer au relèvement économique de l'île... Ses objectifs sont bien plus modestes. Ce qu'elle veut c'est reserrer les liens de la

communauté corse de Paris [en commençant] dans le domaine social, culturel et sportif" (4). To achieve these three objectives, it proposed to set up:

- " - sur le plan social, un entr'aide désintéressé entre insulaires...;
- du point de vue culturel, ... de créer à Paris, la "Maison Corse"...;
- du point de vue sportif, ... une équipe de football est constituée."

Even at this early stage, however, the group wished to break with some of the features of the traditional Amicales. First, it has "... tourné résolument le dos à ces formes de groupements qui comprennent deux catégories bien distinctes: "les personnalités" et ... "les autres". Ici, tous les adhérents sont sur le même plan". Secondly, "l'Union Corse groupe les jeunes Corses de Paris. La grande majorité des adhérents a moins de trente ans". But this implicit critique of the association's elders was not yet a political one: "Les membres ... s'abstiennent de se livrer à une activité politique partisane ... Ils n'ont pas le goût des grandes discussions... Ils attachent plus d'importance à la qualité des réalisations pratiques".

Nevertheless, reading the early issues of Union Corse it is possible to note a tension. In Leandri's statement of objectives, it was stated that the group "... ne veut pas dire qu'elle se désintéresse de cette importante question [le

relèvement économique de l'île]". This concern for economic and then political questions grew as young intellectuals such as Charles Santoni and Gisèle Poli began to develop more explicitly regionalist themes in the paper. Thus, in an editorial, written in early 1962, Santoni exclaimed: "La Corse est dans une situation grave. Que pouvons nous faire, nous ceux de la nouvelle génération, la génération déracinée? [my emph]" (5). He linked this situation in which young Corsicans found themselves to the recent economic development projects. He was not at this stage against the SOMIVAC and SETCO, but stated that "Nous ne comprendrons pas qu'on laisse se développer davantage l'émigration catastrophique des habitants de l'île, pendant qu'on encouragea parallèlement l'implantation massive ... d'éléments étrangers au département [i.e. les pieds noirs]". Furthermore, Santoni insisted that there must be a cultural renewal linked to the economic one: "Si la Corse perd son âme, abandonne sa personnalité, elle n'aura plus aucune envie de survivre. La Corse sera morte. Une île prospère, peuplée d'habitants nouveaux existera peut-être à sa place".

But Santoni was already proposing a political analysis and solution which went further than moderate regionalism. He advocated at this point a federal solution and criticised the excessive centralization of the French state. This critique was justified by the special situation of Corsica: "La géographie donne à la Corse un caractère spécial qui ne

s'accorde guère de la rigidité centralisatrice de l'Etat". Instead, there should be a political decentralization along federalist lines: "confier à la commune, les affaires de la commune, à la région, les affaires de la région, l'Etat se réservant les affaires de l'Etat". However, he did not propose that the young Corsicans should challenge the leadership of the Mdu29 but should rather support them.

In the following issue, Gisèle Poli pointed to the decadence of the island and insisted that it is the duty of the young to speak up (6). Poli advocated a change in the island's economic relationships: from being primarily related to France, it should shift to a Mediterranean and European context. In an interesting analysis of the Corsican problem, Poli pointed to penetration by the mass media as an important factor in raising the consciousness of deprived groups: these have penetrated into "les endroits les plus reculés". The populations of these places became aware "qu'il existait une vie nationale florissante, que les réalisations étaient nombreuses, et que la France marchait allègrement vers un brillant devenir". It was then that "[c]es populations déshéritées, en découvrant un monde qu'elles ignoraient, prirent soudainement conscience de leur propre misère". The clearest example of this phenomenon, according to Poli, was the Bretons who led the way and "ont fait naître un immense espoir" (7).

By 1963, the tone had hardened. Santoni, in a speech to the Association on January 1963, advocated "(1) la nécessité d'une action de la jeunesse distincte de celle des générations précédentes" and "(2) l'importance d'une réforme intellectuelle et morale en profondeur..." (8). The first point was based on the idea that the revendications of the elders did not take into account the specific demands of youth. For example, they were not asking for a Corsican university. In the second point he developed themes which show the influence of federalist philosophers such as Alexandre Marc (9), but adapted to a Corsican context: "Il s'agit ... de sauvegarder ce mode de vie corse si étroitement lié à l'humanisme méditerranéenne... Le respect de la personne, le sens de la mesure, le souci de la justice, la pratique de la solidarité, l'attachement de la liberté, telles sont les caractéristiques de cette civilisation méditerranéenne à laquelle nous appartenons". One of the purposes of their group was "recréer ... un milieu dans lequel ces valeurs aient cours" against a civilisation which reduces man to an object, against "l'hypertrophie et la demesure [de] l'Etat tentaculaire". For these reasons he declared that "nous sommes résolument régionalistes". Thus Santoni proposed three directions for the Association:

- a) la promotion d'un régionalisme authentique qui conditionne la pratique correcte de la démocratie...;
- b) la restauration de l'idée communautaire...;
- c) l'ouverture méditerranéenne ... [this was linked to the process of European integration].

Union Corse thus provided an important forum of organisation and political expression for the young intelligentsia of the diaspora.

Union Corse grouped together students and ex-students. On 18 July 1962, a group composed exclusively of students was founded at Vivario, a mountain village in Corsica near Corte: the Union nationale des Etudiants Corses (UNEC) (10). The UNEC was an amalgamation of seven previously existing Associations d'Etudiants Corses (AEC) from Paris, Aix, Nice, Marseilles, Montpellier, Caen and Lyons. The term "national" here referred to the French national context. The first officers of the group were drawn from the principal universities which were attended by Corsican students. The founder and first President was Dominique Alfonsi (Paris); the Secretary-General was Jacques Luciani (Paris); the Treasurer was Henri Groult (Lyons). The committee members were Noël Pantalucci (Marseilles), Romain Colombani (Aix), and Dominique Rostini and Maurice Polovia (both at Montpellier) and Lucien Felli.

The principal objective of UNEC was the creation of a Corsican University but it remained close to the Union Corse and supported the wider objectives of the radical regionalists. In a statement issued prior to the formation of the UNEC, the AEC declared that "Nos deux associations représentent la totalité de la jeunesse corse à Paris" (11).

In the early phase, UNEC, like Union Corse, supported the moderate regionalists of CAPCO: "... les etudiants, tout comme l'Union Corse, se déclarent solidaires du CAPCO". At the end of 1964, these two groups, with another called "La Corse", merged to form a new organisation called "Union Corse L'Avenir". The newspaper Union Corse also took the new name.

The CEDIC

The above tendency may be described as leaning toward "progressive" political ideologies such as one branch of radical federalism and socialism (12). There existed at the same time another tendency which was closer to old-style regionalism, although in this early period of the first stirrings of radical regionalism these differences were not always clearly discerned. This tendency may be called right-wing radical regionalism. The continuity with old-style regionalism was provided, at least in part, by the personal and family contacts between the older generation and the younger. The link was maintained in journals such as L'Insulaire, founded, as seen, by Jean Makis, who had collaborated with the Italians and served a spell in prison for these activities, and taken over by his son, Achille de Susini. De Susini opened up the paper to writers sympathetic to right-wing ideas and to such discredited figures as François Pietri.

The young right-wing radical regionalists formed their own organisation later than their left-wing counterparts. It was not until April 1964 that the Comité d'Etudes et de Défense des Intérêts de la Corse (CEDIC) was founded by Paul-Marc Seta, a graduate of the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, who also became its first president and leading ideologist. Max Simeoni was also a leading member of the group. At first, the CEDIC had no newspaper of its own, but Louis Rioni, editor of L'Informateur, allowed the group to express its ideas in this newspaper.

In fact, Seta had already been using the columns of L'Informateur to elaborate what later became the ideology of the CEDIC. It is instructive to look at some of the themes which he puts forward at this time. He, too, favoured a federal Europe (13) but was closer to the position of the right-wing federalist Guy Héraud whose book, L'Europe des Ethnies he described as "un remarquable ouvrage" (14) than to the more left-wing federalism of the Parisian students. He concluded that "... seule la création de l'Europe des régions mettra fin aux dominations de l'Etat unitaire" (15). Seta defined the problem of Corsica in this framework and his solution to the problem was couched in the same terms. He demanded "une autonomie contractuelle"; "la revendication globale d'une autonomie contractuelle et proportionnelle" (16). He criticised the existing institutional structures of

the département and Conseil Général, and proposed instead a Regional Assembly (17).

After the creation of the CEDIC these ideas were presented in L'Informateur in a more explicit and coherent manner. The aim of the association was the "sauvegarde de l'ETHNIE CORSE": "... il ne s'agit pas seulement d'accroître la production agricole de l'île ou de développer le tourisme en Corse, mais d'orienter l'action entreprise de façon à ce que ces éléments du progrès économique servent EN PRIORITE LES INSULAIRES, et permettent le maintien et l'enracinement en Corse de l'ACTIVITE ET DE L'UNITE ETHNIQUE [emph in text]" (18). It was this existence of a distinct ethnic group that justified the demand for separate administrative structures: "La collectivité insulaire doit être associée à la gestion de la Région, et aux responsabilités qui en découlent". The notion of the Corsicans constituting a separate ethnie was an idea quite contrary to the notion of France as "one and indivisible" and was a new way of expressing the nineteenth century regionalist critique of the Republic, as found, for example, in authors such as Le Play. This insisted that the departmental structures set up at the Revolution destroyed natural human communities. In 1964, Seta and Yves Le Bomin gave a more clear form to these ideas in the Manifeste du C.E.D.I.C. pour L'ETHNIE CORSE (19).

Although the young intellectuals in Paris were developing similar themes there were important differences between the two tendencies. First, the CEDIC was based primarily in Corsica itself, mainly in the region around Bastia. Second, it was less favourable toward the use of Marxist concepts to analyse the problem of Corsica. Instead, it limited itself to the framework proposed by right-wing federalists such as Guy Héraud. Third, it viewed the moderate regionalists in the CAPCO in a more critical manner than did Union Corse. This may have been for two reasons. First, the CEDIC were close to Achille de Susini and the old-style regionalists who had quit CAPCO after a violent disagreement. Second, CAPCO was now completely dominated by the parties of the French left which had begun to cooperate with the "left" clan of Giacobbi. The Parisians, given their overall socialist orientation, were (like the Breton UDB) more favourable to some form of cooperation with such parties. Finally, while the left-wingers sought an ouverture méditerranéenne, some of the CEDIC sympathizers such as Jacques Luciani (also a member of UNEC), expressed overtly racist judgements in L'Informateur: "Le sol de France: un paillasson pour les métèques" (20). Another article in the paper attacked the North Africans who were arriving in Corsica: "... les Services de la main-d'oeuvre devraient éliminer le plus possible cette main-d'oeuvre [les musulmans nordafricains] très peu productive, dans nos villes" (21).

Despite these differences the two tendencies seemed to have some common features: their youthfulness, their desire for a radical change in the administrative structures between Corsica and France, their federalist philosophy, their critique of the economic development programme (although for different reasons). These elements of a possible common programme were enough for the two groups to attempt to create a single organisation. This took place on 31 July 1966 during the Assises Régionalistes de la Jeunesse Corse which took place on the island. The new group was called the Front Régionaliste Corse (FRC).

The Front Régionaliste Corse

A tract distributed immediately prior to the Assises (22) outlined the topics to be discussed:

- des lois exceptionnelles pour la Corse...;
- la reconnaissance de la personnalité de notre région...;
- son érection immédiate en région de programme;
- la réalisation rapide d'un plan d'ensemble;
- le droit et les moyens pour la jeunesse corse de rester et de travailler dans son pays;
- l'égalité totale des conditions de vie avec les autres régions de l'ensemble français.

During the Assises, Dominique Alfonsi criticised the moderate regionalists. Santoni presented an analysis of the

Corsican problem in the framework of the internal colonialist thesis developed by Robert Lafont. Seta spoke on the system of "autonomie administrative interne". Finally, Max Simeoni presented a synthesis of the speeches (23). Thus the proceedings were dominated by the leaders of the two tendencies. The outcome was the fusion of the CEDIC and L'Union Corse-L'Avenir to form the Front Régionaliste Corse (FRC).

The marriage between left-wing and right-wing radical regionalism was, however, short-lived. The ideological differences between the two tendencies were too great and, after a few months, the CEDIC left the new organisation. Already, in August 1966, the speeches of Alfonsi and Santoni had been criticised in the columns of the L'Informateur by a columnist called Fléchettes. Alfonsi was criticised for the violence of his attack on the moderate regionalists while Santoni came under attack for quoting Lenin. The two CEDIC militants who were members of the Comité Directeur of the FRC, P. Beretti and M. Simeoni, resigned explaining that the CEDIC was the group which best expressed their views. In November 1966, L'Informateur became the official journal of the CEDIC and, on 1 November 1966, the group founded its own paper: Arritti (a Corsican word meaning "Arise!").

Another consequence of the withdrawal of the CEDIC was the departure from the FRC of Dominique Alfonsi who resigned

in August 1967 because he disagreed with the departure of the CEDIC. Already, in December 1966, Alfonsi had returned to Ajaccio and founded his own newspaper which bore the title La Corse hebdomadaire. He created at the same time a "comité à aspirations régionalistes tendu vers une moralisation de la vie politique et à la prise en main de l'économie insulaire par une nouvelle génération élitaine" (24). The tendency represented by Alfonsi may be described as lying, in ideological terms, somewhere between the right and left-wing tendencies.

The FRC remained in existence but was now composed almost exclusively of the left-wingers. The Mémorial des Corses gives a good summary of the reasons for the split:

La controverse a porté et porte encore sur des options de fond. Il s'agissait de savoir si le régionalisme devait s'armer politiquement, s'il devait affirmer des options socialistes plutôt que de déboucher immédiatement sur une technique électoraliste en négligeant l'approfondissement doctrinal sur un régionalisme démocratique qui dépasserait en impact une simple revendication institutionnelle - sur ce débat, le mouvement régionaliste s'est divisé en plusieurs tendances (25).

By the middle 1960's, then, the tendencies within the younger generation of radical regionalists had been clarified, and each tendency had its own ideology, tactics and organisation. It is not the purpose of this Chapter to give a history of the subsequent development of the movements. This has been done competently elsewhere (26). Rather it will try to place them within the context of the general plan of the

thesis: their relationship to Corsican society, the system of mediation between the island and the state, and the changes that have occurred in the relationships between these. This means analysing the two principal tendencies in terms of their: a) ideology; b) programme and tactics; c) socio-economic support base and d) success or failure. These features of the movements will then be related to the above three factors.

THE LEFT-WING RADICAL REGIONALISTS

These were represented principally by the FRC following the departure of the right-wingers but also by other groups such as those founded by Dominique Alfonsi on his return to Ajaccio. The exit of the right-wingers left the group free to develop more fully its own distinctive brand of regionalism, some elements of which had been germinating since around 1960.

Ideology

In February 1967, L'Union Corse l'Avenir published the Propositions du Front Régionaliste Corse (27). In these may be found a clear expression of the group's ideology. The proposals were divided into two sections. The first section developed an analysis of the Corsican problem, and the second proposed a programme to solve this problem. It is the first section which is of most interest.

First, there was the affirmation that La Région Corse constituted "une unité organique naturelle, parfaitement définie dans ses trois dimensions". These are:

- a) Une dimension socio-culturelle: autrement dit, l'existence d'un peuple ...;
- b) Une dimension géographique: la Corse est une île de la Méditerranée ...;
- c) Une dimension économique: l'économie corse est une économie sous-développée ...

Second, the FRC provided an explanation for this underdevelopment: le colonialisme intérieur: "La situation de la Corse est une situation de type colonial". This framework is explicitly adopted from the Occitan regionalist movement presided over by Robert Lafont , the C.O.E.A. (Comité Occitan d'Etudes et d'Action), and homage is paid to the notion of révolution régionale, although mention is not made of the author of these ideas, Robert Lafont. Corsica is an example of internal colonialism because it has, according to the FRC, the following characteristics:

- (1) La fuite des ressources naturelles.
- (2) L'exploitation des ressources par un grand capital agraire ou financier...
- (3) La réduction constante du marché du travail.
- (4) La prolétarianisation des Corses hors de Corse et l'implantation dans l'île d'un sous-prolétariat importé.
- (5) La dépossession de la terre [aidée] par la SOMIVAC et

les organismes de crédit.

(6) L'écrasement du petit commerce et de l'entreprise étroitement liés à la vie locale.

(7) Le monopole du pavillon ...

(8) Soumission absolue par le moyen du pouvoir central, aux impératifs d'une politique économique nationale puis européenne ...

(9) La soumission aux impératifs d'une politique militaire qui transforme les régions sous-peuplées en bases opérationnelles ...

(10) L'ignorance par la majorité des Corses de leur culture ...

(11) Le portrait du colonisé corse sous les traits d'un paresseux, d'un incapable, voire d'un criminel ...

The theory of internal colonialism as applied to Corsica which is the FRC's distinctive contribution to Corsican regionalism was given further expression in a rapport d'orientation presented to the group's Third Congress in 1970. It is worth quoting this in full given the importance of this ideology in subsequent developments:

Tout l'édifice colonialiste repose sur une même souche: la propriété privée des moyens de production et d'échange, avec son expression politique, l'Etat centraliste bourgeois et son expression idéologique, la culture bourgeoise. Il faut détruire ces structures jusque dans leurs fondements, autrement dit, il faut décoloniser d'abord. Si l'on est d'accord sur cette nécessité, il suffit de fixer les objectifs généraux: propriété collective des terres, des rivages, des mines, des industries à créer, des transports, du tourisme ... organisation de l'instruction à tous les niveaux (y compris l'Université au bénéfice du peuple et non plus des privilégiés), promotion de la langue corse et du patrimoine culturel. Cela se nomme socialisme (28).

In the same report can be found a definition of the meaning of colonialism:

Quel est ce sens? Ni plus ni moins que celui d'une surexploitation. Les travailleurs de Nancy, par exemple, sont certainement exploités. Il s'agit toutefois d'une exploitation de type capitaliste bien définie. Lorsque cette exploitation est aggravée et généralisée au point de dévaster un pays, de lui interdire toute progression et tout progrès, au point de paupériser et de clochardiser la grande masse de la population; lorsqu'à cela s'ajoutent des mesures de l'Etat qui tendent à détruire l'identité de cette population en réprimant sa culture, alors seulement il est permis de donner à pareilles conditions de vie pour les larges masses du peuple, le nom de colonialisme; c'est le cas de la Corse.

Thirdly, this system of internal colonialism is set up with the complicity of the Corsicans themselves: une autocolonisation. At the centre of this complicity is "le féodalisme du système des clans". Interestingly, the FRC, perhaps because of the presence in its ranks of former PC fellow-travellers such as Jean Leandri and also because of the Marxist analysis of its Trotskyist members, here develops an analysis of the clan system strikingly similar to that of the PCF in the immediate post-war period which has been mentioned in the previous Chapter: "[c]ette société sclérosée corse favorise la domination anachronique d'une classe dirigeante rétrograde qui tend tous ses efforts vers le maintien de la sclérose et de la désintégration sociales qu'elle juge nécessaires au maintien de son pouvoir". This is convenient for the central power: "on constate aisément quel avantage procure ce système à l'administration centraliste et aux groupes économiques colonisateurs". The use of different party

labels by the clans does not alter the fact that they have all had the same basic approach to the central power: a capitulation and abdication of Corsica's interests.

The arguments of left-wing radical regionalism may be found in their clearest form in Main basse sur une île (29). This book, which appeared in 1971 as a collective work of the FRC was, in fact, written mainly by Charles Santoni and Pascal Marchetti. The book, in effect, is a brilliant attempt to rewrite Corsican history from the viewpoint of the internal colonialism thesis. All Corsican history, and not least the period of French rule, is interpreted as one long story of colonization (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 attempts to illustrate that Corsica is "une colonie à part entière". Most importantly, the present efforts at mise en valeur by the SOMIVAC and SETCO are seen as a continuation of the old pattern. Chapter 3 applies the analysis to the cultural situation of Corsicans: the deculturation and taking away of Corsica's history and the substitution of a degraded "folklorisme": "rien n'échappera plus aux fabricants d'histoire, aux modeleurs d'une Corse de convention, aux marchands de folklore" (30). The authors term this "le grand dérangement culturel". Using the analysis of Albert Memmi in Portrait du colonisé, the authors explain how Corsicans are the instruments of their own colonization and deculturation. Finally, they reject both the poujadism of the petit bourgeois regionalist movements and any tendency towards independence.

Instead they propose a Corsican socialism as the way forward (Chapter 5). This work, probably the most influential piece of writing to come from the Corsican regionalists, had a wide-spread success and was translated into several languages. It provided young Corsicans with a version of regionalism that was in tune with modern ideas. Furthermore, it possessed a coherence and power of argumentation that seemed difficult to refute. For these reasons Main basse sur une île helped to transform the terms in which the Corsican problem was debated.

The ideology of left-wing radical regionalism, then, may be summed up as a reworking of old regionalist themes such as the specific identity and organic unity of the Corsican people in new terms. These are borrowed from the language of both integral federalism and neo-Marxism.

Programme

The FRC developed two key ideas as their principal aims (31): "la possession de la région par les autochtones et l'administration de la région par elle-même". The first aim was based on the notion of "propriété régionale", i.e. it is a fundamental right of the inhabitants of a region to possess collectively and enjoy the usufruct of the natural wealth of the region. A specific strategy and set of tactics were put forward to obtain this aim: it is necessary to struggle:

- Pour exiger la formation sur place de cadres autochtones.
- Pour l'étude régionale des problèmes de rentabilité.
- Pour le réemploi à des fins régionales des sommes déposées aux guichets bancaires.

The second aim was to put the administrative powers of the region in the hands of an assemblée régionale corse. Such an assembly would administer the economic, intellectual and social affairs of the region. to do so it must have a regional executive, emanating from it and with authority over the region's services. The prefect would be replaced by a delegate of the central power responsible for those field services provided directly by the central state and for harmonizing the regional and national plans.

Other proposals made by the FRC included the erection of Corsica into a distinct economic region with its own programme and regional investment bank along the lines of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno in Italy. Regional development planning should be by Corsicans for Corsicans: "Le plan régional de développement de la Corse sera financé par le budget régional et par la Caisse régionale d'investissement corse". It should include: infrastructural investment (ports, roads, dams, etc); industrial investment (with priority given to the creation of jobs in industry); an agricultural policy based on support for the island's pastoral sector (i.e. the opposite of of most economic proposals from the centre which envisaged the disappearance of the latter). In order to bring about this

form of development there would have to be: an educational system to serve the economy; a policy of demographic renewal; an overall plan of technical aid; the opening up of the region to the Mediterranean and to Europe (although not "... l'Europe actuelle des forces économiques, qui assujettissent notre région au sous-développement... nous nous déclarons résolument pour une Europe des peuples, c'est à dire pour une Europe des régions"); improvement in communications and tourism ("le développement d'un tourisme moyen"); and a special fiscal statute.

Support base

Left-wing radical regionalism was based principally in Paris and, to a lesser extent, in the French provincial universities. Dominique Alphonsi tried to bring it back to Corsica but with only limited success, although several of the leaders of this tendency, such as Charles Santoni, did return to the island. In numerical terms, it seems that the FRC was never more than a small group of intellectuals - either students or recent graduates in the liberal professions, especially lawyers and teachers (32). However, the intellectual force of the group's arguments diffused through its newspaper and its 1971 collective publication Main basse sur une île , gave it an influence much wider than the number of members might indicate.

Tactics

The FRC decided not to contest elections itself. This was probably the consequence of the group's small number of members and the fact that the latter lived mainly outside Corsica. Max Simeoni did stand as an FRC candidate in an election in Bastia but the group denounced this use of its name. Instead, it gave conditional support to the parties of the French left such as the SFIO and PCF (33). For example, in 1967, it was more positive toward the programme of the Fédération de la Gauche Démocratique et Socialiste (FGDS) than to that of the UNR. In the parliamentary elections in 1967 in the Corte constituency it recommended its followers to vote for Mondolmi (SFIO) and Bungelmi (PCF). Its attitude may be illustrated by its comments following the victory of the left-wing candidate, Jean Zuccarelli, in a municipal by-election in Bastia in 1968:

... la manière dont il a conduit la campagne, dégagé de l'emprise des clans, sa référence constante à des options idéologiques, son souci de se démasquer du giacobisme en contre-balançant l'influence de celui-ci par la venue de leaders continentaux de la Fédération, MM Billières, Defferre, et Mitterrand. M Zuccarelli est l'élus des ouvriers, employés, agriculteurs, commerçants, autant qu'il est l'élus des clans et de leurs troupes (34).

When the "events" of May 1968 broke out, it was natural that the FRC should participate. Firstly, the radical regionalists were part of the forces of the "new left" which were an essential component of May 1968. Secondly, most of

their members were already in Paris where the first outbreak occurred. Thirdly, many of them were still students or had recently graduated and the "events" were precipitated in the Universities. Following May 1968, the radical regionalists adopted the tactic of joining forces with the Soixante-huitards while many of the latter joined the regionalists. On 19 August 1970, they organised a Journée unitaire progressive corse, with the participation of the CFDT, PSU and MODEF among others (35). In December 1971, they suggested to the leaders of the island's left-wing parties (PS, PCF, PSU), trade unions and regionalist movements, that a "front politique de lutte contre le colonialisme français en Corse" be established (36). Not surprisingly, the Jacobin PCF and PS did not respond favourably while it was the PSU and CFDT, the party and trade union most influenced by May 1968, which did.

Left-wing radical regionalism: success or failure?

As a political movement mobilizing the Corsican "masses" and aggregating their interests the radical regionalists of the left failed. The "masses" continued to support the traditional parties, as may be seen in successive election results. As a group the left-wing were a tiny minority of the total Corsican population. Furthermore, this already tiny movement, like many similar extreme left-wing groups, began to break up reducing its numbers even more. In April 1973, the movement transformed itself into a political party, the

Partitu di u Populu Corsu, following the adoption of a more explicit autonomist programme in the A Chjama di a Castellare (see Appendix). This led to internal disagreements and the Trotskyists left (37). In July 1973, the FRC adopted an explicitly autonomist programme and changed its name to the "Partitu di u Populu Corsu (PPC). Then, some time later, Charles Santoni, one of the principal leaders and the chief ideologue of the movement left to join the new PS. This was in line with similar "transfuges" in other regions such as Brittany and the French Basque Country (38). In July 1974, the PPC joined with the PCP of Dominique Alfonsi to form the Partitu di u Populu Corsu per l'Autonomia (PPCA). However, the PPCA disappeared after a short period of time (in December 1974). In the end, the left-wing radical regionalists were represented by the tiny party of Dominique Alphonsi: the Partitu Pupulare Corsu (PPC) and by the violent separatists who will be treated below. However, they were present in the new Socialist Party of François Mitterrand and had an influence therein which would bear fruit when the latter came to power in 1981 (see Chapter Nine below).

Left-wing radical regionalists, however, were important in ideological terms. They raised the level of analysis and debate on the Corsican question and imposed a radically new framework in which this could be understood. What is important is less the intrinsic merits of this framework than the fact that it helped to rehabilitate regionalism, discredited after

the Second World War, by giving it a "progressive" veneer. The old regionalist themes were now couched in neo-Marxist terms and concepts: the theory of internal colonialism - as well as the theory of integral federalism. Although most of the French left remained Jacobin and would not accept the "colonialist" thesis, nevertheless, other elements of the analysis, especially the economic, made it more acceptable to them. This provided a bridge across which regionalists and socialists could travel to meet and influence each other. The consequences of this meeting would become clear when the left, after its long sojourn in the political wilderness, finally came to power in May 1981.

RIGHT-WING RADICAL REGIONALISM

The first stirrings of this tendency have already been outlined above. The members of this group, because of their personal and family contacts, as well as ideological affinities, were closer to the old-style regionalists of an earlier generation. Their departure from the FRC had two important consequences. First, it led to an ideological conflict with the FRC which was now completely dominated by the left (39). This forced the right-wingers to formulate their own position in a clearer manner. Second, it gave them the opportunity to form their own distinct organisation. In fact, the same personnel formed several organisations with different names: CEDIC (April 1964) became ARC (Action

Régionaliste Corse - September 1967) ARC kept the same acronym but changed the words to Azzione per a Rinascita Corsa in July 1973. This change was meant to convey the fact that ARC had become explicitly autonomist. After the events of Aleria in August 1975 (see Introduction), when the ARC was banned the group changed its name to the Associu di i Patrioti Corsi (APC - February 1976) and then to the Unione di u Populu Corsu (UPC), which is its present name.

Ideology

Some of the elements of the right-wingers' ideology have already been mentioned above. These became more explicit as the controversy with the FRC developed and the CEDIC and later ARC were forced to clarify their positions. Immediately prior to the attempted merger the latter declared themselves to be "apolitical" (40). Seta explained this as meaning a refusal to become involved in the political system then existing on the island, that is, the corrupt system of the clans:

"L'apolitisme, en effet, repousse par définition toute subordination à un parti ou à un clan et assure la prééminence de l'économie sur le politique" (41). It is interesting that the claim to be "apolitical" is often made by right-wing nationalist groups. The Breton MOB claimed to be "ni rouge, ni blanc" (see above Chapter One) while the early Provisional IRA claimed to be "neither right nor left" and opposed to both

socialism and capitalism. In fact, such groups tend to be more against the former than the latter.

Another reaction of such groups is to reject "foreign" political philosophies such as Marxism or socialism in favour of a purely nationalist one. This reaction may be found in a speech by one of the first leaders of the right-wing regionalists, Lucien Alfonsi, at the founding Congress of ARC, in Cateraggio (42). In defense of the "apolitical" orientation, he quotes with approval Paul Sérant: "Les régionalistes ont le droit d'être pour ou contre la monarchie, pour ou contre le socialisme, de croire à l'Europe ou de ne pas y croire. Mais ils doivent ensemble défendre la région". He then develops a quasi-nationalist interpretation of Corsican regionalism: the ARC, according to Alfonsi, differs from the FRC in that it is the bearer of a "régionalisme purement corse". This position is adopted because these non-Corsican political philosophies divide Corsicans rather than unite them:

En Corse fermer la porte du régionalisme à tous ceux qui ne font pas dévotion à telle ou telle chapelle politico-philosophique, c'est se condamner à l'inefficacité, donc à la mort ... Pour arracher au gouvernement, quel qu'il soit, une mesure contre laquelle l'appareil administratif centraliste, jaloux de ses prérogatives et soucieux de ses intérêts dressera jusqu'à son dernier souffle tous les obstacles en son pouvoir, il faut l'adhésion massive de la population. Il est ridicule, il est criminel de prétendre que le régionalisme l'obtiendra en divisant encore ce qui est déjà morcelé.

These positions are based on the assumption, shared with the left-wingers, that there exists a Corsican ethnie or peuple which possesses an organic unity. The right-wingers, however, claim that "foreign" political philosophies, such as Marxism, are based on the theory of class struggle and the predominance of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. Such a philosophy runs counter to the ARC's desire to unite all classes in Corsica on the basis of their "Corsicanness". It is for this reason, too, that they reject the parties of the French mainland based as these are on class interests. But they also reject them because they are French and therefore instruments of centralization. Once again, it is Alfonsi who explains:

Il n'y a rien à attendre des partis français: [ils] sont centralistes, les uns à droite par filiation conservatrice, héritiers plus ou moins conscients, plus ou moins volontaires, des 40 rois qui, en mille ans, ont fait la France, les autres, de gauche, par tradition jacobine ... Tout lien du régionalisme avec un parti revient automatiquement à le couper des autres, donc à diviser les Corses (43).

The idea that the Corsican people must be united and not divided, which was central to the ARC's ideology and related to the notion that Corsicans constitute an ethnie or peuple was later given more explicit expression in the ARC's booklet Autonomia (44), written in 1974 as the movement's equivalent to Main basse sur une île:

Il [le peuple corse] est une réalite historique, charnelle. Il possède sa langue véhiculaire, son atavisme, son instinct, son comportement spécifiques. Il est enraciné depuis des millénaires dans la terre rude et belle de l'Ile de Corse. Leur union est indissoluble (45).

Autonomia, like Main basse sur une île, presented a highly idealized picture of this peuple heroically struggling throughout history to preserve its existence and identity against the incursions of the island's many invaders. More importantly, the island's present ills were interpreted in the same terms of defense against aggression, the aggressors now being the French:

Le passé de la Corse française a lentement et impitoyablement préparé l'agression du present, à la fois générale et multiforme, que trop de Corses ne distinguent pas derrière une expansion tapageuse dont ils pensent bénéficier alors qu'elle est organisée contre eux. A son tour, l'agression d'aujourd'hui prélude minutieusement à l'exécution du grand dessein colonialiste de demain, inscrit dans les Plans et Schémas de l'Etat français: l'élimination du peuple corse [my emph.] (46).

The ARC shared with the FRC the notion that Corsica was colonized by France. In fact, this "colonialist" interpretation may be traced back to the writings of Achille De Susini in L'Insulaire in the late 1950's (see previous Chapter). This was not as "progressive" as it might seem at first sight. The complaint of old-style regionalists such as De Susini was not against colonialism as such but against Corsicans receiving the same treatment as Africans and Asians. However, the ARC does draw to some extent on the "internal

colonialist" thesis of Lafont as mediated by the FRC but denuded of its Marxist content and of the conclusion that there should be a socialist solution:

Toutes les agressions économiques, financières, démographiques, sociales, écologiques pratiquées de 1957 à 1973 par la volonté ou l'assentiment de l'Etat français contre le peuple corse ont donc tendu à priver ce dernier de ses ressources naturelles pour en confier à d'autres l'exploitation et les bénéfices. Une telle attitude de la part d'un Etat à l'égard d'un territoire qu'il contrôle ne peut porter qu'un nom: le colonialisme.

Le colonialisme de l'Etat français vis-à-vis de la Corse pourrait n'être, cependant, qu'une variante affaiblie du colonialisme totale, une sorte de version interne, s'il s'était borné aux aspects dénoncés plus hauts, dans ce bilan de l'expansion. Pour mériter tout à fait son nom, le colonialisme doit revêter aussi des aspects politico-administratifs et judiciaires - et trouver des complices, conscients ou abusés, dans la population et représentants légaux (47).

Programme

The programme proposed by ARC had two principal elements: a revitalization of the plan for economic development and a change in the administrative structures between the island and France. Unlike the FRC the ARC did not blame the economic ills of the island on the capitalist system or the existing process of European integration which they (like earlier figures such as De Susini) supported. Rather they used an argument that went back to nineteenth-century regionalism: the island's ills were caused by the fact that the French state had abandoned them (48) - which was somewhat contradicted by the notion of a

solution "purement corse". ARC pointed to three principal areas for development: tourism, agriculture and industry. What was needed was for the state to provide the means to develop them (49). The model chosen was the Italian state's policy with regard to the Mezzogiorno and Sardinia:

... le plan de développement [de la Sardaigne] a commencé par l'implantation d'unités industrielles qui, par leurs dimensions, leur haute technicité et leur capacité productive, doivent se révéler compétitives au niveau national et même européen (50).

This, in fact, was implicit in the PAR of 1957 whose general orientation, according to the CEDIC and ARC, was correct. What went wrong was the initial lack of means provided to achieve these goals, the change of orientation with the Fifth Republic and the arrival of the pieds noirs on the Plaine Orientale. Finally, the authorities forgot that "[l]e développement économique de la Corse doit être fait par les Corses et pour les Corses (51). The economic development programme of the right-wing radical regionalists was based on continuing the orientations of the 1957 PAR but with Corsicans in control of the development.

To obtain this, different administrative structures are necessary. Paul-Marc Seta, in the pages of L'Informateur, developed the theme of obtaining a special statute of internal autonomy:

Sauvegarder l'ethnie ne s'avère possible que si la collectivité insulaire devient étroitement et réellement associée à l'administration comme à l'économie de la région corse, de façon à contrôler les investissements et répartition des bénéfices du Plan d'Action Régionale. Un tel résultat ne peut être obtenu que par l'octroi à la Corse d'un statut spécial qui lui donnerait les moyens d'exercer cette action concrète dans la conduite des affaires régionales. L'autonomie de gestion dans les affaires corses, procurée par l'octroi d'un statut spécial, signifierait pour les insulaires une collaboration plus étroite et donc plus confiante avec le pouvoir central de Paris ainsi que la consultation obligatoire de leurs représentants avant toute décision d'origine légale ou réglementaire intéressant l'île. Sans autonomie locale, sans statut special, la Région ne peut espérer protéger son ethnie (52).

Tactics

Although the ARC proclaimed itself to be "apolitical", it decided initially to engage in electoral activity. This tactic was based on the strategy of mobilizing the Corsican people on the basis of its organic unity. The traditional political parties were based on divisions of ideology or class or those promoted by the traditional clans while the ARC presented itself as the unifying alternative to these. In March 1967, Max Simeoni stood as a candidate in a legislative election in Bastia (under the label of the FRC!). He received only a small percentage of the votes cast (see Appendix on electoral activity in Corsica). In Autumn 1967, his brother Edmond was candidate in the cantonal election in Bastia Terravecchia. In the 1968 municipal elections in Bastia, Max headed a regionalist list which obtained only a few hundred votes. In 1971, Max again headed a list in the municipal elections in

Bastia. Finally, in 1973, the ARC decided that elections in Corsica were too rigged for it to have a fair chance. It decided therefore not to adopt this tactic again:

Il est certain que les résultats électoraux de l'ARC ne sont pas à la mesure de l'audience réelle que connaît le mouvement ... On peut être sympathisant régionaliste, voire même militant sans pour autant suivre la consigne de renoncer à la pulitichella (53).

They did not consider the possibility that the vast majority of Corsicans still did not wish to join in their "mobilization". They decided, therefore, to try to occupy other terrains and were present in almost all the social protest movements that occurred in Corsica in the 1960's and early 1970's (54).

Finally, the ARC militants were not averse occasionally to threaten violence and to sometimes use it, although this was not a usual tactic for them. In fact, violence as used by this tendency was more a series of symbolic gestures rooted in the island's cultural system, as explained above in Chapter Six. There was no attempt to organise a systematic campaign against the state but rather sporadic incidents such as at Aleria in 1975 or Bastelica/Ajaccio in 1980 (55). These incidents sparked off mass protests and provoked a sense of solidarity among the islanders. However, the ARC and, later, the UPC leaders denounced the use of violence.

Support base

Right-wing radical regionalism, in contrast to the left-wingers, was, as has been noted above, implanted on Corsica itself. Within Corsica, however, its influence was concentrated in specific areas (56). These were principally Bastia, the area of the Oriental Plain near Bastia and the Fiumorbu region to the west of the Plain. It is not difficult to find the reasons for this. Right-wing radical regionalism found its greatest support among those social groups most affected by the upheavals caused by the economic development programme of the 1960's: small farmers, hoteliers, shopkeepers and commerçants. In other words, the traditional constituency of poujadisme (57). As the Mémorial des CorSES expressed it:

La clientèle initiale du mouvement est faite de membres de catégories sociales auxquelles s'adressaient plus particulièrement le CEDIC, la Confédération Générale Interprofessionnelle (CGIC), les PME ... c'est-à-dire, des commerçants, des artisans, des boutiquiers, des membres des professions libérales (58).

This orientation was made explicit in an editorial which appeared in Arritti:

Notre action a pour elle de prendre son élan, au départ, sur une catégorie de CorSES particulièrement touchés par les injustices dont notre département est accablé: les petits commerçants groupés au sein de la CGIC que préside notre ami Jean Villanova. Nous nous concentrons sur eux parce qu'ils sont les victimes visées par l'illégalité fiscale que l'on veut imposer à la Corse. Quelques mauvais esprits, radoteurs du clan, essaient bien de dresser les consommateurs contre les commerçants.

Laissons leur cette basse manoeuvre. Notre action a pour objet l'intérêt absolu de toutes les catégories de Corse, mais à ce titre elle doit la priorité à ceux dont la situation commande toutes les autres et personne ne peut nier valablement que le commerce soit le facteur déterminant de l'économie corse. Ce choix de priorité était indispensable, mais nous défendrons toutes les causes de toutes nos forces car, en abandonner une, serait de trahir toutes ... (59).

Although the ARC/UPC tendency failed to garner much support in electoral terms - reaching its height with about 10 per cent of the vote in the 1982 Regional Assembly elections (see below Chapter Nine) - it did attract a significant following among young Corsicans. This was especially true after the violent incidents mentioned above, and can be seen from the level of participation in protest marches. Furthermore, an opinion poll taken soon after the events of Aleria indicated that a large minority of Corsicans were sympathetic to some of the theses of the regionalists and with their action at Aleria (60).

Right-wing radical regionalism: success or failure?

This tendency has been successful in relative terms, that is, compared with their left-wing rivals (the opposite of what occurred in Brittany - see Chapter One above). They have managed to establish a stronger presence on the island. Furthermore, they have been successful in keeping the Corsican question alive and on the agenda. The occasional use of violence provoked a repressive response from the Government

and this in turn produced a wave of sympathy on the part of many young Corsicans. Finally, unlike the left-wingers this tendency has been successful in maintaining their organisation in existence over a period of almost twenty years with very few splits occurring (61).

In terms of the movement's attempted mobilization around the theme of the peuple corse it must be seen as a failure. The vast majority of Corsicans have remained faithfully attached to France and remain unwilling to call this into question. However, the movement could claim some success in the sense that it legitimised the term and concept peuple corse. This is evident when one compares the responses of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing quoted above in Chapter Five and the use of the term by President Mitterrand on a visit to the island in 1982 (see Chapter Nine below). The problem for radical regionalists of both right and left tendencies has been that while they have admitted to being both Corsican and French they put the emphasis on the first element of their dual identity. The majority of Corsicans, however, have been proud to place the second element in first place.

THE VIOLENT SEPARATISTS (62)

The Corsican "phobia" has always been that the island would leave the French state and be returned to Italy. During the 1930's the autonomist movements did indeed flirt with this

notion, as some of their members fell under the influence of Mussolini's irredentism. The moderate and radical regionalist movements were convenient umbrellas under which those who held such opinions could resume their activities. As early as 1961 a group calling itself the Comité Corse pour l'Indépendance (CCI) made its existence known by planting bombs in the Bastia region. In 1962 the group published a pamphlet entitled Livre blanc (63). In late 1967/early 1968, a groupuscule called Corse Libre was founded which also carried out several bombings in Bastia and Ajaccio (64). The most important groups, however, were the Fronte Paisanu Corsu di Liberazione (FPCL - October 1973) and Ghjustizia Paolina (GP - march 1974). In May 1976 these two groups merged to form the best known of the Corsican separatist groups - the Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse (FLNC).

Ideology

The ideology of the violent separatists may be described as the making explicit and the carrying to their logical conclusion of the assumptions of the radical regionalists. The most important difference is that the separatists do not feel the need to pay lip service to the existence of a dual identity. They simply deny they are French. However, there is a division here too between right-wingers and left-wingers. The former may be found in the CCI who rejected an autonomist solution within the French state and opted for an independent

Corsica. However, this group was also linked to those who opposed De Gaulle's policy in Algeria and who sympathized with the pieds noirs (65). There would seem to have been links between them and the pied noir terrorists of the OAS with an agreement being signed between them (66). Corse Libre advocated complete independence but does not seem to have had a very developed theoretical position.

The FPCL did not, at first, demand complete independence but demanded instead the statute of "protectorate" (67). GP was as vague in its declared options (68). However, in its Manifeste de la Pentecôte published in 1975 it made a clear choice for independence. The FLNC, finally, as its name suggests, wished for complete independence. In fact, the name was adopted from the Algerian FLN, the assumption being that Corsica too was a colony that had to be liberated in a national liberation struggle. Here, in effect, can be discerned the most radical expression of the internal colonialist thesis. The violent separatists accept fully the theory as elaborated by groups such as the FRC. They, however, wish to take action of a more radical kind (69).

Programme and tactics

The early use of violence in the 1960's does not seem to have been based on an elaborate political theory. Rather, it seems to have been the work of individuals and small cells

motivated by the desire for revenge at the spoliation of their society and their own bitterness at being left out of the development of Corsica (70). Furthermore, it was a Corsican tradition to express one's emotions in violent form, although the use of explosives was not traditionally Corsican. However, as time went on, the groups felt the need to elaborate a more theoretical justification of the use of violence. The FLNC distinguished between propagande armée and lutte armée. The former was the use of violence to draw attention to the island's plight and to put pressure on the authorities to respond to their demands. The targets of this campaign were not people but buildings. Among the latter the favourite targets were Government buildings, the SOMIVAC and SETCO and hotels and farms set up under the PAR, as well as spectacular targets such as aeroplanes and ships. However, the lutte armée would arrive only at a later stage. This would be a full scale insurrection in which the Corsican people would rise up against the French and the spilling of blood would be inevitable. It would seem that some of the violent separatists feel that this stage has been reached in the 1980's (see below Chapter Nine).

Bomb attacks in Corsica began in the early 1960's and gradually increased in intensity (71) as the following figures indicate:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of bomb attacks</u>
1971 -	9
1972	18
1973	43
1974	111
1975	226
1976	298 (incl. destruction of a Boeing aircraft at Ajaccio)
1977	(first violence appears on mainland France)
1979	329
1980	462
1982	742
1983	608
1984	490
1985	396 (72).

However, it should be pointed out that although the number of bombs was increasing, often these bombs consisted of only a few ounces of gelignite and caused little damage. By contrast, bombs planted in Northern Ireland by the IRA (Irish Republican Army) may contain as much as 1000 lbs. of explosive in one bomb and cause widespread damage. Most of them are aimed at isolated villas and houses in the mountainous interior. Furthermore, most of the bomb attacks of the Corsican separatists have caused little disruption to the everyday life on the island. Although there are large numbers of security forces on the island, there is little sense of a

society at war, as is the case in Northern Ireland. It must be concluded therefore that Corsican violence, although seemingly impressive in terms of statistics is, in fact, quite marginal. In 1980's, however, there has been a tendency to radicalize the violence and several assassinations have taken place.

Support base (73)

The personnel of the violent separatist movements seems to have been largely drawn from the ranks of the legitimate radical regionalists. Indeed many were members of the ARC or FRC by day and clandestines by night. However, it would seem that none of the violent separatist movements ever had a very widespread following. The actual numbers involved were quite small even if these were very active and could carry out many bombings thus giving the impression of a much greater support base. The opinion poll quoted above (74) indicated that about 3 per cent of the population supported the idea of independence.

There was, nevertheless, an ambivalence on the part of Corsicans toward these clandestine movements. The sentiment of solidarity and close family contacts led many Corsicans to participate in demonstrations of solidarity with Corsican political prisoners and against the police repression especially during the Giscardian period. Such demonstrations,

however, should not be confused with support for the ideas of the separatists.

Violent separatists: success or failure?

If we assess the success or failure of the separatists from the point of view of obtaining their declared aims, then they must be judged to be a complete failure. There is little likelihood that Corsica will achieve independence, not least because of the desire of the vast majority of the people living on the island, including most Corsicans, to remain French. However, the separatists have achieved a certain amount of success in keeping the Corsican problem on the political agenda, and this has contributed to the solution put forward by the Socialists in the Statut Particulier.

Attention should also be drawn to the existence of barbouzes such as the "Front d'Action Nouvelle contre l'Indépendance et l'Autonomisme" (FRANCIA) founded in 1977 as a direct response to autonomist and separatist violence. FRANCIA was the group responsible for the events of Bastelica-Ajaccio in January 1980 and for many bombings against the autonomists (75). Following these events comités nationalistes were created everywhere on the island. These later became the Consulta di i Cumitati Naziunalisti (CCN). The latter went through some internal splits but eventually emerged around 1981 as the mouthpiece of the FLNC. In 1983, after the first

Corsican Assembly Elections, the FLNC broke a cease-fire it had observed since 1981 when the Socialists were elected. The Government banned the CCN and this changed its name to the Muvimentu Corsu di Autodeterminazione (MCA) (see below Chapter Nine).

CONCLUSION

Both kinds of radical regionalism were composed of those social groupings which were most excluded from the system of mediation between Corsica and France. The right-wing tendency may be described as the younger generation of old-style regionalists whose ideology had been given a more modern and "progressive" veneer: federalism and europeanism, as well as socio-economic groups excluded from the economic development programme. The second tendency included those excluded by geography (domicile outside Corsica) and culture (une génération déracinée).

An indication of their distance from the system of mediation is the extremeness of their ideologies. Both groups radically call into question the traditional administrative and political relationships between Corsica and France. Both advocate a system of internal autonomy based on a federal system of relationships. Both conceive of Corsicans as constituting an ethnie, peuple or nation which possesses intrinsic rights such as the right to negotiate with the

French people or state on the kind of relationships that should exist between them. Finally, both attacked the clan system and wished to abolish it rather than simply changing the elites who run it to make it less corrupt.

Radical regionalism exploits the ambiguity that constitutes the Corsican identity. Moderate regionalists stressed the French element of this identity. The radicals stress the Corsican element although, with the exception of the violent separatists, they usually do not completely deny the French element. However, the majority of Corsicans have refused to follow them in this line of thinking. Furthermore, the clan system quite successfully resisted this challenge to its hegemony and has reestablished itself.

The general pattern of radical regionalist mobilization was established by the mid-1970's. The two main tendencies - left-wing and right-wing - remained in existence, although the former showed more fissiparous tendencies than the latter. Several groups formed around these tendencies such as Donne Corse, a Corsican women's' group, and A Riscossa, a support group for political prisoners. During the Giscardian period heavy police repression was used, but this became a constituent element of the problem as it drove many young Corsicans into the radical organisations. The movement even spread among the school children through the ULNC (the Union des Lycéens nationalistes corses). By 1981, Corsica seemed to

be a tinder-box or, as Delors and Muracciole describe it, a poudrière, with violence coming from both the extreme nationalists and the right-wing barbouzes. It was for these reasons that the new Socialist Government elected in June 1981 after the Presidential victory of François Mitterrand in May of that year, seriously turned its attention to the problème corse. To this we now turn.



EPILOGUE: THE SOCIALIST REFORMS

The foregoing analysis has shown that the Corsican problem is a complex one and that the regionalist movements were alienated in various ways from the traditional system of mediation between the local society and the state. Before 1981, French Governments had responded to this problem in a partial, piece-meal fashion which often exacerbated the problem itself. Furthermore, they often excluded Corsicans themselves from running their own affairs.

When the Socialists came to power in 1981, they were determined to apply a completely different approach. This was based on a comprehensive or global understanding of the problem and the solution was to be found in allowing Corsicans themselves, and other regional populations, to run their regions' affairs. The principal limitation placed on these reforms was that the Jacobin notion of the "one and indivisible Republic" was to be maintained. But this was to be a new understanding of Jacobinism: democratic Jacobinism. This epilogue analyses these developments in so far as they affect Corsica and the regions in general.

CHAPTER NINE: THE SOCIALIST REFORMS OF 1981

The argument presented so far in this thesis is that regionalist movements in the different regions of France emerged as a result of the conjuncture of internal and external factors: rapid socio-economic changes which tended to disrupt the political and social relationships in traditional societies. Governmental responses to these movements have varied. During the Fourth Republic, the regionalization programme of the centre-left Governments coincided with some of the demands of the moderate regionalists (see Chapters Four and Seven above). This changed with the arrival to power of De Gaulle who set out to reduce the power of Parliament and of political parties and, hence, the influence of local politicians over the centre which had been mediated via the party system and Parliament.

These governmental responses became an important factor of alienation of certain regionalist groups as two fundamentally different ways of conceiving the territory bounded by the "Hexagon" entered into conflict. On the one hand, there was the traditional Jacobin vision of De Gaulle and his successors Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing who emphasised the unity and indivisibility of the Republic. For them there existed only the French nation spread throughout the entire territory bounded by the Hexagon. The radical regionalists, on the other hand, questioned this very concept

of a French nation and conceived the "Hexagon" as a kind of prison within which natural "regions", ethnies and nations were artificially bound together by conquest.

These two mutually incompatible visions implied two equally conflicting logics for the elaboration and implementation of regional policy. The first led to a technocratic and functional regionalization. This approach promoted a regional development designed to ensure national unity. From the point of view of the regions themselves, it was undemocratic, piece-meal and inadequate. The second implied a regionalization congruent with a radical regionalism and federalism in which the units of policy-making and implementation would be the French state and the sub-state regional units. Policies would be drawn up and implemented on a contractual basis with the state and the regions operating as equals. A minority of the radical regionalists refused even this and sought complete separation from the French state. The clash of ideologies led to serious agitation within the regions and a continuous radicalization of the movements, which have been analysed in detail with regard to the Corsican case in this thesis.

It was within this context of social and ideological conflict that the left, during the 1960's and 1970's, developed its own regional theory (1). Finding itself in opposition for a long period of time, the left realised that

the regional question was another stick with which it could beat successive right-wing Governments. Furthermore, the left at the end of the 1960's had a political programme which was either empty of content or purely negative. This vacuum could be filled by the ideas of the "new left" and the "new social movements" (2). It began therefore to abandon its former Jacobinism and to take into account the demands being made by the regionalists. This was helped by the fact that the latter, also at odds with the Gaullist regime, were undergoing a parallel change, abandoning their traditional conservatism and adopting elements of socialist ideology. This facilitated a meeting of minds with the traditional left, and sections of the two traditions began to collaborate. Furthermore, several important figures within the regionalist movements, such as Michel Phlipponneau and Louis Le Pensec from Brittany, Jean-Pierre Destrade from the French Basque Country and Charles Santoni from Corsica, actually joined the Socialist Party, thus helping to raise the consciousness of the latter with regard to the regional problem. Another important entry into the party was the PSU leader Michel Rocard, who had been a fervent advocate of a "decolonization" of the regions (3). Finally, mention should also be made of Gaston Defferre who had his own brand of regionalism and who had contacts with French federalist movements (4).

It should be noted, however, that just as there were several regionalisms within the regionalist movements, so,

too, there were several positions with regard to the regional problem within the left. The PCF, PS and PSU all adopted significantly different lines (5). Within the PS there co-existed the traditional Jacobinism of groups such as the CERES, the moderate regionalism of individuals such as Defferre and the more radical regionalism of Le Pensec and Santoni. It is important to note these diversities both within the left and within the regionalist movements since it helps to explain apparent inconsistencies in the regionalist positions finally adopted by the left, and in particular by the Socialists, and the divisions and incomprehensions among the regionalists with regard to these positions.

Despite these divisions within the PS, the party managed to agree on a basic policy toward the regional question. This may be found in several positions adopted in the period preceding the Presidential elections of May 1981. This regional policy was part of a wider programme which advocated the restructuring of French society according to the principles of autogestion and political decentralization. Thus, one of the theses on autogestion adopted by the PS national congress in June 1975 states:

Les régions doivent devenir des collectivités démocratiques avec leurs assemblées élues au suffrage universel, leurs exécutifs et leurs propres services techniques et administratifs. Certaines régions constituent des pays de minorité ethnique et leur identité sera forte. Les principes qui sous-tendront leur organisation sont de portée générale et constituent un des aspects du droit à la différence.

This basic position may also be found in the Socialist Manifesto, drawn up at the extraordinary Congress of the PS held in Créteil on 24 January 1981 with a view to the forthcoming Presidential elections (6). The Manifesto was composed of a preamble followed by the 110 Proposals of the Socialist candidate. The preamble states that " ce qui constitue peut-être le point central de notre action, car il conditionne tous les autres, que l'on appellera, selon l'objet, décentralisation, responsabilité à la base, organisation des contre-pouvoirs, autogestion". This is based on a reassessment of the role of centralisation in building the French nation: "si le pouvoir central a servi, naguère, l'unité nationale, aujourd'hui il lui nuit". It should be pointed out, however, that De Gaulle had made the same point thirteen years previously when he stated in a famous speech, quoted above in Chapter Two, that "l'effort multiséculaire de centralisation n'a plus raison d'être". In other words, the Socialists remained Jacobins in the sense that they wished to preserve the unity and indivisibility of the Republic ("nous proclamons notre attachement irréductible à la patrie") but they considered that such unity could now be achieved, not by denying that diversity exists, as traditional Jacobinism had done, but by a democratic respect for this diversity. This meant recognizing the rights of cultural and linguistic minorities, especially the fundamental "droit à la différence".

From this basic principle would follow several concrete measures concerning the regions and their populations. Some of these are outlined in the 110 Proposals, especially proposals 54-59. 54 promises a general programme of decentralization, a special statute (Statut Particulier) for Corsica and a single département encompassing the French Basque Country. 54 deals, then, with the regionalist demands for a restructuring of France's administrative structures. The cultural question is dealt with in 56: "La promotion des identités régionales sera encouragée, les langues et cultures minoritaires respectées et enseignées". These promises were repeated in speeches made by the Presidential candidate Mitterrand. The attitude of the PS was summed up in a speech at Lorient, Brittany, when Mitterrand stated: "C'est blesser un peuple au plus profond de lui-même que de l'atteindre dans sa culture et sa langue" (7).

It is, therefore, not surprising that, following the Socialist victories of 1981, the new left Government should announce a "vast" programme of decentralization under the direction of Gaston Defferre who was named Minister of the Interior and Decentralization. Decentralization was to be la grande affaire du septennat. Several authors have examined the nature and functioning of this programme (8). Our concern here is with that part of the programme that deals with the regional problem and the problem of cultural and linguistic

minorities. Have the Socialists kept the promises outlined above? What have been the policies formulated since May 1981? How has their implementation affected the condition of the regions and the minorities?

First, it should be noted that it is the promise of decentralization that the Socialists have most faithfully kept, even when other aspects of their project of Government have been abandoned or seriously diluted (9). It is, however, rare that a political party is completely faithful to its pre-election promises. This is also the case with the Socialist decentralization project and policies toward minorities. These two points - the implementation of many of the pre-election promises and the modification of some of them - are clear from an examination of the Socialists' record since May 1981.

The new Government decided to act with speed in initiating the decentralization programme. This tactic was aimed at overcoming possible resistance from the right, now in opposition and demoralized following their electoral defeats, and from the upper ranks of the civil service, still unsure about the new Government. In this way, the necessary legislation was passed in 1982 and in the same year the reforms began to take effect. This tactic of speed had two effects: it meant that the policies finally adopted were very close to the pre-election promises and that an irreversible situation was created. But this aspect of irreversibility,

designed to ensure that the right could not tamper fundamentally with the reforms should they be returned to power, also meant that the Socialists themselves would be forced to respect their own creation. This is particularly important, as the Socialists "swung to the right" in April and May of 1983, a swing confirmed by the "new realism" approach of Laurent Fabius, who became Prime Minister in June 1984.

Besides pushing through the more general decentralization programme, the Socialists have put into effect some of their more specific promises. Corsica was given a Statut Particulier by legislation based on a previous Socialist bill of 1977. The Statut Particulier gives to Corsica a Regional Assembly, elected by direct suffrage, to administer the political, social, economic and cultural affairs of the region (10). The powers of the Corsican Assembly are greater than those granted to the conseils régionaux, the new bodies, also directly elected, which are to administer the other regions.

It is, however, in the response to proposal 56, concerned with the rights of cultural and linguistic minorities that the left-wing Governments were most faithful to their promises. In August 1981, the Minister of Culture, Jack Lang, commissioned Henri Giordan, an academic and Occitan activist, to draw up a report on this question. This report, completed in February 1982, under the title Démocratie

culturelle et droit à la difference, (11) was the basis for a private member's bill tabled for the Socialist group in the National Assembly by their Deputy for the Bayonne constituency, Jean-Pierre Destrade .

THE GIORDAN REPORT

The Giordan Report takes up some of the traditional theses of radical regionalism and develops them further. The solution to the problem of cultural and linguistic minorities is conceived as lying in the promotion of cultural democracy, based on the "droit à la difference". But the report goes further than previous analyses made by the Socialists. First, it widens the number of minorities to be included in the general category and, therefore, entitled to be considered in any policies adopted in their favour. It was part of the received wisdom that there existed in France seven linguistic minorities, all territorially based (12). Giordan includes other linguistic minorities with a territorial base (those who speak a dialect of French such as picard and gallo) as well as those minorities not defined by territory. The latter are, according to Giordan, immigrant workers and political refugees, who are not French citizens; Jewish, Gypsy and Armenian populations who are; and those communities from the territorially based minorities (Corsicans, Bretons, etc) living in cities like Paris, Lille, Lyons, etc.

The second important development is that any policies adopted toward these minorities should be based on the necessity of a réparation historique because of the repression of their cultures and languages in the past. In other words, the Government should say that it was sorry. In order to translate this act of contrition into concrete acts of atonement, it is recommended that several bodies be established to preserve and promote the minority cultures and languages, for example, a Commission de la recherche sur les langues et cultures minoritaires and a Centre national de documentation, de recherche et d'échange. There should also be administrative structures to ensure that the voices of the minorities be heard by Government. The "piece maîtresse" of these would be a Commission nationale des cultures minoritaires. This would occupy an intermediary position between the Ministry of Culture, the Directions régionales des affaires culturelles and those bodies dealing with the non-territorial minorities. Finally, the Giordan Report recommended that the minorities within France establish contacts with those outside it (a significant departure from previous attitudes).

After the publication of the Giordan Report, both the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education engaged in a considerable effort to put some of its recommendations into effect. The former set up the Direction du développement culturel (DDC), in 1982, replacing the Mission du

développement culturel which had existed since 1979. It is the responsibility of the DDC to carry out the policy of cultural decentralization. It does so by a "politique contractuelle avec les collectivités territoriales" and by taking into account the "différences des identités culturelles et le dialogue international des cultures" (13). The DDC negotiates "cultural contracts" with all the regions, ten départements and sixty-nine medium-sized towns. The purpose of these contracts is to make the state and the local Government institutions partenaires égaux in the formulation and implementation of cultural policies. The difference between these contracts and the chartes culturelles drawn up in 1974 by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing lies in the number of local bodies involved - over a hundred - and in the increase in financial support - aid for cultural projects in the regions was increased by two-thirds. The contracts are marked by a great diversity, corresponding to the cultural diversity in the regions themselves. All emphasize, however, the preservation of the local cultural heritage, the encouragement of artistic creation, and the building up of the instruments (outils) of cultural development.

The Ministry of Education was also directly concerned with the cultural dimension of decentralization which obviously affects the educational sector, given the promise to teach minority languages and cultures. Alain Savary, Minister of Education in 1982, stated during a conference on

bilingualism in Strasbourg: "Aller vers le multilinguisme, c'est éviter l'écueil d'une langue hégémonique, l'anglais en l'occurrence". This would be based on a "prise en compte du maintien et du développement des langues regionales" (14). Concretely, this means that the educational system must take into account linguistic and cultural particularities and integrate them into its overall curriculum. As the Minister put it at a later date: "De la maternelle à l'université les cultures régionales auront droit de cité avec un "véritable statut" " (15). This policy would be applied by the Academy Rectors. In June 1982, for example, the Rector of the Academy of Strasbourg in Alsace circulated a letter in which he stated that regional languages and cultures should be taught in the schools of Alsace. It was also recognised that German was the written expression of the Alsatian dialects. This represents a significant change in policy, since, although German was taught in Alsatian schools, there was not a very positive encouragement of the Alsatian dialects themselves nor of the idea that German might be their written expression.

It would seem, however, that the activity of the Ministry of Education was less intense than that of the Ministry of Culture. It is, of course, easier and less politically dangerous to promote cultural development than to bring about radical changes in the administrative and educational spheres. The latter two are much closer to the bone of Jacobin sensibility than the question of regional languages which

most political groups are prepared to support even if it only at the level of lip-service. We shall see below the limits this Jacobin sensibility has imposed on the Socialist plan for France's minorities. Nevertheless, it may be remarked that, after 10 May 1981, many of the Socialists' promises to the regionalists and to cultural minorities were implemented.

The regionalist demands for administrative reform were taken into account by the overall programme of political decentralization and administrative deconcentration. Corsica was given its Statut Particulier. Demands for the protection and encouragement of minority languages and cultures were, to some extent, met by the policy of cultural decentralization, based on the Giordan Report and expressed legislatively in the Destrade Bill, even if the latter did not have the same status as a Government-sponsored Bill. The Ministries of Culture and Education engaged in a considerable effort to put these new policies into effect.

THE STATUT PARTICULIER FOR CORSICA

Corsica was perceived by the Socialists as having a peculiar set of problems not to be found even in the other "ethnic" regions of France. This peculiarity derived from the fact of insularity. Nevertheless, the island was also seen as being a particular instance of a wider problem - the plight of regions and linguistic minorities - and it was therefore

chosen to be test-case (a banc d'essai) for the decentralization reforms as a whole. What was to be tested in particular was the functioning of the new decentralised institutions.

There was obviously a certain amount of ambiguity here. How could Corsica be used as a test-case for a general phenomenon if it was a particular case? The answer to this problem seems to be that while the degree of the island's problems differed from that of the other regions such as Brittany and the French Basque Country (reflected in the higher level of political violence on the island), the nature of the problem is the same: how to transform peripheral societies from backward enclaves of economic decline and political clientelism to modern democratic societies.

Those who had especial responsibility for drawing up the Statut Particulier had an intimate knowledge of the situation. Gaston Defferre who, as Minister of the Interior and Decentralization had the task of drawing up and implementing the decentralization laws, was also mayor of Marseilles, a city with the largest Corsican population outside of Corsica. His right-hand man in Marseilles was Bastien Leccia, a Socialist Deputy of Corsican origin who, as noted in Chapter Seven above, was one of the leaders of the Mouvement du 29 Novembre. Furthermore, as already noted, Charles Santoni was one of the important transfuges from the radical regionalists

to the new PS. These Corsican Socialists had been responsible, in 1977, for presenting the bill to the National Assembly which would have given to Corsica a Statut Particulier which was very close to the statute of autonomy demanded by the radical regionalists (16).

Not surprisingly, the bill did not get far in an Assembly dominated by the right. Nevertheless, it provided the inspiration for the Socialist project of 1982. The new Government was determined to make a radical break with the policies of the right-wing Governments of the past and decided that, in the case of Corsica, the way to do so was by a Statut Particulier. In fact, divisions within the PS itself and limitations imposed by the Conseil Constitutionnel led to a toning down of the 1982 version compared with that of 1977 (17). The principal difference between the two is that, whereas in the original version, decisions of the Corsican Assembly (elected by direct suffrage) would have been binding on the national Government, in the updated version, the Assembly would have only a consultative role. In other words, there was a firm rejection of any drift towards a federalist system and a reaffirmation that political sovereignty should remain totally with the central Government. Nevertheless, the Socialist project did represent a more radical form of political decentralization compared with the regionalization attempts of their predecessors, if only in that the functioning of local administrative institutions, because of

election by direct suffrage, is now to be controlled by the local populations. Furthermore, in the Corsican case, an examination of the legislative texts, and the new institutions which they establish, reveals a largely coherent and comprehensive attempt to deal with most of the elements of the Corsican problem.

The Socialists had to strike a balance between two opposed ideologies and political groupings. On the one hand, there were those who had been alienated from the political system - the regionalists of various kinds. On the other, there were those, perhaps the majority of Corsicans, who feared that any move toward political decentralization would lead to the separation of Corsica from France. Many local politicians also feared the consequences of a decentralization which forced political responsibility on them, accustomed as they were to the "irresponsibility" of patron-client relationships made possible by massive subsidization from the state. The Socialist Party, having adopted regionalist theses in the 1960's and 1970's, tended to sympathize with the former group. At the same time, they knew they could not afford to alienate the latter.

The Statut Particulier for Corsica reflects this desire to reconcile these opposing tendencies, but also represents a wish to change the system of "irresponsibility" of local politicians by introducing a greater measure of local

democracy. For the Jacobins, there was the reassurance that the reforms were not intended to encourage any move toward federalism. For the regionalists, there was the setting up of a Regional Assembly, elected by direct suffrage, which would allow the local population greater control over their political, social, economic and cultural affairs.

In practice, however, the statute leans more toward the regionalists than toward the traditional Jacobins (as opposed to the new Jacobins of the PS). First of all, there is the recognition that Corsica is a special entity with characteristics that mark it off from the rest of France: "L'organisation de la région de Corse tient compte des spécificités de cette région résultant, notamment, de sa géographie et de son histoire". An entire section (Titre 1er) of the law of July 1982 dealt with the "identité culturelle de la Corse" (18). While the laws did not explicitly recognise the existence of an ethnie corse or a peuple corse, the recognition long demanded by the radical regionalists as the legal basis for policy-making, the emphasis on Corsica's specificity was at least a step in the direction of such a recognition. On a visit to the island in 1983, President Mitterrand himself used the phrase le peuple corse, which seems to confirm this (19). This was central to the demands of the radical regionalists, who had adopted the federalist idea that the legal basis of centre-periphery relations should be that of a contract between a legal person (the ethnie or

peuple) and the state drawn up by the two partners as equals. In fact, the Socialists had not abandoned the Jacobin concept of the state as the primary and final locus of political sovereignty, in opposition to this federalist concept. Nevertheless, with regard to the awareness of the regionalists' position, there was a notable shift from the period when French Governments merely recognised "des Français qui habitent en Corse" to a recognition that Corsicans might at least have a dual identity and even that they constituted a distinct peuple.

The institutions created by the Statut Particulier may also be seen as a concession to the radical regionalists, even if, as we have seen, the powers granted to them were less than the latter hoped for. The most important of these institutions was the Corsican Assembly, consisting of sixty-one members elected by direct universal suffrage by proportional representation (20). The executive of the region is no longer the regional prefect, who becomes instead the commissaire de la République, but the Chairman of the Assembly and his bureau of vice-Chairmen. This may be seen as a response to the demand by regionalists for greater political control over the regional institutions. At the same time, the specificity of Corsica is recognised by giving it a Regional Assembly while the other regions will simply have Regional Councils.

The difference lies in more than the name as the Assembly will have greater powers than the Councils. Its basic function is to administer the economic, cultural and social affairs of the regions (21). It will do this principally by deciding the priorities of that portion of the national budget allotted to Corsica and then entering into a contract with the state on the basis of this decision. While Corsicans have, in this way, been given a greater control over how their island is administered (thanks to the system of direct elections), political sovereignty remains with the Government, since the latter may veto any proposal that the Assembly puts forward. The only binding power the Assembly has on the Government is to stop any proposed legislation of the latter which affects the region in order that the advice of the region may be given. In the end, however, the Government is not obliged to accept this advice. This dilution of the Assembly's powers may be seen as a result of that continuing Jacobinism of which we have spoken above (22).

Other institutions created by the Statut Particulier have the function of assisting the Assembly in its task of administering the region. These include two consultative councils: the conseil économique et social and the conseil de la culture, de l'éducation et du cadre de vie, the latter being unique to Corsica. The members of these councils are appointed in a proportion that should reflect the importance

of the forces vives of the region (economic, social and cultural interest groups).

This desire to include a wide cross-section of the local population (and not simply local notables) may be seen as following the basic logic of the Socialists' reforms: the attempt to promote greater democracy at the local level. An important aspect of this is the inclusion of those who had been alienated in various ways from the mainstream of Corsican political and social life as outlined above (Chapter Eight). These include cultural activists who felt the Corsican culture had been degraded by official neglect and even hostility, political actors who felt they could not participate in the existing political system over which they could exercise little control, and economic groups such as trade unions and peasant groups which were excluded by pre-existing regional bodies set up during the period of right-wing Governments. According to the regionalist theory developed by the left, democracy would be promoted only by the inclusion of these forces vives into the political system and the processes of decision-making and implementation. Only in this way could the structural problem be solved (the corrupt system of patron-client relationships and economic dependency). This approach is also evident in the creation of bodies known as the Offices (economic development agencies). These may be seen as a response to the long-standing Corsican complaint that the SOMIVAC and the SETCO were controlled by non-Corsicans in the

interests of groups foreign to the island. The establishment of the Offices was meant to rectify this situation by placing the development agencies under the control of the Regional Assembly and, therefore, of the local population.

These development agencies are the Office d'Equipment hydraulique and the Office du Développement agricole et rural, which replace the SOMIVAC. Both Offices have a single board and Art. 16 (23) stipulates that professional farmers' organisations should have the majority of seats on it. Art.15 states that the Office du Développement agricole et rural must submit its budget proposals to the Regional Assembly, which may then modify them. In this way, it is hoped to avoid the abuses that had marked the SOMIVAC operations. Greater control over transport is provided by an Office des Transports, by means of which the Region would take over from the state ("l'Office des Transports est substitué à l'Etat") the responsibility for negotiating contracts with the maritime companies. These contracts would define "les tarifs, les conditions d'exécution, et la qualité de service ainsi que leurs modalités de contrôle" (24). The Presidents of the three Offices are chosen by a vote of the Regional Assembly.

The Socialists wished in this way to promote a type of development which differs from that of the PAR of 1957. It is now agriculture which occupies the central place instead of tourism. However, the latter is not neglected, and an Agence

régionale de Tourisme has also been created. In fact, there is a concern to promote a harmonious economic development, and both the decentralization laws, and the Statut Particulier, have created several bodies to ensure this. These include the Comité de Coordination pour le développement de la Corse, presided by the Prime Minister (art. 8); a group composed of mayors to draw up a Schéma d'Aménagement de la Corse (art. 9); a Commission mixte sur l'emploi (art. 21), the chairmanship of which is "alternativement assurée par un représentant de l'Etat et par un représentant de la Région de Corse"; a Comité régional de Prêts; and a Comité régional de la Communication audiovisuelle (art. 5) (25). Besides these bodies specific to Corsica, the region will receive others under the general programme of decentralization, notably in the fields of education, culture and environment, housing and professional training (Law of 7 January 1983).

There would also be a transfer of resources and personnel, an administrative deconcentration corresponding to this political decentralization. All field services of the state will be grouped under the direct control of the regional prefect, who will then make them available to the executive of the Regional Assembly (26).

In summary, then, it may be argued that the Socialist Statut Particulier is a comprehensive attempt to deal with several elements of the Corsican problem. By recognizing and

promoting the two dimensions of the Corsican identity, an attempt has been made to reconcile and harmonize both. The element of unbalanced economic development is met by setting up bodies whose function is to promote a more balanced economic and social development. By democratizing the regional bodies, it is hoped to eradicate the alleged political irresponsibility of the local politicians by thrusting responsibility upon them. At the same time, it is hoped that the input of the forces vives of the region will accelerate this process of modernisation. Democratization would, hopefully, also have the effect of reducing the degree of exclusion and alienation. At least this is the theory? What, however, happened in practice?.

The creation and functioning of the new institutions

There were two main sources from which possible resistance to the reforms would come: from the local politicians and from within the civil service (27). To overcome this possible resistance, the Government chose to move quickly (28). The main legislative texts had become law by mid-1982, and the first elections to the Corsican Assembly were held in August of the same year. This had the advantage of catching the opposition (the traditional French right), still in disarray and demoralized, unprepared, while the Government benefited from the prestige of its recent victory. On the other hand, it entailed the risk of a hasty, ill-

prepared implementation of one of the basic planks of the Socialist programme.

In practice, the reforms were implemented more smoothly than might have been expected . The FLNC called a cease-fire before the Presidential elections and prolonged it as it waited to see the new Government's response to the Corsican problem. Although it finally denounced the Government's plans as a "new form of colonialism", and its political counterpart the Consulta di Cumitati naziunalisti (CCN) boycotted the Assembly elections in August, the cease-fire nevertheless held until then. Furthermore, the type of proportional representation adopted, with only 1.6 per cent of the vote being necessary to obtain at least one seat, enticed the UPC (autonomists) and PPC (nationalists) to present lists. Thus, the strategy of drawing back into the mainstream of political life those excluded or alienated from it, seemed to be working (except on the FLNC and CCN). Since the Regional Assembly is the key institution of the reform, it was necessary that it should be marked from the start as the legitimate expression of the political complexion of the Corsican people. For this reason, a special Commission was set up, to examine and purge the island's electoral registers, which were notorious for their inflated character (29). This measure was also designed to attract the autonomists and nationalists who had hitherto refused to contest elections on the grounds of their corrupt character.

The Corsican regional Assembly election of 1982

<u>Party list</u> <u>cast</u>	<u>Seats</u>	<u>% of votes</u>
RPR-UDF-Bonapartist	19	28.0
PCF	7	10.8
UPC	7	10.6
MRG (Haute-Corse)	7	10.3
UDF dissidents	6	9.6
MRG (Corse-du-Sud)	4	6.7
PS	3	5.4
RPR dissidents	2	3.1
Diverse Right (Gaullist)	1	2.7
Ex-PS (Santoni)	1	2.4
PPC	1	2.1
Independent	1	2.1
MRG dissident	1	1.7
Others	-	2.2

Source: Le Monde 10/8/1982

The elections were marked by a high turn-out (68.84 per cent of registered voters cast their votes - 136,795 out of 201,166) (30). Surprisingly for Corsica, there were no claims of electoral irregularities. The Government was highly pleased with the success of the elections. Gaston Defferre later remarked that "les élections se sont déroulées dans le calme et la dignité. Pour la première fois depuis longtemps, aucune contestation n'a accompagné la proclamation des résultats. L'élection de votre Assemblée n'est entachée d'aucun soupçon ..." (31). This view was later reiterated by President Mitterrand himself during a visit to the island: "Vous avez battu les records de participation, sans aucun contentieux

électoral. Voici donc une Assemblée incontestable dans sa réalité démocratique" (32).

The results of the election, however, brought only mixed comfort to the Government. First of all, there were numerous lists - 17 lists each containing 61 candidates, or 1037 candidates for 61 seats in an electorate of roughly 201,000 registered voters - with each major political formation, including the Communist Party, facing a dissident list. The Socialists themselves were challenged by a list led by Charles Santoni, who had been expelled from the party because of disagreement over the implementation of the Statut Particulier. Such a multiplicity, reminiscent of the politics of the Fourth Republic, held out the prospect of an unstable Assembly, since the formation of a majority would be more difficult. At first, however, the Government were more concerned that their strategy of wooing the autonomists paid off. The UPC had indeed won 7 seats and 10.6 per cent of the votes cast. and, since the left/right blocs did not each have enough seats to form a majority, the UPC found itself in a mediating position. It decided to ally itself with the left and this enabled a majority to vote for a Chairman, Prosper Alfonsi of the MRG, who then formed an executive (33). The internal Commissions were set up, and the Assembly got under way (34). The first phase of the reform passed off, therefore, successfully.

At this point, however, the hasty and ill-prepared nature of the reform began to have its effect and threatened to damage the credibility of the new institutions. For instance, the building that housed the Assembly was inadequate; there was insufficient funding for the Assembly's administrative staff; and complaints were heard that the Government did not take its own brainchild sufficiently seriously. Furthermore, the FLNC, unimpressed by the reforms, relaunched its campaign of violence and even stepped it up, causing public unease (35). The diminishing credibility of the Assembly and its inability to deal with the violence, combined with the growing public unease, prompted the Government to act. The Prime Minister, Pierre Mauroy, sent a letter reaffirming Government support for the reforms (36). In June 1983, President Mitterrand himself paid a visit to the island to bolster the prestige of the Assembly and to reassure all sections of the population. This was followed up by a visit from Gaston Defferre with the same purpose.

Despite this shaky beginning, the reforms were, by 1986, well under way and there were several indications that the new institutions would survive and even have a certain amount of success. First of all, the Assembly was in operation, and those initially opposed to the Statut Particulier (the local politicians) did not sabotage it. On the contrary, realising that the nature of the "transmission belt" by which resources are channelled from the centre to periphery had irreversibly

changed, their aim has been to capture the most important places in the new system. With the help of an intermediary group called the intergroupe de sept (37), they managed to secure the posts of Chairmen of the important Offices. Furthermore, they voted, almost unanimously with the left, in favour of the the budget priorities, at 5.30 a.m. on 25 February 1984 (38). These would form the basis of a contract negotiated between the Assembly and the Government. The later reversal of position of the right helped by the intergroupe de sept, which blocked the Assembly's functioning and provoked its dissolution by the Government, may be interpreted as a tactical move rather than an attack on the institution itself. The right-wing opposition hoped in this way to strengthen its position and even to win a majority in a new election (for an analysis of the August 1984 elections see below). But this in itself indicated an awareness that local politics must now be fought out within the new institutions. In other words, the Socialists had created an irreversible process to which all Corsican politics had to adapt.

Secondly, despite the refusal of the FLNC to accept the new institutions, most of those alienated from the system have been drawn back into it. It is significant that Edmond Simeoni, one of the original founders of the ARC/UPC tendency, and three of the founders of the FRC, Charles Santoni, Dominique Alfonsi and Lucien Felli, all sat as Assembly members in the first Assembly. The withdrawal of the UPC from

the Assembly on 12 January 1984 was explained by the party as a protest against the Government's "abandonment" of the Assembly (39). This criticism, however, implies an acceptance of the new institutions. The real motive behind the withdrawal was more probably the fear that the UPC would lose influence among Corsican youth, who suspected them of having gone soft on the Government and the pouvoir (40). It is more likely that they, too, wished to use the new elections to increase their representation in the Assembly. Furthermore, the FLNC has become increasingly marginal and is now perceived by most Corsicans either as a threat to their fundamental conviction that Corsica should remain French or as being undemocratic. Many Corsicans who had hitherto sympathized with the group became ill at ease with their xenophobic campaign against the continentaux (Frenchmen from the mainland). This has been aimed mainly at schoolteachers and modest workers such as postmen whose "crime", in the eyes of the FLNC, was that they bore French names. The tiny minority support of the FLNC was sarcastically emphasised by Mitterrand when he remarked: "...je ne connais pas de démocratie ou 1,6 per cent, ou plutôt moins, a pu faire la loi à 98,4 per cent" (41).

Thirdly, the transfer of resources and personnel took place more or less as planned. There was practically no resistance from within the civil service. The Government was astute enough to choose Corsican civil servants who desired to return to their home island to take charge of the different

field services. Prefects who enthusiastically supported the decentralization reforms were appointed. Thus, an irreversible dynamic was created which must ensure at least the survival and probably the success of the new institutions.

Finally, the Assembly began to act as a forum in which divisions and grievances on the part of the Corsican population could be expressed and fought out (42). If politics is war by another name, then it is possible that the endemic violence which has plagued Corsican society may be acted out in a symbolic manner within the Assembly.

The August 1984 Regional Assembly Elections (43)

These tendencies were confirmed by the elections, held in August 1984, which followed the dissolution of the first Assembly. As has been noted above, this dissolution was provoked by the right in the hope of strengthening their position in the new Assembly rather than an attack on the institutions as such. Indeed, it was the confirmation of their acceptance of these institutions. The Government wished to prevent a recurrence of the situation in the first Assembly when small groups were able to impose their will and create a situation of instability. Accordingly, following a recommendation from the Senate, they increased the threshold necessary for a list to obtain a seat from 1.6 per cent to 5 per cent. This higher barrier had the effect of forcing groups

to coalesce before the elections and not after them. Whereas in the 1982 elections there were seventeen lists, in these elections there were only ten.

Regional Assembly Elections of August 1984

Registered	203,366
Voting	139,439
Abstentions	31.43%
Total votes	136,944

	<u>seats</u>	<u>votes</u>	<u>% of votes cast</u>
Union of the Opposition (1)	19	39,953	29.17
MRG (2)	9	19,405	14.17
MRG-PS (3)	9	18,899	13.80
PCF (4)	7	16,777	11.73
FN (5)	6	12,631	9.22
CNIP (6)	5	10,781	7.87
MCA (7)	3	7,161	5.22
UPC (8)	3	7,146	5.21
Several parties (9)	-	3,568	2.60
MCS-PPS (10)	-	1,323	0.96

- (1) Union of the Opposition, RPR,UDF, Bonapartists, Independents: Jean-Paul de Rocca-Serra, Deputy RPR.
- (2) MRG of Upper Corsica: François Giacobbi, Senator.
- (3) MRG of S. Corsica and PS: Nicolas Alfonsi, Deputy.
- (4) PCF: D. Bucchini, mayor of Sartène.
- (5) FN: P. Arrighi.
- (6) CNIP and RPR dissidents: J. Chiarelli.
- (7) MCA, Corsican Movement for Self-determination: P. Poggioli.
- (8) UPC, Union of the Corsican People: Max Simeoni.
- (9) Several Parties: Denis de Rocca-Serra.
- (10) MCS-PPC, Corsican Movement for Socialism-Corsican People's Party: Charles Santoni.

Source: Le Monde, 14/8/1984

What is perhaps most significant about these elections from the point of view of this thesis is that the new institutions were an attempt to draw back into the political

process those who had been alienated from it. Of significance here was the fact that the extreme nationalists of the FLNC/MCA tendency presented a list (after the FLNC resumed its bombing campaign, the CCN was banned but changed its name to the Muvimentu Corsu di Autodeterminazione - MCA) . Now, not only the traditional right-wing opposition accepted and participated in the new institutions, but the extreme nationalists too. The latter still did not accept the institutions as the embodiment of their political aspirations. On the contrary, they advocated a completely independent Corsica. Nevertheless, the institutions had become a central focus of the island's political life and the nationalists were forced to recognise this and try to influence their functioning. In fact, the nationalists' list obtained 3 seats with 5.22 per cent of the votes cast by biting into the support, of the UPC which dropped to 5.21 per cent. The latter suffered from the illness of their charismatic leader Edmond Simeoni but the principal reason for its loss of votes was indeed what they had feared: a significant portion of the nationalist supporters, especially the younger ones, who had given them their support withdrew it because of their alleged compromise with the Socialists. Nevertheless, the nationalists took their seats in the new Assembly and, furthermore, participated in its functioning.

The other notable feature of the 1984 elections was the success of the neo-Fascist National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen

in winning six seats on a list led by Pascal Arrighi (who had been a Gaullist politician and had led the attempted coup of Ajaccio in 1958). This frustrated the designs of the traditional right (RPR and UDF) of winning a clear majority in the new Assembly, and they were forced to form a coalition with the extreme right in order to capture the Chairmanship and, therefore, the executive of the Assembly. What is interesting in this situation is that for the first time in Corsican history, all the political tendencies on the island from the extreme nationalists to the extreme right were now represented in one Assembly. While the right used their position to try to frustrate the nationalists (for example in refusing to vote the funding to the local university which was accused of being a nationalist hotbed) at least there was now the possibility that if the left win power again, perhaps with the help of the autonomists or nationalists these positions could be reversed. In other words, the political conflicts of the island are now being fought out within the new institutions.

Prospects for the future

So far in this Chapter we have tended to take the most optimistic view of the Statut Particulier and its potential for resolving the Corsican problem. This is because there are real grounds for such optimism and, by 1986, the signs so far pointed to the continuing survival of the institutions and the

possibility that in the long term they would contribute to changing and modernizing political behaviour on the island. The Regional Assembly could be seen as having a pedagogic function, teaching the local politicians how to behave in a more principled manner than had hitherto been their custom. This may be achieved by the accountability forced on them by the fact that their performance is now subject to the sanction of the local population because of direct elections. Furthermore, the old clan system is in the process of breaking down as new political forces (such as the left, the autonomists and nationalists, and some modernizing sections of the traditional right) are given the possibility of exercising power within the Region. At least, these are the possibilities that the new institutions open for the future.

Nevertheless, other commentators, such as Professor Yves Mény, have taken a less optimistic and even a sceptical view with regard to the entire decentralization reforms seeing in them another example of "plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose". While such authors are right to emphasize the continuity with previous decentralization programmes, they seem to underestimate the very real changes that have taken place, in particular the change which allows regional bodies to be elected by universal suffrage. The disappointment of authors such as Michel Crozier (44) may result from too short-sighted a view of the political process and while Crozier is right that "on ne change pas la société par décret", the

"content" (that is local politics) must change as the "context" (the new institutions) changes. This change, however, will take place only in the long term.

Despite this, the critics are correct to point out certain failings of the reforms. For example, in the case of Corsica there are now too many institutions (45). Besides the Regional Assembly and its accompanying institutions, there remain the institutions of the island's two départements. This has led to a certain amount of confusion and overlapping with regard to their functions and powers. In fact, this is an instance of what is perhaps the most serious ambiguity of the entire decentralization reforms: the failure to make a clear choice between a decentralization based on the département or one based on the region, it being generally recognised that the two levels of local Government are compatible only with difficulty.

This does not detract from the fact that the Statut Particulier does represent a courageous and far-sighted attempt (perhaps the first such attempt in Corsican history) to tackle the Corsican problem in a democratic manner. Paradoxically, the Government has had to force the majority of the local population to accept the responsibility of running their own affairs. This is an interesting example of the Rousseauesque problem of whether one can force people to be free. The success or failure of the reform depends, then, on

two groups of actors: on the islanders themselves and on the Government. The former must learn a new set of political habits. The latter have already gone a long way by providing the institutional context within which this take place. However, they must continue to provide financial, technical and political support until the island has developed sufficiently to provide largely for itself. This will never be totally possible but at least Corsicans might live in a more dignified manner than ever before.

THE LIMITS AND LIMITATIONS OF SOCIALIST DECENTRALIZATION

Despite these measures, however, there was not been a complete implementation of the Socialists' pre-election promises. This failure concerns particularly those parts of the reforms under the control of the Ministers of the Interior and Decentralization (Defferre) and Education (Savary), that is the administrative and educational aspects. First, while Corsica received a Statut Particulier, this is a considerably diluted version of the original 1977 Bill. To give the Corsican Assembly the powers originally envisaged would have required a change in the Constitution and would have meant, basically, that France would become a federal state. Here, we have the clue to the Socialists' apparent inconsistencies and refusal to implement parts of its pre-election programme. It is the continuing allegiance to the Jacobin concept of the one and indivisible Republic and the refusal of federalism,

repeated by Gaston Defferre both inside Parliament and outside it, that has imposed limitations on the policies they are prepared to accept. Further limitations were imposed by the Constitutional Council and by the Senate (46). In fact, the Defferre Bill was given an easy ride through the Senate because its provisions were based on a previous Bill (drawn up by the same expert under Giscard d'Estaing) which had already been examined and approved by the Senate. Such a Bill would not have infringed the sacred canons of Jacobin ideology.

The dilution of the powers of the Corsican Assembly, reduced to a consultative status, is one example of this. But to give to Corsica a special statute in the first place was based on the fear that alienation in Corsica (expressed by the FLNC bombing campaign) had reached such a point that the attachment of the island to France was seriously threatened (even if such a fear seems to have been highly exaggerated). In other regions, this fear was less because there were less serious attempts to call into question the attachment of the region to the Republic. The refusal of Gaston Defferre to create a single Basque département was based on the fear that this would encourage separatism, given the violent situation on the Spanish side of the border and the presence of large numbers of ETA refugees on the French side (47). Defferre also had to take into account the opposition of local right-wing politicians.

One interpretation of the Jacobin notion of nationhood is that the individual's personality can develop only within the wider context of French culture. In other words, the minority languages and cultures, by themselves, are insufficient to bring about this development. It is this underlying idea that may explain the apparently inconsistent behaviour of the Minister of Education, Alain Savary, and the limits he imposed on the teaching of minority languages. Despite his promise that they would have a "droit de cité" from the "maternelle à l'université" he showed himself very reluctant to allow this to happen. Thus, the right to grant a licence d'études bretonnes was given to the University of Rennes only after being first refused and then conceded under pressure from Breton cultural groups and the university itself. There is still no maîtrise de langue bretonne, nor will there be a licence d'études basques. The University of Corte in Corsica, however, is empowered to grant both the licence and maîtrise of Corsican studies. At the level of secondary education no new teachers would be trained to teach the minority languages. Finally, the state would not take into its charge the nursery schools which had been set up and run by the cultural associations on a voluntary basis: the Basque ikastolak and the Breton diwan, for example. The Minister's response to those who protested against these limitations was: "Oui au respect des particularismes régionaux. Non au ghetto" (48). In other words, there remained the fear that too much encouragement might threaten the Jacobin concept of education.

Nevertheless, the Minister later relented on some points, such as on the question of the nursery schools, but not on others. These tensions that are evident in the Education Minister's positions reveal, perhaps, a deeper tension between the regionalists' appeal to ethnic roots and the universalistic tendencies of the left.

These, then, are the principal reforms with regard to the regions and the problem of cultural and linguistic minorities. They may be described as a democratic Jacobinism. The right, predictably, condemned the reforms as posing a threat to the French language and even to the unity of the French nation. Le Figaro, in its response to the Giordan Report, cried: "Alarmant. C'est la langue française qui est aujourd'hui en danger, attaquée de l'intérieur même du pays" (49). The Quotidien de Paris, made the same charge: "...c'est surtout la langue française ... qui est en question" (50). A former Senator, J. Debu-Bridel, went so far as to claim that "... le régionalisme est le père de l'autonomisme qui risque finalement d'engendrer le séparatisme" (51). Such positions have, honestly or dishonestly, refused to recognise the Jacobin dimension of the Socialist project which has been described above. The right, however, later became a "convert" to the reforms, realising that an irreversible process was taking place, and it was concerned to capture the most important positions within the new system (52). It was the local politicians of the opposition who were the most

vociferous in calling for elections to the yet to be established Regional Councils. They realised that these might provide them with another "front" from which to attack the Socialist Government. The latter, not surprisingly, was reluctant to hold these elections, and these took place only in 1986 (the results have not been included in this thesis).

The Socialists, however, might have expected the right to behave in this manner. They were more concerned that their project be accepted by the forces vives of the regions, that is by those popular forces which had been alienated from the mainstream of political and economic life and whom they considered to have the greatest potential for democratically reforming regional life. According to the Socialists, the regionalists represented one of the most important elements of these forces vives and their aim was to reintegrate them into the French polity. The regionalists themselves, however, have not always understood the dialectic of unity through diversity which lay at the heart of the Socialist project. Some Bretons, Basques, Savoyards and others asked why it was Corsica and not their regions which received a Statut Particulier. There was resentment that the Basques were not given a single département, and the Bretons were perplexed as to why the Socialists did not grant them their long-standing request for a unified Breton region. The refusal to give more educational support infuriated the cultural activists.

The most important consequence of the Socialist approach, which granted a great deal but imposed limitations, has been to divide the regionalist movements into those willing to cooperate and those who remain purs et durs. The UPC, for example, belongs to the first category and presented lists in the two elections to the Corsican Assembly in 1982 and 1984. The Breton UDB maintained its basic position of cooperation with the parties of the French left. Since groups such as the UPC and UDB represent the majority tendencies within the regionalist movements it would seem that the Socialist strategy of drawing back into the fold those who had become alienated from it was largely successful.

Nevertheless, there has been a further process of radicalization, as the purs et durs elements of the nationalist movements have rejected the Socialist reforms. This has had important consequences within the movements themselves. First, several new nationalist movements have appeared, putting pressure on the longer established ones. In Corsica, for example, the ALNC (Armée de libération nationale de la Corse) inspired by the Irish INLA, and the BRC (Brigandes Révolutionnaires Corses), inspired by the Italian Red Brigades, appeared alongside the FLNC. The two new groups put pressure on the latter forcing it to adopt a hard-line position towards the Socialist Government. It did so by carrying out several bombings thus entering into direct competition with the more established FLNC. As a result, the

latter stepped up its activities both in their number and their nature. In 1983 and 1984, several assassinations were carried out by the organisation as well as a xenophobic campaign of violence against continentaux. Similar trends could be observed in Brittany and the French Basque Country. A split occurred in the UDB with the expulsion of hard-liners who wished to end the policy of cooperation with the Socialists. New nationalist movements have appeared and there has been a resurgence, albeit on a small scale, of FLB (Front de Libération de la Bretagne) violent activity. In the Basque Country, too, new nationalist movements have appeared and violence has increased with the activities of Ipparetarak ("those of ETA of the North"). The latter group has killed two policemen and carried out several attacks on tourists.

Despite this hardening of attitudes and actions and the increase of police repression against these groups, it is unlikely that the Socialist plan will be seriously threatened by them. It could be argued that the radicalization is this time related to the weakness of the movements. First, the movements have lost their more moderate and, perhaps, more intelligent, members many of whom have been appalled by the xenophobia and excesses of the hard-liners. There is a feeling on the part of left-wing sympathizers that the radicals have swung too far to the right in their political positions and forms of activity. There has also been a loss of support from sections of the traditional left such as the

Socialists and Communists and trade-union and humanitarian organisations who supported the reforms and rejected the use of violence. Prior to May 1981, these groups had also condemned violence but were more "understanding" towards its practitioners, blaming the policies of Giscard and his predecessors as being its root cause. They also gave support to the political prisoners from the regionalist movements. Now this has stopped. In Corsica, for example, the left has formed the MCD (Mouvement Corse Démocratique) to mobilize the population against political violence. In fact, the population had already been mobilized by the right under the umbrella of the CFR (Corse Française et Républicaine). The success of these mobilizations illustrates a ras-le-bol reaction on the part of the local population toward the activities of the FLNC. The lack of support for the FLNC is shown by the low score of the MCA (Muvimentu Corsu de l'Autodeterminazione), a legal movement close to the former, who gained just above 5 per cent in the Regional Assembly elections of August 1984 (53).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it may be said that the Socialist decentralization reforms represent a significant change in the way in which French Governments have dealt with the regional problem and the problem of cultural and linguistic minorities. It could be argued that the reforms meet the demands of

administrative decentralization more than those of the ethnic minorities. This is true, but it should be kept in mind that in Socialist ideology these form a single problematic the parts of which cannot be separated. It is, therefore, thought that by tackling problems of administrative reform, the framework would be created in which a solution might be found to the other problems raised by the forces represented in the new social movements. Such a framework would facilitate a process of change based on democratic participation by the forces vives of the country, impossible because of previous exploitation by the right-wing Governments of the past. The reform is based on the dialectic of unity through diversity and seeks to bring about a form of cultural democracy. It was implemented with a great deal of fidelity to the original promises although these were modified when it was felt that the unity of the French nation might suffer. In other words, to answer the question posed by Mark Kesselman (54), what we have is not the end of Jacobinism, but a new kind of Jacobinism based on respect for cultural and linguistic diversity. Finally, the reforms have introduced a real change in the nature of local politics, including the nature of the regionalist movements themselves. The latter have been radicalized, violence has increased, but now there exists a real possibility for the re-insertion of the more moderate elements, who represent the majority, into the mainstream of political life.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to analyse the roots of contemporary regionalism and ethnic nationalism in France, using Corsica as a case-study. To do so, it has first attempted to build a conceptual framework applicable to the French case. Second, it has used this framework to analyse the phenomenon as it is found in Corsica. Section One (Chapters One and Two) contains the theoretical work. Sections Two (Chapters Three, Four and Five) and Three (Six, Seven and Eight) forms the case-study. An epilogue dealing with the Socialist regional reforms has been included.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Section One was an attempt to find the correct conceptual framework for studying the French cases of regionalism and ethnic nationalism. In Chapter One it was found that, since the thesis is concerned with the political analysis of these phenomena, the correct empirical framework should be the French nation-state. Other possibilities, such as the problem of "islands" or a "Mediterranean" framework, or "new social movements", appropriate to other disciplines such as geography, anthropology and sociology, were rejected. An important question was whether the Corsican case is unique - an aberration within the French system - or whether it is an instance of wider phenomenon within the system. To help answer

this question, a brief comparative analysis of regionalist and ethnic nationalist movements in France was undertaken.

The analysis indicated that the regionalist phenomenon had, indeed, appeared in several parts of France. But it also became clear that the phenomenon was characterised by great diversity: in the kinds of movements, and in the degree of strength they have obtained within the regions. Interestingly, some regions, such as Alsace and Flanders, which had known strong autonomist movements in the inter-war period, and where one might have expected similar movements at the present day, have been relatively quiescent. In other regions, such as Brittany, Corsica and the French Basque Country, there has been a wide range of movements using different kinds of tactics to achieve a variety of demands. In their different ways, all of these movements succeeded in putting the problems of their regions high on governmental agendas.

The analysis allowed us to make an important distinction between (i) moderate regionalism and (ii) radical regionalism. The former is characterised by its Jacobin orientation: it bases its demands precisely on the fact that the region forms part of the French Republic and should be treated on a basis of equality with the rest of France. The latter, on the contrary, is anti-Jacobin in orientation: it calls the traditional administrative and political relationships between the French state and the region into question. Both moderate

and radical regionalism have right- and left-wing tendencies. Radical regionalism, in turn, can be further divided into autonomists who seek a simple modification of the existing relationships between their region and France and separatists who seek to leave the French polity. A further distinction concerns the tactics employed: moderate regionalists in general have eschewed the use of violence and have usually combined parliamentary lobbying with mass mobilization. Some left-wing radicals, such as the FRC in Corsica and the UDB in Brittany, have been willing to co-operate with left-wing national parties such as the PCF, PS and especially the PSU. The right-wing radicals, on the other hand, have adopted more nationalist positions and seek to go it alone, often refusing to cooperate with French national parties because they are French and, therefore, instruments of French centralization. Finally, both right and left-wing radicals divide into those who use violence and those who adopt non-violent tactics.

Several questions which are important for political science were raised as a result of this comparative analysis. The first is why an allegedly unitary state such as France, the "one and indivisible Republic", has witnessed the emergence of certain centrifugal tendencies. Other questions were why these tendencies arose in some areas and not in others and, related to this, why they were stronger in some than they were in others. A further question concerned the actual nature of the movements: what were their ideological

orientations, their socio-economic bases, their successes or failures in influencing Government policy. A final question was how French Governments have responded to these movements some of which often challenged the very legitimacy of the state itself.

Theoretical models

In order to answer these questions, a theoretical model was found to be necessary. This was constructed in Chapter Two, after a critical and eclectic adoption of elements of several existing models. These models were placed in one of two general categories: (i) the "academic"; and (ii) what may be called the "militant". Those in the first type are so-called because they are developed by scholars who are not politically involved in the movements they study. Those in the second are developed by those who are so involved. Of course, university professors may also be militants and, therefore, there may be some over-lapping between them.

One of the most important of the academic models is that developed by Rokkan and Urwin. These authors attempted to chart the macro-historical dimension of the problem by relating to long-term developments in nation- and state-building. Any particular instance of regional or ethnic diversity may be positioned on a "conceptual map". This approach is valuable in as much as it accustoms us to seeing

the problem in its historical context. It is also useful in drawing attention to different kinds of centre and different kinds of periphery and to the differing roles played by elites in each. Its disadvantage is that it is inadequate for examining particular cases such as those of Corsica or other French regions and for the examination of particular historical periods such as the post-war period in Western Europe. This is principally because of the "macro" scale adopted which is incapable of grasping the complexity and nuances of particular cases.

Similar remarks might be made about another "macro" approach: the uneven development thesis of Ernest Gellner. This adopts the same long-term perspective as the above but whereas Rokkan and Urwin emphasize super-structures (nations, states, institutions) it stresses infra-structural economic developments. Once again, such a macro-historical approach is valuable: it reminds us of the fact that capitalism did not develop evenly in a diffusionist manner. On the contrary, it developed unevenly, affecting different regions in different ways. This uneven development led to serious under-development of regions within nation-states that may themselves be highly developed. Several factors, such as the improvement of the means of communication, made the under-developed regions more aware of their disadvantaged position in relation to the developed centres and they began to demand equality with them. However, a study of the political significance of the

movements seeking to represent the interests of these regions demands closer attention to more specific factors. These include the system of public administration at the local level and the policies of particular Governments toward the regions. The uneven development approach, however, provides the indispensable background to this more detailed analysis.

Another approach, adopted by L.J. Sharpe, attempts to make the analysis more concrete by looking at "decentralizing trends" in Western Europe. This postulates the idea that the political salience of "ethnicity" in recent times is part of a wider trend toward decentralization, which is characteristic of the modern state in the contemporary period. This is seen as contradicting the assumptions of both Marxism and Liberalism that a homogeneous nation-state would eliminate societal particularities. It also contradicts the assumption of European "integrationists" such as Karl Deutsch that various kinds of transactions would bring about a united Europe itself characterised by homogeneity. Some of Sharpe's insights relating to ethnic nationalism such as the idea that "ethnicity" may be a form of "psychic income" for the members of an oppressed ethnic group, are valuable. What is more dubious is the idea that regionalism and ethnic nationalism may be seen simply as instances of a phenomenon called "decentralizing trends". Rather, it would be truer to say that they are political phenomena in a distinct category which may link up to the wider tendencies and adapt these to their own

needs. One important reason for this is that such regionalism and ethnic nationalism existed prior to the appearance of these decentralizing trends and, therefore, cannot simply be identified with them.

The same remark might be made about the approach, advocated by Alain Touraine, which places regionalist and ethnic nationalist movements within a general category called "new social movements". This is connected with the idea that capitalism itself is in rapid transformation and, therefore, that the old movements are less relevant. The "new social movements" (ecologists, feminists, New Left, regionalists) are expressions of these changes. But, in fact, some of these movements, such as the regionalists, are often "old social movements" which, after a period of being discredited because of the collaboration activities of some of their members, became politically creditable again. They recovered their credibility by being part of larger coalitions led by more "legitimate" notables and by adopting "progressive" political philosophies such as federalism and europeanism. In other words, the "new" social movements are often, in reality, old movements with a new political veneer. However, Touraine's thesis is valuable in so far as it points to the wider socio-economic transformations in the contemporary period which are the context in which these movements have been given a new lease of life.

Another important theory, proposed by A.D. Smith, is that ethnic nationalism is simply a sub-category of a wider phenomenon called "nationalism". This may be placed somewhere between the academic and militant approaches. It is based on the idea that there exists a typology of nations and nationalisms. A key assumption in this approach seems to be that there exist nations with states and nations without states. "Ethnic nationalism" falls into the latter category. The militant version of this theory postulates the prescriptive notion that such nations should have states. The merit of this approach is that it reminds us that the idea of "nation" itself is a complex one. But an important criticism that may be made against it is that it sometimes begs the question it ought to answer: it assumes the existence of "nations" in the modern sense of the word when this may be no more than a mobilizing project in the minds of nationalist militants. In the French case it is doubtful whether there exist several micro-nations crushed by an imperialistic Jacobin nation-state. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the existence of groups differentiated by ethnic characteristics such as language or customs is itself a sufficient justification for them having their own state.

A similar approach to the theory of ethnic nationalism is the theory of "ethnicity" of Guy Héraud, a leading exponent of the branch of federalism known as fédéralisme intégral. The basic idea in this approach is that the modern nation-state,

based on an individualistic concept of liberal democracy, has, by a process of excessive centralization, crushed more "natural" human communities called ethnic groups. These groups are characterised by having their own language, culture and history. Federalists such as Héraud advocate the superseding of the nation-state by a dialectical movement: by promoting European integration along federalist lines through a "return to the sources", that is, by a radical regionalism. Héraud advocates the creation of what he calls a "Europe des ethnies".

Another model falling between the academic and militant stools is the theory of "internal colonialism", which is partly an application of the theory of uneven development thesis. The principal exponents of this are Robert Lafont, who applies it to France, and Michael Hechter, who applies it to the Celtic fringe of the British Isles. Eleonor Koffman has tried to apply it to the Corsican case. This theory draws on the Marxist theories of uneven development and unequal exchange and seems to make the same assumptions as the theory of ethnic nationalism: that there exist groups of "nations" submerged by the modern nation-state. In turn, the theory has been used as a mobilizing tool by contemporary militants who wished to give a more "progressive" or "socialist" veneer to a regionalism which had been identified with the political philosophy of the right. This approach is valuable in so far as it has drawn attention to and analysed structural

relationships of economic dependency between centre and periphery and related cultural and political developments to these. It is this concern with the structural and economic dimensions of the problem that should be retained.

In general, these different models have made a valuable contribution to the study of regionalism, centre-periphery relations and wider questions such as state- and nation-building. They have drawn attention to an important feature of nation-states which tends to be forgotten by the official ideologies of these states: the existence of distinct peoples, characterised by cultures, histories, social habits and sometimes languages different from those of the dominant culture. They also point to the mythological character of the "nation" and the sometimes artificial juxtaposition of "nation" with "state". The "nation" is often not "one and indivisible" but many and divided.

Where they might be criticised is in their assumption that such potential nations are actually nations. It is true that a distinction may be made between nation understood simply as the group into which one is born (the mediaeval notion) and nation in its modern sense (dating from the French Revolution) of a voluntary association of free citizens. assuming that the latter is also "one and indivisible" and should have its own state. This justifies, to some extent, the distinct terminology used by regionalists such as the

distinctions between primary nations and secondary nations, or nation and nationality, or ethnic nationalism, national minority. But, the militants and academics sympathetic to their cause often confuse the two: they take the second, Jacobin notion, which they criticise, and simply apply it to their own group. A consequence of this, which sometimes distorts their analysis, is that their own "nation" is already "one and indivisible" and, indeed, that this is one of the marks of nation-hood. The analysis contained in this thesis illustrates, on the contrary, that such sub-national groups are as divided internally as the dominant nation which is criticised. Furthermore, if the second meaning of nation is accepted, then it must be recognised that, at least in the French case, the majority of the populations in the regions voluntarily identify with the dominant French nation and do not think of themselves as constituting distinct nations. Finally, another criticism that may be levelled at the regionalists and their sympathizers is that they assume that the regions and the state are unitary actors. The problem is often presented as struggles between the "Corsicans", "Bretons", "Irish" against the "French" or the "French state" or against the "British" or "British imperialism". This thesis has attempted to show that, on the contrary, there exists a great internal diversity which has given rise to distinct forms of regionalism and regionalist movements which have different ideologies, tactics, degrees of popular support and varying influence over Government policy. Furthermore, there

is an almost equally great diversity on the part of governmental responses to the regional question.

A two-dimensional model

In this thesis an attempt has been made to develop an alternative model which retains some of the elements in the existing models but combines other approaches not hitherto used much in studies of regional conflict. These approaches are the theory of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and Marxist geography.

A macro-historical approach is used but confined to the French case. First the long-term process of nation-building by a centralizing French state was examined. It was found that, while the building of the French nation was largely completed, the ancient sub-stratum of peoples remained to some extent. These survived as traditional societies with cultural characteristics different from the dominant society. It was the survival of these societies which created ambiguous situations leading to the existence of dual identities: French and the identity of the specific region. This created an "ideological space" which those opposed to central government policy could attempt to fill.

The second factor relevant to France was the break-up of these traditional societies by more or less rapid economic and

social changes. This was the catalyst which often sparked off the regionalist movements. Such movements occurred in periods of social and economic stress as at the end of the nineteenth century, the inter-war period, and the period following World War II. However, it is in this last period that the movements have managed to garner more widespread support than ever before. To explain this it is necessary to analyse several factors specific to this period: the important economic changes in France since the Second World War; Government regional policies; the growth in trends such as "new social movements", and decentralization.

The model constructed here attempts to provide a framework useful for describing and explaining these movements. The vertical dimension of the model, with concepts drawn from the IGR approach, allows us to explain the way in which such societies have survived. Central to this understanding is the notion of mediation between the local society and the state. In this process of mediation local notables, elected politicians and administrators establish a network of relationships, based on mutual self-interest, cemented by the phenomenon of complicity. This served to integrate the local society into the dominant one. But it also protected it from complete assimilation by the centre: that is, it also maintained differentiation. The regionalist movements may then be analysed in relation to this system of mediation.

The horizontal dimension of the model draws on concepts from Marxist geography such as economic territorialization. It may also be seen as a variation of the uneven development thesis. It helps us to situate the regionalist movements in their socio-economic context, both internally and in the relation between the region and the rest of the society. It also provides an important element in an analysis which stresses the importance of socio-economic changes as factors of differentiation-cum-assimilation. Such changes have often been the catalysts sparking off regionalist protests. Finally, traditional societies have broken up principally as a result of such changes taking place in a rapid manner.

This two-dimensional model is useful for several reasons. Its vertical dimension allows us to analyse the factors of assimilation-cum-differentiation in a state with a Jacobin tradition. It does so by drawing attention to various factors - institutional, economic, political - which contributed to the ambiguity of centre-periphery relations. However, this in itself is not sufficient to account for the complexity of the phenomenon: the diversity of the movements and their relationship with the local society. The horizontal dimension allows us to do this by analysing the movements in relation to the socio-economic background. Although this model has been developed to analyse the phenomenon of regional conflict in France it may be sufficiently wide to be of use in examining

federal systems such as Canada or quasi-federal systems such as the United Kingdom. In fact, the IGR approach has been applied to both kinds of system. At the same time, it is sufficiently narrow to allow for both a middle-level analysis - the system of public administration at the local level - and a micro-analysis of individual movements.

THE APPLICATION OF THE MODEL: A CASE-STUDY OF CORSICA

The results of the case-study of Corsica may be found in Sections Two and Three. Section Three (Chapters Three, Four and Five) explored the phenomenon of ambiguity in the Corsican-French relations. Chapter Three showed how institutions, which had been developed to promote assimilation both encouraged a voluntary identification with France and served to protect certain characteristics of the local culture. In particular, it was seen how a peculiarly Corsican expression of the French political system came about. Chapter Four showed how economic developments on the mainland, which produced situations either of benign neglect or of encouragement of local development on the part of the central Government, had the effect of encouraging a sense of specificity. The most important development here was the adoption of the Plan d'Action Régionale in the 1950's by the Governments of the Fourth Republic. This raised the expectations of Corsicans and made them feel that they were at least being treated as fully Frenchmen. However, these

expectations were dashed with the arrival of De Gaulle and the Fifth Republic. Chapter Five illustrates the phenomenon of "assimilation-cum-differentiation" with regard to political statements about the island made from the centre. Corsicans felt themselves to be, and were encouraged to feel, super-français. Paradoxically, it was this intensity of feeling which differentiated Corsicans from other Frenchmen. However, many statements from the centre emphasised ways in which Corsicans were not French. The conclusion arrived at in Section Two is that Corsica-French relations were ambiguous: a strong voluntary identification combined with a sense of economic, cultural, political and social differentiation to produce a dual identity: Corsicans are both French and Corsican.

Section Four (Chapters Six, Seven and Eight) looked at the problem from the point of view of the islanders. Chapter Six analysed the horizontal dimension of the model: the historical and socio-economic context within which the movements took place. From the political view-point, the most important feature of this society is the system of mediation between the local society and the state known as the clan system, the socio-economic roots of which are analysed in this Chapter. Chapters Seven and Eight analyse the different forms of regionalist movements in relation to this system of mediation and socio-economic context.

Chapter Seven examined the phenomenon of moderate regionalism. This form of regionalism emphasised the French dimension of the Corsican identity. It based its demands on the idea that Corsica is French and is, therefore, entitled to the same treatment as the rest of France. The principal demands of this form of regionalism were concerned to promote closer relations between Corsica and France. They may be summed up in the notion of territorial continuity. Moderate regionalism also demanded that the French state assist the region to overcome its natural or artificial handicaps. It did not call into question the traditional administrative structures between the local society and the state such as the departmental system. Some of its exponents, however, favoured the creation of regional assemblies, although they would have opposed powers which would have made France a federal state.

However, the analysis of moderate regionalism showed it to be a wide coalition of forces which included radical regionalists who did call into question these traditional structures. These are analysed in Chapter Eight. But radical regionalism itself consisted of a variety of movements characterised by distinct ideologies and tactics. These were: the right-wing and left-wing tendencies; autonomists and separatists; those who used occasional violence, those who used continual violence, and those who were non-violent.

Section Four analysed the movements in relation both to the socio-economic context and to the system of mediation. It found that the more moderate the movement in both ideology and tactics, the closer it was to the system of mediation, and vice versa. The moderates were found to be the local notables - local politicians, especially those belonging to mainland parties, local businessmen, and members of the liberal professions. The radicals, on the other hand, were those who were most alienated: old-style regionalists; young intellectuals of the Corsican Diaspora; small farmers and shop-keepers endangered by, and excluded from, the new economic developments of the 1960's. But the group most difficult to analyse was the violent separatists precisely because of the clandestine nature of their activities.

It was seen from this analysis that Corsica was different in several important respects from other French regions. The fact of insularity meant that its cultural system had survived much longer than in other regions. Its economic system, too, was more backward. This meant that, when the socio-economic changes did come in the 1950's and 1960's, they were felt all the more keenly. Another difference is that on Corsica there existed already a tradition of violence which meant that Corsicans were more willing to use this.

However, there are also important similarities between Corsican regionalist movements and the other French movements.

First, there was the important role of the local notables and the development of moderate regionalism. Of course, there may simply be a contagion effect: the Breton CELIB had shown the way. However, it may be also be a consequence of the fact that all the regions were suffering the same kind of crisis in the system of public administration at the local level: the traditional relations between the centre and the periphery were in the process of breaking down. What is remarkable is that in Corsica, Brittany and the French Basque Country, the pattern of development from moderate regionalism to radical regionalism was broadly similar. The movements adopted similar kinds of ideologies and tactics. This was the case even when there was little contact between them. The conclusion that might be drawn from this is that the regionalist phenomenon in France is fundamentally a problem of centre-periphery relations within the French state at a particular period of its history.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS THESIS

The analysis of the Corsican problem in the framework developed in this thesis is useful in so far as it makes a modest contribution to the literature on regionalism and ethnic nationalism. First of all, it is a political analysis of one important case: Corsica. Second, it provides a model that permits us to analyse certain features of the phenomenon

of ethnic nationalism which tended to be ignored in other approaches.

It rejects the idea, often found in the literature, that there exist homogeneous entities called submerged "ethnies" or "micro-nations". On the contrary, it was found that these were often highly differentiated societies which considered themselves to belong to the French nation. The framework adopted allowed us to place regionalist movements in their socio-economic context and, in this way, to analyse their diversity. What were sometimes presented as theories such as ethnicity, ethnic nationalism or internal colonialism, were seen often to be ideological weapons used by regionalist movements and these, in their turn, can be placed within a wider context and become thereby more comprehensible.

The analysis presented in the thesis is also of value for two other reasons. First, it helps us to understand the nature of centre-periphery relations within the French state. Second, it helps us to appreciate developments in the regional policy of French Governments since the Second World War.

With regard to the question of centre-periphery relations within France, it is clear that the notions of a homogenized nation-state and of a "one and indivisible Republic" are inadequate for understanding the complexity that actually exists. Anti-Jacobins are right to point to this plurality. On

the other hand, the very existence of the plurality of France is an indication that the contention of the anti-Jacobins that a centralized Jacobin state ruthlessly crushed submerged nations or ethnies may itself be mythical. In other words, the existence of diversity two hundred years after the French Revolution may indicate a greater toleration of diversity than the anti-Jacobins admit. Furthermore, many inhabitants of the regions, including the local politicians, seem to have been content with this situation most of the time. This ambiguous consensus is an important dimension of centre-periphery relations in France.

With regard to specific regional policies, not only has there been a diversity of regionalist responses but also a variety of governmental responses. During the period of the Fourth Republic there was a coincidence between a governmental regional policy concerned to bring into productivity under-developed economic areas in the regions and the demands of the moderate regionalists. In fact, the Fourth Republic was characterised by the important influence of rural notables in the central organs of power such as Parliament. Furthermore, administrators sympathetic to regionalism and even federalism, such as Jean Monnet and Jean-François Gravier, were influential at this period. There was, furthermore, a strong link between the process of European integration, in which France at this period played an important role, and

regionalism. This meant that many of the demands of moderate regionalism were met by the central Government.

A significantly different approach to regional policy was reached with the accession to power of De Gaulle and setting up of the Fifth Republic. This led to a new orientation of governmental priorities with regard to the regions, expressed in the policies adopted by the first Prime Minister, Michel Debré. Then the emphasis was placed on national development to promote French grandeur. Only those regions already strong, such as Paris or Rhône-Alpes, were to be developed to assist this process of aggrandisement. Weaker regions were to be ignored. This particularly affected Corsica which was one of the weakest regions and one of the most Gaullist.

The change of régime and regional policies had important effects on the regionalist movements themselves. The apparent lack of concern for the underdeveloped regions on the part of the Gaullists deeply offended the sensibilities of the local inhabitants. This led to two principal reactions: (i) a radicalization of the movements; (ii) a swing to the Gaullists on the part of many notables. In the Corsican case, only one of the clans at first rallied to De Gaulle - the de Rocca Serra clan - while the other - the Giacobbists - continued to support the moderate regionalists. However, the intransigence of the Gaullist Government and subsequent Governments under Pompidou led to the demise of their movement. This left the

field open to the radicals who, from the middle 1960's, began to occupy the centre of the stage. During this period Government policy toward the regions was a mixture of the carrot and the stick. The regions continued to be subsidised in a clientelistic manner while increasingly repression became more frequent. The latter was particularly true under President Giscard d'Estaing. In the regions most affected by these changes this led to a cycle of violence, police repression and further violence. This, in turn, led to increasing alienation of social groups, such as small farmers, shop-keepers and intellectuals, already disillusioned by Government policy, and the alienation of new groups such as the youth of the regions. When the central Governments did adopt regional policies in the 1960's and 1970's these tended to ignore the political, administrative and cultural reforms and to concentrate on economic issues. The strategy was to incorporate key functional elites into the policy-making system. However, these incorporated elites usually had a purely consultative role and were given little political power. The local populations were as powerless over the affairs of the region as they had been before. In Corsica, this led to increasing radicalization within the movements and a greater willingness by the more extreme elements to resort to violence. By the time of the 1981 Presidential elections parts of the island could be fairly described as a tinder-box.

The analysis found in this thesis may also be of a more general interest to the field of studies of regionalism and ethnic nationalism outside France, as well as to the general study of centre-local relations in modern nation-states. First, it warns against treating the social actors - regionalists, notables, the "state" - as if they were unitary actors. The analysis presented in this thesis brings out clearly that these minority groups, while they do retain a certain common identity of culture, social habits and perhaps language, are nevertheless internally quite diversified. This diversity is itself of political significance because it affects the degree to which movements may mobilize the local populations and affect Government policies.

The "state", too, is not simply a unitary actor but a complex of different organisations, levels of Government, and individual actors. This means that often there is no "state" policy which is a unified and coherent whole. It is true that different countries have overall traditions of politics and administration: it is contended that Britain is characterised by incrementalism and a toleration of minorities; Germany has a strong legal tradition in its administrative system; Italy has a tradition of a sprawling and incoherent state bureaucracy with clientelistic modes of mediation. France, it is alleged, has inherited tendencies toward centralization and is characterised by the existence of a technocratic administrative elite. Nevertheless, within these overall

traditions, there exists a great diversity of practices and traditions. It is this which should put us on guard against assuming that the state is simply a unitary actor.

Another way of stating this is that all the actors involved - state agencies and representatives, local politicians, regionalist movements, the local populations - are all acting under various constraints. In terms of the distribution of power relationships, all have some kind of power but this is unequally distributed because of these constraints. The most important actors are those representing the state itself: they possess the various resources with which to respond or not to respond to the demands of the regionalists. But this power is constrained by wider economic and political factors: whether they can afford generous regional policies; whether to concede too much will lead to other groups making demands; the very diversity of demands within the regions. This is evident in the Corsican case studied in this thesis. Government policy toward Corsica has been marked by continual shifts in orientation, by incoherence, by leaps forward to be followed by steps backward, by good-will mingled with supercilious indifference depending on the individual politicians or administrators involved. A good example of this is the decision to send the returning pieds noirs to Corsica. In all probability this was simply an ad hoc decision made hurriedly in a situation of crisis. It was not, as radical regionalists claimed, part of a

state conspiracy to wipe out the Corsican "ethnie" and replace it with another.

Perhaps the most stringent criticism that may be made of the policies of French Governments toward the regions is that they have been usually piece-meal, short-term and often conceded too little too late to the regionalists. Often, they have been policies imposed on the regions without the proper participation of the local populations, except for a few notables sympathetic to the Government. During the Fifth Republic, even these local elites themselves were often not consulted and, if they were, their advice was sometimes ignored. Another limitation and cause of grievance was that Governments often thought that economic or administrative solutions were sufficient and that questions such as respect for local cultures and democratic participation by the inhabitants of the regions in the running of their own affairs could be safely ignored.

But the movements themselves were also operating under constraints. The most important constraint was that the Government held the budget strings and it was it which made the final decision concerning the distribution of resources. Moderate regionalists, during the Fourth Republic, exercised a certain amount of power in the sense that they had established a lobby system based on networks of contacts in the political and administrative systems. The radical regionalists, on the

other hand, could only exercise the negative power of street agitation and violence or the threat of it. In fact, this produced relatively meagre results except for the keeping the issue on the political agenda. Paradoxically (given their rejection of the French system) it was the presence of sympathizers with their cause in the national French Socialist Party that gave them an opportunity to achieve some of their demands. This took place with the decentralization reforms of the Socialists initiated in 1982.

THE SOCIALIST REFORMS

The Socialists, elected in May and June 1981, tried to adopt a radically different approach to the regions and cultural and linguistic minorities, based on the notion of "democratic Jacobinism". This means that the unity and indivisibility of the French nation is still to be maintained. The Socialist, however, thought that the centralization of previous periods, once necessary, now hindered the creation of a nation that was one and indivisible. Now, this could be achieved by a new respect for the rights of minorities and the setting up of institutions designed to allow them to exercise some control over their own affairs.

The most important political aspect of these reforms is the fact that Regional Councils and, in Corsica, a Regional Assembly, were to be elected by universal suffrage using

proportional representation. It is still too soon to assess the success or failure of these new developments. The Regional Councils were elected only in the 1986 Legislative Elections. The Corsican Regional Assembly has, however, been in operation since August 1982 and there have been three elections to it. The conclusion to be drawn from the report contained in the Epilogue to this thesis, on the Statut Particulier and the reforms with regard to linguistic and cultural minorities, is that so far the reforms have been quite successful. In effect, these reforms were based on a more comprehensive understanding of the Corsican problem than any previous Government had possessed. Furthermore, they are perhaps the first attempt by any French Government to allow the local population to have a say over the running of their own affairs. Significantly, for the first time, all the island's political tendencies are represented in a single assembly to administer the region's affairs. Violence is continuing but the signs are that the radical regionalists are considerably divided and weakened, while the more moderate tendencies are willing to re-enter the political system.

In conclusion, then, the thesis has demonstrated that the roots of the phenomenon of regionalism and ethnic nationalism in France are both long-term: the historical factor of nation-building, the socio-economic background, the relations between the centre and the periphery and short-term: the particular sets of circumstances of political and economic conjuncture at

any particular time. The phenomenon is complex and the model presented here may be of use in analysing it. However, it is hoped that the model will also be use in analysing similar phenomena in countries other than France. Finally, even in the case of Corsica, much research needs to be carried out. In particular, a full sociological analysis of the regionalist movements, and in particular the clandestine separatists remains to be made.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the general principles of the theory of the structure of the atomic nucleus. It is shown that the structure of the nucleus is determined by the interaction of the nucleons, which are the particles that make up the nucleus. The interaction is described by the strong interaction, which is the most powerful of the four fundamental interactions. The strong interaction is responsible for the binding of the nucleons together in the nucleus. The second part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the experimental results of the study of the structure of the atomic nucleus. It is shown that the experimental results are in good agreement with the theoretical predictions of the theory of the structure of the atomic nucleus. The third part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of the applications of the theory of the structure of the atomic nucleus. It is shown that the theory has many important applications in the field of nuclear physics and in the field of the development of nuclear energy.

INTRODUCTION

- (1) Jean-François Gravier, Paris et le Désert français, (Paris: Flammarion 1947).
- (2) The pieds noirs were European settlers in the Muslim countries of North Africa. They were so-called because the native peoples mistook their shoes for black feet!

CHAPTER ONE

- (1) There are problems with using this as the sole criterion, since minority languages are on the wane in France. Furthermore, in Brittany there are two minority languages - Breton and "gallo", the latter a Romance dialect spoken in the eastern part of Brittany for several centuries before the area was incorporated into France. However, language does provide a useful starting-point: see R. Petrella, La renaissance des cultures régionales en Europe, (Paris, Editions Entente, 1978), pp 175-265, for a discussion of minority languages in Europe - especially pp. 212-55, for the degree to which these languages are still spoken.
- (2) See Y. Person, "Présentation", Les Temps Modernes, vol. 29, (1973), p.1.
- (3) For a general introduction to Catalonia see P. Deffontaines, La Méditerranée catalane, (Paris: PUF, 1975); P. Verdaguer, "Sur le Roussillon", Europe (January-February 1981), pp. 96-108, deals with cultural developments; J. Rossinyol, Le problème national catalan, (Paris: La Haye, 1974), deals principally with Spanish Catalonia; G. Héraud, L'Europe des Ethnies, 2nd ed., (Paris, Nice: Presses d'Europe, 1974), pp 135-6. However, there is a paucity of literature on this area.
- (4) See Deffontaines, op. cit.
- (5) See E. Coornaert, La Flandre française de langue flamande (Paris: Editions Ouvrières, 1970); M. Ruys, Les Flamands, (un peuple en mouvement, une nation en devenir), (Brussels and Paris: Vander, 1973); Héraud, op. cit., pp. 20-34; on collaboration between Flemish autonomists, see P. Ory, Les collaborateurs, (1940-45), (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1976), Chapter Nine: "Je suis partout, minorités nationales et collaboration", pp. 168-200.

- (6) Alsace has attracted much more attention from scholars than Catalonia or Flanders. Héraud, op. cit., pp. 29-78, provides an extensive bibliography. The reader may usefully consult M. Anderson, "Regional identity and political change: the case of Alsace from the Third to the Fifth Republic", Political Studies, (Oxford), vol. XX (March 1972), pp. 1730; E. Philipps, La crise d'identité, (l'Alsace face à son destin), (Strasbourg: 1978), especially the section on the autonomists, pp. 218 ff.; J-C. Streicher, Impossible Alsace (Histoire des idées autonomistes), (Paris: Ed. Entente, 1982); for the inter-war period see S. Gras, "La presse française et l'autonomisme alsacien en 1926", and B. Reimeringen, "Un communisme régionaliste? Le communisme alsacien", both in C. Gras and G. Livet (eds.), Régions et régionalisme en France (du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours), (Paris: PUF, 1977; and Ory, op. cit., on collaboration.
- (7) In 1978 Iffrig was fined 100,000 francs and had to pay 130,220 francs in costs, in a law suit brought against him by the Ligue des droits de l'homme because of his overtly racist views, see Streicher, op. cit., p. 158.
- (8) See H. Espieux, Histoire de l'Occitanie (Agen: Centre Culturel Occitan, 1970); R. Lafont, La Revendication occitane, (Paris: Flammarion, 1973); Y. Barelli et al., L'Espérance occitane, (Paris: Ed. Entente, 1980), which contains a useful bibliography, pp. 135-8.
- (9) Notably in Décoloniser en France, (Paris: Gallimard, 1971); see also his Autonomie: de la région à l'autogestion, (Paris: Ed. Gallimard, 1976).
- (10) See J. Davant, Histoire du Pays Basque, (Bayonne: Ed. Elkar, 1970); Héraud, op. cit., pp. 161-2; a good treatment of modern regionalism and nationalism in the French Basque Country may be found in J. Malherbe, "Le nationalisme basque et les transformations socio-politiques en Pays Basque nord", in P. Bidart (ed.), La nouvelle société Basque, (Paris: Harmattan, 1980), pp 51-84.
- (11) For the details of the emergence of this group and the social background of its members, see Malherbe, op. cit.
- (12) "Attentats commis en Pays Basque nord et quelques prises de position d'avril 1975 à janvier 1979", Eglise Aujourd'hui en Monde Rural, no. 413, (Decembre 1979), pp. 608-10.
- (13) For an analysis of these results see Malherbe, op. cit., pp. 74-6.

- (14) Brittany is the region which has attracted the most attention from scholars. For an extensive bibliography see M. Nicolas, Histoire du mouvement breton (Emsav) (Paris: Syros, 1982), pp. 365-74); good introductions to the region are H. Wasquet and R. de Saint-Jouan, Histoire de la Bretagne, 7th edn., (Paris: PUF, 1980); M. le Lannou, La Bretagne et les Bretons, (Paris: PUF, 1978). Nicolas, op. cit., is a detailed analysis of the Breton movement (also known as the Emsav). R. Dulong, La question bretonne, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1975) is a shorter analysis; H. Guilorel, "Problème breton et mouvement breton", in Pouvoirs, no. 19, (1981), pp. 83-102, is a succinct account of the problem and of the contemporary nationalist movement. S. Berger, Peasants against Politics (Rural Organisation in Brittany 1911-1967) (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), deals mainly with the département of Finistère (one of the four départements of Brittany) and is an excellent analysis of the nature of corporatism in Breton society. J.E.S. Hayward, "From functional regionalism to functional representation in France", Political Studies, vol XVII, (March 1969), pp.. 48- 75, is an excellent treatment of the problem.
- (15) Berger, op. cit., pp.. 99-177.
- (16) See Dulong, op. cit., pp.. 44-6.
- (17) On the extent of collaboration, see Ory, op. cit.; for two differing interpretations of this period see Yann Fouéré, "Le régionalisme breton sous le gouvernement de Vichy et le Comité consultatif de Bretagne", and Michel Denis, "Mouvement breton et fascisme. Signification de l'échec du second Emsav", both in Gras et Livet (eds.), op. cit., pp.. 481-506. Fouéré attempts to minimise the extent of collaboration of the Breton regionalist movement with the Nazis and the Vichy régime while Denis emphasises it.
- (18) The most thorough treatment of the rise and decline of this movement may be found in Nicolas, op. cit., pp.. 109-212; see also Hayward, op. cit., (1969).
- (19) See op. cit., p. 93; and also Hayward, op. cit.
- (20) Quoted in Nicolas, op. cit., p. 93.
- (21) On the French federalists see A. Greilsammer, Les Mouvements fédéralistes en France de 1945 à 1974, (Presses d'Europe, 1975); on the relations between federalists and regionalists see John Loughlin, "Federalist and regionalist movements in France", in M. Burgess (ed.), Federalism and Federation in Western Europe, (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp.. 76-98.

- (22) Quoted in Dulong, op. cit., p. 26.
- (23) See Union Démocratique Bretonne, Bretagne=Colonie, 2nd edn., (Rennes: UDB, 1974).
- (24) For an analysis of election results in Brittany see Nicolas, op. cit., pp. 317-22. The results quoted below are taken from this work.

CHAPTER TWO

- (1) See Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), Chapter Seven; the same point is made by Sven Tägil (ed.), Regions in Upheaval (Ethnic Conflict and Political Mobilization), (Kristianstad: Esselte Studium, 1984), pp. 31-2; on the problem of the relationship between Marxism and local nationalism, see T. Nairn, The Break-up of Britain, (London: 1977).
- (2) A good summary of these theories may be found in Hodges, European Integration, (London: Penguin, 1972); a critical appraisal of the "integration" theorists may be found in L.J. Sharpe, "Decentralist Trends in Western Europe: a First Appraisal", in L. J. Sharpe (ed.), Decentralist Trends in Western Democracies, (London: Sage, 1979), pp. 9-79.
- (3) See C. Waxman (ed.), The End of Ideology Debate, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968).
- (4) See Stanley Hoffman, "Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol XXI, Nos. 1 & 2, September/December 1982, pp. 22-37.
- (5) See Charles Herod, The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought (The concept of Nations with History and Nations without History), (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).
- (6) A good exposition of the application of these theories to the regional problem may be found in Tagil, op. cit., pp. 30-37.
- (7) See Ibid., p. 31.
- (8) See E. Gellner, op. cit., 12:31
- (9) See Lafont, Décoloniser en France, (Paris: Gallimard, 1971)

- (10) M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism (The Celtic Periphery in British national development, 1536-1966) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).
- (11) W. Beer, "Internal colonialism and rising expectations: ethnic activism in contemporary France", in R. Hall (ed.), Ethnic Autonomy - Comparative dynamics, (Oxford: Pergamon, 1979)
- (12) T. Gurr, Why men rebel, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).
- (13) Beer, op. cit., pp. 216-17.
- (14) See L.J. Sharpe, op. cit., pp. 52-3.
- (15) See G. Héraud, L'Europe des ethnies, (Paris: Presses d'Europe, 1974).
- (16) A.D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); another treatment may found in Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethno-nationalism", Journal of International Affairs, Vol 27:1, 1973, pp. 1-21; Tagil, op. cit., uses the term "regionalethno-national" to describe the phenomenon.
- (17) Smith, op. cit., distinguishes between the "French" and "German" concepts of nation: the former means nation as voluntary association of citizens, the latter nation as ethnic community.
- (18) See op. cit., p. 61.
- (19) André Gundar Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).
- (20) Immanuel Wallerstein, The World System, (New York & London: 1974).
- (21) For an introduction to Rokkan's work see P. Torsvik (ed.), Mobilization, Centre-Periphery Structures and Nation-building. (A volume in Commemoration of Stein Rokkan) (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1981). An attempt to apply Rokkan's models to France, especially Brittany, has been made by Hervé Guillourel, "France: religion, periphery, state and nation-building", in Ibid, pp. 390-428; see also Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin, Economy, Territory, Identity (Politics of West European Peripheries), (London: Sage, 1983).
- (22) See S. Rokkan, "Entries, voices, exits: towards a possible generalization of the Hirschman model", Social

Science Information, vol. XIII (1974), pp. 39-53. ; and Rokkan and Urwin, op. cit., p. 31.

- (23) op. cit., p. 29.
- (24) Marx commented on it in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte ; Tocqueville in The Old Régime and the French Revolution, (New York: Doubleday, 1955), published originally in 1856; a good exposition of this trend by a contemporary author is J.E.S. Hayward, Governing France: The One and Indivisible French Republic, 2nd edition, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983): Chapter One deals with the centralizing trends in France, while Chapter Two deals with decentralization; Pierre Avril, Politics in France, (London: Penguin, 1969), pp. 174-187.
- (25) See M. Bouloiseau, La république jacobine. (Nouvelle histoire de la France contemporaine), (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1972).
- (26) Quoted in Nicolas, Histoire du Mouvement Breton, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
- (27) Idem.
- (28) Idem.
- (29) On the attitudes of the French left to the regional problem, see Yves Mény, Centralisation et décentralisation dans le débat politique français (1945-1969), (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1974); M. Philipponeau, "La gauche et le régionalisme (1945-1974)", in Gras et Livet (eds.), Régions et régionalisme en France (du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours), (Paris: PUF, 1977), pp. 529-43; M. Rocard, "La région, une idée neuve pour la Gauche", and P. Sadran, "Les socialistes et la région", both in Pouvoirs, no. 19 (1981), pp. 131-47; for the attitude of the PCF see L'Humanité, 12/6/1976.
- (30) See Y. Mény, "Crises, régions et modernisation de l'état", in Pouvoirs, no. 19, (1981), pp. 6-8.
- (31) See Dulong, La question bretonne (Paris: Armand Colin, 1975).
- (32) Pierre Grémion, Le pouvoir périphérique, (Paris: Seuil, 1976); Berger, Peasants against Politics, op. cit., has emphasized this point with regard to Brittany; see also Rokkan and Urwin, op. cit., p.5.
- (33) For an analysis of the significance for the regions of the change from the Fourth to the Fifth Republics, see Dulong, op. cit., (1975), pp. 191-2.

- (34) Ibid.
- (35) This Marxist interpretation has been challenged by, for example, J. Charlot, Le Gaullisme, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1970), pp. 188-91. However, it is important to point the "suitability" of the Gaullist state to the socio-economic restructuring of post-war France, without necessarily adopting a determinist position.
- (36) See J. Hayward, "Incorporer la périphérie", op. cit.
- (37) V. Wright, "Regionalization under the French Fifth Republic: the triumph of the functional approach", in Sharpe (ed), op. cit., pp. 193-234. However, Wright is an opponent of the theses of the regionalists: see his "Questions d'un jacobin anglais aux régionalistes français", in Pouvoirs, no. 19, (1981), pp. 119-30.
- (38) There has been a tendency simply to classify all of these movements under the heading of "new social movements". See, for instance, A. Touraine et al., Le Pays contre l'Etat, (Paris: Seuil, 1981),; Wanda Dressler-Holohan has used this framework in her excellent work on the Corsican problem: Développement économique et mouvement autonomiste: le cas de la Corse, 2ème rapport, (Grenoble: Université de Grenoble, 1981).
- (39) Deil Wright on the USA and R. Rhodes, "Intergovernmental Relations in the United Kingdom", in Y. Mény and V. Wright (eds.), Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 33-78; see also F. Dupuy, "The politico-administrative system of the Département in France", in ibid., pp. 79-103.
- (40) Michel Crozier, Le Phénomène bureaucratique, and La société bloquée,; Jean-Pierre Worms, "Le Préfet et ses notables", Sociologie du Travail, 3 (July - Sept), 1966; Jean-Claude Thoenig, "La relation entre le centre et la périphérie en France", Bulletin de l'Institut Internationale de l'Administration, Dec. 1975.
- (41) Thoenig, in fact, describes the prefect as a kind of governor at the beginning of his article but the remainder of it is a complete refutation of this idea.
- (42) S Tarrow, Between centre and periphery (Grassroots politicians in France and Italy), Yale University Press, 1977.

- (43) This point is made by J-F Médard, "Political clientelism in France: the centre-periphery nexus reexamined", in S.N. Eisenstadt and R. Lemarchand (eds), Political clientelism, Patronage and Development, pp125-169. Médard sees Corsica and Nice as having clientelistic political systems; there are in fact several forms of clientelism: see L. Graziano, "A Conceptual Framework for the study of Clientelistic Behaviour", European Journal of Political Research; M. Caciaglia and F. Belloni, "The "New" Clientelism in Southern Italy: The Christian Democratic Party in Catania", in Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, op. cit., pp. 35-56 and J. Chubb, "Naples under the left: The Limits of Social Change", in ibid., pp. 91-124.
- (44) cf Thoenig, op cit.
- (45) cf Médard: "The notable is not only the relay of the administration, he is the mediator between the centre and the periphery, which suggests the need for a greater emphasis on the relations between the notable and his community, and more sustained attention to the sociological dimension of this relationship", op. cit., p. 127.
- (46) cf Renaud Dulong: "L'ensemble administratif est ainsi étudié - avec beaucoup de finesse - comme s'il était entièrement clos sur lui-même, n'ayant de rapport avec l'extérieur que par formulaire ou par jeu d'influences", Les Régions, l'Etat, et la Société locale, (Paris: PUF, 1978), p. 46.
- (47) op. cit., p. 154.
- (48) cf Dulong, op. cit. (1978).
- (49) On the divisions within the federalists see Greilsammer, op. cit., pp. 198-203.
- (50) A graphic description of how peasants in Southern Italy in the 1930's conceived of the state is found in the masterpiece of Carlo Levi, Il Cristo si è fermato a Eboli; see also E. Gellner, Nations and nationalism, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), pp. 8-18, for a brilliant discussion of what he terms "agro-literate societies", i.e. societies with a small literate élite and a mass of illiterate peasants.
- (51) op. cit. (1972).

CHAPTER THREE

- (1) See Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. p.410; also Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 8-31..
- (2) See Chapter Two above.
- (3) See George Dawson, L'Evolution des Structures de l'Administration locale déconcentrée en France, (Paris, 1969), p.5.
- (4) Idem.
- (5) See T. Flory, Le mouvement régionaliste français, (Paris: PUF, 1966).
- (6) See Chapter Two above.
- (7) See S. Gras, 'La presse française et l'autonomisme alsacien en 1926', and B. Reinmerigen, 'Un communisme régionaliste? Le communisme alsacien':, both in C. Gras and C. Livet (eds.), Régions et régionalisme en France (du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours), (Paris: 1977).
- (8) Ibid.
- (9) A good example of this is the conservative Breton peasant syndicate the Office de Landernau which, in 1936, had good relations with the Front Populaire government. See S. Berger, Peasants against Politics, op.cit.
- (10) See H. Machin, The Prefect in French Public Administration, (London: Croom Helm, 1977); Jean-François Auby, Les commissaires de la République, Editions Que Sais-je?, (Paris:PUF, 1983)
- (11) Quoted in Machin, op. cit., p.19.
- (12) See J-P Worms, "Le Préfet et ses notables", op. cit., (1966).
- (13) See Thoenig, "La relation entre le centre et la périphérie en France", op. cit.
- (14) See Chapter Two above on Crozier's concept of complicity.
- (15) See M. Kesselman, The Ambiguous Consensus, (A study of local government in France), (New York: 1967).

- (16) See Janine Renucci: "Un Conseil des Douze, puis des Dixhuit, représentait le peuple pour l'En Deçà et l'Au-Delà des Monts, tandis que deux orateurs résidaient à Gênes. Tous furent peu à peu réduits à des fonctions honorifiques, alors que les Corses étaient évincés des plus hautes charges. Leur noblesse n'était pas reconnue comme un corps privilégié analogue à celle de Gênes, dure épreuve pour l'orgueil local. La Corse était réellement sous l'Autorité de son gouverneur génois, installé A Bastia", La Corse. (Paris: PUF, 1982), pp. 12-13; Pascal Marchetti: "A la fin du XVIIe siècle, Gênes ... ferme aux autochtones les emplois publics ...", Une mémoire pour la Corse, (Paris: Flammarion, 1980), p. 13.
- (17) See Francis Pomponi, "Emeutes populaires en Corse; aux origines de l'Insurrection contre la domination génoise (Décembre 1729 - Juillet 1731)", Annales du Midi, no.170, Avril-Juin 1972; Antoine Casanova et Ange Rovère, Peuple corse, Révolutions et Nation française, (Paris: Ed. sociales, 1979), pp. 19-53.
- (18) On Paoli see Marchetti, op. cit., pp. 41-66; and M. Bartoli, Pasquale Paoli (Père de la Patrie Corse), (Paris: Ed. Albatross, 1974).
- (19) See Voltaire: "En cedant la vaine et fatale souveraineté à un pays qui lui était à charge, Gênes faisait en effet un bon marché, et le roi de France en faisait un meilleur. Il restait à savoir si les hommes ont le droit de vendre d'autres hommes ...", Le Siècle de Louis XV.
- (20) See Francis Pomponi, Histoire de la Corse, (Paris: Hachette, 1979), p. 281.
- (21) Idem.
- (22) Idem.
- (23) There were four Intendants and four Commandants en chef of which Marboeuf was the best known and longest serving.
- (24) Pomponi, op. cit., p. 24.
- (25) Idem.
- (26) See Casanova et Rovère, op. cit., p. 211 and footnote 27, p.223.
- (27) Pomponi, op. cit., pp. 247-8.
- (28) Marchetti, op. cit., p. 89.
- (29) Quoted in Marchetti, op. cit., p. 94.

- (30) Pomponi, op. cit., p. 94.
- (31) See Maurice Bourjol, Les Institutions régionales de 1789 à nos jours, (Paris: Edit. Berger-Lavault, 1969)), pp. 69-71.
- (32) On this episode see Marchetti, op. cit., pp. 113-125 for an interpretation by a contemporary nationalist.
- (33) Letter to Miot, Commissaire of the Directory, 1796, quoted in Marchetti, op. cit., p. 127.
- (34) See Charles Santoni, "Résistance et repression en Corse, 1769-1819, Les Temps Modernes, nos. 324, 325, 326, August-September 1973.
- (35) Pomponi, op. cit., p. 318.
- (36) Quoted in idem.
- (37) On literature in Corsica see F. Ettori, "Langue et littérature" in F. Pomponi et al., Corse, (Paris: Bonneton, 1981), pp. 171-211.
- (38) Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, (The modernization of rural France 1870-1914). (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).
- (39) P. Bourde, En Corse (L'esprit de clan, Les moeurs politiques. Les vendettas. Le banditisme.), 2e edn., (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1887).
- (40) See Georges Ravis-Giordani, "L'alta pulitica et la bassa pulitica; valeurs et comportements dans les communautés villageoises corses (XIXe-XXe siècles), Etudes rurales, 1976, pp. 171-189.
- (41) A clan leader from Saint-Florent remarked to Paul Bourde: "Jadis [nos clients] nous auraient suivis à la guerre: maintenant, ils nous suivent au scrutin", op. cit., p. 10.
- (42) On this aspect of local politics in France, see S. Tarrow, Between Centre and Periphery: grassroots politicians in Italy and France, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1977).
- (43) Jean-Paul Delors and Stéphane Muracciole, op. cit., p.73.
- (44) On Emmanuel Arène, see ibid, pp. 77 seq.
- (45) This is the clientelistic approach analysed by Graziano, Chubb and Macaglia, see Chapter Two, f.n. (36).

CHAPTER FOUR

- (1) See Claude Fohlen, "France 1920-1970", in Carlo Cipolla (ed.), The Fontana Economic History of Europe, (Contemporary Economics), Part One, (London: Collins, 1976), pp. 72-127.
- (2) See Maurice Niveau, Histoire des faits économiques contemporains, 4e edn. (Paris: PUF, 1976), p. 69; J. Marczewski, "Y a-t-il eu un 'take-off' in France?", Cahiers de l'I.S.E.A., mars 1961, pp. 76 seq.
- (3) See Niveau, op. cit.
- (4) See David Thomson Europe since Napoleon, 2nd revised edn., (London: Penguin, 1978), pp. 255-261.
- (5) See Fohlen, op. cit., pp. 72-73, on reasons for this stagnation.
- (6) See her Peasants against Politics op, cit.
- (7) On this question see A. Albitreccia, La Corse, Son Evolution au XIXe siècle et au début du XXe siècle, (Paris: PUF, 1942); see also Chapter Six, f.n. (19).
- (8) See Corse, Les raisons de la colère, (Paris: Editions sociales, 1976), p. 16.
- (9) See Pomponi, Histoire de la Corse, (Paris: Hachette, 1979), pp. 229-334 on the early part of the nineteenth century, and pp. 366-368 on the Second Empire; see also P. Antonetti, Histoire de la Corse, (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1973), pp. 443-457.
- (10) On demographic trends the best treatment is the thesis of Janine Renucci, Corse traditionnelle et Corse nouvelle, (Lyon: Edit. Audin, 1974).
- (11) Ibid.
- (12) Described in greater detail in Chapter Six below.
- (13) See Francis Pomponi, "Crise de structure économique et crise de conscience en Corse (Fin XIXe siècle - début XXe)", Typologie des crises dans les pays méditerranéens (XVIe-XXe siècles), Nice. 1977. pp. 76-113.
- (14) See Delors et Muracciole, Corse La Poudrière, op. cit., pp. 77-80.

- (15) Op. cit., p. 14.
- (16) Op. cit., p. 15.
- (17) See K. Allen and M.C. MacLennan, Regional problems and policies in Italy and France, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), pp. 147-149.
- (18) See J.F. Gravier, Paris et le désert français, Paris: Flammarion, 1947)
- (19) Allen and MacLennan, op. cit.
- (20) Allen and MacLennan, ibid, pp. 155-157; J. Fancheux, La décentralisation Industrielle, (Paris: Edit. Berger Levrault, 1959).
- (21) Le Monde, 7/3/1961.
- (22) See Chapter Six below.
- (23) Comité technique de co-ordination de d'étude du plan: "Plan de mise en valeur de la Corse", Paris, 1949.
- (24) Programme d'Action régionale établi en application du décret no.55-873 du 30 juin 1955 pour la Corse.
- (25) Décret no.55-873 du 30 juin 1955 relatif à l'établissement de programmes d'action régionale, Journal Officiel, 3 juillet 1955.
- (26) Op. cit., p. 13.
- (27) Ibid. p. 4
- (28) Ibid. p. 15.
- (29) Idem.
- (30) Ibid.p. 16.
- (31) On the pastoral question see F. Pernet et G. Lenclud, Berger en Corse, (essai sur la question pastorale), (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1977).
- (32) Op. cit., p. 17.
- (33) Ibid. p. 19.
- (34) Idem.
- (35) Ibid. p. 20.

- (36) Ibid. p. 36.
- (37) Idem.
- (38) This may be found in A.M. Guigue, Le programme d'action régionale et le problème corse, (Nancy: 1965).
- (39) Quoted in Perrier, op. cit. p. 21.
- (40) Ibid. p. 12.
- (41) Ibid. p. 13.
- (42) Ibid.p. 19.
- (43) Rapport Neuwirth: rapport 1322 (1962) de la Commission de la production et des échanges, dit Rapport Neuwirth, Assemblée Nationale.
- (44) Ibid. p. 75.
- (45) Corse 1972, Résultats et commentaires, Direction départementale de l'équipement.
- (46) PAR, p. 13.
- (47) Ibid. p. 18.
- (48) Ibid. p. 19.
- (49) Idem.
- (50) Ibid p. 24.
- (51) p. 107.
- (52) Talk given by Marcel Savreux, n.d., p.8.
- (53) M. Maurice Laure was commissaire of the French government at the Bank of Madagascar and the Commores, at the Bank of Morocco in January 1953, and then President of the Compagnie Immobilière de Tunisie in July 1955. He was President of SOMIVAC and SETCO from March 1957 to September 1968, then became their honorary president. M. René Watin was administrateur civil in Morocco before becoming directeur-général of SOMIVAC and SETCO. See P. Dottelonde, Histoire de la Revendication Corse, (Paris: Thèse de 3e cycle, 1983/84), Vol 2, LXV, LXVI.
- (54) op. cit.
- (55) Ibid. p. 154.
- (56) See Delors et Muracciole, op. cit., pp. 139-143.

- (57) See "Un quart de siècle de bouleversements", in Pomponi et al., op. cit., p. 304.
- (58) See Perrier, op. cit., p. 31.
- (59) Mission interministerielle pour l'aménagement et l'équipement de la Corse, Schéma d'aménagement de la Corse, , (Ajaccio: Préfecture, 1972).
- (60) Op. cit., p. 33.
- (61) Idem.

CHAPTER FIVE

- (1) Mérimée, Columba et 10 autres nouvelles. (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), first published in 1840.
- (2) Quoted in Nicolas, Histoire du Mouvement Breton, op. cit., p. 20.
- (3) Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, op.cit.
- (4) For an account of this by the radical regionalists, see FRC, Main basse sur une île, (Paris: Ed. Martineau, 1971): see below Chapter Eight.
- (5) Quoted in Marchetti, Une mémoire pour la Corse, op. cit., p. 194.
- (6) Idem.
- (7) Idem.
- (8) See M. Martini, Les Corses dans l'expansion française, (Ajaccio: Ed. Les Myrtes, 1953).
- (9) Estimates vary: see Renucci, op. cit., (1974), for the most accurate account.
- (10) La Corse des années ardentes 1939-1976, (Paris: Edit Albatross, 1976), p. 16.
- (11) quoted in ibid., p. 15.
- (12) On the occupation of Corsica, see Silvani, op. cit., and M. Choury, La résistance en Corse (Tous bandits d'honneur), 2e edn.(Paris: Editions Sociales, 1958).
- (13) See Choury, op. cit.

- (14) See Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, Vol. 1, (Pendant la Guerre, Juin 1940 - Janvier 1946), (Paris: Berger-Lavault, 1946), p. 326.
- (15) "Discours prononcé à l'Assemblée consultative au cours du débat sur la défense nationale", in De Gaulle, ibid., p. 369.
- (16) Quoted in Silvani, op. cit., p. 18.
- (17) Quoted in ibid., p. 30.
- (18) See "Discours prononcé à Ajaccio (Place de la Mairie), in De Gaulle, op. cit., p. 328.
- (19) Quoted in Silvani, op. cit., pp. 68-69.
- (20) On the attempted coup at Ajaccio, see Silvani, op. cit., pp. 81-96; and M. Savreux, L'homme à tout faire de la République (Nice: Edit. Lefevre, 1977).
- (21) See Silvani, op. cit., pp. 97 seq.
- (22) Quoted in Silvani, op. cit., p. 107.
- (23) Known as the Arrêtés Miot and the Décret Impérial, these had granted certain tax exemptions to Corsica to compensate for the problem of insularity.
- (24) Quoted in Silvani, op. cit., p. 148.
- (25) 55,879 = Oui; 47,351 = Non; i.e. 54% in favour although this was a smaller proportion in favour of the General than was the case in the Presidential election of 1965 when there were 60% voted in his favour.
- (26) Quoted in Silvani, op. cit., p. 174.
- (27) Idem.
- (28) Journal Officiel, 10 janvier 1970.
- (29) See Chapter Four, footnote (59).
- (30) The Conseil Général proposed 27 amendments as did as the CODEC. See Silvani, op. cit., p. 189.
- (31) Hudson Report: Travaux et recherches de prospective: survol de la France, no. 29 (Rapport Hudson).

- (32) See John Frears, France in the Giscard Presidency, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 19 -29 on the ideas of the President; pp. 171-172 deals with his attitude to the regions: "I am entirely hostile to the political fragmentation of France, because France ... would exhaust much of her strength and external authority if she cut herself in little pieces on the political level. That is why I am ... hostile to political regionalism. On the other hand, regional economic development has always seemed to me something very reasonable and very efficient. I am also, unlike some others, entirely favourable to France conserving all her cultures", quoted on p. 172.
- (33) The reform of the law on abortion for example.
- (34) The Peyrefitte Bill Liberté et Sécurité, for instance.
- (35) Quoted in Silvani, op. cit., p. 207.
- (36) Quoted in ibid., p. 211.
- (37) Quoted in ibid., p. 223.
- (38) Idem.
- (39) Idem.
- (40) Quoted in Silvani, op. cit., pp. 223-4.
- (41) See Introduction above.
- (42) Reported in R. Ramsay, The Corsican Time-bomb, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).

CHAPTER SIX

- (1) On this aspect of the Corsican problem, see Janine Renucci, Corse traditionnelle et Corse nouvelle, (La géographie d'une île), (Lyon: Editions Audin, 1974), pp. 15-23; pp. 46-49; on the problem of insularity in general see Allan Macartney, (ed), The Islands of Europe, (Edinburgh: Unit for the study of Government in Scotland, 1984), esp. Malcolm Anderson, "The Island Dimension", pp. 1-6, and John Loughlin, "Corsican-French Relations", pp. 83-91.
- (2) F. Ratzel, La Corse, étude anthropo-géographique, (Annales de Géographie, 1899), quoted in Renucci, op. cit., p. 3.

- (3) See R. Grosjean, "La préhistoire et la protohistoire", in P. Arrighi, (ed), Histoire de la Corse, (Toulouse: Editions Privat, 1971).
- (4) "Prouvent-ils [les monuments pré-historiques] l'arrivée d'envahisseurs venus de la mer ou de propagations étrangères plus pacifiques? L'île préhistorique n'a jamais vécu en vase clos. Les relations avec la Sardaigne, la Toscane et la Ligurie furent précoces, ont peut-être véhiculé des influences ibères. Les < Peuples de la Mer > débarquèrent-ils sur ces rivages? S'agissait-il d'Occidentaux, de Crétois ou de Mycéniens?, Ibid, quoted in Janine Renucci, La Corse, (Que Sais-je?) (Paris: PUF, 1982), p. 6.
- (5) See Jean Jehasse, "La Corse antique - La Corse Romaine", in P. Arrighi, op. cit., (1971).
- (6) See Jean et Laurence Jehasse, La nécropole préromaine d'Aléria, (Paris: Editions CNRS, 1973).
- (7) The Romans described the Corsicans in unflattering terms: for example, Titus Livius described them as "Semblables au sol qui les porte, ils sont grossiers, sauvages et presque aussi intraitables que les bêtes qu'ils nourrissent", quoted in M. Labro, La question Corse (Paris: Editions Entente, 1977), p. 12.
- (8) Renucci op. cit. (1982), claims that "... la langue corse d'aujourd'hui provient directement du latin", p. 8.
- (9) See P. Antonetti, Histoire de la Corse, (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1973).
- (10) See ibid., pp. 93-110.
- (11) The Genoese period has left a mauvais souvenir in the collective consciousness of the islanders shared by both Jacobin and regionalist historians alike: a good example of the former is Jean-Baptiste Gaï, La tragique histoire des Corses, 8e edn., (Paris: Laffont, 1946), and of the latter is Pascal Marchetti, Une mémoire pour la Corse, (Paris: Flammarion, 1980).
- (12) A good treatment of this period from a Marxist viewpoint is A. Rovère, "La Corse au temps de Pascal Paoli", in A. Casanova et A. Rovère, Peuple corse, Révolutions, et Nation française, (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1979), pp. 15-106. On the origins of the revolt itself see F. Pomponi, "Emeutes populaires en Corse: aux origines de l'insurrection contre la domination génoise (décembre 1729-juillet 1731)", Annales du Midi, no 170, avril-juin, 1972; an interpretation from a radical regionalist

(Corsican nationalist) perspective may be found in P. Marchetti, op. cit.

- (13) On the episode of the Royaume Anglo-corse see P. Tomi, "Le royaume anglo-corse", Etudes Corses, no. 19, 1956-1957 and C. Ambrosi, "La sécession de la Corse en 1794", in Mélanges d'études corses offerts à P. Arrighi, (Centre d'Etudes Corses d'Aix en Provence, 1971), pp. 11-39. On the Italian Occupation and the Corsican Resistance see Maurice Choury, La résistance en Corse (tous bandits d'honneur!), 2ième edn., (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1958)
- (14) See Pierre Simi, Le climat de la Corse, (Bulletin de la Section de Géographie, 1963).
- (15) See map of arrondissements and cantons in J. Renucci, op. cit. (1974), p. 13.
- (16) See Fernand Braudel, L'identité de la France, Vol 1, Espace et Histoire, (Paris: Editions Arthaud-Flammarion, 1986), especially Chapter One: "Que la France se nomme diversité", pp. 28-111.
- (17) On the practice of transhumance see Renucci, op. cit., (1974), pp. 59-62; see also F. Pernet et G. Lenclud, Berger en Corse, (essai sur la question pastorale), (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1977).
- (18) Renucci, op. cit. (1974), p. 60.
- (19) See A. Casanova, "Note sur les pressoirs pré-industriels de Corse", Corse Historique, numéros 31-32, 1968, and "L'évolution des techniques rurales en Corse: le cas du moulin à eau (fin XVIIIe-début XIXe siècles), Problèmes d'histoire de la Corse, de l'Ancien Régime à 1815, (Actes du Colloque d'Ajaccio, 1971).
- (20) A typical example is F. Blanqui, Rapport sur l'état économique et moral de la Corse en 1839, (Paris: Didot, 1840).
- (21) See A. Rovère, "La Corse au temps de Pascal Paoli", op. cit., pp. 20-22.
- (22) The first step taken by the ancien régime was to draw up the massive survey, Le Plan Terrier, which remains a mine of information for the historian; see A. Albitreccia, Le Plan Terrier de la Corse au XVIIIe siècle, (Paris: PUF, 1942).
- (23) See A. Albitreccia, La Corse, son évolution au XIXe siècle et au début du XXe siècle (Paris: PUF, 1942); also the passage from Perrier, Les raisons de la colère, quoted above in Chapter Four, f.n. (8).

- (24) Article II of an ordinance of 21st April 1818 stipulates that "les produits fabriqués en France pourront arriver en Corse en exemption de tous droits, sauf à payer ensuite les droits de sortie du tarif général s'ils passaient définitivement à l'étranger". On the other hand, "toutes les autres marchandises ou denrées envoyées de Corse en France acquitteront à leur entrée des droits de tarif général comme venant de l'étranger", quoted in Jean-Paul Delors et Stéphane Muracciole, Corse La Poudrière, (Paris: Editions Alain Moreau, 1978), p. 102.
- (25) See A. Albitreccia, La Corse, son évolution...op. cit., p. 110-113; and Perrier, op. cit., p. 17.
- (26) Quoted in Delors et Muracciole, op. cit., p. 197; see also the Rapport Delanney, Commission extraparlamentaire et interministérielle chargée d'étudier la situation actuelle de la Corse, Journal Officiel, 4 July 1909, 12 Sept. 1909, 10 Nov. 1909, pp. 715-1370.
- (27) On this question see Renucci, op. cit., (1974), p. 136 who states that "L'opinion publique avance arbitrairement 40,000, alors que les listes du Livre d'Or n'atteignent pas 10,000. La vérité se situe probablement entre 10 et 20,000 pour une population présente légèrement inférieure à 270,218, résultat du recensement de 1911".
- (28) On this question see Loughlin, "Corsican-French Relations", in op. cit.
- (29) On the Corsican elites see A. Casanova, "Caporaux et Communautés rurales en Corse", Corse Historique, no 11, 3e trimestre, 1963; and F. Pomponi, Essai sur les notables ruraux en Corse au XVIIe siècle, (Aix-en-Provence, 1962).
- (30) See A. Casanova, "Evolution historique des sociétés et voies de la Corse. Essai d'approche", Cahiers d'histoire de l'Institut de Recherches Marxistes, Sommaire No. 12 (1983), pp. 36-65
- (31) Cf. the following grida sent from the Senate to the Government of Genoa on the 2nd Decembre 1711: "Dall'oratore del Regno di noi, Angelo Luigi Matra, ci è stato esposto essere uno de' maggiori stimoli a delinquere che abbiano i corsi, il vedersi invadere da loro emoli di propria autorità, e senza licenza d'alcun giudice, il possesso de' beni che essi attualmente godono, che però nello Statuto di Corsica sono state proibite con rogororse pene dette invasioni ... atto così criminoso e che partorisce frequentissimi omicidi ...", Libro Rosso, p. 656, quoted in Rovère, op. cit., pp. 24-5; during the Restoration there were about one

hundred deaths a year (in a population of less than 200,000) and in the years 1834 and 1835 there were about 200 in each year, see Pomponi, Histoire de la Corse, p. 341; P. Antonetti, op. cit., gives the following figures for the numbers of murders in the nineteenth century: 148 (1852), 30 (1854), and an average of 40 a year towards the end of the century..

- (32) Blanqui, op. cit., is particularly aware of this.
- (33) For an anecdotal treatment of Corsican banditry see X. Versini, Un siècle de banditisme en Corse (Paris: Editions de Paris, 1964); a more rigorous historical treatment may be found in F. Pomponi, Histoire de la Corse, op. cit., pp. 341-349..
- (34) On this notion of culture see E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 8-13.
- (35) There exist dialectal differences among the different regions of Corsica.
- (36) On this question see Charles Tuffelli, Une Corse au XX^e siècle, (Ajaccio: La Marge, 1982), pp. 122-23.
- (37) See F. Ettori, op. cit.
- (38) Ibid.
- (39) On these traditions see Louis Panassié and Laurent Verdeaux, L'Ame Corse, (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1979), passim.
- (40) See J-M. Luciani, La Corse sous Napoléon III, Chapter Three: "Les voies et les moyens de communication", B.S.S.H.N.C.
- (41) See Ettori, op. cit.
- (42) See Versini, op. cit.
- (43) On the origin of the clans see Pomponi, op. cit., (1962); also Histoire de la Corse, by the same author; an excellent account of the functioning of the clans by a nineteenth journalist may be found in P. Bourde, En Corse, (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1887; for a more contemporary account see Delors et Muracciole, op. cit., pp. 73-100; for an anthropological view-point, see J. Gil, "Le clan se sent menacé", Kyrn, October 1981.
- (44) See Delors et Muracciole, op. cit., pp. 88, f.n. 16.
- (45) On clientelism see references in Chapter Two, f.n. (36).

- (46) See G. Ravis-Giordani, "L'alta pulitica' et la 'bassa pulitica': valeurs et comportements politiques dans les communautés villageoises corses (XIXième - XXième siècle)", Etudes Rurales, (65), 1977, pp. 171-189.
- (47) See X. Versini on Arène.
- (48) On the economic basis of this system see Perrier, op. cit.
- (49) See Renucci, op. cit., pp. 146-9: in 1962 95,571 Corsicans born in Corsica lived on the continent mainly in Provence-Côte d'Azur which had more than half (56 per cent) and in Paris which had nearly one quarter (23 per cent). Other regions had smaller groupings: Rhône-Alpes (6 per cent), Languedoc (3 per cent), Sud-est Aquitaine (3 per cent).
- (50) On this aspect of the Corsican diaspora see René Sédillot, La grande aventure des Corses, (Paris: Fayard, 1969): during the first half of the twentieth century 20 per cent of colonial administrators in the French Empire were Corsican while in the overseas Army 22 per cent of the total and 6 per cent of the officer class were Corsicans.
- (51) See Renucci, op. cit., p. 148.
- (52) Perrier, op. cit., p. 19.
- (53) Delors and Muracciole express it in the following terms: "Dans toutes les régions de France, les ressources de l'Action Sociale proviennent, dans leur quasi-totalité, du département et de la commune. Ceci oblige les collectivités locales à beaucoup de prudence: pas question de distribuer ses deniers à la légère. Pour la Corse, tout au contraire, l'Etat paie la plus grande part. Pour le groupe trois [l'aide médicale gratuite, la prise en charge hospitalière, mais surtout l'aide aux infirmes et la tierce personne] de l'Action Sociale, par exemple, la charge de ce dernier s'élève à 12 per cent en Meurthe-et-Moselle et 56 per cent dans les Hautes-Alpes, mais à 88 per cent en Corse. ... [l]es sommes versées au titre de l'aide sociale [sont] considérables: 14,75 milliards de centimes rien que pour 1975. Une simple comparaison permet de situer le problème. En 1976, dans les Hautes-Alpes, département économique similaire à la Haute-Corse, six cents personnes bénéficiaient d'une aide dont le montant se situait, en moyenne, autour de 450 francs par mois. En Haute-Corse, 6,5000 personnes touchaient, elles, 850 francs", op. cit., p. 78.
- (54) See M. Labro, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

CHAPTER SEVEN

- (1) The best treatment of this is the magistral thesis of Janine Renucci, Corse Traditionnelle et Corse nouvelle, (Lyon: Editions Audin, 1974).
- (2) See Chapter One above on the distinction between moderate and radical regionalist movements.
- (3) See F. Pomponi, "Crise de structure économique et crise de conscience en Corse (Fin XIXe siècle - début XXe)", in Typologie des crises dans les pays méditerranéens, (XVIe-XXe siècles), (Nice: 1977), pp. 76-113.
- (4) See F. Pomponi, "Le régionalisme en Corse dans l'entre-deux guerres", in Régions et régionalisme en France du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours, (Paris: PUF, 1977).
- (5) See Pascal Ory, Les collaborateurs, op. cit., pp. 168-200. Ory estimates that there were no more than 17 irredentists in Corsica including the leader of the A Muvra group Petru Rocca and Jean Makis. However, there were a large number of collaborators in December 1942 - 453.
- (6) See J. Bowyer-Bell, The Secret Army, (London: Sphere, 1972).
- (7) This was one of the principal reasons for the decision by Irish nationalists to launch the Easter Rising in Dublin in 1916.
- (8) See the debate between Michel Denis and Yann Fouéré mentioned above in Chapter One, fn.
- (9) See Loughlin, "Regionalist and Federalist movements in contemporary France" in Michael Burgess. (ed). Federalism and Federation, (Croom & Helm, 1985).
- (10) See Chapter on Vichy programme in Gras et Livet, op. cit.
- (11) See M. Choury, Tous bandits d'honneur (Résistance et Libération de la Corse), 2nd edn., (Paris: Ed. Sociales, 1958) who admits that one of the primary motivations of Corsicans who joined the maquis was a certain Italophobia.
- (12) Ibid.

- (13) See Ange Rovère, "Pour une Corse nouvelle: la stratégie du PCF à la Libération (1943-1945)", in Cahiers d'histoire de l'Institut de recherches marxistes, Sommaire no 12, 1983 pp. 66-88.
- (14) Rovère, Ibid., p. 86.
- (15) Rovère, Ibid., p. 59.
- (16) Terre Corse (TC), 18/4/44.
- (17) Idem.
- (18) TC, 1/4/45.
- (19) Idem.
- (20) Le Petit Bastiais (PB), 16/12/43.
- (21) PB, 18/12/43.
- (22) PB, 26,27,28/12/43.
- (23) PB, 9/12/44.
- (24) TC, 2/4/44.
- (25) TC, 23/4/46.
- (26) TC, 23/12/46.
- (27) TC, 22/4/45.
- (28) TC, 30/9/45.
- (29) Rovère, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
- (30) Rovère, op. cit., p. 64; P. Silvani, La Corse des années ardentes (1939-1976), (Paris: Editions Albatross, 1976), p. 59; Delors et Muracciole, Corse La Poudrière, (Paris: Editions Moreau, 1978), p. 87.
- (31) Plan d'aménagement,
- (32) In Pomponi et al., op.cit.
- (33) Savreux was a dynamic Prefect but fell victim to the attempted coup in Ajaccio in 1958 when Paras, in sympathy with the Army revolt in Algiers, took over the Préfecture. For the Prefect's own account of these events see M. Savreux, L'homme à tout faire de la République, (Nice: Editions Alain Lefeuvre, 1977).
- (34) quoted in L'Insulaire (Ins), 26/1/53.

- (35) See above Chapter Four.
- (36) See Silvani, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
- (37) See, e.g., Delors et Muracciole, op. cit., p. 220.
- (38) R. Ramsay, The Corsican Time-Bomb, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), pp. 33-4,
- (39) Ins., 30/12/57.
- (40) Idem.
- (41) Ins., 16/2/59.
- (42) Ins., 21/9/59.
- (43) Le Mémorial des Corses (Mém), Vol V, p. 225.
- (44) As noted in the account given in Ins., 1/12/59.
- (45) Idem.
- (46) Idem.
- (47) Idem.
- (48) Achille De Susini continually posed this threat in the columns of L'Insulaire.
- (49) Mém., Vol V, p. 227.
- (50) Quoted in Ins., 11/1/60.
- (51) Ins., 18/1/60.
- (52) Ins., 25/1/60.
- (53) Ins., 22/2/60.
- (54) Idem.
- (55) Represented were fifty Corsican associations and trade unions, including the following: Association des Maires, Conseil Général, CDJA, CERC, Chambre de Commerce de Bastia, Chambre Départementale des Métiers, Comité de Coordination des Groupements Corses de l'Extérieur, DIECO, Fédération des Commerçants du Nord et du Sud de l'Île, Fédération Départementale de l'Hotellerie, des Cafés et Restaurants, La Fédération des Entrepreneurs de BTP, le Mdu29N, les Syndicats d'initiative, les U.D. des Syndicats nationaux (CFTC, CGT, FO, FEN), UNEC, Jeune Chambre Economique, two pied noir groups: ANFANOMA and

"ceux d'Algérie, syndicats de Producteurs de vins, de commerçants, etc., see Dottelonde, op.cit. (1983-4), p. 125.

(56) Ins., 28/10/63.

(57) Ins., 16/12/63.

(58) Ins., 23/12/63.

(59) Mém., Vol V, p. 228; see also Dottelonde, op. cit., for a good analysis of these developments.

(60) Ibid., p. 229.

CHAPTER EIGHT

(1) See Pierre Dottelonde, Histoire de la Revendication Corse 1959-1974 (Du "Département français à la "Nation corse"), (unpublished) thèse de 3e cycle, (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, 1983-1984); and by the same author, Eléments pour une histoire de la revendication corse: 1959-1973, (unpublished) Mémoire, (Paris: I.E.P.-Paris, 1981),.

(2) See Dottelonde, op. cit., (1981), p. 154.

(3) See Le Mémorial des Corses, Vol V, p 248.

(4) Union Corse (UC), July 1961.

(5) UC, Fev/Mars, 1962, no 4.

(6) UC, Avril/Mai, 1962, no 5.

(7) UC, Juin/Juillet, 1962, no 6.

(8) UC, Fev/Mars, 1963, no 9.

(9) On the links between federalists and regionalists, see Alain Greilsammer, Les Mouvements Fédéralistes en France de 1945 à 1974, (Nice: Presses d'Europe, 1975); and John Loughlin, "Federalist and Regionalist Movements in France", in M. Burgess, (ed), Federalism and Federation in Western Europe, (London: Croom and Helm, 1986).

(10) Le Mémorial des Corses (Mém), Vol V, p 250.

(11) Ibid, p 251.

- (12) See Greilsammer, op. cit., on different ideological strands within federalism
- (13) L'Informateur Corse (L'Inf), 27/1/64.
- (14) L'Inf, 17/2/64.
- (15) Idem.
- (16) L'Inf, 30/3 - 6/4/64.
- (17) Idem.
- (18) L'Inf, 15/6/64.
- (19) A copy is reproduced in Dottelonde op. cit., (1983-84), Vol 2, pp. CXXVII-CXXXI.
- (20) L'Inf, 15/2/65.
- (21) L'Inf, 26/7/65; this adds: "Les humiliations subies par nos compatriotes [the pieds noirs of Corsican origin] ne sont pas encore estompées".
- (22) Reproduced in L'Inf, 25/7/66.
- (23) L'Inf, 1/8/66.
- (24) Le Mémorial des Corses, p 253.
- (25) Ibid, p 253.
- (26) See Dottelonde, op. cit., (1983-84), for the period up to 1974.
- (27) L'Union Corse-L'Avenir, Fev 1967, no 24.
- (28) Quoted in Le Mémorial des Corses, Vol V, p. 256.
- (29) See Main basse sur une île, op. cit.
- (30) Ibid., p. 30.
- (31) "Propositions du Front Régionaliste Corse", see note (26)
- (32) See Dottelonde, op. cit., (1983-4), Vol 2, (Annexes), p. XC.
- (33) Le Mémorial des Corses, Vol V, p. 256.
- (34) Quoted in ibid., Vol V, pp. 256-7.
- (35) See Dottelonde, op. cit., (1981), p. 149

- (36) Idem.
- (37) Idem.
- (38) For example, Louis Le Pensec in Brittany and Jean-Pierre Destrade in the French Basque Country.
- (39) On this see Delors and Muracciolo, Corse la Poudrière, op. cit., pp. 233-237; Dottelonde, op. cit., (1983-84), gives an exhaustive blow by blow account, pp. 190-228.
- (40) L'Inf, 29/3/65.
- (41) L'Inf, 27/9/65.
- (42) Quoted in Le Mém, Vol V, p 261.
- (43) Quoted in idem.
- (44) ARC, Autonomia, (Bastia: Editions ARC, 1974).
- (45) Ibid, p. 13.
- (46) Ibid, p. 14.
- (47) Ibid, pp 89-90; see also article by Guy Héraud, "Observations critiques sur la notion de colonialisme intérieur", Europe en formation, no. 193, (Avril, 1976), pp. 16-20, which accepts some of the elements of the theory.
- (48) See F.Pomponi, "Crise de structure et crise de conscience économique en Corse (fin XIXe début XXe siècle), in Actes des journées d'études de Bendor, (Nice, 1977) for the early manifestations of this argument; the Manifeste du C.E.D.I.C. blames "l'attitude négative des Pouvoirs Publics", p. 12..
- (49) See Le Mém, Vol V, p 263.
- (50) Quoted in idem.
- (51) See idem.
- (52) Quoted in Ibid, p. 264; see also the Manifeste du C.E.D.I.C.
- (53) Quoted in Ibid, p. 263; the pulitichella may be translated into French as la politique politicienne.
- (54) See Autonomia, pp 192-198. which lists the principal actions of the movement until 1974.

- (55) On the events of Aleria see J-P Delors et S. Murraciolo, Corse la Poudrière, (Paris: Ed. Alain Moreau, 1978), Chapitre I, "Le Coup de Tonnerre d'Aleria", pp. 7-33 and the account given by the leading protagonist on the autonomist side, Edmond and Lucie Simeoni, Le piège d'Aleria, (Paris: Ed. Lattes, 1975); on the events of Bastelica-Ajaccio, see the reports in Corse-Provençal, Nice-Matin, and Le Monde, for January 1980.
- (56) See Pierre Dottelonde, "Pour une nouvelle approche du nationalisme corse: Etude sur la diffusion du phénomène dans l'espace insulaire", in Etudes CorSES, no. 23, 1984, pp. 73-112.
- (57) On poujadisme, see Vincent Wright, The Government and Politics of France, 2nd edn., (London: Hutchinson, 1984), p. 159.
- (58) op. cit., Vol V, p. 266.
- (59) Quoted in Le Mém, p. 266.
- (60) 59 per cent of those questioned expected an explosion of discontent; 62 per cent felt the action of ARC were justified as against 21 per cent who thought they were not; 60 per cent held the government responsible for the deaths of the two gendarmes; 52 per cent were sympathetic with ARC; 52 per cent thought ARC was good for Corsica. However, 55 per cent were in favour of keeping the present administrative relationship between Corsica and France and only 38 per cent were in favour of a statute of autonomy within the French Republic; only 3 per cent wished for complete independence and the setting up of Corsica as a sovereign state: Sondage "Nouvel Observateur-S.O.F.R.E.S. réalisé entre les 28 et 30 août 1975 en Corse (see Appendix Four for full details).
- (61) Lucien Felli and another UPC member split from the UPC following the Regional Assembly Elections of 1982 to form a new group called "Diaspora Sud" - in protest at the excessive implantation in the north of the island and at the danger that the movement was losing its contact with Corsican youth because of its involvement in the new Regional Assembly.
- (62) The following details are taken from the excellent Appendix "Fiches d'identité des principaux mouvements corses (1959-1974)", in Dottelonde, op. cit. (1983-84).
- (63) Reproduced in ibid., pp. CXXIII bis-CXXIII ter.
- (64) Ibid, p. LXXXIII.
- (65) Ibid, p. LXXV.

- (66) Idem.
- (67) Ibid, p. LXXXIX.
- (68) Ibid., p. XCIII.
- (69) A good example may be found in the declarations made during the trial of 21 members of the FLNC in June 1979. They describe themselves as "Combattants du Peuple Corse hier, prisonniers d l'Etat français aujourd'hui ... qui nous [permet] de dénoncer ... l'oeuvre illégitime et maléfique du colonialism français en Corse ... [La Corse a] le droit à la RESISTANCE, le droit à la LUTTE ARMEE ... c'est le plus impérieux des devoirs pour un colonisé. Nous sommes des combattants de la Nation corse vers sa libération nationale", Roneotyped manuscript, n.d.
- (70) In L'Union-Corse l'Avenir, no 20, Novembre 1965, Gisèle Poli wrote an article on "Après les plasticages" in which she shows an understanding attitude toward the bombers' early violence
- (71) A good analysis of clandestine political violence in Corsica may be found in David Hermant and Didier Bigo, op. cit., "La violence politique en Corse", Etudes polémologiques, (37) 1er trim. '86: pp. 71-114; for figures on violence see "Cagoules à tête de Maure" 1983.
- (72) Figures compiled from David Hermant and Didier Bigo, op. cit.; Broche op.cit.; Le Quotidien de Paris and La Croix.
- (73) See the excellenct analysis by David Hermant and Didier Bigo, op. cit.
- (74) See the opinion poll carried out by the Nouvel Observateur-S.O.F.R.E.S. quoted above in note (58) which shows that in 1975 only 3 per cent of those interviewed favoured complete independance.
- (75) The events of Bastelica-Ajaccio were sparked off in January 1980 when three "barbouzes" of FRANCIA set out to kidnap and kill an autonomist leader from Bastelica a large village in the mountains near Ajaccio; see Introduction to this thesis.

CHAPTER NINE

- (1) See above Chapter Two, f.n. (23).
- (2) On the French Socialist Party see Claude Bimodière and Lyne Cohen-Socal, Les nouveaux socialistes, (Paris: 1977).
- (3) See article by M. Rocard referred to in Chapter Two, f.n. (23).
- (4) See John Loughlin, "Regionalist and federalist movements in France", in M. Burgess (ed.), Federalism and Federation in Western Europe, (London: Croom and Helm, 1986); Yves Mény, op.cit., (1974), gives a full account of these developments.
- (5) The PCF, for example, refuses the PS term "minorities linguistiques and culturelles" and prefers to speak of the "langues de France et cultures regionales", see the Parliamentary Bill tabled by the Communist group in the National Assembly, Journal Officiel, 30th July 1984, pp. 7-8.
- (6) Socialist Manifesto (Paris: 1981).
- (7) Quoted in Le Monde, 9/9/1981.
- (8) See in particular Yves Mény, "La décentralisation", in Administration 82 (Institut International d'Administration Publique), Paris, 1983, pp 13-57; Michael Keating, "Decentralization in Mitterrand's France", Public Administration, Vol 61, no 3, Autumn 1983 pp. 237-51; Y Mény, "Decentralization in Socialist France", West European Politics, Vol 7, no 1, 1984, pp. 65-79; perhaps the most perceptive treatment so far is that of Mark Kesselman, "The end of Jacobinism? The Socialist regime and decentralization", Contemporary French Civilization Fall/Winter 1983/4, Vol VIII, nos 1&2, pp. 84-103.
- (9) See the article by Vincent Wright, "The Change in France", Government and Opposition, Autumn 1981, for a survey of the progress of the reforms.
- (10) For a fuller analysis of the Statut Particulier and the functioning of the new institutions, see below.
- (11) Henri Giordan, Démocratie culturelle et droit à la différence (rapport au Ministre de la Culture), (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1982).

- (12) See, for example, Yves Person, "Présentation", Les Temps Modernes, Vol 29, 1973-4, p. 1.
- (13) See Ministère de la Culture, 2 Ans de Politique culturelle, ('81-'83), Paris, 1984.
- (14) Le Monde, 26/2/1982.
- (15) Le Monde, 20-21/6/1982.
- (16) Proposition de loi, no. 1991, portant statut particulier pour la Corse, seconde session ordinaire de 1976-1977.
- (17) Loi no. 82-214 du 2 mars 1982 portant statut particulier de la région de Corse (organisation administrative), Journal Officiel du 3 mars 1982, pp. 1-16. Louis Le Pensec, one of the sponsors of the 1977 bill, declared that "on ne peut pas faire le même texte de loi quand on est dans l'opposition et quand on est au gouvernement". Besides this, the jurists of the Conseil Constitutionnel pointed out that the "pouvoir réglementaire régional" which the 1977 bill would have given to the Regional Assembly belonged only to the government and was unconstitutional.
- (18) Loi no. 82-659 du 30 juillet 1982 portant statut particulier de Corse (compétences), JO du 31 juillet 1982, pp. 2459- 2463.
- (19) "... la meilleure façon de représenter ce peuple corse ..." [my emphasis], address to the Corsican Assembly, 13th June 1983.
- (20) "L'élection a lieu à la représentation proportionnelle, suivant la règle de la plus forte moyenne, sans adjonction ni suppression de nom et sans modification l'ordre de présentation", art. 5 of loi du 2 mars 1982. At first, it was decided that only 1.6% of the votes cast was necessary for a list to obtain a seat.
- (21) Art. 2 of loi du 2 mars 1982.
- (22) Gaston Defferre, in an address to the Corsican Assembly on the 1st December 1983, forcefully stressed the limitations of the Assembly's powers: ... ni la loi, ni son esprit, ne conduisent à faire que toutes les propositions de l'Assemblée de Corse soient obligatoirement réalisées par le Gouvernement ... Le statut particulier, conformément à la constitution, ne donne pas le pouvoir à l'Assemblée de Corse d'édicter, directement ou indirectement, ses propres lois".
- (23) Loi du 30 juillet 1982.

- (24) Art. 20 of the loi du 30 juillet 1982.
- (25) All from ibid.
- (26) Ibid. arts. 23-27; see also J-F Auby, op. cit.
- (27) See Machin, op. cit., for the importance of the resistance to reform by these two groups.
- (28) See Mark Kesselman, "The end of Jacobinism?", Contemporary French Civilization, Vol VIII, no. 2, 1983.
- (29) "une commission de contrôle des opérations de vote de recensement", art. 23 du loi du 2 mars 1982. It was the practice of Corsican mayors including those of the two big town of Ajaccio and Bastia (each with 50,000 inhabitants), to "negotiate" with the INSEE, on the numbers of inhabitants in their communes!
- (30) For a fuller account of the 1982 elections see Hainsworth and Loughlin, "Le problème corse", Contemporary French Civilization, Vol.VIII, no. 3, Spring 1984.
- (31) Address to Assembly, 1st December 1983.
- (32) Address to Assembly, 13th June 1983.
- (33) This consists of the Chairman and a number of vice-Chairmen whose number may range from four to ten (art. 32 of loi du 2 mars 1982), the number to be decided by the Assembly. At this point it opted for the maximum number of ten.
- (34) There are five Commissions: (1) Finances, budget et fiscalité ; (2) Plan et interventions économiques, chargée du bilan et de la prospective; (3) Environnement, urbanisme, logement et affaires sociales; (4) Culture, éducation et formation; (5) Contrôle des agences et offices régionaux. The function of the Commissions is to prepare the "décisions qui incombent [à l'Assemblée] et des affaires qui lui sont soumises", art. 12 of the Règlement intérieur of the Corsican Assembly.
- (35) 806 bombs exploded in 1982 and 591 in 1983. Furthermore, there was an increase in criminal activities such as armed robberies, protection rackets, etc., with the distinction between the FLNC and the Corsican underworld being, at times, blurred.
- (36) 6th June 1983.
- (37) This was formed by two Assembly members who left the UPC, Felli and Ferrandi, the two radical regionalist independents, Santoni and Dominique Alfonsi, and three

whose political orientation was toward the traditional right.

- (38) Provoking the cry from Charles Santoni: "E la nave va", La Corse-Le Provençal, 25/2/1984.
- (39) La Corse-Le Provençal, 13/2/1984.
- (40) Interview with Lucien Felli in June 1984.
- (41) Address to Corsican Assembly, 13th June 1983.
- (42) Inhabitants of the mountain village of Bastelica descended to the Assembly at Ajaccio to discuss a conflict about funding for a cross country ski station, La Corse-Le Provençal, 22/10/83; the question of the financial collapse of the Maison de la Culture de la Corse was taken up by the Assembly; violent incidents during which CRS police attacked striking workers in Bastia were raised the Communist Assembly members.
- (43) For a fuller analysis see John Loughlin, "The Elections to the Corsican Regional Assembly, August 1984", Government and Opposition, vol. 20, no. 2, Spring 1985, pp. 240-250.
- (44) For example, Crozier's comment in the preface to the 1984 edition of La société bloquée, that nothing had changed since the arrival of the Socialists to power.
- (45) See Yves Mény and John Loughlin, "La Corsica tra rivolta e riforma: il problema corso e la politica del governo di F. Mitterrand", in Le regioni, a. XII, no. 3, maggio-giugno 1984, pp. 483-504.
- (46) Interview with Professor Yves Mény.
- (47) On the refusal by Defferre see Le Monde, 10-11/1/1982, and Le Figaro, 24/2/1982.
- (48) Le Monde, 20-21/6/1982.
- (49) 16th March 1982.
- (50) 18th March 1982.
- (51) Le Monde, 20/4/1982.
- (52) For example, Michel Giraud (RPR), President of the Conseil général of Ile-de-France has stated: "Il y a dans la réforme une part d'irréversible. La décentralisation doit dépasser les clivages politiques puisque c'est la France qui est en jeu", "La Décentralisation", Le Monde, (Dossiers et documents), no 107, January 1984.

(53) See John Loughlin, Government and Opposition, op. cit.

(54) See article quoted in note (8) above.

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Revue Française de Science Politique

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Les Temps Modernes



APPENDIX ONE

CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN CORSICAN HISTORY



B.C.

- 564 Foundation of Alalia by Phocian Greeks.
260-162 Roman Conquest.

A.D.

- 458 Vandal invasions.
534 Saracen Invasions.
754-774 Corsica ruled by papacy.
1014 Saracens expelled by Pisans and Genoese.
1077-1133 Pisan rule.
1133-1195 Joint rule by Pisa and Genoa.
1195 Genoese control of Bonifacio.
1284 Beginning of Genoese rule.
1453 Genoa hands over the running of the island to
 the Office of St. George.
1729-1769 The revolt against Genoa (the Forty Years
 War)
1755-1768 Paolian period - attempt to set up a
 Republic.
1768 Treaty of Versailles between Genoa and
 France.
1769 Paoli's forces defeated by French at Ponte
 Novo.
1789 Corsica accepted as fully French.
1794-96 Anglo-Corsican Kingdom.
1914-1918 Thousands of Corsicans die during the
 First World War.
1920 A Muvra founded in Paris by Petru and
 Matteu Rocca.
1922 Partitu Corsu d'Azzione (PCA) founded by
 Petru Rocca.

1938	The oath of Bastia sworn.
1942-1943	Occupation by Italy.
Sept 1943	Liberation.
1949	Completion of an <u>Inventaire Départemental</u>
1954	Creation of a Groupement de Défense de la Corse at Bastia.
30 June 1955	Decree permitting formulation of Corsican PAR
1957	Creation of SOMIVAC (Jan) and SETCO (Feb).
1957	Creation of a Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Corses (CERC) by Jean Albertini.
May 1959	Groupement de Défense de la Corse becomes Groupement de Défense des Intérêts économiques de la Corse better known as DIECO.
Nov 1959	Creation of the Mouvement du 29 Novembre.
June 1960	Decree published integrating Corsica into the Circonscription d'Action Régionale, Provence-Côte d'Azur
Nov 1960	Corsican students found Union Corse in Paris.
Feb 1962	Creation of Association des Etudiants Corses in Paris.
Oct 1963	Creation of CAPCO at Ajaccio.
April 1964	Creation of CEDIC.
June 1964	Four organisations of young Corsicans in Paris form the Union Corse-l'Avenir.
July 1966	Assises Régionalistes de la Jeunesse Corse during which the FRC is founded.
May 1967	The CAPCO becomes the MRI. "
Sep 1967	Creation of ARC.

Dec 1969	Corsica is detached from the Region Provence-Côte d'Azur and given its own CODER, called the CODEC.
Aug 1970	Foundation of the PCP at Ajaccio by Dominique Alfonsi.
Aug 1972	Adoption of <u>Schéma d'Aménagement</u> 1972 by the Cabinet.
Jan 1973	The <u>chjama</u> (call) of Castellare.
1973	Regionalist movements become explicitly autonomist.
1973	First <u>université d'été</u> in Corsica.
Oct 1973	Formation of FPCL.
Jan 1974	The FPCL claims recent bomb attacks on the island and is banned by Government.
Jan 1974	Loi Deixonne finally applied to the Corsican language.
Feb 1974	Partitu Corsu pe' u Sucialisimu (PCS) founded.
July 1974	Ghjustizia Paolina makes its first appearance, claiming recent bomb attacks.
Nov 1974	Cunsulta di i Studenti corsi (CSC) founded.
Dec 1974	Libert Bou appointed chairman of the interministerial mission to Corsica.
20 May 1975	Ghjustizia Paolina publishes the <u>Manifeste de la Pentecôte</u> which, for the first time demands the independence of Corsica.
17 Aug 1975	ARC activists led by Edmond Simeoni occupy vineyard at Aleria.
22 Aug 1975	Two gendarmes killed at Aleria.
27 Aug 1975	ARC is banned
27 Aug 1975	Riots in Bastia - a member of the CRS is killed.
1 Feb 1976	ARC becomes the APC.

1 Apr 1976	Territorial continuity between Corsican and mainland comes into force.
4-5 May 1976	FPCL and GP amalgamate to form the FLNC makes its first public appearance by claiming responsibility for 18 recent bombings.
Apr 1977	Anti-autonomist group FRANCIA formed.
Aug 1977	APC becomes the Unione di u Populu Corsu (UPC).
Jan 1980	The events of Bastelica-Ajaccio - UPC autonomists capture "barbouzes". Serious rioting in Ajaccio. This leads to the formation of nationalist committees all over the island. These become the Cunsulta di i Cumitati Naziunalisti (CCN).
10 May 1981	Mitterrand elected President.
Dec 1981	Government accepts the programme to give Corsica a <u>Statut Particulier</u> .
Mar 1982	Statute becomes law.
Aug 1982	First elections to the Corsican Regional Assembly. UPC have seven candidates elected (out of sixty-two).
Aug 1984	Second elections to the Regional Assembly.

Compiled from M. Labro, La Question Corse, op. cit. and P. Dottelonde, op. cit. (1983-4), and various other sources.

APPENDIX TWO

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS OF CORSICAN GROUPS AND ORGANISATIONS

ARC	Action Régionaliste Corse (1967-1973)
ARC	Azzione per a Rinascita Corsa (1973-1974)
CAPCO	Comité d'Action et de Promotion de la Corse
CCI	Comité Corse pour l'indépendance
CCN	Consulta di Cumitati naziunalisti
CEDIC Corse	Comité d'Etudes et de Défense des Intérêts de la Corse
DIECO	Groupeement de Défense des Intérêts économiques de la Corse
FLNC	Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse
FPCL	Fronte Paisanu Corsu di Liberazione (Front Patriote Corse de Libération)
FRC	Front Régionaliste Corse
GP	Ghjustizia Paolina
MCA	Muvimentu Corsu di Autodeterminazione
MCS	Muvimentu Corsu pe' u Socialisimu
Mdu29N	Mouvement du 29 Novembre
MRI	Mouvement Revendicatif Insulaire
PCP	Parti Corse pour le Progrès
PCS	Partitu Corsu pe' u Sucialisimu
PPC	Partitu di u Populu Corsu
PPCA	Partitu di u Populu Corsu pe' l'Autonomia
SETCO	Société d'Equipment touristique de la Corse
SOMIVAC	Société de la mise en valeur agricole de la Corse
UC-A	Union Corse-l'Avenir
UNEC	Union Nationale des Etudiants Corses
UPC	Unione di u Populu Corsu

APPENDIX THREE

ELECTORAL ACTIVITY IN CORSICA IN THE FOURTH AND FIFTH
REPUBLICS
(A sample of elections in Corsica)

FOURTH REPUBLIC

1945

Municipal Elections (20 April and 13 May)

<u>1st Round</u>	FN won 321 communes out of 366
Ajaccio	Socialist - PCF list led by Arthur Giovoni 2,700 Bonapartists - Eugène Macchini Radicals - André Salini 1,200
Bastia	Socialists - Moderates - PCF - Hyacinthe de Montera 2,990 Gaullist-Republican-Radical Socialist - Jacques Faggianelli 1900
Porto-	Sartène, Tramoni (Communist), Calvi, Lucchetti (Socialist), Corte, Sandreschi (Socialist), Vecchio, Pietri (Communist) 21 = Socialist, 112 Radical Socialists

189 Municipalities = FN
43 = Gavinists

Cantonal Elections 1945

62 seats	26 = Radical-Socialists (Giacobbists)	clan
operation	8 = Republican Independents (Gavinists)	co-
	16 = Socialists	
	10 = FN (including 6 PCF)	
	1 = MRP	
	1 = Radical Independent	

(Clans get an absolute majority - co-operate to block Communists. Paul Giacobbi elected President of Conseil Général by 35 to 23).

Legislative Elections 21 October 1945

(Scrutin de liste départemental à la proportionnelle = 4 Deputies)

Radical-Socialists 35,893 votes
2 elected = Giacobbi and Landry

Communists 31,044
1 elected = Arthur Giovoni

Independents 16,014
1 elected = Gavini

<u>Socialists</u>	13,014
	None elected

Referendum - 21 October 1945

Corsicans: National	(1)	96,372	YES to Election of a Constituent
		370	NO Assembly
	(2)	65,521	YES to a Provisional Constitution
		28,796	NO

(Corsicans obeyed instructions of De Gaulle).

1946

Referendum - 1946

National Assembly proposed a new Constitution to replace that of 1875. De Gaulle opposed this.

(France as a whole accepted it but Corsica follows De Gaulle).

May 45, 151, NO
42, 081, YES

October 37, 416, NO
 34, 093, YES

 60% abstentions

Legislative Elections - November 1946

PCF - Socialist	38,702	2 elected = Giovoni, Bianchini
Radicals (Giacobbists)	30,740	1 elected = Giacobbi
Independents (Gavinists)	17,938	1 elected = Gavini

Left loses ground.

Senatorial (Conseillers de la République) Elections 8 December 1946

1 seat for Corsica.

Radical Socialists	37,492	209 delegates
PCF-Socialists	35,269	236 delegates
Gavinists	13,563	106 delegates

347 votes for Landry
264 votes for Vittori (PCF)
6 votes for Romani (not a candidate).

But Vittori gets votes from interdepartmental remainder and gets a seat.

1947

Radicals adhere to De Gaulle's RPF (Rassemblement du peuple français).

PCF excluded from National Government.

Municipal Elections October

Communists and Sympathisers	73 councils
Socialists	46 (+ 25)
Gavinists	86 (+ 43)
Giacobbists	161 (+ 49)

AJACCIO

Bonapartist - Radical Alliance	(1377)
(3587)	
PC (3,950)	
Socialists (357)	

BASTIA Gaullists, (4,239)
 UNR (2,720)
 Socialists (841)
 MRP (374)
 Independent Democrats (277)

UNR (2,720)

MRP (374)

Independent Democrats (277)

Senatorial Elections

"Clan" candidates	Landry elected on 1st round (508)
	Romani elected on 2nd round (490)

Socialists 73 1st round

(Pleven)

UDSR 241 2nd round

(Gaullists RPF organise on island: Zuccarelli and Jean-Paul de Rocca-Serra represent the party).

Radical-Socialist - François Giacobbi

Independents - Gavini

Communists - Giovoni

UDSR - Mufraggi

Legislative Elections 17 June 1951

Radicals	25,000	(in comparison with 1946 -6,000)
		1 elected, Faggianelli

Independents 15,000
1 elected, Gavini (-4,000)

RPF 22,000
1 elected, Serafini

PC 21,000
1 elected, Giovoni

Socialists	4,000	} none elected
Communists	1,000	

UDSR 3,000

1954

Senatorial Elections

Filippi	496 votes	elected 1st round
Rocca-Serra	446 votes	elected 1st round
Giacobbi	236 votes	

1956

Legislative Elections 2 January

Electorate 90,000 voters.

Apparantés (Radicals, Gavinists, "Serafiniati")	67,000 votes
Left	23,000 votes

Radicals (37,000)	3 seats	Faggianelli F. Giaccobbi P. Arrighi
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Independents (19,000)	1 seat	J. Gavini
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Serafini list (11,000)	no seat	
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PCF (20,000)	no seat for first time in 13 years	
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Socialist	No seat (3,000)	
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FIFTH REPUBLIC

Referendum - 28 September 1958

To approve the new constitution of the Fifth Republic.

Corsicans	90,154	YES (80% of voters)
	13,009	NO

Legislative Elections - 1958

1st CIRCONSCRIPTION (Ajaccio)

1st round	UNR	13,888	Arrighi
<u>November 23</u>	Radical-Socialist	6,917	
	Gaullist	5,944	Maillot
	PC	5,310	Giovoni
	Socialist	513	Pinelli
2nd round	UNR	19,149	Arrighi re-
<u>5th December</u>	PC	6,230	elected
			Giovini

2nd CIRCONSCRIPTION (Bastia)

1st round	Independent	5,721	Gavini
	UNR	5,668	Maynard
	Gauche Dém.	5,184	Faggianelli
	Radical-Socialist	4,865	Zuccarelli
	PCF	4,665	Giudicelli
	Socialist	1,605	de Casalta
	Independent	149	Maestracci
2nd round	Independent	10,774	Gavini re-
	UNR	7,249	elected
	Radical-Socialist	7,046	Maynard
	PCF	4,841	Zuccarelliii
			Guidicelli

3rd CIRCONSCRIPTION (Porto-Vecchio)

<u>1st round</u>		11,774	De Rocca-
	Radical-Socialist	9,717	Serra
	UNR	7,033	Giaccobi
	PCF	2,858	Sammarcelli
	Rad-Soc (Bonifacio)	1,453	Bungelmi
	Candidat d'inter\t	896	
	local à Porto-Vecchio)		Tramoni
			D. Feracci
<u>2nd round</u>	UNR	18,903	Sammarcelli
		15,971	elected
	PCF	2,514	De Rocca-
			Serra
			Bungelmi

Corsicans on the continent elected under Gaullist banner.

Achille Peretti	Paris
Jean-Baptiste Biaggi	Paris
Pierre Pasquini	Nice
Colonna d'Anfiani	Marseilles

Pascal Marchetti
René Tomasini

Marseilles
L'Eure

21 DECEMBER 1958 - Presidential Election
Vote of 'grands electeurs' in departmental
capitals.

582 delegates
559 vote

497 De Gaulle
49 Marrane (PCF)
8 Chatelet (Moderate)
5 spoiled

SENATORIAL ELECTIONS 1959

Faggianelli	447	Elected
De Rocca-Serra	425	Elected
Giacobbi	387	
Zuccareli	240	
Jean Mattei	46	
Tranoni	38	

8 January 1961 - REFERENDUM

Referendum on self-determination for Algeria. De Gaulle asks
for a YES.

61,064	YES (76%)
19,199	NO (24%)

YES supported by Sammarcelli, Faggianelli, Serafini, Maillot;
NO by Arrighi, Gavini, Giacobbi, de Rocca-Serra, last
represent 70% of the electorate.

REFERENDUM 5 April 1962

To pronounce on Evian Accords giving Algeria independence;

69,301	YES (88%)
9,438	NO

but abstention rate = 50%.

SENATORIALS 24 September 1962

Filippi (Radical Socialist)	439	elected
Giacobbi (Radical Socialist)	438	elected
De Rocca Serra	326	
Faggianelli	324	
Guidicelli (PCF)	31	
Franchini (PCF)	25	

REFERENDUM 28 October 1962

On whether the French should elect the President directly

75% of all French vote
62% YES
38% NO

Corsica 48% vote
43,763 YES (55%)
35,041 NO (45%)

LEGISLATIVES 18 November 1962

1st Circonscription (Ajaccio-Calvi)

1st round	Serafini (CCB)	15,772 Elected
	Franchini (PCF)	6,883
	Antona (Gavinist)	4,610
	Seta (Radical)	4,256

2nd Conscription (Bastia)

1st round	Zuccarelli (Rad-Soc)	9,651
	Gavini (Independent)	7,177
	Sammarcelli (UVR)	4,875
	Guidicelli (PCF)	4,667
	Maestracci (Independent)	443

2nd round	Zuccarelli	16,541 Elected
	Sammarcelli	6,147
	Gavini	7,087

3rd Circonscription (Corte-Sartène)

1st round	de Rocca-Serra	17,933
	Maynard	14,812
	Cantara (UNR)	2,181
	Colonna (Independent)	1,980
	Bungelmi	2,510

<u>2nd round</u>	de Rocca-Serra	25,427 Elected
	Maynard	22,072

Prefect Turon describes the election as a 'Situation choquante et dérisoire'.

Spring 1963: Conseil constitutionnel annuls elections of Ajaccio-Calvi, Corte-Sartène. New elections.

Corte-Sartène

de Rocca-Serra	21,276 Re-elected
Alfonsi (Radical)	11,314
Pagini (Gaullist)	3,124
Bungelmi (PCF)	2,478
Mattei (UNR)	1,456

Ajaccio-Calvi

1st round	Serafini	14,667
	Arrighi	7,405
	Franchini	5,218
	Tomi	3,671
	Munconi	2,740
2nd round	Serafini	19,659 Elected
	Tomi	17,050

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1965

1st Round (5 December 1965)

Electorate	178,329
Votes cast	100,617
Valid votes	100,038

Results

M. Barbu	456	(0.4%)
C. De Gaulle	56,524	(56.48%)
J. Lecanuet	7,717	(7.72%)
P. Marcilliacy	540	(0.5%)
F. Mitterrand	25,661	(25.66%)
J-L Tixier-Vignancour	9,140	(9.13%)

2nd Round (19th December 1965)

Electorate	178,379
Votes cast	109,233
Valid votes	107,931

Results

De Gaulle	64,381 (59.54%)
Mitterrand	43,550 (40.45%)

LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 5 and 12 March 1967

1st Constituency (Ajaccio)

Electorate	61,868
Votes cast	39,974

1st Round

Jean Bozzi Ve Rép.	20,831	elected on 1st round
Fr. Giacobbi, F.G.D.S.	12,006	
A. Fillippi Codaccioli, P.C.	5,229	
D. Bastiani, All.rfp.	1,908	

2nd Constituency (Bastia)

Electorate	50,591
Votes cast	36,820

1st round

Faggianelli Ve Rép.	9,726	Elected on 1st round
Zuccarelli F.G.D.S.	8,470	
Guidicelli, P.C.	5,091	
Giacommi, Rép. ind.,	5,058	
Hauvesbre-Gallini	1,863	
Simeoni, Région-Corse	1,160	
Vinciguera, 15	15	
Ambrosini	12	
Nucci	4	
Arrighi	3	

3rd Constituency (Bonifaccio)

Electorate	63,518
Votes cast	43,840

J.P. Rocca Sera, Ve Rép.	23,037	Elected
P. Mondoloni, F.G.D.S.	13,299	
Pierucci, Centr. dém.	3,897	
P. Bungalni, P.C.	3,589	
J. Parolo, Défence des	18	

Intérêts corse

Election annulled by decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel
on 12 July 1967.

New election on 27 August 1967.

J.P. Rocca Sera, Ve Rép.	21,834	Elected
P. Mondoloni, F.G.D.S.	14,122	
Bungelni, P.C.	3,779	

23 and 30 June 1968

1st Constituency (Ajaccio)

Electorate	62,732
Votes cast	36,771

Jean Bozzi, d.s., U.D.R.	20,248	Re-elected
F. Giacobbi, Féd.-Rad., prés. Cons. gén., sén., G. dem., anc. min.,	11,972	
A. Ferracci, P.C.,	4,551	

2nd Constituency (Bastia)

Electorate	51,124
Votes cast	36,834

Paul Giacomi, U.D.R.,	19,540	Elected
Jean Zuccarelli, d.s., m., Féd.-Rad.,	10,504	
P. Guidicelli, P.C.	6,294	
G. Viale, P.S.U.	481	
F. Emmanuelli, Jeun. Révol. marx, corse	11	

21 April 1968 (after annulment)

Electorate	51,189
votes cast	33,388

Giacomi, Ind., sout. U.D.-Ve,	15,023
Zuccarelli, Féd.-Rad.,	11,283
Guidicelli, P.C.,	6,158
Simeoni, région	822
Maestracci-Piero	102

28 April 1968

Electorate	36,194
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Zuccarelli	19,098	Elected
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3rd Constituency (Corte-Sartène)

Electorate 65,309
Votes cast 40,077

Jean-Paul de Rocca-Serra d.s., 23,077 re-Elected

U.D.R., m. de Porto-Vecchio,
P. Mondolini, Féd.-S.F.I.O., 11,947
P. Bungelmi, P.C. 3,761
P. Luciani, P.D.M., 1,281
T. Luca, Progr., 11

4 and 11 March 1973

1st Constituency (Ajaccio-Calvi)

Electorate 63,506
Votes cast 41,490

1st round (votes cast 40,295)

Bozzi 12,545
(Sout.Réf. et C.N.I)., 11,340
Alfonsi 9,998
P.C. 4,696
Parti corse pour le progrès 1,302
L.C. 239
div., 22

2nd round

N. Alfonsi, U.G.S.D., 21,858 Elected
Bozzi, d.s. U.R.P., 19,632

2nd Constituency (Bastia)

Electorate 54,238
Votes cast 35,416

1st round (votes cast 38,219)

Giacomi, 16,950
Zuccarelli, 11,197
P.C., 8,046
Réf., 2,004
div., 22

2nd round

Zuccarelli U.G.S.D., 19,619 Re-elected
Giacomi, d.s., U.R.P. 15,797

3rd Constituency (Sartène, Corte)

Electorate 63,820
Votes cast 39,538

de Rocca-Serra, d.s., U.R.P. 20,733 re-Elected on 1st
Modolini, U.G.S.D. 11,321
Bungelmi, P.C., 4,363
Luciani, S.E., 3,129

1st Round Presidential Elections 1974

Electorate 180,173
Votes cast 122,429
Abstentions 57,744 (32.05%)
Valid votes 121,748

Mitterrand	54,418
Chaban-Delmas	33,766
Giscard d'Estaing	29,725
Le Pen	1,064
Royer	884
Laguiller	658
Dumont	596
Krivine	243
Muller	118
Héraud	102
Renouvin	96
Sebag	78

Ajaccio

Electorate 19,140
Votes cast 14,356

Mitterrand,	5,717
Gistard d'Estaing	4,266
Chaban-Delmas	3,706
Le Pen,	210
Royer	152
Dumont	108
Laguiller	90
Krivine	27
Muller	24
Renouvin	20
Sebag	20
Héraud	16

Bastia

Electorate 19,162
Votes cast 12,949

Mitterrand	7,522
Gistard d'Estaing	2,989

Chaban-Delmas	2,000
Le Pen	107
Royer	103
Laguiller	80
Krivine	24
Héraud	15
Muller	15
Renouvin	8
Sebag	6

<u>Corte</u>	
Electorate	4,131
Votes cast	2,239

Mitterrand	986
Giscard d'Estaing	640
Chaban-Delmas	534
Royer	20

<u>Porto-Vecchio</u>	
Electorate	4,270
Votes cast	2,239

Chaban-Delmas	1,440
Mitterrand	624
Giscard d'Estaing	330
Le Pen	26
Royer	26

<u>Sartène</u>	
Electorate	2,494
Votes cast	1,887

Mitterrand	1,282
Giscard d'Estaing	340
Chaban-Delmas	209
Le Pen	26

2nd Round Presidential Elections 1974

Electorate	180,185
Votes Cast	139,408
Abstentions	40,777 (22.63%)
Valid Votes	138,365

Giscard d'Estaing	73,547	53.15%
Mitterrand	64,818	(46.85%)

Ajaccio

Electorate	19,142
Votes cast	15,607

Giscard d'Estaing	8,807
Mitterrand	6,800

Bastia

Electorate	19,278
Votes cast	14,852

Mitterrand	9,041
Giscard d'Estaing	5,811

Corte

Electorate	4,131
Votes cast	2,584

Giscard d'Estaing	1,417
Mitterrand	1,167

Porto-Vecchio

Electorate	4,208
Votes cast	2,676

Giscard d'Estaing	1,953
Mitterrand	723

Sartène

Electorate	2,494
Votes cast	2,092

Mitterrand	1,449
Giscard d'Estaing	643

LEGISLATIVES 2 and 19 March 1978Corse-du-Sud (2)1st Constituency (Ajaccio)

Electorate	59,921
Votes cast	44,546
Abstentions	23.98%

Jean Bozzi, a.s., R.P.R.	22,778 (51.13%) Elected on 2nd round
M.N. Alfonsi, d.s., cons. gén., m. de Piana, M.R.G.	21,768

1st round

Votes cast 41,633
Abstentions 23.98%

J. Bozzi	12,161
N. Alfonsi	11,048
J. Rossi, cons.gén., U.D.F.-P.R.,	10,317
A. Ferracci, P.C.	6,160
A. Simongiovanni, C.N.I.P.	663
Mme. Th. Luciani, Choisir	284

2nd Constituency (Sartène)

Electorate 30,117
Votes cast 23,183

Jean-Paul de Rocca Serra, d.s., prés. cons. gén., m. de Porto-Vecchio, R.P.R.	12,000	Re-elected on 1st round
D. Bucchini, m. de Sartène, P.C.	3,867	
T. Luciani, Cons. Gén., M.R.G.	3,366	
P. Ettori, P.S.	2,079	
D. de Rocca Serra, R.D.A.C.	1,665	
J. Istria, div. maj.,	109	
D. Panzani, div. maj.,	74	
F. Rossi, div. maj.,	23	

Haute-Corse1st constituency (Bastia)

Electorate 59,901
Votes cast 54,020
Abstentions 24.01%

Pierre-Paul Giacomi, a.d., cons.gén., m. de Pruno, R.P.R.	23,397	Elected on 2nd round
M.J. Zuccarelli, d.s. cons. gén., m. de Bastia, M.R.G.	21,623	

1st round

Votes cast 41,190
Abstentions 31.17%

P. Giacomi	12,844
J. Zuccarelli	9,962
P. Guidicelli, cons.gén., P.C.	8,953
M.J. Vinciguerra, U.D.F.-P.R.	8,099
Mme. L. Molinelli, écol.,	1,382

2nd Constituency (Corte, Calvi)

Electorate	53,979
Votes cast	38,406
Abstentions	27.53%

Pierre Pasquini, a.d. round	20,081 (52.28%) Elected 2nd
--------------------------------	-----------------------------

m. de l'île Rousse, R.P.R., M.F. Giacobbi, sén., prés. cons. rég., anc. min. M.R.G.	18,325
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1st round

Votes cast	37,144
Abstentions	31.10%

F. Giacobbi	10,828
P. Pasquini	10,626
F.-G. Geromini C.N.I.P.	7,459
V. Carlotti, cons. gén. P.S.	4,236
V. Duriani, P.C.	3,995

Statistiques électorales 1945 - 1981
A - Avant la suppression du vote par correspondance

Consultations		Inscrits I	Votants V	Taux V/I	Votes par correspondance et procuration					Sources
					Correspond.	Procurat.	Total	Taux / I	Taux / V	
Législatives 45	Corse	158685	96749	60,97						RaoulHusson Elections et référendums (le Monde 1946)
21 octobre 45	Métropole	24622862	19657603	79,84						
Législatives 46	Corse	159702	97840	61,26						
2 juin 1946	Métropole	24696949	20215200	81,85						Ministère de l'intérieur et Documentation française
Législatives 51	Corse	149234	92601	62,05	423	229	652	0,43	0,70	
17 juin 1951	Métropole	24530523	19670655	80,18	60911	9106	70017	0,28	0,35	
Législatives 56	Corse	154692	90831	58,71	251	304	555	0,35	0,61	
2 janvier 1956	Métropole	26772255	22138046	82,69	131017	23112	154129	0,57	0,69	
Législatives 58	Corse	160355	94734	59,08	3816	2368	6184	3,85	6,53	
23 novembre 1958	Métropole	27244729	21025824	77,18	201467	128981	330448	1,21	1,57	
Législatives 62	Corse	169132	98393	58,17	16101	1100	17201	10,17	17,48	
18 novembre 62	Métropole	27526358	18918159	68,72	227106	34607	261713	0,94	1,38	Conseil constitutionnel JO du 30 décembre 1965
Présidentielles 65 1er tour	Corse	178329	100617	56,42						
5 décembre 65	Métropole	28233167	24001961	85,01						
Présidentielles 65 2eme tour	Corse	178379	109233	61,23						
19 décembre 65	Métropole	28023198	23862653	85,15						

Source: Tuffelli (1982)

Statistiques électorales 1945 - 1981
Après la suppression du vote par correspondance

Consultations		Inscrits I	Votants V	Taux V/I	Votes par procuration			Sources
					Nombre	Taux/I	Taux/V	
Municipales 77 13 mars 1977	Corse-du-Sud Haute-Corse	87494 115583	68503 83734	78,29 72,44	16021	18,31	23,38	Pour la Corse : bureaux des élections des préfec- tures. Pour la métropole : le Monde (résultats non définitifs).
	Corse Métropole	203077 33080318	152237 26084554	74,96 78,80				
Législatives 78 12 mars 1978	Corse-du-Sud Haute-Corse	90422 115654	65872 79513	72,84 68,75	15710 18458	17,37 15,95	23,84 23,21	Ministère de l'intérieur et Documentation française
	Corse Métropole	206076 34394378	145385 28656845	70,54 83,31	34168 609202	16,58 1,77	23,50 2,12	
Européennes 79 10 juin 1979	Corse-du-Sud Haute-Corse	88384 115690	42382 53254	47,95 46,03	6462 8046	7,31 6,95	15,24 15,10	Supplément aux <i>Dossiers- du Monde</i> , juin 1969 Pour les votes par procu- ration : bureau des élec- tions des préfectures et ministère de l'intérieur
	Corse Métropole	204074 34347872	95636 21026230	46,86 61,21	14508 348764	7,10 1,01	15,17 1,65	

Consultations		Inscrits I	Votants V	Taux V/I	Votes par procuration			Sources
					Nombre	Taux/I	Taux/V	
Présidentielles 81 1er tour 26 avril 1981	Corse-du-Sud Haute-Corse	90193 115729	60172 73436	66,71 63,45	12032	10,40	16,38	Conseil constitutionnel JO du 16 mai 1981 Pour les votes par procuration : bureaux des élections des préfectures.
	Corse Métropole	205922 35458985	133608 28972114	64,88 81,70				
Présidentielles 81 2è tour 10 mai 1981	Corse-du-Sud Haute-Corse	90290 115538	67553 80696	74,81 69,84	15178	13,14	18,81	
	Corse Métropole	205828 35459328	148251 30648932	72,02 86,43				
Législatives 81 14 juin 1981	Corse-du-Sud Haute-Corse	90573 115644	58477 71719	64,56 62,01	12322 15609	13,60 13,50	21,07 21,76	Résultats non encore publiés par le ministère de l'inté- rieur (1) Le Monde des 16 et 17 juin 1981. Pour les votes par procu- ration : bureaux des élections des préfectures.
	Corse Métropole	206217 35536041	130196 25182262	63,13 70,86	27931	13,54	21,45	

(1) ... (mars 1982)

Source: Tuffelli (1982)


RÉSULTATS POLITIQUES **SUFFRAGES OBTENUS, 1945 - 1982**

Consulta- tions	Résultats d'ensemble				Résultats de la gauche		
	droite	gauche	divers	TOTAL	MRG	PS	PC
L45	16300	79957		96257	35969	13015	30973
L46	19095	78310		97405	33974	12182	32154
L51	37641	54128		91769	28327	4133	21668
L56	28838	60365		89203	36864	3110	20391
L58	42770	50299	1045	94114	35386	2119	12794
L62 ⁽¹⁾	56245	43494	591	100330	31121	—	12373
P65	64381	43550		107931	—	—	—
L67 ⁽²⁾	59596	52577	924 ⁽³⁾	113097	23289	14122	15166
L68	64117	49276	506 ⁽⁴⁾	113899	22734	11957	14585
L73	64695	52924	443	118062	24506	11321	17097
P74	73547	64818		138365	—	—	—
L78	78079	64494	490	143063	35204	6315	22975
P81	77026	70737		147763	—	—	—
L81	61161	67430	57	128648	33258	14520	19652
CANTONALES DE 1982 (5)							
RPR	UDF	Modérés	div. gau.	MRG	PS	PC	TOTAL
9944	7797	5569	1562	8791	7586	7092	48341

- (1) Les élections des circonscriptions d'Ajaccio et de Corte ont été annulées. Nous avons retenu les résultats des élections partielles du 24 mars 1963 (Ajaccio) et du 12 mai 1963 (Corte)
- (2) Même observation pour Bastia et Corte — partielles du 27 août 1967 (Corte) et du 21 avril 1968 (Bastia).
- (3) dont 822 suffrages autonomistes (Max Simeoni).
- (4) dont 481 suffrages PSU.
- (5) 29 cantons sur 52, premier tour (*Le Monde*, 16 mars 1982).

Source: Tuffelli (1982)

L législatives
P présidentielles
E européennes




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Consultations		Inscrits I	Votants V	Taux V/I	Voies par correspondance et procuration					Sources
					Correspond.	Procurat.	Total	Taux / I	Taux / V	
Législatives 67 5 mars 1967	Corse	175977	116266	66,06	25562	2259	27821	15,80	23,92	Ministère de l'intérieur et Documentation française
	Métropole	28300936	22902224	80,92	362357	57693	420050	1,48	1,83	
Législatives 68 23 juin 1968	Corse	183363	114801	62,60	21082	2058	23140	12,61	20,15	
	Métropole	28181848	22532407	79,95	338595	66498	405093	1,43	1,79	
Présidentielles 69 1er tour 2 juin 1969	Corse	181364	110947	61,17						Conseil constitutionnel JO du 20 juin 1969
	Métropole	28774041	22492059	78,16						
Présidentielles 69 2è tour 15 juin 1969	Corse	181270	108910	60,08						
	Métropole	28761494	19854087	69,03						
Législatives 73 4 mars 1973	Corse	182163	119444	65,56	21847	1690	23537	12,92	19,70	Ministère de l'intérieur et Documentation française
	Métropole	29901822	24289285	81,23	392749	75080	467829	1,56	1,92	
Présidentielles 74 1er tour 5 mai 1974	Corse	179086	121472	67,82						Conseil constitutionnel JO du 25 mai 1974
	Métropole	29778550	25285835	84,91						
Présidentielles 74 2è tour 19 mai 1974	Corse	180241	139403	77,34						
	Métropole	29774211	26166242	87,88						

Source: Tuffelli (1982)

TAUX DE PROCURATION PAR RAPPORT AUX INSCRITS

- L législatives
- P présidentielles
- E européennes



Source: Tuffelli (1982)


La région Corse (1970-1979)		
<i>Le Trafic Passagers</i> (Entrées + Sorties) :	1970	1979
	—	—
Ports	785 600	1 730 900
Aéroports	660 100	1 338 400
TOTAL	1 445 700	3 069 300
<i>Le Tourisme :</i>		
Nombre de touristes	445 000	1 150 000
<i>La Production Agricole :</i>		
Vin	1 500 000 hl	1 532 765 hl
Agrumes	7 000 t	27 200 t

La Corse en France (1978)		
	Corse	France
Avoirs en fin d'année dans les Caisses d'Épargne par habitant	4 896,7 F	7 097,4 F
Impôt sur le revenu par habitant (francs) ...	861 F	1 691 F
Véhicules automobiles pour 100 habitants ..	37	37
Téléphones pour 100 habitants	22,6	22,4

Source: Tuffelli (1982)

TAUX DE PARTICIPATION


L législatives
P présidentielles
M municipales



Source: Tuffelli (1982)

ÉVOLUTION DES INSCRITS ET DES VOTANTS


L législatives
P présidentielles
M municipales
E européennes



Source: Tuffelli (1982)


ÉVOLUTION DE LA GAUCHE 1945 - 1981

L législatives
P présidentielles



Source: Tuffelli (1982)

ÉVOLUTION GÉNÉRALE DES SUFFRAGES OBTENUS 1945 - 1981



Source: Tuffelli (1982)

APPENDIX FOUR
MISCELLANEOUS FIGURES AND DOCUMENTS




Deux départements depuis 1975


	Corse du Sud	Haute Corse
<i>Population 1975</i>	101 640 hab.	125 785 hab.
Dont :		
Population active	36 000 hab.	45 310 hab.
<i>Activités économiques :</i>		
Agriculture	5 325 hab.	10 425 hab.
Industrie	2 080 hab.	2 850 hab.
Bâtiment T.P.	7 195 hab.	7 840 hab.
Tertiaire	19 760	22 030
<i>Statistiques agricoles :</i>		
Terres labourées	2 430 ha	6 800 ha
Vignes	4 550 ha	22 000 ha
Vergers d'agrumes	335 ha	2 700 ha
Autres vergers	505 ha	1 469 ha
Châtaigneraies	9 000 ha	16 000 ha
Oliveraies	4 300 ha	6 300 ha
Horticulture et maraichage	250 ha	465 ha
<i>Organisation administrative</i>	2 arrondissements 20 cantons 124 communes	3 arrondissements 29 cantons 236 communes
Superficie	4 166 km ²	4 555 km ²

Source: Tuffelli (1982)

L' HEBERGEMENT HOTELIER ET LES VILLAGES DE VACANCES




Source: Renucci, in Pomponi et al LA CORSE (1984)



superficie en vigne

LE VIGNOBLE CORSE


Source: Renucci, in Pomponi et al LA CORSE (1984)



- superficie en agrumes

LE VERGER D AGRUMES CORSE


Source: Renucci, in Pomponi et al LA CORSE (1984)



130.

LE TRAFIC - PASSAGERS AU COURS DE L' ANNEE 1977

(Entrées et Sorties)



131.

Source: Renucci in F. Pomponi et. al. La Corse (1984)






Fig. 46. — Le dynamisme démographique de la plaine orientale 1962-1968

Sources : Registres des naissances et des décès domiciliés. INSEE Marseille.



Evaluation numérique du dépeuplement
(de l'époque du maximum à 1967)

ces : Recensements. Sondage au vingtième de l'INSEE 1963.



L'intensité du dépeuplement

Régression relative de la population depuis l'époque du maximum et jusqu'à 1962.


Evolution de la Population Insulaire.				
	Population Recensée	Population Estimée	Taux d'accroissement moyen annuel	
			Corse	France
1954	247 000	170 000	0,37 %	
1962	275 000	176 000	3,3 %	1,2 %
1968	269 000	209 000	1,1 %	0,8 %
1975	289 000	227 000		
1982		240 178	0,8 %	0,4 %

Les métamorphoses de l'économie agricole

	1962	1975
	-	-
Exploitants agricoles	11 020	6 385
Salariés agricoles	5 180	9 350
TOTAL	16 200	15 735


Source: Tuffelli (1982)

LES CIBLES DU F.L.N.C.



Source: Hermant and Bigo (1986)

ATTENTATS EN HAUTE-CORSE EN 1984 ET 1985




Répartition géographique imputation	Bastia		Calvi		Corte		Ghisonaccia		Vescovato		Total Corse		Total Police		Total Gendarmerie	
	84	85	84	85	84	85	84	85	84	85	84	85	84	85	84	85
Gendarmerie	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	6	1				
Police	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4				
Militaire ...	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	4				
Administration	3	5	3	4	2	2	3	2	0	0	11	13				
Banque	6	5	2	6	2	2	0	4	1	0	11	17				
Particulier	96	104	25	27	16	9	41	37	15	12	193	189				
Total	109	118	32	39	21	13	44	48	17	12	223	228	52	71	171	157

Source: Hermant and Bigo (1986)

Numéro	Date	Département 2A	Département 2B	Nombre attentats
NUITS BLEUES 1983				
1	09.04.83	—	—	11
2	23.05.83	—	—	60
3	01.07.83	—	—	10
4	12.07.83	—	—	12
5	14.07.83	—	—	10
6	07.09.83	—	—	10
7	07.10.83	—	—	14
8	30.11.83	—	—	21
				148
				soit 25 % du total
NUITS BLEUES 1984				
1	10.01.84	10	3	13
2	27.03.84	1	9	10
3	31.03.84	25	—	25
4	16.04.84	—	9	9
5	18.04.84	8	—	8
6	09.05.84	10	—	10
7	13.05.84	13	2	15
8	18.06.84	19	1	20
9	10.07.84	15	—	15
10	13.07.84	11	36	47
11	21.11.84	4	9	13
12	02.12.84	8	3	11
				196
				soit 40 % du total
NUITS BLEUES 1985				
1	06.05.85	25	—	25
2	10.05.85	—	21	21
3	15.05.85	—	21	21
4	01.07.85	22	25	47
				94
				soit 23 % du total
NUITS BLEUES 1986				
Néant au 12.02.1986				

Source: Hermant and Bigo (1986)



Schema of the development of radical regionalism

Source: Hermant and Bigo (1986)

MOUVEMENTS SÉPARATISTES

SIGLES	MOUVEMENTS	PÉRIODES D'ACTIVITÉS	ACTIONS
C.I.C.	Comité pour l'Indépendance de la Corse	1962	Propagande autonomiste (leader Le Bohin, arrêté pour atteinte à la sûreté de l'État).
C.L.	Corse Libre	1968	Attentats.
G.P.	Ghjiustizia Paolina	Mai 1973/fin 1975	Attentats.
F.P.C.L.	Fronte Paesanu Corsu di Libératione	Octobre 1973/ Mars 1976	Attentats.
G.S.	Ghjiustizia Sampiero	Mai/Juin 1974	2 attentats à Bastelica.
G.C.	Ghjiustizia Corsa	Novembre 1974/ Septembre 1975	2 attentats.
F.R.C.	Front Révolutionnaire Corse	Septembre 1975	2 attentats à Ghisonaccia.
C.R.C.	Commandos Révolutionnaires Corses	Septembre 1975/ Décembre 1975	Attentats.
F.L.N.C.	Front de Libération Nationale Corse	Mai 1976/	
C.S.R.	Comité de Soutien Révolutionnaire	Nov. 1975	3 attentats.
A.R.C.	Armée Révolutionnaire Corse	Décembre 1975/ Février 1976	Attentats et tracts.
A.R.C.	Action Révolutionnaire Corse	Décembre 1975/ Fin 1976	Attentats et tracts.
C.N.I.	Cumitati di Libératione Nasionale	Janvier 1976	Tracts.
G.P.C.C.	Groupe des Patriotes Communistes Corses	Janvier 1976	?
G.A.C.D.A.C.	Groupe d'action clandestine pour la Défense des Agriculteurs Corses.	Avril 1976	Attentats.
G.R.C.	Groupe Révolutionnaire Corse (issu de la Ligue Communiste)	Juillet 1976	?
F.R.	Fronte Corsu pour les intérêts du plan routier de la Corse	Juillet 1976	Menaces écrites.
F.R.B.	Front Révolution Bonifacien	Septembre 1976	?
C.A.C.F.	Comité Anti-Corse Français	Septembre 1976	?
O.F.R.A.	Organisation des Forces Révolutionnaires Actives	Octobre 1976	Attentats.
A.L.C.	Armée de Libération Corses	Mars 1977	?
M.P.L.C.	Muvimentu per a Libératione di a Corsica	Mars 1978	?
M.I.L.C.	Muvimentu per l'indipendenza e a libératione di a Corsica	Avril 1978	?
V.L.D.C.	A Voci Libéra Di a Corsica (La voix libre de la Corse)	Septembre 1978	Emission radio pirate.
B.R.C.	Brigades Révolutionnaires Corses	Janvier 1983/	Attentats.
A.L.N.C.	Armée de Libération Nationale Corse	Juillet 1983/	Attentats.

MOUVEMENTS ANTI-SÉPARATISTES

SIGLE	MOUVEMENTS	PÉRIODES D'ACTIVITÉS	ACTIONS
P.F.	Présence Française (ou Action Française)	Existait déjà avant-guerre. Se manifeste encore de temps en temps	Tracts et lettres.
C.D.L.C.	Comité de Défense du Littoral Cargésien	Juin 1975	Communiqué de presse.
G.L.	Ghjiustizia e Liberta	Septembre 1975/ Juillet 1976	Attentats.
F.B.A.I.	Front de Balagne Anti-Italiens devient	Octobre 1975	
F.C.A.I.	Front Corse Anti-Italiens	Novembre 1975/ Juillet 1976	Attentats
G.F.C.	Ghjiustizia Francésa e Corsa	Novembre 1975	1 attentat à Picanale.
G.M.	Ghjiustizia Morandina	Novembre 1975	Incendie bungalow et tracts.
L.A.I.	Ligue Anti-Italienne	Janvier 1976	1 attentat.
S.C.	Sampiero Corsu	Janvier 1976	Attentats.
O.A.S.	O.A.S. Corse	Janvier 1976	?
A.P.N.	Action Pied Noir	Septembre 1976	?
F.C.L.	France-Corse Libre	Oct.-Nov 1976	1 attentat.
C.C.V.	Comité Corse pour la Vérité	Janvier 1977	?
A.C.V.	Action pour la Corse Française	Février 1977	Attentats
FRANCIA.	Front d'Action Nouvelle contre l'Indépendance et l'Autonomie	Avril 1977/ Janvier 1981	Attentats
P.M.	La Paix ou la Mort	Septembre 1978	Affichettes.

Source: Hermant and Bigo (1986)

La Population urbaine			
	Nombre	% du total	Ajaccio + Bastia
1891	55 000	20 %	37 000
1954	70 - 75 000	42 %	54 000
1962	75 - 80 000	48 %	60 000
1968	100 - 105 000	50 %	80 - 85 000
1975	120 - 130 000	56 %	100 000
1982	120 - 130 000	54 %	100 000

Les Secteurs d'Activité (%)				
	1962		1975	
	Corse	France	Corse	France
Primaire.....	32,7	20,6	20,6	9,5
Secondaire.....	21,5	38,7	25,5	39,2
Tertiaire.....	45,7	40,7	53,9	51,3

Source: Tuffelli (1982)

Evolution de la Structure par Ages (%)			
Ages	1962	1968	1975
0 - 19 ans	27,7 %	27,5	24,5
20 - 39 ans	25 %	26,6	28,6
40 - 59 ans	24,9 %	23,8	23,8
+ 60 ans	22,4 %	22,1	22,6

Evolution de la Population active			
Actifs	1962	1968	1975
Hommes	41 600	51 520	64 300
Dont étrangers	3 680	10 760	21 520
Femmes	9 500	11 860	17 010
Ensemble	51 100	63 380	81 310

L'Evolution de l'Emploi				
Activités Economiques	1962	1968	1975	Evolution 62-75 %
Agriculture	16 500	15 740	15 750	- 5
Industrie	4 320	4 140	4 930	+ 14
Bâtiment				
Travaux Publics ...	6 560	11 380	15 035	+ 129
Tertiaire	23 060	30 800	41 790	+ 81

Source: Tuffelli (1982)

7. Sondage « Nouvel Observateur-S.O.F.R.E.S. réalisé entre les 28 et 30 août 1975 en Corse

Les événements d'Algérie vous ont-ils surpris ou bien, au contraire, est-ce que vous vous attendiez à une explosion de mécontentement en Corse ?

- Les événements d'Algérie m'ont surpris ..	37 %
- Je m'attendais à une explosion de mécontentement	59 %
- Sans opinion	4 %
	<hr/> 100 %

Pensez-vous que l'action des autonomistes de l'A.R.C. à Algérie était, au départ, justifiée ou pas justifiée ?

- Justifiée	62 %
- Pas justifiée	21 %
- Sans opinion	17 %
	<hr/> 100 %

Rendez-vous les Pieds Noirs responsables du mécontentement des agriculteurs corses ?

- Entièrement	11 %
- En partie	49 %
- Pas du tout	29 %
- Ne sait pas	11 %
	<hr/> 100 %

Deux gendarmes ont été tués à Algérie. A votre avis, qui en porte principalement la responsabilité ?

— Les autonomistes de l'A.R.C. parce qu'ils ont ouvert le feu précipitamment	20 %
— Le gouvernement français parce qu'il a refusé de négocier avec les insurgés	60 %
— Sans opinion	20 %
	100 %

Pensez-vous que d'autres événements, comme ceux d'Algérie et de Bastia, risquent de se reproduire en Corse dans les semaines ou les mois qui viennent ?

— Oui	53 %
— Non	28 %
— Ne sait pas	19 %
	100 %

Définissez-vous l'A.R.C. comme...

— ... un mouvement de droite de type nationaliste	17 %
— ... un mouvement sans idéologie politique	40 %
— ... un mouvement socialiste	14 %
— Ne sait pas	29 %
	100 %

Plus généralement, avez-vous de la sympathie ou aucune sympathie pour le mouvement de l'A.R.C. ?

— De la sympathie	52 %
— Aucune sympathie	31 %
— Sans opinion	17 %
	100 %

Estimez-vous que ce que fait l'A.R.C. est bon ou mauvais pour la Corse ?

— Bon	52 %
— Mauvais	30 %
— Sans opinion	18 %
	100 %

Si la gauche était au pouvoir, à votre avis, est-ce que les problèmes de la Corse seraient mieux ou moins bien résolus qu'à l'heure actuelle ?

— Mieux résolus	23 %
— Moins bien résolus	20 %
— Ni mieux ni moins bien résolus	32 %
— Ne sait pas	25 %
	100 %

En définitive, pour la Corse, êtes-vous partisan...

— du statut actuel, la Corse étant une région comme les autres régions françaises	55 %
— d'un statut d'autonomie dans le cadre de la République française	38 %
— de l'indépendance totale, la Corse devenant un Etat souverain	3 %
— Sans opinion	4 %
	100 %

M A N I F E S T E

Le Peuple Corse, lui aussi, a droit à la parole.
Au nom de toutes les générations du passé, qui firent la tradition nationale de la CORSE, nous parlons pour notre Patrie.

Nous disons le danger, qu'on ne saurait taire, et l'espoir qu'on ne saurait perdre.

Nous déclarons que le Peuple Corse a reçu de la Nature et de l'Histoire, le droit inaliénable d'être maître de son destin et de son sol : l'île de CORSE.

Ce droit qui est le nôtre demeure intact, alors même que de longue date une nation étrangère se l'est arrogé.

Bien que vaincue et soumise, la nation Corse, qui trouva avec Pasquale PAOLI son accomplissement et sa gloire, existe encore aujourd'hui. Elle ne peut disparaître que par la destruction de son peuple.

C'est de cela précisément qu'il s'agit aujourd'hui.

NOUS ACCUSONS l'impérialisme français de tenter de détruire le peuple corse, en le chassant de chez lui par des moyens détournés, afin d'en faire une population dispersée de quémandeurs.

NOUS APPELONS tous les patriotes corses à se rassembler, dans une Union de la Patrie, afin de conjurer cette menace.

L'heure est venue d'en finir avec deux siècles de colonialisme et de prétendue assimilation, qui font obstacle à tout progrès politique, économique, social et culturel en CORSE.

L'heure est venue de prendre en mains nous-mêmes nos moyens de production et d'échanges, afin de parvenir au plein épanouissement de nos possibilités humaines dans le cadre de notre milieu naturel, ce qui signifie d'abord pouvoir gagner sa vie, s'éduquer dans notre pays.

L'heure est venue de faire la CORSE nôtre, la CORSE, corse.

Nous disons au peuple français qu'il est pour nous un peuple frère, en dépit des deux siècles de domination que nous ont imposés ses gouvernants. Il a acquis sa plus grande renommée dans le monde par son immortelle DECLARATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME.

Il a établi dans son Droit public les principes fondamentaux du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes.

Nous entendons simplement faire application de ces principes au Peuple Corse.

Nous engageons aujourd'hui une action légale, conforme aux dispositions de la Constitution française, pour assumer L'AUTONOMIE INTERNE.

Celle-ci nous donnera la possibilité de retrouver, dans la nation corse, notre identité culturelle, notre dignité et les moyens de notre renaissance économique, d'établir une véritable démocratie politique, de favoriser l'amélioration du sort des travailleurs, et le retour sur la terre corse de ses enfants expatriés.

Alors seulement pourra s'épanouir la société harmonieuse à laquelle nous aussi sommes en droit de prétendre.

Source: Dottelonde (1983-4)



Le PROBLEME CORSE

LE LIVRE BLANC EDITE PAR LE C.C.I.

LA CORSE

SON PASSÉ = SON AVENIR

LA CORSE fut longtemps le grenier de ROME et, à cette époque, a-t-on écrit, une ère de prospérité inouïe assagit tout à fait les insulaires, chez lesquels auparavant les révoltes naissaient comme des têtes de l'hydre.

L'île complètement exploitée nourrissait sa population et l'abondance et la variété de ses produits faisait les délices des Romains.

Mais la convoitise de ses voisins lui imposa une lutte implacable pour recouvrer son indépendance.

Cette lutte séculaire ne cessa qu'avec l'épopée napoléonienne, car, si curieux que cela paraisse, les corses, à cette époque, n'eurent pas l'impression d'avoir été conquis par la France, mais plutôt d'avoir conquis ce pays, ce qui leur permettait de voir plus grand et de se sentir chez eux, même au delà de leurs frontières.

C'est faux ton pays a été rendu pauvre voilà tout, car la France avait besoin de chair à canons pour ses théâtres extérieurs et encourageait aux dépens tous les comploteurs.

Aussi voyon-nous maintenant cette île si peuv e convoitée et exploitée par un ramassis d'aventuriers, pendant que ses enfants en sont réduits à lutter pour obtenir de maigres pensions qu'ils ont gagnées en consacrant leur jeunesse au service « de ce qu'on essaye de lui faire appeler la mère patrie ».

En parlant d'aventuriers, il ne faut pas inclure ces « Pieds Noirs » qui se sont repliés chez nous, victimes comme tous des mensonges du Pouvoir, car ceun-là sont nos frères dans le malheur et leur place est à nos côtés.

Corse, nous nous ferons un devoir de te prouver que ton île regorge de richesses, de te prouver que ton île est autre chose qu'un puits de char à canons et qu'elle est et doit rester ton orgueil, ta raison de vivre.

PREFACE

Ce livre blanc s'efforce de présenter le problème «CORSE» dans ses grandes lignes, non seulement pour alerter l'opinion corse mais encore l'opinion mondiale.

Il s'efforce, également d'envisager les solutions inhérentes à ce problème, d'en dégager la meilleure.

Il répondra à la campagne de calomnies répandues par le Gouvernement français qui veut que la Corse soit un département de mendicants et d'incapables.

Il essaye de donner à nouveau aux Corses, confiance dans l'avenir de cette île qu'ils aiment tant, en leur faisant comprendre qu'ils sont à un tournant de leur histoire, et qu'il n'y a plus place, pour eux, à des demi-mesures ou à des compromis et que, s'acharner à rester pendu aux branches d'un pays qui sombre dans la décadence équivaudrait à un suicide.

Oùla — Ce livre sera suivi d'une série de conférences.

Après l'Empire vint l'épreuve coloniale, dans laquelle le Corse se lança avec toute sa fougue, ce qui fit dire au grand colonial que fut le Maréchal «YAUTEY : « Sans les Corses la France n'aurait pas d'Empire. »

Que reste-t-il de tout cela ?

Lequel parmi les Corses, quelques soient ses opinions politiques n'a pas ressenti, en voyant s'écrouler en quelques années une œuvre à laquelle il avait tant contribué et qui faisait l'admiration du monde entier, un pincement au cœur aggravé par la constatation que cet effondrement était l'œuvre de l'homme du 18 juin 1940, l'homme auquel il avait accordé sa confiance et sacrifié tant de ses fils.

Peuple corse, tu es fier, aussi essayes-tu de cacher les peines, tes appréhensions, mais tu es meurtri et tu es amené à penser avec angoisse à l'avenir de tes fils dans cette France où le mensonge est roi, cette France qui voit les meilleurs de ses enfants embastillés ou fusillés, parce qu'ils n'ont pas voulu trahir leur serment.

En un mot tu songes à l'Indépendance, mais tu songes à ses conséquences possibles - (on s'est efforcé, depuis toujours, à te faire croire que ton pays était trop pauvre pour se suffire à lui-même.)

L'AUTONOMIE

Au dernier « conseil » des corses qui a tenu ses assises à CORTE, il a été distribué une intéressante brochure traitant de l'autonomie interne ce qui constitue un grand pas en avant dans la prise de conscience à la situation désastreuse de l'île et de ses habitants.

Mais hélas, si l'idée est tentante si elle est même séduisante, dans la pratique elle est, malheureusement, irréalisable.

La raison est bien simple - car le Gouvernement français fort des résultats d'un référendum qui constitue au plus, si moins une escroquerie (« oubliions pas qu'il était surtout constitué de oui « non » et oui « mais ») refusera à la Corse, ce qu'il ne peut pas, sous peine de suicide, accorder à la Bretagne, aux Pays Basques etc.

Par ailleurs en admettant que la Corse seule bénéficie de cette mesure, qu'advient-il ?

Une lettre de Lourdes de la part de ceux qui ont intérêt à ce que ce ne soit pas elle, un pays charmant certes, auquel on distribue les titres les plus flatteurs, mais un pays soumis aux lois de la

République française, qui lui interdira tout développement susceptible de porter atteinte aux profits scandaleux que la « Finance » internationale tire de la Côte d'Azur en particulier et d'autres lieux en général, sous la rubrique « Tourisme ».

Et puis, à quoi bon le cacher, l'autonomie conduit tôt ou tard à l'indépendance et il nous paraît impensable de prévoir deux révolutions, alors qu'une seule suffit pour mettre fin à nos maux.

L'INDÉPENDANCE.

Certains esprits chagrins ont trop tendance à considérer que l'indépendance conduit à l'anarchie, en étayant leur jugement sur le précédent des peuples admis récemment à ce stade.

Or, ce qui est vrai pour certains pays, ne l'est pas pour la Corse, qui disposera, quoiqu'il arrive - et à tous les échelons, de cadres administratifs très appréciés et très recherchés.

D'une Magistrature ayant fait la preuve de sa compétence, sa droiture et sa haute valeur juridique ;

D'un Corps Enseignant à la hauteur de sa tâche et qui ne demande qu'à en faire davantage si on lui en donne les moyens ;

D'un Corps Médical dévoué et éminent ;

De Force de l'Ordre, tant police, gendarmerie et armée, ayant donné sous tous les cieux la preuve de leur courage, de leur compétence et de leur sang-froid ;

D'Hommes d'Affaires dynamiques, qui sont hélas trop souvent freinés, faute de moyens financiers et toujours en bute à une fiscalité écrasante et inadaptée à la Corse ;

Et enfin, Hommes Politiques et Légistes de valeur ne nous manquent pas. Ils ne peuvent souvent, hélas, donner la preuve de leur attachement à la Corse.

Débarassés de ce carcan qu'est pour eux un Gouvernement centralisé à l'extrême, qui de Paris décide de notre sort, sans se soucier de nos aspirations légitimes et de nos protestations, ces hommes politiques pourront, sans aucun doute, administrer la preuve de leur valeur et de leur attachement à la Corse.

Aussi leur demandons-nous d'ouvrir les yeux et d'aban-

donner leurs idées préconçues, d'oublier leurs querelles partiales pour se joindre à tous et œuvrer, libres de toutes contraintes, au bonheur de notre Patrie commune.

Les moyens financiers Les possibilités de travail

La nécessité d'une zone neutre et franche en Méditerranée n'échappe à personne et la Corse, à cet égard, constitue une zone idéale d'abord de par sa situation géographique, ensuite par ses possibilités qui lui permettraient d'offrir non seulement des abris naturels faciles à aménager, mais encore de vastes entrepôts de distribution dans tout le bassin méditerranéen.

Aussi, un système bancaire copié sur la Suisse fixerait, indubitablement de gros capitaux dans l'île, ce qui constituerait non seulement une source de revenus pour le futur Etat, mais encore une source de richesse pour le monde du Travail.

Autres possibilités qui auraient une influence bénéfique sur

l'économie du Pays :

a — les nombreuses sociétés privées de navigation seraient heureuses de disposer au cœur de la Méditerranée d'un pavillon, de ports, d'entrepôts, d'équipages nombreux et compétents.

Conséquences bénéfiques : aménagements de ports et de cales sèches, donc emploi massif de la main d'œuvre locale à tous les échelons et surtout perspectives de travail en permanence pour nos marins qui actuellement sillonnent les mers sous pavillon français et qui risquent, avec la disparition de l'Empire, voir leurs navires désarmés à tous instants.

De plus, la position de l'île lui permettra d'envisager une plaque tournante en faveur des compagnies aériennes, assortie de tarifs raisonnables, ce qui constituerait une nouvelle fois une source de profits pour le monde du travail.

Que dire des profits possibles et qui, comme ceux qui ont déjà été énumérés, élèveraient le niveau de vie de tous.

b — Stations télé radio commerciales, qui couvriraient tout le bassin méditerranéen sans relais (France, Italie, Espagne,

Afrique du Nord, etc.) ;

c. — Pêches industrialisées ;

d. — Cimenteries qui permettraient de fabriquer sur place le fibrociment à un prix raisonnable, grâce à l'amiante du Cap, expédié actuellement dans le Nord de la France et qui nous revient à des prix tellement forts que la construction en Corse n'arrive pas à décoller

e. — L'agriculture, l'exploitation des forêts, l'arboriculture, les conserveries qui permettraient d'encourager les plantations d'arbres fruitiers etc...

Il serait vain d'essayer d'énumérer à l'avance toutes les possibilités de l'île. Elles sont immenses et de par leur variété constituent un ensemble qui permettra à tout le monde de trouver sa place.

Les capitaux ? Il n'en manque pas qui cherchent à se manifester sur un terrain neutre, sûr, où le fisc ne serait pas trop exigeant, dans un pays où, réellement libre dans ses mouvements, en bref, un pays qui, comme Monaco, n'est pas et ne

pourra être menacé d'étouffement, car sa position de neutre et sa position géographique la mettront définitivement à l'abri de voisins trop exigeants.

Ainsi verrons-nous dans ce monde tourmenté la Corse devenir un pays neutre, heureux, ne servant pas de terrain d'expériences de bombes A ou H et autres engins de mort.

Nous verrons également une île où tous les pays francophones, récemment admis à l'indépendance, mais dépourvus de cadres, puiseront, pour essayer de pouvoir mener à bien l'œuvre à laquelle ils se sont attelés.

Le C.C.I. n'est pas un parti politique, c'est à dire un parti comme l'entendent certains politiciens verveux : il est la CORSE de DEMAIN.

CORSES UNISSEZ-VOUS !

votre salut est à ce prix !

C.C.I.



AU PROBLEME CORSE UNE SOLUTION CORSE

MANIFESTE SUR L'AUTONOMIE INTERNE

Par Monsieur PAUL MARC SETA,

*Diplômé des sciences politiques, délégué à la consulte du 19 Août 1962
par l'Association des Corses du XIII^e Arrondissement de Paris,
et par l'Informateur Corse.*

et Monsieur Yves LE BOMIN,

*Entrepreneur B. T. P., Secrétaire général de la Commission d'Etudes
et de Défense, délégué à la consulte par la Fédération régionale
des Entrepreneurs du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics.*

LE SYSTEME : « Bon gré mal gré, la France entre dans cette ère des
féderations annoncée trois siècles par Prémillon ».

J.-F. GRAVIER « Paris et le Désert Français ».

LES RAISONS D'UN ECHEC.

Il est indéniable que chaque année l'Union des Corses de l'Île et
des Corses de l'extérieur devient une réalité.

La tenue de cette consulte nous en offre une nouvelle preuve.

Mais, il est aussi incontestable que les résultats obtenus jusqu'à
présent sont loin d'être à la mesure de nos ambitions. Reconnaissons même
franchement que les pressions exercées sur les Pouvoirs Publics demeurent
largement inspirantes, voire nulles.

Le moment est venu de nous demander quelles sont les raisons pro-
fondes de notre échec.

Tout d'abord, constatons que nos efforts paraissent limités à obtenir
des exemptions fiscales dont il est plus que douteux qu'elles puissent à
elles seules relancer l'économie Corse, en admettant dans la meilleure
hypothèse que de telles exemptions profitent aux seuls insulaires. Et puis,
croisons-nous vraiment intéresser l'opinion locale, à fortiori l'opinion métro-
politaine, par l'exposé des Arrêtés MORT ou encore par la publication de
nos procès devant les Tribunaux. Notre naïveté se lie aux solutions du
Droit et de la Jurisprudence, mais quelle est leur portée si l'Administration
les refuse, et puisque le Pouvoir les ignore. Les problèmes de Droit pur
ne passionneront jamais les foules.

Par ailleurs, l'Administration déjà extrêmement centralisée n'envisage
que des solutions d'ensemble applicables à toutes les parties du terri-
toire national. Les cas d'exception lui répugnent — Elle craint la contagion
de l'exemple — La conception qu'elle se fait de ses rapports avec ses
« sujets » réduit notre Département à un état de mendicité aussi intégrale
qu'humiliant. Une telle constatation nous conduit à envisager une Doctrine

qui, aussi bien dans le cadre de la *Légalité* que dans le cadre *National*,
peut résoudre le problème particulier que pose notre Île.

De plus notre organisation se révèle largement imparfaite sinon même
défectueuse. La multiplicité des mouvements empêche une coordination
parfaite des revendications et des moyens d'action. En outre, l'intervalle
excessif qui sépare les « Consultes » des « Tables rondes », et la division
de convocation, de la session et le même, diminuer considérablement l'effi-
cience de la riposte.

De façon générale, la médiocrité de nos résultats s'explique par le
défaut de doctrine, la mesquinerie de notre programme, le manque de chef
et l'absence de coordination.

Ainsi nous trouvons-nous devant deux séries de problèmes à résoudre :

— LA FORMULATION D'UNE DOCTRINE ABOUTISSANT A
L'ETARGISSEMENT DE NOS REVENDICATIONS :

L'AUTONOMIE INTERNE

— LA MISE AU POINT D'UNE MEILLEURE ORGANISATION

LA DOCTRINE.

Il est désormais certain que le relèvement de l'Île ne peut pas s'effec-
tuer dans les conditions actuelles de tutelle administrative que nous subissons
et dans le climat de défiance que nous connaissons.

Le pseudo-plan dont l'Île bénéficie « en principe » semble par cer-
tains côtés s'apparenter beaucoup plus à une tentative de spoliation ou de
colonisation qu'à une œuvre de redressement économique et social. Cette

Source: Dottelonde (1983-4)

le fait qu'il est mis en application par des technocrates d'importation, un tel plan laisse en dehors la plus grande partie de l'espace insulaire et donc la plus peuplée. Ainsi la population a-t-elle le sentiment d'être tenue délibérément en dehors du plan. De ce sentiment de frustration et d'impul-sion pourraient découler dans l'avenir des conséquences extrêmes que nous désirons éviter.

Ainsi apparaît-il indispensable, dès à présent, de définir une doctrine qui doit assurer aux insulaires le bénéfice exclusif du plan de rénovation en leur donnant les moyens LÉGAUX de le réaliser PAR EUX-MÊMES ET DONC POUR EUX-MÊMES.

En Corse, plus qu'ailleurs, le succès de toute entreprise réclame l'appui et l'intéressement de l'opinion locale. Or nous savons tous tel que la structure centralisatrice et despotique de nos institutions administratives, économiques et financières a provoqué la ruine de l'économie insulaire, déterminé l'émigration de la jeunesse Corse, favorisé la spéculation de groupes d'intérêts, facilité l'arbitraire de l'administration et la violation par celle-ci des règles de droit et des décisions de justice, sans qu'aucune sanction s'ensuive. Nous savons aussi que la haute administration n'est qu'une machine outil, de préférence au service des puissances financières.

L'enrichissement de quelques « fureteurs » précède la ruine des insulaires, le centralisme à cet égard n'étant que le paravent commode d'activités clandestines. Dans tous les domaines, l'assimilation pure et simple de l'Ile aux départements métropolitains apparaît comme la source constante de nos déboires. L'adoption de quelques misérables amendements, qui nous sont d'ailleurs accordés à contre-cœur, ne modifiera en rien cet état de fait.

Par conséquent, partant du principe que le caractère arriéré, multi-faillant et outrancier de notre centralisme administratif est demeuré de tous temps la cause première de nos maux, nous proposons comme remède la

Dans cette optique, l'autonomie n'est nullement un problème politique mais un problème d'ordre purement administratif. Les partisans du centralisme déforment plus ou moins sciemment la signification de l'autonomie en lui donnant une portée politique à laquelle nous refusons de souscrire.

Le pouvoir législatif dévolu par l'assemblée régionale ne porte que sur les matières prévues par le statut octroyé constitutionnellement par l'Etat. En outre, le représentant du gouvernement possède un droit de contrôle sur les décisions prises sur le plan régional.

Quant à l'administration régionale, elle est recrutée et appointée par l'exécutif régional duquel elle dépend. Cette administration régionale n'existe parfaitement avec une administration d'Etat, chacune ayant une compétence déterminée.

Cette conception administrative ne correspond pas à une utopie ou à un schéma révolutionnaire, mais à un mode de gouvernement répandu dans la majorité des pays aussi bien européens qu'américains. En réalité le système Français demeure une exception, peu brillante du reste, entre-tenu et cultivé avec un soin tout particulier par les maniaques du centralisme qui se succèdent quel que soient les régimes.

Pourtant ce sont bien les potentialités du centralisme qui n'ont pas su adapter leurs méthodes de gouvernement à l'évolution du monde moderne et qui sont à l'origine de tant de désastres encore trop récents pour être oubliés.

LE CENTRALISME SURVIT MAIS LA CORSE SE MEURT.

Mais il n'est pas inutile que désormais quelques voix prêtent la reforme de nos institutions administratives. A cet effet, soulignons que le Titre XI de la Constitution de la République Française prévoit qu'en raison de leur situation particulière, les Départements d'outre-mer peuvent

— L'autonomie administrative permettra à nombre de fonctionnaires Corses de faire carrière sur place.

— L'autonomie financière autorisera toutes sortes d'emprunts destinés à créer l'infrastructure économique qui nous fait défaut et d'effectuer les grands travaux d'intérêt public.

— L'autonomie fiscale sera le moyen de développer et de protéger les activités déjà existantes tout en encourageant la création de nouvelles entreprises soigneusement orientées.

Ainsi le relèvement de l'économie insulaire, ébranlé par près de deux siècles de despotisme centralisateur et ruinée par la concurrence conjugée de la métropole et de l'Afrique du Nord, est-il obligatoirement lié à l'octroi préliminaire de l'AUTONOMIE INTERNE.

L'ORGANISATION.

Mais il n'est pas douteux qu'au départ une telle doctrine heurtera à la fois les tenants du système de domination administrative ainsi que certains groupes d'intérêts particuliers dissimulés sous l'apparence de l'intérêt général, les uns comme les autres déformant notre doctrine ou essayant de se l'approprier pour mieux la détruire.

Par conséquent, il ne faut pas nous attendre à un succès immédiat. Au contraire, une phase transitoire apparaît nécessaire, au cours de laquelle, de la valeur de notre organisation dépendra le succès de nos revendications.

Au travers de ses manifestations empiriques, sporadiques et désordonnées, l'organisation actuelle semble, au regard des pouvoirs publics,

doctrine de l'AUTONOMIE INTERNE. Cette doctrine, loin d'être un mythe, s'inscrit dans la réalité des règles constitutionnelles de la plupart des pays démocratiques.

L'AUTONOMIE INTERNE.

NOUS NE REDIRONS JAMAIS ASSEZ QUE L'AUTONOMIE INTERNE N'EST PAS

- UNE DOCTRINE SEPARATISTE
- UNE DOCTRINE POLITIQUE
- UNE DOCTRINE D'OPPOSITION

MAIS QUELLE EST

- UNE DOCTRINE FEDERALISTE
- UNE DOCTRINE ADMINISTRATIVE
- UNE DOCTRINE ECONOMIQUE

L'autonomie interne se présente comme un système de gestion administrative grâce auquel les pouvoirs de la région, octroyés par l'Etat, sont suffisamment étendus et donc efficaces pour permettre le développement prioritaire du patrimoine régional.

Finalement l'autonomie interne n'est qu'une décentralisation poussée permettant et facilitant dans le cadre national l'existence des libertés régionales et assurant la pleine efficacité des décisions prises sur le plan local, grâce au système d'assemblées territoriales élues et d'un exécutif régional responsable.

faire l'objet de mesures d'adaptation de leur régime législatif et de leur organisation administrative. De plus, selon le Journal Officiel du 11 Août 1959, sont délégués comme départements d'outre-mer :

« CEUX GEOGRAPHIQUEMENT SITUÉS OUTRE-MER PAR RAPPORT A LA METROPOLE ».

Ce même titre de la constitution prévoit, qu'outre les départements de la métropole, ceux d'outre-mer et les cinq territoires AUTONOMES déjà existants, d'autres catégories de territoires peuvent être créées par la loi.

Nous demandons en conséquence :

- qu'une loi définisse l'Ile de Corse en tant que région autonome et lui reconnaisse un statut administratif, économique et fiscal particulier dans le cadre de la République Française une et indivisible.
- que le Conseil Général de la Corse soit érigé en assemblée territoriale, celle-ci détenant un pouvoir législatif sur les matières déléguées par le statut légal et désignant un exécutif responsable duquel dépendra l'administration régionale.
- que la population de l'Ile soit réellement associée par l'intermédiaire de ses représentants élus à l'assemblée territoriale et de ses organisations professionnelles groupées au sein d'une assemblée économique régionale, au vote du plan de développement et de redressement.

Ainsi, disposant sur place des outils de mission et de gestion administrative et détenant la responsabilité de tout ce qui concerne les intérêts locaux, les Corses seront effectivement les artisans et les bénéficiaires du relèvement de leur pays, tout en laissant à la métropole le soin de régler les problèmes d'intérêt national.

L'autonomie interne s'avère plus que possible en Corse qui, bien qu'économiquement sous-développée, possède en revanche une élite nombreuse et instruite dans tous les domaines.

être demeurée au stade de l'adolescence, ce qui explique la maigre somme dont on a voulu hypocritement nous gratifier, pensant qu'elle suffirait à calmer notre turbulence juvénile.

Les procédés employés jusqu'à ce jour, s'ils étaient spectaculaires, ne l'étaient que pour nous seuls.

En conséquence, nous devons envisager la reforme de l'organisation existante de façon à accroître sa représentativité, renforcer sa cohésion et porter son efficacité. Pour atteindre ce but, il est nécessaire de créer une organisation telle que, concentrant les forces vives des Corses de l'Ile et de l'extérieur, quelle que soit leur appartenance politique ou syndicale, elle permette une réponse immédiate, en même temps qu'elle remplisse l'office d'organisme d'études, de liaison et d'information.

Durant la période transitoire nous devons aller à la FORCE D'EXPRESSION qui émane de notre doctrine, LA FORCE DE PRESSION qui se dégage nécessairement d'une organisation structurée.

De toute façon à la doctrine évoluée de l'AUTONOMIE INTERNE doit correspondre une ORGANISATION FONCTIONNELLE dotée de moyens d'information et d'expression renoués.

Nous faisons nôtre la conclusion de M. J.-F. Gravier « Avant qu'il ne soit trop tard, une nouvelle nuit du 4 Août doit sacrifier un siècle et demi de privilèges parisiens et d'aberration centralisatrice ».

